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Abstract 
This thesis conducts a cross-national analysis of perceived electoral fairness across 80 
countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas.  The main research question is 
focused on uncovering the determinants of perceived electoral fairness.  The thesis 
analyses two broad groups of variables, with the chapter structures following from this 
distinction.  The first set of variables arises from a meta-analysis of previous studies to 
ascertain the strongest determinants of electoral fairness.  This entails testing as many 
individual and national level variables as possible across as many countries as possible 
to reveal any global trends or regional differences.  The second set of variables arise 
from two theoretical models of electoral management body (EMB) design, both of 
which focus on evaluating the merits of EMB independence or autonomy from the 
ruling government.  Once again, the approach is to examine as many electoral 
management design variables as possible across as many regions as possible.  Results 
unexpectedly indicate frequent negative associations between EMB independence and 
perceived electoral fairness.  The thesis considers different possibilities for these 
unexpected negative results, with the most probable cause being the many 
independent EMBs in authoritarian democracies included in this study.  The thesis uses 
multivariate ordered probit and multilevel mixed-effects regression models to conduct 
analyses at the national, regional, and global levels.  Public survey data comes from the 
AfroBarometer, ArabBarometer, AmericasBarometer, AsianBarometer, and 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.  National level indicators come from the 
Quality of Government, Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Electoral 
Knowledge Network, and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA). 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This thesis analyses why public perceptions of electoral fairness differ between 
individuals across a wide selection of countries.  It examines a wide range of 
psychological, political, economic and other factors that could affect public 
perceptions.  Special attention is placed on the electoral commissions, courts, and 
government departments running elections.  These electoral management bodies 
(EMBs) play a substantial role in determining how free and fair elections are perceived.  
Ask two people in the same country about the fairness of the most recent national 
election and you often get two very different answers.  One may think it was 
completely free and fair, while the other may think it was not at all free or fair.  They 
are talking about the same election and answering the same survey question, but 
differing attitudes arise in almost every democracy after almost every election.  One 
could argue that the objective fairness of elections matters more than subjective 
attitudes, but aggregated public perceptions closely parallel expert assessments of 
electoral fairness or integrity (Norris, Frank, & Martinez i Coma, 2013: 133; Rosas, 
2010: 76).  It is arguably more important to understand variation between individual 
perceptions, since disgruntled members of the public, most of who are not experts, are 
the people who demonstrate, protest, and even riot following a questionable election.  
In extreme cases, this can lead to violent regime change (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 
2013).  Elections perceived as unfair by large numbers of citizens are thus potential 
triggers for political instability.  Perceptions of electoral fairness are especially relevant 
in transitional democracies, where individuals may lose confidence in democratic 
governance if elections are perceived as pervasively fraudulent or corrupt.   
The broad objective of this research is to understand what general features of 
individuals and electoral management bodies influence perceptions of electoral 
fairness.  While a great deal of literature analyses electoral fairness and case studies of 
electoral misconduct (Albaugh, 2011; Alston & Gallo, 2010; Birch, 2007; Bratton, 2008; 
Callahan, 2005; Goodwin-Gill, 2006; Lehoucq & Molina, 2002; Ziblatt, 2009), relatively 
few empirical cross-national studies focus on the general features included in this 
thesis (Birch, 2010; Farrell & McAllister, 2006; Lindberg, 2005; Norris, 2013a) or on the 
bodies running elections (Birch, 2008; Elklit & Reynolds, 2005b; Hartlyn, McCoy, & 
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Mustillo, 2008; Rosas, 2010).  Determinants of perceived electoral fairness include 
individual level factors, which come from public surveys, and national level indicators, 
which describe country conditions and how EMBs are designed.  Some of the strongest 
individual level findings suggest partisanship and participation play an important role.  
For example, people who support winners of the most recent elections tend to make 
more positive assessments of electoral fairness than those who support losing parties 
or candidates (Birch, 2008; Craig, Martinez, Jason, & Kane, 2006; Moehler, 2009).  In 
addition, simply voting in an election, regardless of for which party or candidate, is 
associated with more positive attitudes (McAllister & White, 2011: 676-677), but those 
who voted for winners obviously express greater levels of satisfaction (Nadeau & Blais, 
1993: 562).  The current study confirms these relationships, finding that both voting 
for and identifying with election winners are strong predictors of perceived electoral 
fairness, and that this relationship holds whether supporting winning coalitions or 
majorities.  It also confirms that people who express no political affiliations or do not 
participate in elections tend to have negative attitudes towards electoral fairness.  
Examples of previous national level findings are that better-established political rights 
and electoral systems using proportional representation are associated with increased 
perceptions of electoral fairness (Birch, 2007; 2008: 312-313; Farrell & McAllister, 
2006: 739-740).  Proportional systems are better at achieving representation, 
especially for minorities and election losers because they produce more inclusive 
elections outcomes (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Lijphart, 1984, 1999; Lindberg, 2005: 
61-62), while political rights include freedoms that facilitate electoral participation, 
such as those for association, assembly and petition.  The current research supports 
the positive relationship for proportional representation systems, but found that civil 
liberties, such as freedoms of expression and movement, are more important that 
political rights.  This thesis examines many more factors, indictors and EMB design 
elements to see which determine perceptions of electoral fairness. 
Many proposed determinants included in this thesis either have only been researched 
across a limited selection of countries, or have not yet been examined with 
perceptions of electoral fairness.  Most studies cover one or a few countries, a single 
region or use only one dataset.  For example, McAllister and White (2011) examine 
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perceived electoral fairness in Russia, Rosas (2010) analyses electoral trust in Latin 
America, while Birch (2008) looks at perceptions of the electoral process using the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset, which is dominated by 
European countries.  This thesis extends this work by taking a broader approach using 
five datasets to examine perceived electoral fairness in eighty countries, allowing 
comparisons between Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas. 
To compensate for the overall lack of research on electoral fairness, the current study 
looks to related topics such as democratic satisfaction, electoral participation, and 
institutional trust.  While the correlations between these subjects and electoral 
fairness are usually positive, they are not strong enough to assume identical 
relationships.  We need to confirm these relationships empirically because not all 
factors are likely to have the same relationship with perceived electoral fairness.  For 
instance, Rahn and Rudolph (2005: 546-548) demonstrate a negative relationship 
between ethnic fractionalization and trust in local government, while Alesina et al. 
(2003: 158) find that ethnic and linguistic fractionalization are both negatively 
associated with the quality of government.  The current study analyses the effects of 
different types of cultural fractionalization and demonstrates that religious 
fractionalization has the strongest and more consistently negative relationship with 
electoral fairness.  Due to the wide geographic scope and numerous variables included 
in this study, it adds many new findings that help us understand perceptions of 
electoral fairness. 
A limitation of many existing electoral fairness studies is that they often only include 
‘established’ or ‘liberal’ democracies, but not as many ‘transitional’ or ‘authoritarian’ 
democracies.  This attention imbalance omits large areas of the world and means that 
some trends are not fully explained.  For example, most previous research uses liberal 
democracies and find that people with higher education, greater political knowledge 
and who read newspapers tend to make more positive assessments of electoral 
fairness and democratic satisfaction (Banducci & Karp, 2003: 463; Birch, 2008: 312-
315; Dennis, 1970: 833; Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 740).  However, Moehler (2009) 
finds a negative relationship between higher education and perceived electoral 
fairness in Africa.  The present research concurs with these past studies, finding that 
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people with higher education tend to have positive attitudes towards electoral fairness 
in ‘liberal’ democracies, but negative attitudes in most ‘authoritarian’ democracies.  
The same flipped relationships exist for political knowledge and newspaper attention 
as well.  The obvious explanation is that educated people have a better understanding 
of the objective realities of electoral fairness and so education and political knowledge 
reflects in their attitudes to the reality of what is happening in their respective nations. 
Perhaps the least researched yet potentially most important determinant of electoral 
fairness is the design of electoral management bodies (EMBs).  These institutions are 
responsible for running elections and have a great deal of control over electoral 
fairness.  EMBs can be independent agencies or commissions, relatively free from 
control by the incumbent government, or government departments under the direct 
control of incumbent officials.  An extensive body of literature advocates independent 
EMBs because they increase electoral integrity by increasing professionalism and 
reducing conflicts of interest arising from political parties and officials seeking to stay 
in power (Elklit & Reynolds, 2001; Goodwin-Gill, 2006; Lehoucq, 2002; López-Pintor, 
2000; Mozaffar, 2002; Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002; Pastor, 1999a, 1999b; Wall et al., 
2006).  However, despite the many proponents of independent EMBs, empirical 
evidence suggests otherwise.  Two cross-national studies that examined EMB 
independence revealed a strong negative relationship with perceived electoral fairness 
(Birch, 2008; Rosas, 2010).  This is problematic because many newer democracies have 
established independent EMBs (Elklit, 1999; Elklit & Reynolds, 2002; Pastor, 1999b) 
and many international organizations continue to advocate the independent model 
(EC, 2006; Hounkpe & Fall, 2011; López-Pintor, 2000; OAS, 2009; Wall et al., 2006).  
The current research analyses EMB independence in more detail across more countries 
than previous studies, but most findings for EMBs are either negative or insignificant.  
In other words, evidence suggests relationships in the opposite direction than the 
theories predict.  Most independent EMBs are established in transitional democracies 
and countries with histories of unfair elections (Birch, 2008: 313).  Perceived unfairness 
probably leads to the establishment of independent EMBs rather than independent 
EMBs leading to perceived unfairness.  One of the few positive findings in the present 
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research is that older independent EMBs are associated with increased perceptions of 
electoral fairness.  Future research may therefore produce positive results. 
The remainder of this chapter covers background topics relating to electoral fairness 
and electoral management before previewing subsequent chapters.  The next sections 
provide a better understanding of what is meant by electoral fairness and why this 
topic is under-researched.  This includes some contextual background surrounding 
electoral institutions and a more detailed description of the main thesis research 
objectives.  Each chapter, except the introduction and conclusion, is then outlined 
previewed. 
1.1. Understanding Electoral Fairness 
This thesis uses the term ‘electoral fairness’ to refer to the degree to which structures, 
systems and outcomes of electoral governance are equitable, impartial, and universal.  
A variety of terms have however been used interchangeably to refer to electoral 
fairness, which could result in some confusion.  Rosas (2010) used surveys that ask 
about clean versus rigged or fraudulent elections, but construed this question in a 
variety of ways.  He argued that it tapped into the ‘credibility of elections’ and elicited 
responses regarding ‘trust in the electoral process’ (Rosas, 2010: 75).  This mixing of 
terms is prevalent throughout the literature.  Phrases like ‘electoral credibility’ 
(Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002), ‘electoral integrity’ (Birch, 2008; Norris, 2013a, 2013b), 
‘electoral quality’, ‘electoral trust’ (Rosas, 2010) and ‘electoral fairness’ (Birch, 2010) 
are often used interchangeably when referring to assessments of elections.  Electoral 
processes are similarly evaluated according to their freeness, fairness, impartiality, 
honesty, credibility, trustworthiness, cleanliness, or quality.  This miscellany of terms 
occurs on the negative side of evaluations as well, with words such as fraudulent, 
flawed, rigged and unfair all describing unacceptable elections.  Different 
interpretations of survey questions are clearly plausible for both negative and positive 
public opinions.  Ultimately, survey respondents are indicating their acceptance, 
satisfaction, approval, or support for elections or the electoral process.  The use of the 
phrase ‘perceived electoral fairness’ in this thesis comes from a desire for a broadly 
understood term that captures the essence of the topic, while also specifying that the 
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data arises from public opinion and refers to perceptions.  The analysis does not 
examine objective levels of electoral fairness, since actors behind electoral misconduct 
will usually seek to keep their activities out of public view.  However, aggregate public 
perceptions of electoral fairness usually parallel expert and elite assessments 
surprisingly accurately (Norris et al., 2013: 133; Rosas, 2010: 76). 
Perceptions of electoral fairness depend on processes and outcomes (Anderson & 
Tverdova, 2001; Wilking, 2011), which includes elements of both procedural and 
substantive fairness.  Procedural fairness generally focuses on practices and processes, 
or procedures.  It exists when electoral regulations, laws, and policies are created and 
implemented impartially.  This entails applying the same rules and standards to 
different actors and not having anything to gain by treating one actor favourably or 
discriminating against another (Chambers, 1996: 139; Gert, 1995: 104).  People who 
perceive greater degrees of procedural fairness are more likely to trust political 
institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1997; 2001: 52), vote in elections (Birch, 2010), comply 
with laws (Tyler, 1990) and refrain from protesting (Pastor, 1999b; Schedler, 2002b).  
Substantive fairness on the other hand generally focuses on arrangements and 
structures, or the substantive outcomes.  It is achieved by creating a ‘level playing 
field’ where the values of neutrality and equality can reinforce free and fair elections 
(Goodwin-Gill, 2006; Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002).  Perceptions of substantive fairness 
depend on more permanent conditions and circumstances than on procedures.  For 
example, a law can be followed impartially and achieve procedural fairness, but still be 
a substantively unfair law that results in unjust outcomes.  Substantive electoral 
fairness is realized when electoral structures are impartial and the circumstances 
surrounding elections are equitable.  Electoral governance structures that bestow 
disproportionate power to some actors while systematically marginalizing others will 
minimize substantive fairness.  Underprivileged or discriminated groups are not likely 
to view the system as fair and are therefore less inclined to cooperate and comply with 
governing actors.  Both substantive and procedural fairness are essential for 
perceptions of electoral fairness, and deficiencies in either can be associated with 
accusations of injustice or electoral malfeasance. 
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1.2. Political Systems and Electoral Management 
Most democracies are broadly based on either a parliamentary or presidential model, 
often following the paradigmatic examples set by the United Kingdom or United 
States.  Achieving impartial electoral management can be problematic in both systems 
because they were not designed with modern political parties in mind, but the 
tripartite separation of powers in presidential systems can obscure conflicts of 
interest.  Designers of the American Constitution “put no faith in party competition” as 
a means of balancing power and ensuring impartiality (Hofstadter, 1969: 50).  When 
the tripartite separation of powers was created, political and legal theorists had little 
experience with anything resembling modern, organized, and enduring political 
parties: 
No place was made for the parties in the system, party government was not 
clearly foreseen or well understood, government by parties was thought to 
be impossible or impracticable and was feared and regarded as something 
to be avoided.  The Founding Fathers knew intuitively that party 
competition, if given a chance, would upset their calculations 
(Schattschneider, 1942: 6-7). 
Most constitutions written before the emergence of modern political parties are not 
designed to contend with their effects on the political system.  Under a ‘classical’ 
model of electoral governance, the executive branch manages elections and the 
legislative branch approves their results.  This arrangement relies upon inter-branch 
competition and an assumption that each branch guards its responsibility to prevent 
fraudulent elections (Lehoucq, 2002: 30).  The model works reasonably well as long as 
opposed political parties control the executive and legislative branches.  However, this 
classical model is disabled when one party or coalition controls both the executive and 
legislative branches (Lehoucq, 2002: 42).  This is particularly problematic for 
presidential systems, but parties also upset the balance between the more fused 
executive and legislative branches in parliamentary systems.  The classical model of 
electoral governance therefore became anachronistic after the emergence of modern 
political parties.  However, approximately three-quarters of advanced industrialized 
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countries still divide electoral governance between the executive and legislative 
branches (Pastor, 1999b: 7). 
A solution to the emergence of political parties, one that many newer democracies 
have adopted, is to isolate the ‘electoral function’ as separate from the executive and 
legislative functions.  The result is often a fourth branch of government or a 
permanent and constitutionally protected independent body.  Austria (1920), 
Czechoslovakia (1920) and Greece (1927) were among the first countries to give 
constitutional status to their electoral institutions (Lehoucq, 2002: 30).  Electoral 
bodies established and protected by a constitution are harder to change or 
manipulate, since requirements for constitutional amendments are usually more 
stringent than for regular legislation.  This practice is most widespread in Latin 
America, where Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela have constitutionally independent electoral 
management bodies or additional branches of government dedicated to overseeing 
electoral affairs (Blaustein, 1993; Maddex, 2007; Pastor, 2004; Taylor, 1955).  Most 
third-wave democracies around the world have adopted the model of an independent 
and usually permanent electoral management body (Elklit, 1999; Elklit & Reynolds, 
2002; Pastor, 1999b).  The independent model has been successful at supporting 
electoral integrity and scholars have argued for its adoption in older democracies.  
Tugwell (1974: 599-601) advocated the establishment of an independent electoral 
branch in the United States to help ensure fair and impartial electoral governance.  
Ackerman (2000: 718) likewise recommended a ‘democracy branch’ to impartially 
manage electoral affairs, emphasizing the importance of constitutional protections 
against “the predictable efforts by reigning politicians to entrench themselves”.  Most 
arguments and theories regarding electoral governance advocate the independent 
model. 
Electoral management bodies are the institutions responsible for the essential tasks of 
running elections and conducting most associated tasks.  They can exist at any level of 
government that holds elections, but this thesis focuses on the national level, and 
there are many types of electoral management body.  The term ‘Electoral 
Management Body’ (EMB) is a catchall phrase that refers to all these different bodies 
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and institutions (See Appendix D for a full list).1  The International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) handbook provides a general definition: 
An EMB is an organization or body which has the sole purpose of, and is 
legally responsible for, managing some or all of the elements that are 
essential for the conduct of elections and of direct democracy instruments – 
such as referendums, citizens’ initiatives and recall votes – if those are part 
of the legal framework (Wall et al., 2006: 5). 
While differing in their specific mandates, responsibility for a core set of tasks defines 
whether an institution is considered an EMB.  These include determining voter 
eligibility, receiving and validating electoral participant nominations, conducting 
polling, counting votes and tabulating results (Wall et al., 2006: 5).  Any institution that 
performs one of these core tasks can qualify, meaning multiple EMBs may exist within 
one country.  In addition to these core tasks, EMBs may also be responsible for voter 
registration, boundary delineation, voter education, media monitoring, political party 
regulation, political finance regulation, and electoral dispute resolution (López-Pintor, 
2000; Pastor, 1999b; Wall et al., 2006: 63).  The responsibilities on this second list are 
not core tasks, so other government agencies or independent bodies may perform 
them without being called EMBs. 
Strong, professional and impartial electoral management bodies can make a 
substantial contribution to building public trust in elections.  To do so, an EMB must 
impartially apply the same rules to different political actors, which necessitates not 
having anything to gain by treating two other actors differently (Gert, 1995).  This does 
not necessarily require all parties be treated equally, but rather that all parties be 
treated as equal (Dworkin, 1977), holding them to the same standards (Chambers, 
                                                     
1 They frequently have names composed of the words ‘election’ or ‘electoral’ 
combined with ‘commission’, ‘department’, ‘committee’, ‘board’, ‘council’, ‘tribunal’, 
or ‘court’ (ACE, 2012).  National institution names usually include the words ‘central’, 
‘national’, ‘supreme’ or the name of the country.  For example, the ‘Central Election 
Commission’ in Russia and the ‘Election Commission of India’.   
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1996).  Flawed or unfair electoral management can forestall nascent democratic 
transitions, provoke violent protests or, under exceptional circumstances, lead to 
revolutions and civil war (Pastor, 1999b).   
While EMBs play a critical role in ensuring free and fair elections, relatively little was 
known about them until recently.  Researchers have largely overlooked or ignored 
these institutions (Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002: 5; Pastor, 1999a: 80) and there are only 
a handful of empirical cross-national studies examining the relationship between EMB 
design and public perceptions of electoral integrity (Birch, 2008; 2011: 109-132; Rosas, 
2010).  This kind of study has been difficult for two pragmatic reasons: a lack of 
properly encoded datasets relating to EMB design, and the fact that multilevel 
regression methods require substantial computing power.  Consequently, most 
research used smaller samples, qualitative case study methods, and anecdotal 
evidence or adopted an overly simplistic view of EMB design.  Previous quantitative 
research reduced numerous aspects of institutional configuration into one 
dichotomous variable, limiting the usefulness of any findings.  Research into EMB 
design has increased slightly in the last decade, but most aspects of electoral 
management remain empirically unexamined and under-specified.  The current project 
seeks to rectify this situation by researching EMB design in considerable detail. 
1.3. Researching Electoral Fairness 
Until recently, we did not know much about the details and dynamics of electoral 
misconduct.  Thanks to collaborative research efforts and election observer missions, 
we are now aware of the wide range of activities that undermine electoral integrity 
(Lehoucq, 2003; Lehoucq & Molina, 2002; Molina & Lehoucq, 1999).  We know it is 
problematic in both competitive races, where it can decide outcomes and lead to 
political instability, as well as less competitive races, where it can damage electoral 
credibility and prevent the consolidation of democracy and electoral institutions 
(Lehoucq, 2003: 21).  Similar problems can arise no matter how competitive the 
election.  Voters can face unfair disenfranchisement, intimidation, misinformation, or 
misleading ballots.  Problems in electoral governance can arise from partisan 
patronage, cronyism, nepotism, bribery or kickbacks.  Balloting can be corrupted 
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through miscounting votes, vote buying, absentee vote abuse, ballot destruction, vote 
invalidation, noncitizen voting, or ballot stuffing.  Many of these problems arise from 
corrupted electoral management, but this is an under-research topic. 
The lack of research into electoral fairness is unfortunate because electoral 
malfeasance is a continuing problem in both established and transitional democracies.  
Electoral fraud may occur more frequently in transitional or authoritarian democracies, 
but political elites in established liberal democracies also engage in corrupt practices to 
gain control of electoral management and win elections (James, 2011: 235).  After the 
1996 general election in the United States, both major parties accused each other of 
voter fraud, with misused absentee ballots in Louisiana and noncitizen voting in 
California (Pastor, 1999a: 75).  Controversy struck again surrounding vote counting 
during the 2000 Florida election in the United States (Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002: 9-
10).  Local 2004 elections in the United Kingdom were voided for two districts by the 
High Court because of corrupt and illegal practices made possible by insufficient 
safeguards (Stewart, 2006: 660-662).  In Canada, the 2011 federal elections witnessed 
illegal fundraising, spending limit abuses, and deceptive communications with voters 
(Elections Canada, 2013).  Transitional democracies are more susceptible to electoral 
fraud because they often have to contend with the additional challenge of insufficient 
technical expertise or resources required for the complexities of running elections 
(Pastor, 1999a: 77-78).  Electoral fairness is not guaranteed, even in established 
democracies, and impartial electoral management remains important for all types of 
democracy. 
Pastor (1999a: 75-77) has speculated that researchers in industrialized nations have 
not examined electoral fraud within their countries because it is assumed to be 
minimal.  The problem is somewhat mitigated in established democracies by two 
factors that are less applicable in newer and developing democracies.  First, a political 
culture of impartiality and professionalism tends to exist within the electoral 
institutions of established democracies.  These values are usually more entrenched in 
older democracies, but may not have had a chance to take hold in newer democracies.  
Corruption and bribery may be endemic, nepotism and cronyism may be the norm, 
and free and fair elections can be much harder to achieve as a result.  Second, a 
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government or incumbent caught meddling in advanced democracies stands a greater 
chance of being caught and losing legitimacy and support.  It is less likely that 
governments in developing countries are caught committing electoral fraud, giving 
them less of an incentive to refrain from electoral misconduct.  This is often because 
informal and less visible channels of manipulation are more pervasive or the media is 
not as free from control by the incumbent government.  Even if it is free from 
government interference, mass media channels may not reach the entire population 
because of limited infrastructure, lower ownership rates of radios and televisions or 
low literacy rates.  This is not to say advanced democracies are entirely free electoral 
fraud, just that the problem appears more prevalent in newer democracies.  These 
democracies may also be more fragile, which means unsatisfactory perceptions of 
electoral fairness could hinder democratic consolidation and push countries into 
becoming a more autocratic.  Unfair elections in established democracies are less likely 
to undermine public confidence in the system of government, since people will 
recognise them as aberrations rather than the norm, but they may have more 
detrimental effects amongst populations new to democratic governance. 
In summary, this thesis looks at why perceptions of electoral fairness differ and which 
variables have the greatest effects on those perceptions.  The dependent variable is 
therefore perceived electoral fairness and there are two types of independent 
variables: individual level factors from public surveys and national level indicators from 
institutional datasets.  National level variables include the different variables used to 
measure EMB design elements.  The remainder of this chapter provides a structural 
overview of the thesis. 
1.4. Structural Outline of Thesis 
There are six chapters in this thesis besides the introduction and conclusion.  There are 
two literature chapters, two methods chapters, and two results chapters.  These follow 
the dual objectives of this thesis: examining determinants and analysing electoral 
management bodies for their effects on perceptions of electoral fairness.  Chapters 2, 
4 and 6 focus on individual and national level factors, while chapters 3, 5 and 7 focus 
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on the design of electoral management bodies.  The following sections preview each of 
these chapters. 
Chapter 2: Conventional Explanations of Electoral Fairness 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on factors that have demonstrated effects on 
perceived electoral fairness, or related types of political trust.  The chapter is split 
based on a distinction between individual and national level variables.  Section 2.1 
explains all individual level factors, such as age and gender, which come from cross-
national public surveys.  Section 2.2 covers national level indicators that are not 
related to electoral management, which are reviewed in Chapter 3, such as GDP per 
capita and media freedom scores.  The chapter examines over twenty individual level 
factors and almost twenty national level indicators.  The purpose of examining so 
many variables is to determine the strongest predictors of electoral fairness.  Sets of 
variables are structured around thematic groupings to make them more accessible.  
The following paragraphs outline the main parts of the chapter, starting with individual 
level factors, which are displayed in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1: Summary of Individual Level Groupings 
 
Both the individual and national level variables included in this study were selected 
based on one or more of three broad justifications.  First, some are included to 
account for their known effects because they have demonstrated consistent 
associations with electoral fairness.  For instance, people with high incomes and 
electoral systems using proportional representation have both revealed positive 
relationships with perceptions of electoral fairness (Birch, 2007, 2008; Farrell & 
McAllister, 2006: 740).  High-income individuals express positive attitudes because this 
classification defines a group that benefits and prospers in the current system.  
Proportional representation systems are favoured because they produce election 
results that more closely represent voter preferences.  The second justification for 
including variables is that many have only been analysed using a limited set of 
countries or produced mixed results.  For example, higher education has demonstrated 
a negative relationship with perceived electoral fairness in Africa, a weak positive 
relationship in Latin America, but insignificant results in Russia (McAllister & White, 
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2011; Moehler, 2009; Rosas, 2010).  Examining mixed and under-researched variables 
across more countries, regions, and datasets should provide a better understanding of 
their relationships with perceived electoral fairness.  The third justification for 
including variables is that they have not been analysed with perceived electoral 
fairness but are likely to demonstrate effects.  For example, individual assessments of 
the economy and national level economic indicators have shown strong associations 
with other kinds of political support, such as democratic satisfaction and institutional 
trust (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Cho & Bratton, 2006; 
Kotzian, 2011; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Lühiste, 2006; Wong, Wan, & Hsiao, 
2011).  However, previous cross-national studies on electoral fairness have not 
included these variables.  They are incorporated within the present study because they 
are likely to have effects. 
Figure 1.2 outlines how national level indicators are thematically grouped throughout 
this thesis.  The groupings have similarities with the individual level groupings, but 
differ because national level factors usually come from institutional sources and apply 
to entire countries.  The literature explaining these indicators is included in section 2.2. 
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Figure 1.2: Summary of National Level Groupings 
 
To summarize, this chapter provides an overview of the individual level factors and 
national level indicators in this study.  It explains the theoretical justifications for 
selecting variables and their expected relationship with perceived electoral fairness.  
Variables are included to control for known effects, examine them for clearer trends, 
or because they have not been examined with electoral fairness.  The next chapter 
reviews the literature on electoral management body design. 
Chapter 3: The Role of Electoral Management Bodies 
Chapter 3 reviews two electoral management body models that supposed to enhance 
electoral integrity and fairness.  The first is the conventional independent model, 
explained in section 3.1, which is when the body running elections is separate from 
government.  The independent model is promoted by most scholars because it 
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separates electoral management from the incumbent government, which may seek to 
manipulate the electoral process to maintain power (Elklit & Reynolds, 2001; Goodwin-
Gill, 2006; Lehoucq, 2002; López-Pintor, 2000; Mozaffar, 2002; Mozaffar & Schedler, 
2002; Pastor, 1999a, 1999b; Wall et al., 2006).  The model is one broad type in a 
threefold typology that also includes the governmental model, when the executive 
government runs elections, and the mixed model, when elections are run by a 
combination of independent and governmental bodies (Wall et al., 2006). 
Despite its numerous supporters, relatively few cross-national studies have empirically 
analysed how EMB design affects perceptions of electoral fairness.  Research by Birch 
(2008) and Rosas (2010) unexpectedly revealed a negative or muted relationship 
between EMB independence and perceived electoral fairness.  The variable usually 
used to represent independence conflates all aspects of EMB design into one 
dichotomous value, making it insufficiently detailed to be useful.  This thesis separates 
EMB design into its component parts to gain a better understanding of which features 
have the strongest association with perceptions of electoral fairness.  Those with 
positive effects could be incorporated within national EMBs, while those with negative 
effects can be avoided or reformed.  This approach has already demonstrated that 
shielding EMB appointments from partisan control and selecting members based on 
their expertise has a positive effect on the quality of elections (Hartlyn et al., 2008).  
Reforming electoral institutions can increase political trust and evaluations of 
democracy (Cho & Bratton, 2006), but we need more research to make better 
decisions based on empirical evidence. 
This chapter seeks to layout two EMB models in as much detail as possible, with each 
element discussed separately.  Designing better EMBs is important for increasing 
electoral fairness, voter participation, democratic legitimacy and political trust.  This 
research will therefore be of interest to constitution writers, legislators, policy makers, 
governments, election observers, academics, non-governmental organisations and 
anyone interested in enhancing electoral integrity.  The design elements summarised 
in Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 are briefly introduced in subsequent paragraphs. 
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Figure 1.3: Summary of Conventional Independent Model 
 
The conventional independent model is composed of seven criteria, but data is only 
available for six of these: implementation of core election tasks, powers to propose 
electoral reforms and settle electoral disputes, budgetary and expenditure discretion, 
formal accountability to legislature, member selection by non-executive actors, and 
fixed terms of office.  Figure 1.3 summarises these six criteria and the available 
variables used to measure them.  Section 3.1 explains the criteria and their constituent 
elements as well as their anticipated relationships with perceived electoral fairness.  In 
general, greater independence from the incumbent government is expected to 
increase perceptions of electoral fairness. 
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Figure 1.4: Summary of Categorised Autonomy Model 
 
The second model of electoral management design, summarised in Figure 1.4 and 
further explained in section 3.2, is the categorised autonomy model.  This fourfold 
framework of EMB design was developed by Van Aaken (2009), but has not yet been 
empirically investigated.  The framework unpacks the conventional independent model 
by distinguishing between types of autonomy: institutional, financial, personnel and 
functional.  Institutional autonomy refers to whether EMBs are separate institutions 
with their own legal personality and not part of a government department or under 
the supervisions of a minister.  Financial autonomy refers to how much budgetary and 
expenditure discretion an EMB enjoys free from governmental control.  Personnel 
autonomy refers to whether EMB staff appointment processes and employment 
tenures are insulated from government interference.  The fourth category, functional 
autonomy, is increased if an EMB with institutional, financial and personnel autonomy 
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performs more tasks related to electoral management.  This covers the most topics 
and is the biggest category of autonomy.  The purpose of each type of autonomy is to 
restrict the influence of incumbent officials who may seek to maintain power by 
manipulating the electoral process.  All four types of autonomy are vital, but functional 
autonomy is arguably more important because it includes electoral tasks more likely to 
receive public attention, such as voter registration and ballot counting. 
It is important to note the different terminology used throughout this thesis to help 
distinguish between the two models.  The first model refers to ‘independence’ while 
the second uses ‘autonomy’.  Both models focus on separating electoral management 
from government interference and the different terms could be used interchangeably 
as synonyms.  The linguistic distinction between independence and autonomy is used 
merely for clarifying between the two models so that mentions of independence and 
autonomy refer to their respective models. 
In summary, Chapter 3 outlines the literature for two models of electoral management 
design.  They have received very little comparative research attention, but the few 
studies that that looked at the independent model found negative or insignificant 
relationships with perceived electoral fairness.  These findings go against the 
theoretical assumptions and the dichotomous measures of independence they used do 
not provide sufficiently detailed information.  The approach taken in this thesis is to 
examine as many design elements as possible for their effects on perceived electoral 
fairness. 
Chapter 4: Measuring the Effects of Established Factors 
Chapter 4 outlines variables that have demonstrated associations with perceived 
electoral fairness or other areas of political support.  It covers the individual and 
national level variables, regression methods, data sources, case selection, and data 
management procedures.  However, the primary purpose of the chapter is to outline 
the individual and national level variables to be analysed with perceived electoral 
fairness.  All individual level variables come from five cross-national surveys: rounds 
three and four of the AfroBarometer, years 2006 to 2010 of the AmericasBarometer, 
wave one of the ArabBarometer, wave two of the AsianBarometer and module one of 
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the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES).  Countries were selected from 
these datasets based on the requirement that the surveys be conducted as soon as 
possible after national elections.  This approach resulted in selecting eighty countries 
across six continents, which includes over one hundred and twenty thousand 
individual surveys.  The chapter explains the mundane but necessary tasks of managing 
multiple dataset and recoding items to create common variables. 
The most important common variable is the one measuring perceived electoral 
fairness.  Section 4.1 explains how a common dependent variable was created and 
describes levels of perceived fairness across the selected countries.  The 
AfroBarometer, ArabBarometer, and AsianBarometer use the same four-point 
electoral fairness question.  The AmericasBarometer uses a seven-point electoral trust 
question, while the CSES uses a five-point question about fairness in the electoral 
process.  The common dependent variable for electoral fairness uses a four-point 
scale.  Levels of perceived electoral fairness are then contrasted to provide a 
comparative overview. 
Section 4.2 focuses on how individual level variables were recoded to facilitate 
regional comparisons between different datasets.  Although the surveys ask many of 
the same questions, they do not always provide the same possible answers.  For 
example, questions about income sometimes provide answers in quintiles, dollar 
amounts, or subjective assessments.  A solution for income was to create a 
dichotomous variable representing high-income individuals.  This section explains the 
different techniques employed for creating new individual level variables from the 
different versions of survey questions.  The section also provides key descriptive 
statistics of most variables to provide a better understanding of their value 
distributions. 
All national level variables are described in section 4.3, except those for electoral 
management, which are outlined in the next chapter.  Most come from the Quality of 
Government (QoG) dataset (Teorell, Charron, Samanni, Holmberg, & Rothstein, 2011), 
which combines many other sources.  These national level indicators, such as electoral 
system type or economic growth rate, apply to entire countries rather than individual 
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survey respondents.  This section provides details about how variables were changed 
in magnitude or recoded so larger values indicated more of the measured concept.  
For example, values of the Corruptions Perceptions Index were reversed so that larger 
numbers meant more corruption rather than less. 
Section 4.4 explains the multivariate and multilevel regression methodologies used to 
analyses variables with perceived electoral fairness.  Individual level factors are 
investigated using both ordered probit models and multilevel mixed-effects models, 
while national level indicators are only measured using multilevel mixed-effects 
models.  Individual level factors are examined using separate country regressions, 
aggregated regional models, and combined global models.  National level variables 
cannot be tested using separate country models because they apply to the entire 
nation and there is no variation.  The limited numbers of countries in regional datasets 
means that not very many national level variables can be included in multilevel 
models.  This limitation necessitates using multiple models to test all the national level 
indicators.  All models use the same dependent variable for perceived electoral 
fairness and standardized beta coefficients.  Betas provide a way of analysing which 
variables have the most explanatory power or strength. 
In summary, Chapter 4 focuses on how individual and national level variables were 
measured and generated.  This includes the methods used for creating common 
variables, including the common dependent variable.  The chapter also explains data 
sources, data management procedures, and country selection requirements. 
Chapter 5: Exploring the Effects of Electoral Management Design 
Chapter 5 describes the variables for the two electoral management models and the 
methods used to analyse their associations with perceived electoral fairness.  The 
chapter is divided into four main parts, two for each of the EMB models.  Section 5.1 
outlines the conventional independent model and section 5.2 explains the methods for 
analysing its effects on perceived electoral fairness.  Similarly, sections 5.3 and 5.4 do 
the same for the categorised autonomy model.  Both EMB models are analysed using 
multilevel mixed-effects regressions.  Multiple regression models are necessary for 
analysing each EMB design because the datasets do not include sufficient numbers of 
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countries to test many national level variables.  Data for measuring the two EMB 
designs comes from ACE (Administration and Cost of Elections) Electoral Knowledge 
Network and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 
Section 5.1 outlines the variables for the conventional independent model.  Its 
subsections describe the available data for the six independent EMB model criteria: 
implementation, powers, budget, accountability, member selection, and terms of 
office.  These criteria were originally laid out by Wall et al. (2006) in Electoral 
Management Design, but they have been modified slightly based on available data.  
The intention motivating independent EMB model criteria is to limit executive 
government control over electoral management and increase the integrity of elections.  
For example, the accountability criterion specifies that EMBs report to the legislature 
rather than the executive, while the budget criterion requires that EMB budgets be 
separate from executive departments or ministries.  Section 5.2 then explains how the 
different independent model criteria are analysed with perceived electoral fairness.  It 
also lays out the logical structure of data and the necessary conditions for constructing 
the criteria variables. 
Categorised autonomy model data and variables are explained in section 5.3, which is 
structured around the different categories of autonomy.  The original fourfold 
framework was outlined by Van Aaken (2009), and differentiates between 
institutional, financial, personnel and functional autonomy.  Institutional autonomy 
considers the legal personality, accountability, permanence, and constitutional status 
of EMBs.  Financial autonomy depends upon which actors determine EMB budgets 
control expenditures.  Personnel autonomy takes into account member appointments, 
selection criteria, and security of tenure.  Functional autonomy is the most important 
category and includes eight different electoral management tasks.  Counting an EMB 
as having functional autonomy requires a minimal level of autonomy across the other 
three categories.  The assumption is that electoral fairness will be enhanced if 
autonomous EMBs perform more core electoral functions (van Aaken, 2009: 313).  The 
multiple variables composing the autonomy categories are tested separately before 
analysing additive indices for each category.  Section 5.4 outlines how the variables 
and indices are created as well as the regression models used to analyse them. 
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In summary, Chapter 5 describes the variables and indices needed for examining the 
two EMB models with perceived electoral fairness.  It explains the six criteria for the 
conventional independent model and the four categories for the categorised 
autonomy model.  The chapter outlines how available data was adapted to fit the 
theoretical models as closely as possible and how additive index variables were 
created.  The chapter also explains the multilevel mixed-effects regression models 
used to analyse the EMB designs and their respective variables. 
Chapter 6: Results for Established Factors Reveal Trends 
This chapter provides the results for all variables except those pertaining to electoral 
management design, which are presented in the next chapter.  Chapter 6 is split 
between results for individual level variables in section 6.1 and national level results in 
section 6.2.  Subsections follow the same thematic groupings used in previous 
chapters.  All variables are analysed using regional and global models, but individual 
level variables are additionally analysed using individual country models.  These are 
displayed in Appendix E and summarised in the body of this chapter.  The following 
paragraphs briefly outline the findings of this research project, with detailed 
discussions in Chapter 6. 
Socio-demographic results indicate that older, male, or higher income individuals tend 
to view elections positively.  Relationships are weak for gender or income, making age 
the strongest socio-demographic predictor.  The consistency of this relationship is 
surprising because previous studies have produced mixed results for age, both with 
electoral fairness and other types of political support (Cho & Bratton, 2006: 745; 
Kotzian, 2011: 34; Moehler, 2009: 362; Rosas, 2010: 85).  Tertiary education also 
shows mixed results between regions and countries, but there appears to be a trend.  
Higher education in ‘authoritarian’ democracies tends to be associated with negative 
assessments, while it shows positive associations in ‘liberal’ democracies.  Higher 
education may therefore act as a proxy for being informed about the electoral system, 
meaning the attitudes of higher education individuals more accurately reflect realities 
of electoral integrity. 
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The second grouping for participation and engagement variables reveal two strong 
global trends.  Both electoral participation and supporting election winners have 
strong positive associations with perceived electoral fairness.  This matches previous 
findings of a positive relationship with electoral fairness and political trust (Anderson & 
Tverdova, 2003: 101-102; McAllister & White, 2011: 676-677; Moehler, 2009: 359-362) 
and parallels literature on the positive effects of identifying with or voting for election 
winners (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Banducci & Karp, 
2003; Birch, 2008; Chang & Chu, 2006; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Craig et al., 2006; Singh, 
Karakoç, & Blais, 2012).  Other variables in the model, such as political interest and 
left/right ideology, often demonstrate regional differences rather than global trends.  
Living in urban areas displayed consistently negative relationships, but these often 
failed to obtain significance. 
Media attention variables reveal trends that provide additional insights.  Prior research 
suggests that watching television decreases political trust and reading newspapers 
increases it (Hart, 1994; Hetherington, 1998; Karp, Banducci, & Bowler, 2003; McLeod 
& McDonald, 1985; Miller, Goldenberg, & Erbring, 1979).  This study conversely finds 
newspaper attention has a negative association with perceived electoral fairness, 
while watching television has a weakly positive effect.  Political knowledge also 
demonstrated a weak negative relationship, where previous research indicated 
positive associations (Birch, 2008: 315; 2010: 1610; Carpini & Keeter, 1996: 221-227).  
The reason is likely to be the fundamental differences in the electoral processes that 
better educated and politically aware people notice.  These variables therefore could 
define groups of individuals that have more objectively accurate perceptions of 
electoral fairness. 
Two trends arose from the economic performance grouping of variables.  First, people 
who view the economy as improving tend to perceive elections as fairer.  This trend 
was most apparent for attitudes regarding the present state of the national economy, 
but comparisons with past and future economic conditions provide additional 
evidence.  The positive results match findings for other types of political support 
(Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Chang & Chu, 2006; 
Chappell, 1990; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Hibbs, Rivers, & Vasilatos, 1982; Lühiste, 2006; 
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Mishler & Rose, 2001; Moehler, 2009; Wong et al., 2011).  A second trend was that 
personal finances matter less than the national economy, but the same positive 
relationship is evident.  This weaker association is new for perceived electoral fairness 
and agrees with findings for other areas of political support as well (Anderson & 
Guillory, 1997: 75; Cho & Bratton, 2006: 745; Lühiste, 2006: 487-488).  The last variable 
in this grouping is having paid employment, which did not obtain significance. 
Measures of political performance demonstrated strong global trends with perceived 
electoral fairness.  People who think government corruption is high are less likely to 
perceive elections as fair.  This corresponds with research in other areas of political 
trust (Chang & Chu, 2006: 265; Lühiste, 2006: 489-490; Mishler & Rose, 2001: 52; 
Singer, 2011: 301) and prior findings with electoral fairness (McAllister & White, 2011: 
676).  Trust in the executive, legislature, judiciary, police, and political parties all 
showed strong positive associations with perceived electoral fairness, but the trend is 
strongest for executive and legislature trust.  These are new findings with electoral 
fairness and strongly suggest institutional trust has a positive effect globally.  Results 
for crime victimization support the negative relationships found for other kinds of 
political support (Ceobanu, Wood, & Ribeiro, 2011: 66-69; Pérez, 2003: 642-644), 
implying victims of physical crime tend to trust elections less. 
The sixth model evaluates group memberships and related variables for their effects 
on perceptions of electoral fairness.  The strongest trend to emerge from this grouping 
is that people who generally trust others tend to view elections as fairer.  This is 
another new finding with perceived electoral fairness and positive relationship 
matches findings for other types of political trust (Dowley & Silver, 2002; Kaase, 1999; 
Lühiste, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Zmerli & Newton, 2008).  Having no political 
affiliation or being non-partisan has a significant negative association with perceived 
electoral fairness, which expands upon similar findings (Birch, 2008: 312).  One 
possible reason why non-partisan individuals have negative attitudes is that they may 
not be satisfied with any of the political parties in an election.  Being non-religious did 
not obtain significance, and there are no consistent results for being in religious or 
ethnic majorities. 
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National level variables are combined in another six thematic groupings.  The first is 
democratic performance, which reveals that civil liberties matter more than political 
rights for perceptions of electoral fairness.  Prior research indicated a positive 
relationship for political rights (Birch, 2008: 313-314), but including civil liberties 
reveals its comparatively stronger association with perceived electoral fairness.  
Democratic experience, measured in years since national suffrage, did not obtain 
significance, probably because the other included variables had more explanatory 
power. 
Electoral context variables revealed an overall positive trend for electoral systems 
using proportional representation, which coincides with prior findings (Birch, 2007; 
2008: 312-313; Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 739-740).  Proportional representation 
systems are often favoured because they facilitate the inclusion of minority groups and 
more closely represent public preferences (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Cho & Bratton, 
2006: 747; Lindberg, 2005: 61-62).  The size of election victory margins was expected 
to be positive, but the only significant result was negative.  This agrees with previous 
unexpected findings of a negative relationship (Hartlyn et al., 2008), but not with other 
research indicating a positive relationship (Birch, 2008).  The size of victory margins 
thus does not present any global trends.  The last electoral context variable is public 
funding of political parties, which did not achieve significance despite previous 
research indicating a positive relationship (Birch, 2008: 306, 313). 
The only trend amongst parliamentary composition variables was that having more 
women in parliament is associated with positive assessments of electoral fairness, 
coinciding with findings using related types of political support (Karp & Banducci, 2008: 
112; Lawless, 2004).  The current study finds some evidence of a negative relationship 
between lower legislature sizes and perceived electoral fairness, but previous research 
conversely indicated a positive association (Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 739-740).  
Evidence for the effects of legislature size does not indicate a global trend, but instead 
suggests regional or contextual differences.  Finally, population per MP did not achieve 
significance in any regional model, despite previous research indicating a mild negative 
relationship (Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 736, 740). 
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Two trends emerged from the political performance set of variables.  First, greater 
media freedom is correlated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness.  This is an 
important finding because the relationship is strong and it has not been demonstrated 
with perceived electoral fairness before.  Second, higher levels of public sector 
corruption were negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness, paralleling the 
effect of corruption on other types of political trust (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; 
Gilley, 2006; Kotzian, 2011; Seligson, 2002).  Income inequality produced mixed results 
not suggestive of any global trends, but previous research has demonstrated negative 
effects with other types of political support (Anderson & Singer, 2008; Kotzian, 2011). 
The fifth grouping for economic performance variables does not reveal any trends, or 
any significant coefficients.  The models included measures for human development, 
GNI per capita, and GDP growth per capita.  The insignificant results for these objective 
measures stand in stark contrast to subjective measures for economic performance, 
which achieved robust and consistently positive relationships with perceived electoral 
fairness.  The findings suggest that objective national level economic performance may 
not affect perceptions of electoral fairness, despite having strong and significant 
effects on other types of political support (Birch, 2008: 313-314; Gilley, 2006: 57; 
Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000). 
From the cultural fractionalization variables, religious fractionalization demonstrates 
the strongest consistent negative trend, suggesting that people are less likely to view 
elections as fair in countries with greater religious diversity.  Linguistic fractionalization 
showed a strongly negative relationship in the global model, while results for ethnic 
fractionalization were mixed and insignificant.  Previous research had indicated 
negative effects for ethnic and linguistic fractionalization using different measures of 
political approval (Alesina et al., 2003: 158; Rahn & Rudolph, 2005: 546-548).  The 
strong negative relationship between religious fractionalization and perceived 
electoral fairness suggests it is more importance for electoral fairness than the other 
cultural fractionalization variables. 
To summarise, Chapter 6 presents the results for individual and national level variables 
with perceived electoral fairness.  The chapter makes comparisons with prior findings 
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and discusses trends, highlighting strong relationships.  Results indicate that that older, 
male or higher income individuals who vote, support elections winners, trust the 
executive and legislature, view the economy as improving, corruption as decreasing 
and live in religiously homogeneous societies are more likely to view elections as fair.  
National level findings reveal that civil liberties matter more than political rights, 
proportional representation systems may help, having more women in parliament is 
positive, more religious fractionalization is negative, media freedom is probably 
beneficial, public sector corruption matters and national economic indicators are not 
very important. 
Chapter 7: Unexpected Results for EMB Models 
Almost all literature on electoral management bodies advocate an independent model 
because it is expected to increase electoral integrity and enhance public attitudes 
(Elklit & Reynolds, 2001; Goodwin-Gill, 2006; Lehoucq, 2002; Mozaffar, 2002; Mozaffar 
& Schedler, 2002; Pastor, 1999a, 1999b; Wall et al., 2006).  The likelihood of free and 
fair elections is expected to increase when electoral bodies are independent of the 
executive branch (López-Pintor, 2000: 140).  This is because electoral legitimacy is 
enhanced when independent EMBs are perceived as impartial and not subject to 
political control, but legitimacy is undermined when EMBs are perceived to be aligned 
with the incumbent government or partisan interests (Wall et al., 2006: 21).  Lehoucq 
(2002: 31) therefore argues that independent EMBs are one of the central reasons why 
democratization is sustained in some countries and not others. 
Despite the arguments in favour of independent EMBs, the results in Chapter 7 do not 
support the assumption that independent or autonomous EMBs increase perceptions 
of electoral fairness.  Most significant findings for both models show negative 
relationships with perceived electoral fairness.  This research project finds little 
empirical evidence to support the theoretically derived criteria and recommendations 
of the two EMB models.  The implications are somewhat alarming given that many 
international organizations involved in electoral reform actively promote the adoption 
of an unproven independent model (EC, 2006; Hounkpe & Fall, 2011; López-Pintor, 
2000; OAS, 2009; Wall et al., 2006). 
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The predominance of significant negative results probably reflects that independent 
EMBs are established in response to unfair elections.  Birch (2008: 313) similarly 
suggested the negative relationship for independent EMBs could be result from their 
establishment in response to problematic electoral integrity.  This would explain the 
negative correlations between EMB independence and perceived electoral fairness.  
The causal direction is thus not that independent EMBs produce unfair elections, but 
that unfair elections trigger reform towards more independent electoral bodies.  
Election observers and non-governmental organizations often encourage transitional 
democracies to establish independent EMBs as a way to reduce electoral malfeasance 
(EC, 2006; Hounkpe & Fall, 2011; López-Pintor, 2000; OAS, 2009; Wall et al., 2006). 
Consequently, most transitional democracies have independent EMBs that were 
established more recently, while most established democracies have governmental 
EMBs that were established much earlier (Elklit, 1999; Elklit & Reynolds, 2002; Pastor, 
1999b).  Established democracies are known for having higher levels of electoral 
integrity, while transitional democracies are known for more frequently having 
problems with electoral fraud.  Including different types of democracies in the same 
regression models produces negative results because countries with lower levels 
electoral fairness are more likely to have independent EMBs. 
The independent EMB model produced mostly negative or insignificant results with 
perceived electoral fairness.  The strongest negative trend is for EMB members having 
fixed terms, which produced significant negative coefficients in most models.  EMB 
accountability to and member selections by the legislature or judiciary are both 
negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness.  Significant findings are also 
negative for important core implementation tasks of voter registration, sorting and 
counting votes and consolidating results are negative.  Many other criteria did not 
obtain any significant relationships with perceived electoral fairness.  For example, 
there were no significant results for EMBs proposing electoral reform or having the 
legislature or judiciary determine EMB budgets and control expenditures.  There are a 
few positive results in some regional models, but these are usually overshadowed by 
additional negative results in other regional models.  For example, making EMBs 
responsible for settling electoral disputes demonstrated a weak positive relationship in 
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one regional model, but a strongly negative relationship in another.  While the criteria 
were expected to have positive effects on perceived electoral fairness, most significant 
relationships were negative. 
Findings for the categorised autonomy model are also mostly negative or insignificant 
with perceived electoral fairness.  All significant associations are negative for having 
electoral law in the constitution as well as making autonomous EMBs responsible for 
approving boundary changes and monitoring media coverage of elections.  No 
significant results were produced for any element of personnel or financial autonomy.  
This means that non-partisan membership requirements, members appointed by the 
legislature or judiciary, fixed members terms and terms longer than the election cycle 
have no significant effect on perceived electoral fairness.  It also means there are no 
significant effects for having legislatures or EMBs determine budgets or control 
expenditures.  Aspects of other autonomy categories also produce only insignificant 
results.  For example, both the institutional autonomy requirement that EMBs report 
to the legislature and the functional autonomy requirement that EMBs be responsible 
for settling electoral disputes produced no significant results.  Many elements of the 
categorised autonomy model produced mixed results, but there were still more 
negative than positive results.  For example, delegating boundary delimitation tasks to 
autonomous EMBs was expected to increase integrity, since government 
gerrymandering of districts remains a problem in most democracies (Albaugh, 2011; 
Carson & Crespin, 2004; Hirsch, 2003; McDonald, 2004).  However, the one positive 
relationship for this task was overshadowed by three significant negative coefficients.  
Results were also mixed for autonomous EMBs receiving and reviewing financial 
reports of political parties or candidates, providing voter information, running voter 
registration, sorting and counting votes, and consolidating election results.  Additive 
autonomy category indices are also mostly mixed or insignificant.  The institutional 
autonomy index is negative in the Africa model.  The financial autonomy index has 
positive coefficients in the Africa and Europe models, but this is undermined by a 
negatively significant relationship in the Americas model.  The personnel autonomy 
index does not obtain significance in any model.  Finally, the functional autonomy 
index demonstrates strong negative coefficients in the Africa and Europe models, but a 
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positive coefficient for the Americas model.  There is weak evidence in favour of 
autonomous EMBs being responsible for proposing electoral reforms, but no clear 
significant trend.  One of the only variables to produce consistently positive results was 
EMB longevity, measured in years since first established.  This finding suggests that it 
may take time for independent EMBs to improve electoral integrity, meaning future 
studies may reveal positive trends.  Overall, evidence for categorised autonomy model 
is mostly insignificant or negative. 
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Chapter 2. Conventional Explanations of Electoral Fairness 
The main goal of this chapter is to review available literature on individual level factors 
and national level indicators that are expected to have effects with perceived electoral 
fairness.  To address the overarching research question of why perceptions of electoral 
fairness differ, we need to analyse any factors and indicators that could justifiably be 
expected to have effects.  This includes both individual level factors such as 
demographics and public attitudes, as well as national level indicators such as 
economic growth and the type of electoral system.  This chapter reviews over twenty 
individual level explanatory factors and almost twenty national level indicators.  The 
explanatory variables outlined in this chapter were selected based on three broad 
justifications: to analyse potential new relationships, to confirm the results of previous 
smaller studies, and to account for known effects.   
First, existing research on electoral fairness is relatively limited, so the chapter 
extrapolates theoretical and empirical findings from similar types of political support.  
What little research has been conducted on electoral fairness suggests it may be 
similar to other types of political trust.  There are strong correlations between 
different types of political support, such as democratic satisfaction and institutional 
trust (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 
2003), and perceived electoral fairness demonstrates similarly strong and consistently 
positive correlations with these different types of political support.  This suggests that 
attitudes towards democracy and institutions share significant similarities with 
attitudes towards elections.  Factors and indicators that have demonstrated consistent 
relationships with correlated types of political support are likely to reveal similar 
trends with perceived electoral fairness.  They are also likely to do so for the same 
theoretical reasons, which is one reason for including variables in this study. 
A second justification for including variables is that they have only been analysed with 
electoral fairness across a limited set of countries or have demonstrated mixed results 
between studies.  For example, higher education revealed a negative relationship with 
perceived electoral fairness in Africa, a weak positive relationship in Latin America, but 
insignificant results in Russia (McAllister & White, 2011; Moehler, 2009; Rosas, 2010).  
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Other variables, such as direct public funding of political parties (Birch, 2008: 306, 
313), have only been examined using one dataset.  Relationships that have only been 
demonstrated once or twice with perceived electoral fairness require replication 
studies before they can be considered robust and reliable.  This will confirm 
relationships across more countries and provide empirical support for these under-
researched relationships. 
Finally, some factors and indicators have repeatedly demonstrated consistent 
relationships with perceived electoral fairness across multiple studies.  For example, 
people who support elections winners have consistently positive attitudes electoral 
fairness (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Anderson & 
Tverdova, 2003; Banducci & Karp, 2003; Birch, 2008; Chang & Chu, 2006; Cho & 
Bratton, 2006; Craig et al., 2006; McAllister & White, 2011; Moehler, 2009; Singh et al., 
2012).  Any factors or indicators that have established strong and consistent 
associations with perceived electoral fairness are included in this study to account for 
their known effects. 
In summary, the primary research question seeks explanations for differences in 
perceptions of electoral fairness.  The limited available research motivates a desire to 
expand the literature and our understanding of this important topic.  The analysis and 
inclusion of different variables is therefore not driven by an overarching theory.  
Expected relationships are each derived from separate theoretical backgrounds and 
previous empirical findings.  This gives rise to numerous secondary research questions.  
How do socio-demographic factors, such as age and gender, effect perceptions of 
electoral fairness?  Which type of cultural fractionalization has the strongest negative 
effect on public attitudes?  Do subjective or objective measures of economic 
performance have more explanatory power?  There are more secondary questions 
than could be concisely or helpfully listed here, but each main section of Chapter 2 is 
summarised with a list of expected relationships based on theoretical and empirical 
findings. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided based on a distinction between individual level 
factors.  Section 2.1 covers all the individual level factors and is structured around six 
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thematic groupings.  These are socio-demographics, participation and engagement, 
media attention, economic performance, political performance, and group 
membership.  Section 2.2 outlines all national level indicators, except those for 
electoral management design, which are covered in Chapter 3.  These are again 
combined into six different thematic groupings: democratic performance, electoral 
context, parliamentary composition, political performance, economic conditions, and 
cultural fractionalisation.  The individual and national level thematic grouping are used 
to structure later chapters and as a guide for constructing regression models. 
2.1. Individual Level Factors 
The starting point for this research is relationships between individual level factors, 
such as majority group memberships or interest in politics, and public attitudes 
regarding electoral fairness.  It could be argued that subjective individual level 
perceptions are not as reliable as more objective measures of electoral malfeasance 
and fraud, but aggregated public perceptions are strongly correlated with expert and 
elite assessments (Norris et al., 2013; Rosas, 2010: 76).  The numerous individual level 
factors covered in this section are included for different reasons.  Many have not been 
examined with electoral fairness, but are expected to demonstrate associations based 
on relationships with similar types of political support.  Others have demonstrated 
mixed results or only been examined across a limited selection of countries, but there 
are good theoretical justifications or preliminary evidence to merit their inclusion.  
Some better research factors are included to control for their known effects on 
perceived electoral fairness.  The following subsections outline the different individual 
level thematic groupings, starting with socio-demographic factors. 
2.1.1. Socio-Demographics 
Previous research indicates that socioeconomic status and demographic characteristics 
affect attitudes towards the government, public administration, political system, and 
elections (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 74; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101; Birch, 
2008; Norris, 2002, 2004; Rosas, 2010).  The socio-demographic factors included here 
are age, gender, income, and education. 
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Gender 
Females are consistently less politically trusting and satisfied using different measures 
of political support.  Women are less likely to be happy with the political system 
(Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101), view the state as legitimate  (Seligson, 2002: 424), 
be satisfied with democracy (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 74; Singh et al., 2012: 206), or 
extend trust to political institutions (Anderson & Singer, 2008: 581-582; Cho & Bratton, 
2006: 745; Moehler, 2009: 359).  These findings demonstrate a significant and 
consistent negative association between females and a wide range of political support, 
but they do not tell us the reason for this relationship.  The most probable explanation 
is that women often have less influence in politics and political institutions, and may 
therefore feel more systematically discriminated.  Women are underrepresented in 
most political bodies, especially when considering higher positions of authority and 
power.  This is gradually changing, but women are still the minority gender in political 
institutions and positions around the world.  The same negative relationship holds 
when it comes to perceptions of electoral fairness, probably for similar reasons.  Men 
are consistently more likely to trust elections and feel they are conducted fairly, 
although the substantive impact is usually mild compared with other factors (Birch, 
2008: 312; Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 740; Rosas, 2010: 85). 
Age 
Age is related to many kinds of political and institutional trust, but the substantive size 
of significant relationships is usually small and inconsistent.  A common finding links 
younger respondents with greater democratic satisfaction, support for state legitimacy 
and trust in political institutions and government (Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002: 342; 
Anderson & Singer, 2008: 581-582; Cho & Bratton, 2006: 745; Moehler, 2009: 359; 
Seligson, 2002: 424).  Conversely, other studies have found older respondents more 
trusting of civil servants (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 102), more satisfied with and 
supportive of democracy (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 74; Kotzian, 2011: 34) and more 
likely to vote (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2009: 1414-1415; Birch, 2010: 1610).  Empirical 
studies are also inconclusive regarding the relationship between age and perceptions 
of electoral fairness.  Older respondents tend to be more cynical about electoral 
fairness in Africa (Moehler, 2009: 362) and the United States (Dennis, 1970: 833), but 
 37 
show positive attitudes towards electoral trust in Latin America (Rosas, 2010: 85) and 
across a selection of mostly European countries (Birch, 2008: 312; Farrell & McAllister, 
2006: 740).   
It is unclear why age shows mixed results across with perceived electoral fairness and 
other types of political support.  One explanation is that age increases cynicism while 
younger respondents are more willing to extend political support.  The logic behind 
this line of reasoning is that older generations may have experienced more electoral 
fraud and scandals, resulting in more pessimistic attitudes towards political actors, 
institutions, and systems.  Alternatively, one could anticipate that repeated elections 
might allow the public to remove corrupt politicians and gradually increase the quality 
of elections.  Whichever direction the respondent age relationship leans, effect sizes 
are small compared with other factors, meaning its impact on perceptions of electoral 
fairness is probably mild if it exists.  Based on the broadest set of countries in the most 
similar recent research (Birch, 2008; Rosas, 2010), it is assumed that older respondents 
will tend to view elections as fairer. 
Income 
Income generally has a positive effect on political attitudes.  People with higher 
incomes tend to be more satisfied with the way democracy works (Anderson & 
Guillory, 1997: 74), have higher levels of political participation (Birch, 2010: 1610; 
Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999: 1102), and view the electoral process as fairer (Birch, 2008: 
312; Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 740).  Some research finds inconclusive associations 
between income and political legitimacy (Seligson, 2002: 424), or that the relationship 
may have more to do with factors associated with higher income brackets than directly 
with all income levels (Gilley, 2006: 56).  However, the general trend is that a higher 
income level usually means a person is broadly benefiting from the current system and 
is thus more likely to be supportive of political institutions, actors, and processes. 
Education 
Higher education levels are expected to develop analytical skills that help people 
understand public affairs and discuss the political world, but the relationship between 
education and perceptions of electoral fairness is complex and contradictory.  For 
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example, higher education has been positively related to satisfaction with democracy 
in some countries (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 74), not significantly related to 
satisfaction with democracy at all in others (Singh et al., 2012: 206), and is sometimes 
negatively associated with support for political legitimacy (Seligson, 2002).  People 
with higher education levels often make more positive evaluations of the political 
system (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101) and are generally more supportive of 
democracy (Kotzian, 2011: 34).  Higher levels of education have also been associated 
with critical opinions regarding the incumbent government (Kotzian, 2011: 34), lower 
institutional trust (Chang & Chu, 2006: 265; Lühiste, 2006: 485, 493) and reduced 
consent to authority (Moehler, 2009: 359).   
The same inconsistent findings exist for the relationship between education and 
elections.  Higher education levels are usually associated with greater levels of political 
participation (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2009: 1415; Birch, 2010: 1610; Leighley & 
Vedlitz, 1999: 1102), but the results are mixed with regard to perceptions of electoral 
fairness.  Moehler (2009: 362) found a negative relationship between higher levels of 
education and perceptions of electoral fairness in AfroBarometer counties, while 
McAllister and White (2011: 677) found no significant relationship in Russia and Rosas 
(2010: 85) found a mild positive relationship in Latin American countries.  Using a 
larger international cross-section of countries reveals a positive relationship between 
education levels and perceived electoral fairness (Birch, 2008: 312; Farrell & 
McAllister, 2006: 740).  Prior research by Dennis (1970: 833) also suggests that 
respondents with higher educational levels are more likely to approve of electoral 
processes, but less likely to believe that elections are effective.  Research by Birch 
(2008), which is the most pertinent to the current research, found a positive 
relationship using a large international cross-section of countries. 
Education levels usually have significant associations with political attitudes, but the 
directions of these relationships vary or are inconsistent between studies and 
countries.  Highly educated people are in a better position to evaluate political 
processes and therefore may recognise ballot recount discrepancies as inevitable 
human counting errors rather malicious acts of fraud.  On the other hand, an educated 
person may be able to detect more nuanced manipulation involving the complexities 
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of processes such as boundary demarcation.  The correlations between higher 
education and perceived electoral fairness are more frequently positive.  Therefore, 
while the outcome is not entirely certain, we can assume that higher levels of 
education will lead to increased perceptions of electoral fairness. 
2.1.2. Participation and Engagement 
Levels of political participation and engagement are associated with many aspects of 
political support and institutional trust.  The following sections outline literature on 
supporting election winners, voting in the last election, interest in politics, living in an 
urban or rural area, and having a liberal or conservative political ideology.  Most of 
these factors have demonstrated relationships with perceived electoral fairness, but 
they have not been analysed across as many countries before. 
Electoral Participation 
The causal direction of any relationship between electoral participation and perceived 
electoral fairness is unclear and difficult to verify, but probably goes in both directions.  
For example, people who think elections are fair are more likely to vote (Birch, 2010: 
1615), since they are more likely to believe the process works and their ballot will be 
properly counted.  Conversely, people who vote are more likely to believe elections 
are fair (McAllister & White, 2011: 676-677), perhaps to justify their participation and 
commitment of time and effort.  The positive relationship nevertheless holds for 
supporters of both election winners and losers, though winners naturally express 
greater satisfaction (Nadeau & Blais, 1993: 562).  The positive relationship maintains 
across other types of political support.  People who vote are more likely to support the 
political system (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101), express confidence in civil servants 
(Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 102) and trust institutions such as the courts, army and 
police  (Moehler, 2009: 359).  It is thus unsurprising to find a positive relationship 
between electoral participation and viewing elections as fair (McAllister & White, 
2011: 676-677; Moehler, 2009: 362). 
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Political Interest 
Expressed interest in politics, like other elements of participation and engagement, is 
associated with different aspects of support.  Politically interested people are likely to 
know more about political and the electoral system.  They may be better able to 
discern between technical irregularities and electoral fraud, and may therefore tend to 
have positive views regarding elections.  Increased interest in politics and public affairs 
has been linked to positive attitudes towards political system performance (Anderson 
& Tverdova, 2003: 101) and the way democracy works (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 74), 
but the relationships are not always as reliable or consistent as other factors such as 
supporting electoral winners.  For example, political interest is negatively associated 
with support for democracy in some contexts such as post-communist European 
countries (Dowley & Silver, 2002: 522-523).  Nevertheless, individuals with greater 
political interest are usually more likely to trust a wide range of political actors and 
institutions (Anderson & Singer, 2008: 582; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 102; Cho & 
Bratton, 2006: 741; Moehler, 2009: 359).  They tend to defend democracy, consent to 
authority, believe the government is responsive to their needs (Moehler, 2009: 359), 
and have higher levels of political participation (Birch, 2010: 1613; Leighley & Vedlitz, 
1999: 1102).  Most importantly, higher political interest is associated with positive 
assessments of electoral fairness (Moehler, 2009: 362). 
Winner Status 
An extensive empirical literature clearly and consistently demonstrates that being on 
the winning side of an election leads to positive assessments of political actors, 
institutions, systems and processes (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 
2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Banducci & Karp, 2003; Birch, 2008; Chang & Chu, 
2006; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Craig et al., 2006; McAllister & White, 2011; Moehler, 
2009; Singh et al., 2012).  This should be no surprise as people who supported election 
winners are more likely to be satisfied with the outcome.  Winners have more positive 
attitudes towards the political system in general (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 99) and 
are more satisfied with the way democracy works (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 78; Cho 
& Bratton, 2006: 743).  Winners are also more trusting of the incumbent government 
(Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002: 343; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001: 333), civil servants 
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(Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 102), government officials (Chang & Chu, 2006: 269), and 
even institutions such as courts of law, the army and the police (Moehler, 2009: 352).  
These examples demonstrate that winning has a positive impact on many different 
types of political support.  This could be because winners tend to believe the current 
government is concerned about and responsive to their needs (Anderson & Guillory, 
1997).  The literature on supporting election winners includes large international cross-
sectional analyses as well as time-series studies and numerous statistical techniques.  
The relationship has been tested under different political systems and cultures at 
different times against a wide array of control variables, making it one of the more 
robust findings in political science. 
Identifying with or voting for winning candidates, parties or coalitions are all positively 
associated with increased trust in elections (Birch, 2008; Craig et al., 2006; McAllister & 
White, 2011; Moehler, 2009).  This finding arises from both international comparative 
analyses covering most areas of the world as well as smaller studies encompassing one 
or a few countries, and the results maintain statistical significance despite the inclusion 
of multiple national and individual level control variables.  The studies have focused on 
different aspects of elections, including the conduct of elections (Birch, 2008: 312), the 
broader electoral process (Craig et al., 2006: 589) and election outcomes  (McAllister & 
White, 2011: 676).  Some studies use party identification, where surveys ask which 
candidate or party people identify with, while other use voting choices (Anderson & 
LoTiempo, 2002; Anderson & Singer, 2008).  In both cases, supporting election winners 
is significant and strongly related to positive assessments of political institutions and 
electoral fairness.  The relationship is also maintained whether counting only a single 
winning candidate or party, or counting all members of a winning coalition (Banducci & 
Karp, 2003: 463-464).  What matters for public satisfaction is getting preferred 
candidates or parties into government and their ability to enact desired policies (Singh 
et al., 2012: 206).  Of all the variables examined, supporting the winner is often the 
most powerful reason for consenting to an election outcome and perceiving it as fair 
(Nadeau & Blais, 1993: 562).  This holds across presidential and parliamentary systems 
and for both executive and legislative elections.  Supporting election winners is 
expected to have a strong positive relationship with perceived electoral fairness. 
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Urban/Rural Status 
It is anticipated that rural status will tend to be associated with positive attitudes 
towards electoral fairness.  Populations in rural areas are often more homogeneous 
that the more heterogeneous demographics found in cities and urban areas.  This 
increases the chances for a candidate to represent a bigger proportion of voter 
preferences and thus increase satisfaction with elections when they win.  The lower 
population densities in rural areas also tend to decrease the ratio of representative to 
voters, making it easier for people to reach out to representatives and have their 
voices heard.  Research into the relationship between rural status and political trust is 
limited, but existing studies indicate a positive relationship.  People who live in smaller 
towns and villages are more likely to trust political institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1997: 
439-440; 2001: 50) and elections (Rosas, 2010: 87).  Previous studies included post-
communist countries in Eastern Europe and democracies in Latin America.  The current 
research will expand upon this to include countries from more regions of the world. 
Political Ideology 
Political ideology is determined via self-placement on a spectrum from left to right, or 
liberal to conservative.  This spectrum is inapplicable in large parts of the world, 
particularly those parts that have not yet industrialised, but remains a useable concept 
in some countries.  This mixed applicability is reflected in the empirical literature, with 
political ideology often not achieving statistical significance.  However, two recent 
studies indicate significant findings in the same direction.  In Latin America, Rosas 
(2010: 85) found that both political elites and citizens who identify as right-wing tend 
to have greater levels of trust in elections.  Birch (2008: 313) also found perceptions of 
electoral fairness to be negative for people on the left and positive for people on the 
right.  Although the substantive effect was moderate in both cases, people who lean to 
the right may tend to perceive elections as fairer than left leaning people.  Political 
parties often seek to win-over the median voter, which is most cases means appealing 
to conservative mainstream preferences.  People on the left are generally more 
progressive and seek changes that take longer to materialize with demographic 
changes.  This could be one reason for positive attitudes amongst people on the right 
and negative attitudes amongst people on the left. 
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2.1.3. Media Attention 
Media attention has not been studies extensively with perceived electoral fairness, but 
previous findings have produced significant relationships (Banducci & Karp, 2003; Hart, 
1994; Hetherington, 1998; McLeod & McDonald, 1985; Miller et al., 1979).  The 
following sections outline prior research regarding attention to different sources of 
political news of and levels of political knowledge. 
Television/Newspaper/Radio Attention 
Media attention is sometimes measured in aggregate, treating all sources of media as 
equal, but dissimilar sources may generate different relationships with perceived 
electoral fairness.  Newspapers are less likely to be a source of entertainment and are 
usually more focused on news, which makes the frequency of newspaper reading a 
better proxy for attention to political and electoral news.  Consistent findings indicate 
that watching television news tends to reduce political trust while reading newspapers 
tends to be associated with increased political trust and participation, even after 
controlling for demographic and socioeconomic factors (Hart, 1994; Hetherington, 
1998: 800; McLeod & McDonald, 1985: 26-27; Miller et al., 1979).  The aggregative 
approach of combining attention to all news sources has delivered statistically 
insignificant findings or significant but mixed results (Moehler, 2009: 359, 362; Rosas, 
2010: 84).  The more useful approach is to analyse each source of election media 
coverage separately to see if there are differences. 
According to Banducci and Karp (2003: 461), media attention during election 
campaigns is generally positively related to increased levels of trust, system support 
and satisfaction with democracy.  However, they found that more serious and labour 
intensive news outlets such as newspapers tend to generate more consistently positive 
political attitudes, while television may not do so as reliably or may even have a 
negative impact on political attitudes (Banducci & Karp, 2003: 463).  This could be why 
studies that treat all media coverage as equal and aggregate them into an index 
produce mixed findings.  If the different sources of media generate relationships in 
different directions, combining them into a single index will obscure the nature of the 
separate relationships.  The current research will test the assumption that more 
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frequent newspaper reading will be associated with greater perceptions of electoral 
fairness. 
Political Knowledge 
Political knowledge represents greater political awareness and the ability to make 
more nuanced assessments of the political world.  For example, Europeans with more 
political knowledge express greater degrees of national political trust, but are less 
likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works at the level of the European Union 
(Karp et al., 2003: 287).  We can expect interactions between electoral fairness and 
political knowledge because informed citizens will be better able to assess the quality 
of elections.  If an election is fair, a politically knowledgeable person is more likely to 
perceive this, but they will also be more aware of any electoral malfeasance.  Political 
knowledge is measured using factual questions about political actors, institutions, or 
structures.  People who get these questions correct tend to be more supportive of 
democracy, more likely to participate in elections (Birch, 2010: 1610; Carpini & Keeter, 
1996: 221-227) and more likely to have confidence in the electoral process (Birch, 
2008: 315).  However, political knowledge is also associated with increased scepticism 
regarding political institutions and democratic performance, especially when there are 
acknowledged legitimacy problems (Karp et al., 2003: 285).  Based on the generally 
more positive trend in previous findings, political knowledge is expected to be more 
frequently associated with positive assessments of electoral fairness.  One reason for 
this is that people with political knowledge are likely to be more forgiving of technical 
errors and administrative blunders because they understand the complexities and 
challenges of running elections. 
2.1.4. Economic Performance 
One of the most consistent findings with regard to political support is that good 
economic performance increases trust in a wide range of political actors and 
institutions (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Bratton, 2008; 
Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Nannestad & Paldam, 1994; Wong et al., 2011).  The 
research into links between economic performance and perceptions of electoral 
fairness is more limited however (Moehler, 2009), which is something the current 
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research aims to rectify.  Most survey research distinguishes between perceptions of 
the national economy, or ‘sociotropic’ economic performance, and perceptions of 
personal economic situations, or ‘egocentric’ political performance.  The following 
sections outline the perceived past, present, and future conditions both for the 
national economy and for respondents’ personal finances.  An additional individual 
factor related to economic performance is whether respondents have paid 
employment. 
National Economy 
National economic performance is one of the most important factors affecting political 
attitudes and one of the most frequently cited policy issues across a broad range of 
countries (Singer, 2011: 303).  Economic performance even rivals winner status in 
terms of its substantive positive effects on institutional trust and perceptions of 
electoral fairness (Moehler, 2009: 358-360, 362).  The evidence linking economic 
performance to different forms of political support is voluminous, with good reviews of 
this literature available from Nannestad and Paldam (1994) and Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier (2000).  Very robust and consistent findings show that when national 
economic performance is good, people are more likely to be satisfied with democracy 
(Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 74-75), trust government (Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002: 
341-343) and express confidence in institutions (Cho & Bratton, 2006: 745; Lühiste, 
2006: 487-488; Wong et al., 2011: 270). 
Most research evaluates national economic conditions, looking at inflation or 
employment rates and GDP growth.  When inflation and unemployment rates are low, 
and GDP growth rates are high, people are more likely to support political officials and 
institutions (Chappell, 1990; Hibbs et al., 1982; Wong et al., 2011).  A good overall 
current national economic situation is therefore expected to produce positive 
correlations with perceived electoral fairness.  However, we must also consider both 
the past national economic situation and the expected future economic condition.  
Looking to the future, people who are optimistic about improving economic conditions 
have higher levels of political trust and confidence in institutions (Chang & Chu, 2006: 
265; Mishler & Rose, 2001: 52).  The belief that future national economic conditions 
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will improve is also expected to show positive relationships with perceptions of fairer 
elections.  Considering the past, Monroe (1978) argues that economic performance is 
cumulative and there is a time lag before economic changes effect public evaluations.   
This suggests that people who think the current national economic situation has 
improved when compared with the past are more likely to view elections as fair.  In 
summary, people who think the past economic situation was worse, the present 
economy is good, and the future situation will be better are expected to have positive 
attitudes towards the fairness of elections. 
Personal Finances 
Economic performance can also refer to perceptions of personal or egocentric financial 
performance.  People who think their personal financial situation or their individual 
living conditions are good are more satisfied with democracy and political institutions, 
but this does not have as strong an impact as thinking the national economy is doing 
well (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 75; Cho & Bratton, 2006: 745; Lühiste, 2006: 487-
488).  The relationship between personal financial situations and political trust has 
received less attention, and the results are not as consistent.  Statistically significant 
results are not as frequent and when they are the effect sizes are usually smaller, but 
the relationships are usually in the same direction.  The same assumption regarding 
national economy can therefore be adjusted for personal financial conditions.  People 
who think that their present financial situation is good, things have improved 
compared with the past and their finances are expected to continue improving are 
more likely to view elections as fairer. 
Paid Employment 
Employment status is linked with political attitudes, although this factor sometimes 
does not produce significant results.  Nevertheless, people with paid jobs are more 
likely to positively evaluate the political system (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101), 
trust political institutions, express satisfaction with democracy (Anderson & Singer, 
2008), vote in elections (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2009: 1414-1415; Grönlund & Setälä, 
2007: 413, 415) and perceive elections as fair (Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 740).  The 
retired, unemployed, and students are not as likely to express their support, or the 
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relationships are not statistically significant.  The positive relationship between paid 
employment and political support makes sense, especially when considering that 
widespread unemployment often undermines confidence in governments.  A similarly 
positive relationship is expected between paid employment and perceptions of 
electoral fairness. 
2.1.5. Political Performance 
Opinions regarding political performance are strongly related to multiple aspects of 
political support.  The following sections discuss effects of perceived levels of political 
corruption, institutional trust and being or knowing a victim of physical crime. 
Government Corruption 
Perceived government corruption is related to a range of negative public assessments 
and holds across different political and cultural contexts.  Combatting corruption is 
often as important as economic performance in determining political trust (Wong et 
al., 2011: 270) and can even trump the importance of economic performance if it is 
perceived as pervasive (Singer, 2011: 301).  Low levels of government corruption are 
expected to be associated with positive attitudes towards electoral fairness.  This 
follows from previous research indicating that people who think corruption is 
decreasing are more likely to have a positive view of elections (McAllister & White, 
2011: 676).  This matches the consistent finding that higher levels of perceived 
government corruption lead to lower levels of other kinds of political and institutional 
trust (Chang & Chu, 2006: 265; Lühiste, 2006: 489-490; Mishler & Rose, 2001: 52).  
Perceived government corruption differs from the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 
which is based on expert assessments, because it depends upon public attitudes.  
Publicly perceived corruption is often considered a more subjective indicator than the 
CPI, but there is likely to be a high degree of correlation between the two.   
Institutional Trust 
Institutions and actors such as the executive, parliament, judiciary, political parties, 
and police are important because they play pivotal roles in electoral governance.  The 
executive government is often the primary actor for electoral tasks ranging from 
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logistical organization to selection of electoral management body (EMB) members.  
Political parties are often involved in electoral management, for example through 
member selection processes or via partisan membership requirements.  Parliaments 
usually have substantial influence over EMBs through accountability and appointment 
mechanisms, controlling budgets or expenditures, or via their control of the electoral 
legislative framework.  The judiciary is less directly involved in electoral management, 
but often adjudicates electoral disputes or conducts ballot recounts.  Police are 
included because they provide security during elections and are usually the institution 
tasked with investigating allegations of electoral fraud and enforcing electoral laws.  
Greater levels of public confidence in these institutions may also reflect that they are 
less corrupt and more effective at performing their roles.  For example, confidence in 
the executive and legislative acts as a proxy for measuring how well these institutions 
represent public interests, while confidence in the police may reflect public confidence 
that political corruption and electoral fraud will be addressed.  People with greater 
confidence in these institutions are therefore expected to view elections as fairer. 
The causal links between trust in political institutions and trust in elections is likely to 
travel in both directions.  Hetherington (1998: 799) found that institutional trust to be 
a strong and significant cause of dissatisfaction with political leaders, and that political 
trust simultaneously affects and is affected by different forms of political support.  
Brehm and Rahn (1997: 1012-1015) similarly found stronger evidence that confidence 
in political institutions causes increased interpersonal trust rather than the other way 
around.  Institutional trust is commonly the dependent variable, probably because this 
is of interest to political scientists, but will be employed as an independent variable in 
this study to investigate the effects of institutional trust on perceived electoral 
fairness. 
Crime Victimisation 
Being a victim of crime usually has a negative impact on political attitudes, with 
previous research finding clear and significant connections between crime 
victimization and democracy (Ceobanu et al., 2011; Pérez, 2003).  People who have 
experienced crime or feel insecure are less likely to be satisfied with and support 
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democracy (Ceobanu et al., 2011: 66-69; Pérez, 2003: 642-644).  Political legitimacy is 
also negatively associated with higher homicide rates (Nivette & Eisner, 2013: 13).  
Crime may affect political support indirectly through approval of police and thus the 
incumbent government.  Regimes where the police fail to protect the public are seen 
as less effective and public anger is directed at the incumbent government, which 
accordingly loses political support.  The implication is that people who have 
experienced crime are more likely to question the government’s ability to protect 
citizens or implement successful policies, which reduces perceived political legitimacy.  
Research on the relationship between crime and political attitudes is limited, while 
research into the relationship between crime victimisation and perceptions of electoral 
fairness is essentially non-existent.  Crime victimisation is included in this study to test 
whether the negative relationship between crime victimisation and support for 
democracy is also present for perceptions of electoral fairness.  Being, or personally 
knowing, a victim of a crime is expected to reduce perceptions of electoral fairness. 
2.1.6. Group Memberships 
Previous research has found relationships between different aspects of political 
support and group membership.  The groups included here are religious, ethnic, and 
linguistic.  Additional factors include being non-religious, non-partisan and generally 
trusting other members of society. 
Cultural Groups 
The cultural factors of ethnicity, language, and religion often affect political attitudes 
and engagement.  Members of cultural majority groups tend to have greater levels of 
support for democracy, political systems, governments, and political institutions 
(Dowley & Silver, 2002: 524; Lühiste, 2006: 491; Norris, 2004: 221-226).  Minority 
groups often have less confidence in political institutions (Kelleher & Wolak, 2007: 714, 
716-717), are less likely to vote in elections (Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999: 1111) and tend 
to perceive electoral processes as less fair (Birch, 2008: 318; Norris, 2004: 224).  
Respondents who are part of an ethnic, linguistic or religious minority tend to have 
more negative attitudes than those in the cultural majority.    
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The relationships between cultural factors and perceived electoral fairness may not 
always be consistent, since group membership and political attitudes depends upon 
complex interactions.  Members of minority groups that recently migrated sometimes 
have more optimistic attitudes towards the political system and institutions (Maxwell, 
2010).  In addition, some countries may do very well at promoting multiculturalism and 
including minority groups within government, which reduces the negative impact of 
being a member of a minority group.  In Canada, the French minority is well 
incorporated and votes more frequently, whereas the newer Chinese minority has not 
been as well incorporated and votes less frequently (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2009: 
1420).  Another cause for mixed results regarding the attitudes of minorities is their 
political power.  If a minority cultural group captures the national political structures 
and derives advantages from this position, they could view the political system, 
institutions and elections more positively.  In new democracies that were previously 
communist, minorities that politically benefitted from the collapse of the Soviet Union 
tend to view democracy and political institutions more favourably than Russian 
minorities that remain behind (Dowley & Silver, 2002: 522-524).  The Russian ethnic 
groups lost political power and influence when the new democracies splintered off 
from the Soviet Union, and consequently have more strongly negative political 
attitudes than other minorities.  The effects of majority versus minority status may not 
be universal, but depend on wider cultural and political contexts.  However, most 
democracies are based around principles of majority rule, which helps ensure the 
majority’s needs are met and the preferences of the majority are prioritised.  Members 
of majority groups are thus expected to view elections as fairer. 
Non-Religious 
An argument could be made that religious respondents are less likely to support 
democracy, since the preference for authoritarianism in spiritual matters may transfer 
to a preference for authoritarianism in political matters (Nadeau & Blais, 1993: 557-
558).  However, empirical research into associations between religiousness and 
political attitudes often uncovers a relationship in the opposite direction.  People who 
are religious are more likely to support government, democracy and society across a 
wide selection of counties, although the effect is often mild (Kotzian, 2011: 32).  More 
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specifically, attending religious services is often associated with positive attitudes 
rather than religious beliefs.  The mechanism of the relationship adheres to the social 
capital premise that more community involvement translates into higher levels of 
societal and political trust.  Studies using religious attendance demonstrate stronger 
positive correlations with institutional trust (Mishler & Rose, 1997: 439-440) and 
electoral participation (Bevelander & Pendakur, 2009: 1416; Birch, 2010: 1610).  A 
negative relationship is therefore expected between being non-religious and 
perceptions of electoral fairness. 
Non-Partisan 
Winners are expected to view elections as fair and losers to view them as unfair, but a 
large segment of respondents have no candidate or party preferences.  These people 
have a non-partisan status, which means they do not feel close to or identify with a 
particular political party or candidate.  They often do not vote either, and may be 
equally disillusioned with existing electoral candidates or the political system in 
general, viewing political participation as futile.  For whatever reasons, people lacking 
party identification tend to be less likely to believe elections were conducted fairly 
(Birch, 2008: 312).  Cho and Bratton (2006: 741) found non-partisans to be situated 
between winners and losers, being more satisfied than losers and less satisfied that 
winners.  We can thus expect the relationship between non-partisan status and 
perceptions of electoral fairness to be negative, but not as strongly negative as for 
losers of an election. 
Social Trust 
Social trust is sometimes called ‘interpersonal trust’ or ‘generalised social trust’ and 
deals with how much a person generally trusts other people in their society.  People 
who are generally trusting of others are theoretically more likely to extend this trust to 
political actors and institutions.  However, previous research has uncovered mixed 
results when examining the relationships between social trust and political attitudes.  
The associations are sometimes non-existent or weak, with many studies not finding 
any significant results (Kotzian, 2011: 34).  The lack of reliability may be due to 
difficulties in establishing causal direction of relationship (Mishler & Rose, 2001), or 
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because uncovering relationships necessitates large cross-national studies and many 
studies look at a limited set of countries (Zmerli & Newton, 2008: 717).  This is 
reasonable because the generalised nature of social trust means it should be more 
prominent through comparisons with other countries.  It is rare for social trust to be 
negatively related with political attitudes in cross-national studies.  When results are 
significant, they are usually positive.  Indeed studies with significant results show that 
social trust is positively correlated with support for democracy, political institutions 
and government performance (Dowley & Silver, 2002: 522-523; Kaase, 1999: 13-14; 
Lühiste, 2006: 485; Mishler & Rose, 2001).  The current research is cross-national and 
thus expects to uncover a positive association between social trust and perceptions of 
electoral fairness. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the expected relationships based on previous findings and 
theoretical assumptions.  They are combined within the same thematic groupings 
presented in the preceding sections.  These include socio-demographics, participation, 
media attention, economic performance, political performance, and group 
membership.  For clarity, these same groupings are used throughout the thesis. 
Table 2.1: Summary of Expected Individual Level Relationships 
Public perceptions of elections will tend to be positive if people… 
 are older, male, have higher incomes or are more educated; 
 support electoral winners, participate in elections, express higher political 
interest, live in rural areas or have a conservative (right-wing) political ideology; 
 read newspapers more frequently or have greater political knowledge; 
 think the national economy is performing well, think their personal financial 
situation is improving or have paid employment; 
 perceive public sector corruption as low, political institutions as trustworthy, or 
are not victims of physical crimes; 
 are members of ethnic, linguistic and/or religious majority groups, are religious, 
are partisan or generally trust other people. 
2.2. National Level Indicators 
The second focus of this research project is national level indicators, which previous 
research indicates have considerable explanatory power regarding political support 
and trust (Kotzian, 2011: 35).  Gilley identified three areas that determine state 
legitimacy: democratic rights, overall welfare gains, and general governance (Gilley, 
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2006).  Many of the indicators composing these three broad areas are included in the 
current research.  Other indicators are included based on the same broad reasons used 
for individual level factors.  Some are included based on theoretical and empirical 
extrapolations from similar types of political support.  Many have only been analysed 
across a few countries or demonstrated mixed results and are included so clarify their 
relationship with perceived electoral fairness.  Other indicators are included to account 
for their known effects because they have demonstrated consistent relationships with 
perceived electoral fairness.  The many national level indicators included in this 
research are grouped into six thematic areas to make them more accessible: 
democratic performance, electoral context, parliamentary composition, political 
performance, economic performance, and cultural fractionalisation.  These same 
groups are used throughout the thesis, forming the basis of regression models, and are 
discussed in the following sections. 
2.2.1. Democratic Performance 
A country’s degree of democratic performance has considerable effect levels of 
political support and public confidence in political institutions.  Indicators included in 
this thesis are the number of years since universal suffrage, political rights, and civil 
liberties.  The latter two are indices from Freedom House that combine a range of 
national issues.  Together these indices act as proxies for the level of democratic 
achievement, which is an important determinant for political attitudes.  Further 
information is provided in the following paragraphs. 
Democratic Experience 
The longer a country has had universal suffrage, the greater the likely level of 
democratic achievement.  Year of universal suffrage was chosen instead of years of 
democracy because this research is about electoral fairness and electoral systems that 
prevent half the population from voting, in the case of women’s suffrage, are less likely 
to be perceived as fair.  The assumption is that the longer a system has had universal 
suffrage the more likely perceptions of electoral fairness will improve.  There will be 
exceptions, but a longer period of universal suffrage should be associated with a 
stronger democratic culture, a fairer political playing field, and more stable 
 54 
institutions.  Treisman (2000: 433-435) found that longer exposure to democracy has a 
small but significant association with lower levels of perceived corruption.  Democratic 
age does not always significantly affect political attitudes, such as evaluations of the 
political system (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101), but democratic satisfaction 
generally increases alongside accumulated democratic experience (Farrell & 
McAllister, 2006: 736-737, 739-741). 
Political Rights 
One way of measuring the level of democracy is using political rights.  These include 
procedural fairness under the law as well as rights of civil and political participation.  
When the legal system functions impartially, accusations of electoral fraud are more 
likely to be addressed and those making the accusations are less likely to be unjustly 
punished.  When people are granted freedoms of association, assembly, and petition, 
their political engagement unhindered and their vote is more likely to be free.  It is 
therefore not surprising that Birch (2008: 313-314) found a positive relationship 
between political rights and higher perceptions of electoral fairness.  The same 
positive relationship between political rights and perceptions of electoral fairness is 
anticipated in this research. 
Civil Liberties 
Civil liberties are related to political rights and include assurances of personal safety 
and privacy, freedom from discrimination, and individual rights such as freedoms of 
expression, thought, religion and movement.  This usually includes freedom of the 
media and human rights such as gender equality and civic freedoms, which are 
consistently powerful determinants of political legitimacy (Gilley, 2006: 57).  Countries 
that protect civil liberties are more likely to have fair elections because citizens can 
more safely criticize the government and form opposition movements.  Incumbents 
may face increased public accountability and scrutiny, making the potential costs of 
committing electoral fraud much higher.  The current research therefore expects to 
find a positive relationship between civil liberties and perceptions of electoral fairness. 
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2.2.2. Electoral Context 
The electoral context refers to conditions surrounding elections and the electoral 
system.  Different aspects of the electoral context have been shown to affect public 
perceptions of electoral fairness.  These include whether the electoral system uses 
proportional representation, whether parties have direct public funding and the 
victory margin of elections. 
Proportional Representation 
Electoral systems that incorporate elements of proportional representation (PR) have 
demonstrated positive effects on public attitudes.  The more proportional a system, 
the less prone it is to functioning only for the benefit of the majority.  In majoritarian 
systems, the majority can more easily have its interests represented while minorities 
are less likely to have effective representation.  Minority groups are often excluded 
from power and those with periphery preferences are discouraged from participating 
(Lijphart, 1984, 1999).  There is however evidence that people may have to experience 
the two systems in order to fully appreciate the difference (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 
78-79).  Other contrary empirical findings indicate that PR in conjunction with 
presidential systems may be associated with higher levels of political corruption 
(Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, 2005), and hence the possibility of decreased perceptions 
of electoral fairness.  Nevertheless, most studies find a positive relationship between 
proportional representation and political attitudes.  Proportional systems have been 
associated with greater consolidation of democracy than majoritarian systems (Birch, 
2005).  They are often better at achieving representation, accountability and governing 
capacity (Lindberg, 2005: 61-62).  Proportionality also boosts support for the political 
system amongst minority groups, who have a greater chance of getting their 
representatives into parliament and getting public attention for their particular issues 
(Cho & Bratton, 2006: 747).  The greater representation extends beyond minority 
groups to society in general, with increased opportunities for a more politically diverse 
parliament and the representation of a wider range of interests and issues.  This could 
be why election losers are generally more satisfied in proportional systems than in 
majoritarian ones (Anderson & Guillory, 1997).  People in countries that have 
proportional electoral systems are more likely to feel government is responsive to their 
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needs.  Proportional representation is therefor associated with increased levels of 
political support, reduced levels of electoral fraud and increased perceptions of 
electoral fairness (Birch, 2007; 2008: 312-313; Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 739-740).  
The relationship between proportional representation and perceptions of electoral 
fairness is therefore expected to be positive. 
Direct Public Funding 
Direct public funding of political parties is one way of levelling the playing field, helping 
to make electoral competition more equitable by giving all parties a fairer chance to 
win elections.  Public funds can provide support for newer political parties that might 
otherwise be poorly funded, which often helps make electoral competition more 
equitable (Casas-Zamora, 2005: 227).  Perhaps the strongest argument in favour of 
public funding is that it alleviates parties from incurring debts to wealthy private 
donors and facing pressure to align their priorities accordingly (Scarrow, 2007b: 203).   
However, the provision of public funding may fail to curb political finance corruption 
because politicians still seek additional private funding to gain a campaigning 
advantage over their competition (Casas-Zamora, 2005: 225; Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002: 
78).  The public may not always like the idea of subsidising parties with taxpayer 
money, and the practice is generally unpopular with electors (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002: 
78).  Direct public funding may also freeze existing party systems because payment 
criteria usually favour incumbents, helping protect them from newer competitors (Katz 
& Mair, 1995).  Yet evidence either does not support this contention (Scarrow, 2007a), 
or points in the opposite direction.  There is empirical support for a strong positive 
relationship between direct public funding of parties and increased public confidence 
in elections (Birch, 2008: 306, 313).  Given the theoretical reasoning and previous 
findings, this current research expects to find a positive relationship between direct 
public funding of political parties and perceptions of electoral fairness. 
Victory Margin 
The margin of victory, or closeness of the electoral race, is often postulated to affect 
political attitudes, but supporting evidence is sparse and inconclusive.  A bigger victory 
margin might be expected to increase the acceptance of election outcomes, since a 
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larger margin should mean that more people support the elections winners and be 
satisfied with the outcome.  However, the opposite relationship has been found.  As 
the margin increases, the likelihood of an acceptable election outcome decreases 
(Hartlyn et al., 2008: 87).  Similarly unexpected results have been found with rates of 
voter turnout (Birch, 2010: 1611).  Other studies have found a positive relationship 
between margin of victory and perceptions of electoral fairness (Birch, 2008: 313), but 
some findings indicate no statistically significant relationship (Rosas, 2010: 85).  Victory 
margin will be included here to determine whether there is a relationship, or whether 
this factor can be overlooked in future research.  Following from the most similar 
research by Birch (2008), victory margin is expected to be positively related to 
perceptions of electoral fairness. 
2.2.3. Parliamentary Composition 
The composition of the national parliament is highly relevant for perceptions of 
electoral fairness, especially when survey questions ask specifically about legislative 
elections.  The three aspects of parliamentary composition covered in this research 
include the size of the lower legislature, total population per parliamentary member 
and the percentage of women in the national legislature. 
Legislature Size 
Larger lower legislatures usually mean smaller electoral districts and more seats.  
Having smaller constituencies increases the likelihood of diversity within the 
legislature, while also decreasing the ratio of voters to representatives.  The additional 
seats in larger legislatures provide more chances for different parties or groups to get 
their representatives elected.  Farrell and McAllister (2006: 739-740) found that larger 
legislatures are significantly associated with positive perceptions of electoral fairness.  
The same assumption of a positive relationship is used the current research, but will be 
tested for confirmation across many more countries. 
Population per MP 
A smaller ratio of voters to Members of Parliament (MPs) should increase 
responsiveness and voter satisfaction, but the empirical results have so far been mixed 
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or contradictory.  Voters per MP has demonstrated a mild negative relationship with 
electoral fairness (Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 736, 740).  Data for total population is 
used instead of for total eligible voters because it is more widely available.  The rations 
should be similar however, as total population and total eligible voters will roughly 
parallel each other.  The effects of population per MP will be analysed using a wide 
selection of countries to verify previous findings and determine if there are any broad 
trends in its relationship with perceived electoral fairness.  As with the previous study, 
the association is expected to be positive. 
Women in Parliament 
A higher percentage of women in parliament may be positively associated with 
political attitudes, but the topic needs more cross-national empirical research 
(Wangnerud, 2009: 65-66).  Having more women in parliament is likely to increase 
perceptions that the political system is more equitable.  Karp and Banducci (2008: 112) 
found more women in parliament to be substantially and significantly correlated with 
greater democratic satisfaction and increased likelihood of elections reflecting voter 
preferences.  Having more women in parliament is also associated with lower levels of 
corruption (Dollar, Fisman, & Gatti, 2001).  Moreover, the effects of more equitable 
descriptive representation of women in parliament boosts the political evaluations of 
both males and females (Karp & Banducci, 2008: 113-114).  Lawless (2004: 89-90) also 
failed to find any interaction effects between gender and the percentage of women in 
the US Congress.  If there is a relationship between women in parliament and political 
attitudes, it appears unrelated to gender.  Based on previous research, the relationship 
between women in parliament and perceptions of electoral fairness is anticipated to 
be positive. 
2.2.4. Political Performance 
The performance of government obviously affects public confidence in political actors 
and institutions, but it also affects other aspects of governance such as the perceived 
fairness of elections.  The aspects of political performance with demonstrated 
relationships in this area include public sector corruption, national income inequality 
and media freedom.  Income inequality is included within the political rather economic 
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performance grouping because the market by itself does not produce a fair 
distribution of income, and redistributive policies are generally needed to reduce 
income inequality. 
Public Sector Corruption 
This national level indicator differs from the previous measure of public attitudes 
towards corruption because it is an expert-created index: Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index.  People in countries with higher levels of corruption 
tend to have negative attitudes towards political actors and institutions.  Higher 
corruption is associated with dissatisfaction regarding democracy, decreased support 
for the political system, and distrust of the government and civil servants (Anderson & 
Tverdova, 2003: 99; Kotzian, 2011: 32-33).  Corruption is often correlated with support 
for the incumbent government, meaning people hold the current government 
responsible for the level of corruption rather than the political system or democracy.  
The ability of government to fight corruption is a substantial determinate of state 
legitimacy (Gilley, 2006: 57; Seligson, 2002: 424).  Elections also display the same 
negative relationship with higher levels of corruption (Birch, 2008: 313; Hartlyn et al., 
2008: 88).  Following this previous cross-national research, the relationship between a 
corruption and fairer elections is expected to be negative. 
Income Inequality  
Countries with very unequal income distributions are more likely to have citizens with 
differing interests, which could carry over into electoral politics and increase pressure 
to capture the electoral process.  Income inequality usually is negatively correlated 
with political support.  People in countries with high levels of income inequality are 
more likely to evaluate the performance of the political system negatively and to 
distrust political institutions (Anderson & Singer, 2008: 583-585). Higher levels of 
income inequality correlate with lower levels of support for democracy, although the 
effect size is small (Kotzian, 2011: 32).  Interestingly, ideologically left-wing 
respondents are more likely to express negative political evaluations when income 
inequality is high, but this interaction effect is not significant in countries with more 
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equal incomes (Anderson & Singer, 2008: 585).  The relationship between income 
inequality and perception of fair elections is expected to be negative. 
Media Freedom 
Freedom of the media is a foundational element of an open and functioning 
democracy.  Freedom of the media entails independent stations, channels, and news 
outlets free from government intervention or interests.  Media controlled by the state 
are particularly susceptible to biased electoral coverage and favouring the incumbent 
party or candidate.  Increased media freedom and independence therefore acts to 
level the playing field by giving opposition parties a better chance of getting their 
message heard.  It enables the press to act as a check on government abuses of power, 
in this case with regard to elections.  Greater media freedom tends to be associated 
with reduced levels of public sector corruption (Chowdhury, 2004).  Free media 
increases the risk of getting caught committing electoral fraud, thereby providing good 
incentive against malfeasance.  The relationship between media freedom and 
perceived electoral fairness is therefore expected to be positive. 
2.2.5. Economic Performance 
Economic performance is one of the most consistently important determinants of 
political attitudes, affecting government support, political legitimacy, and electoral 
fairness (Birch, 2008: 313-314; Gilley, 2006: 57; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000).  Some 
studies have even found that economic development is more important than 
democratic achievement for political support (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101).  
Three economic indicators are used in this research: the Human Development Index 
(HDI), Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth per capita. 
Human Development Index 
The Human Development Index combines life expectancy, education level and income 
indices.  Relationships with political attitudes are not always statistically significant 
(Hartlyn et al., 2008: 88), but higher levels of development tend to be associated with 
positive evaluations of systemic performance (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101).  Birch 
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(2008: 313-314) found a very strong positive relationship between the Human 
Development Index (HDI) and perceptions of fair electoral processes. A positive 
relationship between the HDI and perceived electoral fairness is expected because 
socioeconomically developed countries are usually the more established democracies.  
GNI Per Capita 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita measures the overall level of economic 
development.  Per capita measurements of economic development are positively 
associated with evaluations of democracy (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 100-103).  This 
could be because perceived corruption decreases as GDP per capita increases 
(Treisman, 2000: 415; 429-430).  The frequency of acceptable elections tends to 
increase with greater GNI per capita (Hartlyn et al., 2008: 88).  Perceptions of electoral 
fairness should therefore be positively associated with GNI per capita because officials 
in richer countries may be less likely to risk accepting bribes, and officials in richer 
countries usually have better technical capacities for detecting fraud.  However, higher 
per capita GNI can be associated with negative attitudes towards government and 
people in higher income countries may be more critical of democracy.  Economic 
growth rates may therefore act as a more important determinant of political attitudes 
(Kotzian, 2011: 31-33), which is the third economic performance indicator. 
GDP Growth Per Capita 
Using economic growth rates rather has the added benefit over per capita GDP of 
being a performance measure that countries at different stages of development can all 
aspire to achieve (Gilley, 2006: 57).  Comparative research occasionally reveals a weak 
relationship between economic growth and support for democracy or the government, 
citing political rather than economic factors as more important (Powell & Whitten, 
1993).  However, the more frequent and robust finding is that economic factors, 
particularly growth, are more important (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000).  Growth rates 
are especially important for democratic support in established democracies compared 
with transitional democracies (Kotzian, 2011: 31-33).  Economic growth also has a 
positive impact on attitudes towards the political system and trust in civil servants 
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(Anderson & Tverdova, 2003: 101-102).  It is therefore expected to have a positive 
relationship with perceived electoral fairness. 
2.2.6. Cultural Fractionalization 
Cultural fractionalization refers to the degree of ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
diversity.  Very little empirical cross-national research exists on the relationship 
between cultural fractionalization and perceived electoral fairness.  Previous studies 
on related topics suggest the relationship will be negative however.  Ethnic 
fractionalization is negatively related to trust in local government, meaning that living 
in a city with higher ethnic diversity decreases political trust (Rahn & Rudolph, 2005: 
546-548).  Greater ethnic diversity also has a strong negative relationship with 
economic growth in Africa (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Posner, 2004), and may affect 
political support indirectly through reduced economic performance.  Alesina et al. 
(2003: 158) similarly find that both ethnic and linguistic fractionalization are negatively 
associated with the quality of government.  Linguistic diversity can also be a source of 
political conflict (Keech, 1972).  The overall expectation therefore is that greater levels 
of diversity in these cultural dimensions will increase the likelihood of inter-group 
electoral competition and decrease perceptions of electoral fairness. 
Table 2.2 summarizes the assumptions for national level indicators not related to EMB 
design.  For clarity, they are listed according to their thematic groupings in preceding 
sections.  These were democratic performance, electoral context, parliamentary 
composition, political performance, economic conditions, and cultural 
fractionalization. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of Expected National Level Relationships 
Public perceptions of elections will tend to be positive where … 
 universal suffrage has lasted longer, political rights are well established or civil 
liberties are protected; 
 the electoral system uses proportional representation, parties receive direct 
public funding or the victory margin is larger; 
 legislatures are larger, the ration of population per MP is lower, or parliament 
has higher percentages of women; 
 public sector corruption is lower, income inequality is lower or there is freedom 
of the media; 
 human development, per capita GNI or per capita GDP growth is higher; 
 religious, ethnic or linguistic fractionalization is lower. 
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Chapter 3. The Role of Electoral Management Bodies 
This chapter outlines two models of EMB design and their component parts, explaining 
how they are expected to affect perceptions of electoral fairness.  These expectations 
are informed by theoretical frameworks more than previous findings, since there is a 
notable lack of research on EMB design, but empirical findings are incorporated and 
discussed if they are available.  The first EMB design is the conventional independent 
model, when a body separate from the executive government runs elections, which is 
one of three broad types.  The other types are the governmental model, when the 
executive runs elections, and the mixed model, when an independent body and the 
executive share electoral management responsibilities.  EMBs are determined to be 
one of these three broad types based on a common set of criteria.  The second EMB 
design analysed in this theses is the categorised autonomy model, which distinguishes 
between four types of autonomy: institutional, financial, personnel and functional.  
These categories focus on separating the EMB, its finances, staff, and responsibilities 
from direct executive government control.  The functional category requires autonomy 
in the other categories, helping to ensure electoral management tasks are carried out 
independently of the executive government.  The categorised autonomy model can be 
thought of as an extension to the conventional independent model, since it adds 
further details and specifications.  This thesis uses the terms ‘independence’ and 
‘autonomy’ to distinguish between the two EMB design models, but both terms refer 
to separation from the executive government. 
Research into both new and old democracies suggests that the likelihood of free and 
fair elections increases ‘when an electoral body is independent from a country’s 
executive branch’ (López-Pintor, 2000: 140).  Despite its apparent merits, an 
independent EMB may be less necessary in established democracies with advanced 
economies.  Many established democracies maintain a broadly governmental model of 
electoral management, but also have publics that view elections as generally free and 
fair.  Administrative competence is relatively high in established democracies and the 
tasks associated with electoral management are less challenging compared to other 
more complex aspects of governance.  Most citizens in developed countries thus take 
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for granted that electoral processes are impartial, and generally have more confidence 
in the conduct of elections (Pastor, 1999a: 77-78).  There are exceptions however, and 
the advantages of independent electoral governance are becoming more apparent. 
EMB independence may be more important in new and transitional democracies 
where administrative capacities are often underdeveloped, impartiality and 
professionalism are often not yet embedded within the political culture, and important 
resources are scarcer.  Under these circumstances, opposition parties and candidates 
may interpret technical irregularities as political fraud and malfeasance by the 
incumbent government.  This can be socially divisive and politically destabilising at a 
crucial point in the establishment and consolidation of democracy.  An independent 
EMB separates electoral governance from incumbent interests in maintaining power 
and thereby reduces opportunities for electoral malfeasance.  Independent and 
permanent EMBs can provide opportunities for career advancement and the 
development of professional electoral officers.  These EMBs often support the ongoing 
training of their staff, cooperate with other EMBs or international organizations, and 
help educate citizens about democratic processes.  This helps reduce technical 
irregularities and establish public trust in democracy and electoral governance. 
The following sections are divided between the two EMB models.  Subsections within 
3.1 explain the conventional independent model criteria.  These include 
implementation, powers, budget, accountability, member selection, and term of office.  
Subsections within 3.2 describe the categorised autonomy model and constituent 
features of institutional, financial, personnel and functional autonomy. 
3.1. Conventional Independent Model 
The conventional independent model is one of three broad types in a widely used 
framework for studying and understanding electoral management, which identifies 
EMBs as governmental, independent, or mixed.  The United Nations Development 
Program (López-Pintor, 2000), European Commission (EC, 2006), Economic Community 
of West African States (Hounkpe & Fall, 2011), Organisation of American States (OAS, 
2009) and International IDEA (Wall et al., 2006) all categorise EMBs using this model.  A 
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governmental model exists when elections are organized by the executive branch and 
EMBs are overseen by a minister or civil servant (Wall et al., 2006: 7, 9).  This model 
gives the executive control of most aspects of electoral governance, which opens 
opportunities for corruption and electoral malfeasance, making governmental 
theoretically EMBs more susceptible to electoral fraud.  Examples of the governmental 
electoral management bodies include the Elections Department within the Prime 
Minister's Office in Singapore and the Election Unit within the Ministry of Interior in 
Denmark.  The independent model of electoral management makes a separate body, 
not part of any executive ministry or department, responsible for electoral 
management.  Examples include the Electoral Council in Uruguay and the Independent 
Electoral Commission in South African.  The third broad type is the mixed model of 
electoral management, which usually composed of two, but sometimes more, bodies 
responsible for electoral governance – one institutionally independent of the executive 
and the other located within a government department (Wall et al., 2006: 8).  France 
follows this model, with the Ministry of Interior implementing elections and the 
Constitutional Court responsible for oversight and monitoring.  Japan also follows a 
mixed model, with the Ministry of Interior and Central Election Management Council 
sharing electoral responsibilities. 
The focus for this research project is on the conventional independent model, rather 
than the governmental or mixed models.  It was developed in response to the 
shortcomings of having the incumbent government running elections.  Electoral 
legitimacy is enhanced when independent EMBs are perceived as impartial and not 
subject to political control, whereas electoral legitimacy may be compromised if EMBs 
are perceived to be aligned with the incumbent government or subject to partisan 
interests (Wall et al., 2006: 21).  The independent model depoliticizes election 
governance by removing most conflicts of interest arising from having elected officials 
control the agencies responsible for their own re-election.  Lehoucq (2002: 31) goes as 
far as arguing that independent EMBs are one of the ‘central institutional 
developments that made democratisation stick in some places, but not in others’.  This 
is one reason why the conventional independent model is frequently advocated as a 
way to increase electoral integrity (Elklit & Reynolds, 2001; Goodwin-Gill, 2006; 
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Lehoucq, 2002; López-Pintor, 2000; Mozaffar, 2002; Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002; 
Pastor, 1999a, 1999b; Wall et al., 2006).  Most independent EMBs are permanent 
rather than temporary bodies established only during election time.  This enables staff 
training and citizen education, while also providing career opportunities that help 
retain professional, knowledgeable, and experienced staff.  Independent EMB 
members tend to have the specialized knowledge required for election management, 
experience at detecting electoral fraud, and an interest in maintaining their 
professional impartiality.  The independent EMB model is therefore viewed as superior 
to both the mixed and governmental models of electoral management. 
Despite its theoretical merits, empirical evidence for the independent EMB model is 
inadequate and inconsistent.  Studies research by Birch (2008) and Rosas (2010) has 
demonstrated that the relationship between the independent model and public 
confidence in elections is negative or muted.  Birch (2008) found a strong and 
significant negative relationship between the conventional independent model and 
perceptions of electoral fairness.  This is counterintuitive because the normative 
assumption is that independent EMBs should increase the fairness and quality of 
elections.  The only speculative explanation Birch offers is that independent EMBs are 
introduced in response to electoral fraud, but public perceptions remain biased 
because they remember past electoral conditions (Birch, 2008: 313).  However, the 
previous studies by Birch (2008) and Rosas (2010) used a variable that conflates all 
independent EMB design features into a single dichotomous value.  An alternative 
method of separately analysing the component criteria of EMB independence might 
prove more enlightening.  The current research takes this approach, following the 
original framework outlined by Wall et al. (2006).  There are six criteria with available 
data: implementation, accountability, powers, term of office, budget, and staff.  The 
following sections explain these criteria. 
3.1.1. Implementation 
The first and possibly most important of criteria for distinguishing between the three 
different EMB models is implementation of elections or the electoral process.  This 
refers to which body has responsibility for running elections, particularly core election 
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tasks such as voter registration, operating polling stations and tabulating election 
results.  Under an independent model, a separate body such as an electoral 
commission organizes and runs elections (Wall et al., 2006: 7, 9).  This is in opposition 
to the governmental model, when the logistics of organizing elections is the 
responsibility of an executive body such as the ministry of interior.  Under a mixed 
model, the independent component often monitors or supervises the implementation 
of elections, while the governmental component often organizes and runs elections 
under the direction of the executive (Wall et al., 2006: 8-9).  The fully independent 
model provides less opportunities for government corruption of the electoral process 
that the other models. 
3.1.2. Accountability 
The second criterion for differentiating EMB types is their accountability.  Independent 
EMBs are not directly accountable to the executive branch, but usually report to the 
legislature, head of state or judiciary (IDEA, 2006: 9).  Accountability to these actors is 
intended to enhance transparency and integrity, which should increase public trust 
and confidence in EMB operations (Wall et al., 2006: 223).  The independent model 
insulates electoral management from executive control if the legislature includes 
opposition members, the head of state is not part of the executive government, or the 
judiciary is independent.  Conversely, governmental EMBs are fully accountable to the 
executive branch and subject to ministerial direction.  Under a mixed model, the 
independent component is not accountable to the executive, while the governmental 
component is fully accountable to the executive.  The independent model of 
accountability to non-executive actors is expected to have the strongest positive 
effects on perceived electoral fairness. 
3.1.3. Powers 
The powers criteria is assessed based on whether an EMB can develop the electoral 
regulatory framework (Wall et al., 2006: 9).  The essential attribute for an independent 
model is this ability to make policy decisions without executive control.  At a minimum, 
this means the power to make formal recommendations to the legislative branch 
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regarding electoral regulations, but it may also entail the power to settle electoral 
disputes.  This provides an impartial way of adapting the legislative framework and 
settling disputes rather than having the government implement reforms and arbitrate 
in their own favour.  The powers of governmental EMBs are more limited and usually 
restricted to implementing elections, sometimes sharing this responsibility with other 
government departments (Wall et al., 2006: 13).  Under a mixed EMB model, the 
independent component is usually responsible for supervising the administration of 
elections, while the governmental model is limited to powers necessary for 
administering the election (Wall et al., 2006: 14).  The focus of this research is on the 
independent model power criteria, since granting an independent body the power to 
alter the electoral regulatory framework and set policies free from government control 
is expected to maximize impartiality. 
3.1.4. Composition 
Composition refers to the makeup and selection of EMB staff or members.  
Independent EMBs are composed of members that are outside other branches of 
government, and therefore not under the direct supervision of the chief executive or 
any individual Cabinet minister (Wall et al., 2006: 12).  Independent EMBs usually have 
a permanent core of members that maintain their positions between elections, 
enabling specialized technical training for staff and educational programs to enhance 
citizen engagement.  Governmental EMBs, on the other hand, are composed of and led 
by public servants who are part of the executive branch (Wall et al., 2006: 13).  This 
means there are no EMB ‘members’ since there are employees of the government and 
thus selected exclusively by the executive.  Governmental EMB staff is often 
temporarily assigned during election periods and then return to their main job after 
elections, providing less opportunities for skills development and specialized training.  
For the mixed model, independent component members are usually outside the 
executive government while in office, often with security of tenure, while the staff of 
the governmental component are led by a public servant or minister and are often 
recruited temporarily for the election period.  The independent model limits 
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government interference in staffing and allows opportunities for specialized training to 
increase electoral integrity. 
3.1.5. Term of Office 
The term of office criteria depends upon the job security of EMB staff.  Independent 
EMB members have more security of tenure and often, although not always, a fixed 
term of office (Wall et al., 2006: 12).  This is usually accompanied by restrictions 
regarding dismissing EMB members to provide more freedom to make impartial 
decisions.  Governmental EMBs do not have members in the same way and the staff 
do not usually have fixed terms, since they are hired and fired according to the same 
rules as public servants (Wall et al., 2006: 13).  The lack of fixed terms combined with 
full accountability to a Cabinet minister makes employment tenures less secure and 
induces loyalty towards the executive.  Mixed EMBs are more diverse, but usually the 
independent component has members with some degree of job security while staff in 
the governmental component is part of the public service.  The more secure terms of 
office afforded independent EMB members makes it harder for the executive to 
terminate employment as a means of coercion. 
3.1.6. Budget 
The budget criterion for independent EMBs specifies that they have their own budgets 
separate from any ministry or department and manage their own expenses (Wall et al., 
2006: 9).  Budgetary independence is achieved when EMBs determine their own 
budget needs or have a separate budget allocated by the legislature, while a non-
executive actor audits their expenditures.  Conversely, governmental EMB budgets are 
included within government ministry or local authority budgets (Wall et al., 2006: 7, 9).  
In most cases, this means governmental EMBs do not have their own separate bank 
accounts, determine their own budget nor control over their own expenditures.  
Having the budget determined by the government makes an EMB financially 
dependent and vulnerable to insufficient funding if it goes against executive wishes.  
Under a mixed EMB model, the independent component often has separate budget 
and the governmental component usually shares its budget with a ministry or 
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department.  The independent model of having budgets and expenditures separate 
from the executive government provides the freedom to make independent staffing, 
funding and procurement decisions.  This reduces opportunities for financial coercion 
from the executive government, which should have a positive effect on perceptions of 
electoral fairness. 
Table 3.1: Summary of Conventional Independent Model Hypotheses 
Public perceptions of elections will tend to be positive if an EMB has … 
 responsibility for more core electoral implementation tasks; 
 formal accountability to the judiciary or legislature; 
 the power to propose electoral reforms and settle electoral disputes; 
 members appointed by the legislature or judiciary; 
 memebrs with fixed terms; 
 its budget and expenditures determined by the legislature or EMB itself. 
3.2. Categorised Autonomy Model 
The categorized autonomy model is based on a fourfold framework of EMB design 
developed by Van Aaken (2009).  It separates independence into four categories: 
institutional, personnel, financial and functional autonomy.  This framework has not 
been empirically tested in comparative studies so far.  Institutional autonomy refers to 
the degree of legal separation from government and where the EMB is accountable.  
Personnel autonomy refers to the staff or members of the EMB, how they are 
appointed, who appoints them, and the security of their tenures.  Financial autonomy 
refers to whether EMBs have their own separate budgets, non-executive budget 
approval, and non-executive daily expenditures monitoring.  Functional autonomy 
refers to the competencies and tasks delegated to EMBs, as well as the level of 
discretion EMBs have in setting and pursuing their own goals.  The more tasks assigned 
to an EMB and the more discretion it has in performing them, the greater the potential 
functional autonomy. 
All aspects of autonomy are arguably important, however the functional category is 
perhaps more essential to public perceptions of electoral fairness.  This category 
encompass functions and responsibilities that are more likely to receive media and 
public attention, such as running polling stations, counting votes, settling electoral 
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disputes, and monitoring election participants.  Moreover, functional autonomy 
depends upon the autonomy in other categories.  The assumption regarding functional 
autonomy is that delegating tasks only increases electoral fairness if the EMB is 
“personally, financially as well as institutionally independent” (van Aaken, 2009: 313).  
This means that functional autonomy is dependent on the other three types of 
autonomy, and assigning more tasks to an EMB will not increase electoral fairness if it 
lacks these other types of autonomy. 
The fourfold autonomy specifically states design elements as testable postulates and 
does not aggregate all features into a single dichotomous variable.  This approach 
facilitates more detailed analysis than the conventional independent model.  It also 
includes more aspects of EMB design, enabling the investigation of more features of 
electoral governance and their effect on public perceptions of elections.  As with the 
conventional model, available data does not perfectly match the original design 
assumptions and some modifications are necessary.  Some aspects of the framework 
cannot be empirically investigated, while similar proxies are used for other aspects.  
The model refers to ‘autonomy’ rather than ‘independence’ even though two models 
encompass many of the same aspects of EMB design.  The different terms simply 
provide a linguistic clarification for distinguishing between the categorized autonomy 
and conventional independent models.  The following sections outline the four 
categories of autonomy in more detail, focusing their component parts. 
3.2.1. Institutional Autonomy 
Institutional autonomy refers to the legal independence of an EMB.  This category 
embodies the idea that an EMB should be a distinct legal entity that is, for example, 
capable of being sued independently of any other body.  This institutional separation 
helps limit opportunities for executive control over electoral management and should 
be associated with fairer elections (van Aaken, 2009: 306).  The original institutional 
autonomy framework prescribes making an EMB a separate legal entity, removing the 
possibility the executive giving directions to EMB members, setting up independent 
EMBs within the constitution and establishing permanent EMBs (van Aaken, 2009: 313-
315).  However, not all of these expectations can be directly tested using available 
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data.  They have been modified with the aim of staying as close as possible to the 
original framework.  The following sections summarise the expectations regarding 
institutional autonomy than can be analysed using existing data. 
Accountability 
Accountability, or who an EMB reports to, is of paramount importance for ensuring 
institutional autonomy.  The potential conflicts of interest mean that putting the 
executive in charge of the EMB is like “putting the fox in charge of the henhouse” (van 
Aaken, 2009: 309).  The independent model makes EMBs accountable to the 
legislature, judiciary, or head of state.  The legislature is a larger and more politically 
diverse body than the executive and usually includes some members of the opposition.  
This provides some transparency by giving opposition parties a chance to monitor EMB 
activities.  Accountability to the legislature therefore expected to enhance institutional 
autonomy (van Aaken, 2009: 306), but not as much as reporting to an independent 
judiciary.  Accountability to judicial review impinges least upon EMB autonomy, as long 
as the judiciary itself is adequately independent.  Reporting to an independent 
judiciary will generally reduce opportunities for direct executive control, or at least 
provide a degree of separation from the executive.  The head of state is likewise often 
more impartial than the executive government.  Reporting to the head of state, an 
independent judiciary or legislature limits the ability of the executive to issue 
commands that could unfairly advantage the party in power and help it secure 
elections. 
Longevity 
Permanent EMBs are better able to retain expertise by providing careers, and have 
more time for training staff to detect and prevent electoral malpractice.  Permanent 
bodies also have a chance to develop public legitimacy over time, if they are seen as 
competent and impartial, which will positively affect attitudes towards elections.  
Temporary EMBs assembled for each election can be more easily staffed with 
personnel loyal to incumbents or less willing to resist their influence.  Provisional staff 
may also lack the necessary competencies for ensuring full electoral integrity.  
Temporary EMBs are more likely to depend upon government resources and linked to 
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regular administrative structures, making them easier for the executive to influence.  
Van Aaken (2009: 314) therefore conjectured that permanent EMBs should increase 
electoral fairness.  Developing countries are often urged by international organisations 
to establish permanent electoral commissions because they help ensure honest and 
impartial elections (Hartlyn et al., 2008: 78).  Unfortunately, not data is available to 
measure whether EMBs are established as permanent institutions.  Longevity is used 
as a proxy because data for when EMBs are first established is more readily available.  
Longer lasting EMBs gain more institutional experience, which increases their capacity 
for ensuring fair elections.  Older EMBs will have overseen more turnovers of power, 
which have been found to help consolidate democracy and increase confidence in 
electoral institutions (Moehler & Lindberg, 2009).  Additionally, if an EMB is 
established in response to widespread electoral fraud, a longer existence could allow 
public opinion to change to reflect the impact of new electoral management practices.  
Furthermore, a longer separate institutional existence allows an identity to develop 
independently of any other body.  Although not part of Van Aaken’s (2009) original 
categorised autonomy framework, EMB longevity supplements the permanence aspect 
of original framework and should have a positive association with perceptions of 
electoral fairness. 
Constitutional Status 
When an EMB is established within the constitution, it is harder for incumbent officials 
or parties to modify the institutions for their benefit.  This more stable institutional 
structure provides all parties and candidates a better guarantee that they may 
compete fairly and have a chance to win in the next election.  Easily alterable EMBs 
setup conditions where opposition parties may not feel there is a level playing field, 
since incumbent parties or governments can use regular legislation to give themselves 
an advantage.  Van Aaken (2009: 314) thus argued that establishing EMBs as 
independent bodies within the constitution should be associated with fairer elections.   
Available datasets unfortunately do not indicate whether an EMB is established within 
the constitution, so the closest proxy variable is the status of electoral law.  When 
electoral law is defined in separate legislation, it is easier to change through normal 
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legislative processes.  If an opposition party does win an election, they may find it 
beneficial to alter electoral law to secure their hold on power.  Altering electoral law is 
much harder if it is embedded within the constitution, which may dictate voting 
procedures, EMB structures, member selection criteria, and prescribes check and 
balance mechanisms in relation to other branches of government.  The more aspects 
of electoral law included within constitutions, the less aspects of electoral 
management incumbent politicians and political parties can easily modify.  Elklit and 
Reynolds (2005a: 152) thus argue that the constitutional status of electoral law is 
important for assessing the quality of elections.  Having electoral law in the 
constitution should therefore show a positive association with perceived electoral 
fairness. 
3.2.2. Financial Autonomy 
Financial autonomy is when EMB budgets and expenditures are not subject to 
executive government interference.  Van Aaken (2009: 308) specifies that this refers to 
EMBs having their own bank accounts and budgets that are separate from any other 
governmental body, such as a ministry of interior.  Another aspect of financial 
autonomy is control over daily expenditures.  This allows more operational freedom in 
pursuing the objective of free and fair elections.  The financial autonomy elements 
parallel the budget criteria of the conventional independent model (Wall et al., 2006: 
7, 9, 12) and the same logic applies.  Controlling finances or denying funding is one of 
the surest ways of influencing electoral management and limiting de facto autonomy.  
A degree of budgetary and expenditure independence limits two key avenues of 
executive government control. 
Budget Determination 
Van Aaken (2009: 317, 308) argues that budgets determined by legislatures could 
increase EMB financial autonomy and produce fairer elections.  Parliaments are 
generally more diverse and representative than the executive, so having budgets 
determined by the legislature is expected to decrease the likelihood financial control 
being used for partisan purposes.  Alternatively, the EMB itself may play a role in 
determining its own budget.  This can sometimes entail developing its entire budget 
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independently, in conjunction with another body, or simply with the ratification of a 
body such as the legislature.  Having the power to develop and determine budgeting 
needs independently is expected to enhance financial autonomy. 
Expenditure Control 
A second aspect to financial autonomy is control over expenditures, or the monitoring 
of operational expenses.  Van Aaken (2009: 317) does not provide a separate 
prediction regarding expenditures, but they are a key aspect of financial autonomy.  
Having a separately determined budget will not sufficiently prevent government 
interference if the executive can control daily expenses.  Expenditure control provides 
an additional avenue for financial coercion through withholding approval of necessary 
EMB operational funds.  Electoral management is more impartial when the legislature 
or EMB itself, rather than the executive, controls EMB expenditures.  The original 
budget assumption has been separated into two parts: one for budget determination 
and another for expenditure control.  Van Aaken (2009: 317) makes an additional 
assumption regarding EMBs receiving funds from international donors, but there is 
insufficient data for testing this assumption so it has been omitted.  This thesis will 
analyse whether expenditure control by the legislature or EMB is associate with 
perceived electoral fairness. 
3.2.3. Personnel Autonomy 
Personnel autonomy, which Van Aaken calls ‘personal independence’, refers to how 
insulated the main EMB members are from government control.  Personnel autonomy 
encompasses member selection procedures, membership criteria, and security of 
tenure.  Ensuring personnel autonomy helps reduce the number of ways an incumbent 
government can act dishonestly to secure an election.  Members of EMBs that lack 
personnel autonomy are usually more dependent on the good will of the executive 
government for their appointment and job security, making them vulnerable to 
partisan pressures.  The following paragraphs outline the major aspects of personnel 
autonomy. 
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Member Selection 
The first decisive factor in determining personnel autonomy is who selects the EMB 
members (and chairperson).  This is an essential component to consider when 
measuring the quality of electoral administration (Bland, Green, & Moore, 2012: 11).  
Hartlyn et al (2008: 88) demonstrate that sheltering EMB appointment processes from 
partisan control has strong and significant positive effects on the quality of elections.  
Expanding on this, Van Aaken (2009: 315-316) outlines three basic methods of 
appointing the members and chairperson: appointment by the executive, appointment 
by the legislature, and appointment by the judiciary.  Appointment by the executive, 
which usually corresponds with the party in power, provides the least amount of 
personnel autonomy for EMB members.  Appointment by the legislature is better 
because it increases impartiality through greater transparency and public debate.  
Appointment by the judiciary, provided it is independent, is expected to have the 
strongest positive relationship with fair elections. 
Membership Criteria 
The second aspect of personnel autonomy is the selection criteria for members, which 
is often characterised as based on expertise, partisanship, or a combination of both.  A 
‘partisan representation’ model selects individuals specifically for their political party 
affiliation to achieve a balanced representation of the major parties (Hartlyn et al., 
2008: 79).  A ‘professional autonomy’ model stipulates that member selection be 
based on credentials or expertise to increase impartiality and independence (Hartlyn 
et al., 2008: 79).  Personnel autonomy is expected to be strongest when member 
selection is based on expertise, and weakest when based on partisanship.   
Research on Latin American democracies finds that professionally staffed EMBs are 
“much more likely to oversee acceptable elections” and support a fair democratic 
process (Hartlyn et al., 2008: 89).  Hartlyn et al (2008: 90) argue that a partisan-
expertise balanced EMB can succeed in providing fair electoral governance.  However, 
Rosas (2010) examined professional versus partisan electoral management and found 
muted or inconclusive relationships using LatinoBarometer public survey data, but 
positive relationships when using political elite opinion data.  Further interpretation of 
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the results suggest partisan electoral organisation erodes public confidence in less 
democratic countries, but raises public confidence in fully democratic countries (Rosas, 
2010: 86).  This supports what Van Aaken (2009: 315) argues, which is that that 
member selection based on expertise should be associated with fair elections in 
established democracies, but that this may not be true in transitional democracies.  
The argument is that opposition parties in transitional democracies may need to be 
involved electoral administration before trusting the process and participating in 
elections.  The effects of partisan versus expertise membership criteria are therefore 
potentially contentious and deserve further investigation.  The current study contains 
both transitional and established democracies, which will enable clarifying 
investigations into the relationship between membership criteria and electoral 
fairness.  For the sake of having a clear proposition that adheres to Van Aaken’s 
original framework, mix of partisanship and expertise criteria is expected to produce 
fairer perceptions of elections in transitional democracies, while a purely expertise-
based membership is expected to produce fairer elections in established democracies. 
Security of Tenure 
The security of EMB member positions is important because the impartiality of 
electoral governance can be undermined if members are easily removed from office.  
This aspect of personnel autonomy parallels an essential criteria for the conventional 
independent model, which is that members should have ‘security of tenure’, which this 
does not necessarily mean a fixed term (IDEA, 2006: 6).  Life tenure is expected to have 
the greatest positive relationship with clean elections, but fixed or specified terms 
longer than the election cycle should also correlate positively with more impartial 
electoral governance (van Aaken, 2009: 315).  In other words, greater autonomy is 
expected when EMB member tenures are longer than the tenures of elected 
representative who appoint them (Hartlyn et al., 2008: 80).  Member terms longer 
than the election period should enhance the fairness of elections.  Most election cycles 
are five years or less, so six years or more makes most member terms greater than the 
election cycle. 
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3.2.4. Functional Autonomy 
Functional autonomy refers to the competencies, tasks, responsibilities or functions 
that are delegated to an autonomous EMB (van Aaken, 2009: 308).  The more 
functions an autonomous EMB performs the more functional autonomy it has.  The 
key word is ‘autonomous’ however, because the performance of different functions 
only leads to fairer elections if the EMB performing them is sufficiently autonomous in 
the other three categories.  Functional autonomy therefore depends firstly upon 
achieving the other types of autonomy, and secondly on performing more tasks.  The 
main original conjecture states: 
The more tasks which involve potential conflict of interests of legislators or 
government are outsourced to an EMB, the fairer the electoral process will 
be, given that the EMB is personally, financially as well as institutionally 
independent.  But if the EMB is personally, financially as well as 
institutionally dependent, no degree of functional independence is expected 
to have an effect on the dependent variable.  (van Aaken, 2009: 313) 
An EMB must have institutional, financial and personnel autonomy before functional 
autonomy contributes to the quality of electoral management.  Additionally, the more 
tasks assigned to an EMB that introduce conflicts of interest, the more essential the 
other types of autonomy become.  This is because delegating a broad range of 
functions to a government-controlled EMB maintains the possibility of executive 
control over those functions.  Van Aaken (2009: 308-309, 312) mentions a wide range 
of tasks or functions that can be delegated to an EMB, but does not explain how to 
measure them.  Many of these tasks parallel the seven criteria and associated tasks 
used in the conventional independent model.  For example, both models consider who 
determines voter eligibility, conducts polling, counts and sorts votes, and proposes 
electoral reforms (van Aaken, 2009: 308-309; Wall et al., 2006: 5-9).  The categorised 
autonomy model additionally includes the functions of electoral boundary 
delimitation, electoral dispute resolution, political finance oversight, and voter 
education or information campaigns.  The categorised autonomy model therefor 
covers more aspects of electoral management and provides a broader perspective of 
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electoral governance.  However, some of the tasks outlined by Van Aaken (2009), such 
as allocating media time to political parties and candidates or receiving and validating 
their nominations, cannot be analysed due to this data being unavailable.  The 
following paragraphs outline functions with available data and their expected effects 
on public perceptions of electoral fairness. 
Boundary Delimitation 
The first function Van Aaken (2009: 308) mentions is ‘the alignment of electoral 
districts’, which refers to both the demarcation of constituency boundaries and their 
final approval.  These are separate tasks not necessarily performed by the same body.  
The body that approves boundary demarcation can veto any district modifications and 
only approve changes that prove advantageous.  It is important for both tasks to be 
delegated to an impartial body to avoid demarcations that intentionally benefit 
partisan actors.  Allowing a partisan body, such as the executive or one political party, 
to alter or approve electoral district boundaries presents opportunities for 
gerrymandering.  This entails changing electoral boundaries to provide political 
advantages to a particular candidate or party, or to unfairly disadvantage a particular 
demographic such as an ethnic group (Lublin, 1995).  Gerrymandering remains a 
frequent method for altering electoral landscapes to advantage particular parties or 
candidates in both established and transitional democracies (Albaugh, 2011; Carson & 
Crespin, 2004; Hirsch, 2003; McDonald, 2004).  This is problematic for perceptions of 
electoral fairness because a partisan process is procedurally biased while the resulting 
uneven districts are substantively unfair.  The quality of elections therefore depends in 
part upon the impartiality, transparency and acceptability of constituency area 
demarcation (Elklit & Reynolds, 2005a: 152).  Assigning both boundary demarcation 
and approval to an impartial actor such as an autonomous EMB decreases 
opportunities for partisan gerrymandering.  This should have a positive effect on 
perceived electoral fairness. 
Electoral Reform 
Giving an EMB responsibility for electoral laws and regulation enhances its 
competency (van Aaken, 2009: 308).  Incumbent governments could disadvantage 
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opposition parties by passing restrictive laws or preventing participation based on 
invented legal technicalities.  Delegating electoral reform to an autonomous EMB 
insulates this task from partisan manipulation, but also raises legitimacy problems 
regarding accountability to the public.  Elmendorf (2005: 1447-1448) argues that 
delegating regulation of electoral law to politically independent bodies is 
democratically illegitimate, and suggests that they should be advisory rather than 
regulatory.  This means they should have the power to propose electoral reforms and 
initiate votes on the proposed legislation, but not to have the final say one what 
becomes law.  This would give EMBs a quasi-legislative role because they would be 
able to draft electoral law reforms, but these proposals would require ratification by 
the legislature.  The expectation is that elections will be perceived fairer if autonomous 
EMBs can propose reforms to the electoral legislative framework. 
Financial Oversight 
Delegating political party and candidate financial oversight to an autonomous EMB 
enhances its functional autonomy and limits executive control over electoral 
management (van Aaken, 2009: 308, 313).  This task includes both monitoring and 
sanctioning, which different bodies may perform.  The job of financial monitoring often 
entails receiving and examining the financial reports of political candidates and parties.  
However, simply submitting financial reports does not guarantee honest financing 
practices of candidates and parties.  Parties and candidates must also be sanctioned 
for infractions, which can range from imposing fines or loss of office to prison 
sentences or the suspension of political parties.  Allowing a partisan or partisan 
controlled body to perform these functions provides opportunities for conflicts of 
interest, corruption, and electoral misconduct.  A neutral body, such as an 
autonomous EMB, is better able to uphold the integrity of the electoral process when 
performing financial oversight tasks.  Public perceptions regarding the fairness of 
elections are therefore expected to improve if candidates and parties submit their 
finance reports to an autonomous EMB for auditing. 
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Core Election Tasks 
Van Aaken (2009:308-309) includes the core tasks of conducting elections from the 
conventional model.  These include determining voter eligibility, receiving and 
validating candidate and party nominations, conducting polling, and counting and 
tabulating votes (Wall et al., 2006: 5).  Although they are included within both models, 
the categorised autonomy model uses a different approach when counting them.  This 
topic is covered in-depth within sections 5.3 and 5.4 when discussing data and 
methods, so the difference is only sketched briefly here.  The conventional 
independent model simply determines whether an EMB performs each of these tasks, 
whereas the categorised autonomy model only counts them if performed by an EMB 
with institutional, financial and personnel autonomy.  Given the potential conflicts of 
interest when partisan bodies perform essential electoral tasks, we can presume that 
electoral integrity will increase when these tasks are the responsibility of an 
autonomous EMB. 
Voter Information 
Voter information can be subject to manipulation and malfeasance in an effort to 
secure elections.  For example, voters in opposition strongholds may receive false 
information about voting times, locations or procedures to reduce their turnout.  This 
kind of electoral fraud, which often focuses on suppressing certain demographics of 
voters, includes a diverse range of tactics and occurs in all types of democracies.  
Stringer  (2007-2008: 1012) outlines numerous ways in which American politicians 
“now often rely upon disinformation campaigns” instead of more overt tactics such as 
physical violence, discrimination or legalistic barriers.  The recent 2011 Canadian 
federal election ‘robocall’ scandal, in which voters received false information about 
polling station changes, provides another example of an electoral disinformation 
campaign (Fitzpatrick, 2012).  Making an autonomous EMB responsible for providing 
voter information should tend to reduce the potential biased misinformation and pre-
election manipulation (van Aaken, 2009: 309). 
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Media Monitoring 
Public attention to news media is related to political attitudes (Banducci & Karp, 2003: 
461), making the task of media monitoring relevant to perceptions of electoral 
fairness.  Having a partisan body perform this function increases opportunities for 
conflicts of interest and the likelihood of biased news coverage.  Van Aaken (2009: 
302) does not provide a specific expectation regarding media monitoring, but does 
suggest that delegating this task to an EMB would enhance electoral fairness.  This is 
because an autonomous EMB is more likely to treat all parties and candidates 
impartially by enforcing media regulations according to the law rather than partisan 
interests. 
Dispute Resolution 
An impartial electoral dispute resolution process is important for maintaining the 
fairness, legitimacy and quality of elections (Elklit & Reynolds, 2005a: 154).  Van Aaken 
(2009: 309) lists electoral dispute resolution as one of the important tasks to include 
within the functional autonomy category.  The nature of an electoral court of last 
resort, where participants can appeal their electoral grievances, may impact electoral 
credibility (T. A. Eisenstadt, 2004).  Institutional structures will be especially important 
for election losers and opposition parties.  If the dispute resolution body lacks 
autonomy from the executive or incumbent political parties, it is easier to shut out 
opposition parties or otherwise manipulate the appeals process.  Making an 
autonomous EMB responsible for dispute resolution is expected to increase 
impartiality and perceived electoral fairness. 
In summary, the categorised autonomy model expands upon the conventional 
independent model by looking at more aspects of electoral management.  It examines 
similar topics, but does so using different approaches.  The biggest difference is that 
functional autonomy requires EMBs to have institutional, financial and personnel 
autonomy.  Table 3.2 summarizes all assumptions for the four autonomy categories in 
the order they were presented. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of Categorised Autonomy Model Hypotheses 
Public perceptions of elections will tend to be positive if … 
 EMBs report to the legislature and not the executive, have existed for longer or 
electoral law is established in the constitution 
 the legislature or EMB, without executive involvement, determine the budget 
or control expenditures; 
 EMB members are selected based on expertise in established democracies and 
a combination of expertise and partisanship in transitional democracies, by the 
judiciary or legislature, or member terms are unspecified or at least six years; 
 autonomous EMBs are responsible for boundary demarcation and approval, 
electoral reform proposals, receiving financial reports from political parties or 
candidates, conventional core tasks of election implementation, voter 
information campaigns, monitoring media coverage of elections, or electoral 
dispute resolution. 
 85 
Chapter 4. Measuring the Effects of Established Factors 
Chapter 4 focuses on individual and national level variables, but also introduces the 
datasets and explains data management practices, which additionally apply to EMB 
data and models.  The most important individual level item is the dependent electoral 
fairness variable, which is outlined in section 4.1.  This section explains how different 
versions of the survey question on electoral fairness were transformed into a common 
dependent variable.  The next two sections, 4.2 and 4.3, respectively outline the 
individual level and national level variables.  Individual level data, such as age and 
education, comes from cross-national public surveys like the AfroBarometer and 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.  National level data, such as annual GDP 
growth and national legislature size, comes from institutional datasets sources like the 
World Development Indicators and PARLINE database on national parliaments.  Each 
variable is examined separately, with tables and figures usually included to facilitate 
comparisons between datasets and regions.  Individual level data comes from five 
cross-national survey datasets, while national level data comes from dozens of 
sources.  In total, this thesis includes 121,437 survey respondents from eighty 
countries.  The next section, 4.4, describes methodologies used to analyse the effects 
of individual and national level variables with perceived electoral fairness.  These 
include both ordered probit multivariate regressions and multilevel mixed-effects 
regressions.  The final section, 4.5, outlines the data sources, data management 
procedures, and case study country selection.  The large about of data from multiple 
sources meant it was necessary to create common variables and consistently organize 
the data before making meaningful analyses and comparisons. 
4.1. Perceived Electoral Fairness 
The dependent variable measures subjective perceptions of electoral fairness rather 
than objective realities, but there are three forms of this variable.  Depending on the 
dataset, it refers to the perceived freeness and fairness, or trustworthiness, of either 
elections or the electoral process.  Survey questions have different answer ranges that 
must be recoded into a common variable before making comparisons.  The 
AfroBarometer, ArabBarometer, and AsianBarometer use a four-point response scale, 
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the CSES has a five-point scale, and the AmericasBarometer uses a seven-point scale.  
All dependent variables were recoded to have integer values from 0 to 3, the lowest 
common range.  This option was chosen over creating a dichotomous dependent 
variable to help minimize the loss of data.  Dichotomisation also presents the problem 
of where to divide between fair and unfair when dealing with answer scales containing 
midpoints.  Four-point scales are easily divided in two, but it is unclear whether 
midpoints in the five and seven point scales should be coded as fair or unfair.  
Recoding to a common four-point scale necessitated some decisions on which values 
to group together, but this option remains superior to the loss of detail that would 
result from dichotomization.  Invalid responses, such as Don’t Know or Refused to 
Answer, were recoded either as missing data or as null but valid answers depending on 
what was most appropriate for each survey item. 
The next three sections outline the three different version of the dependent variable.  
Tables display two bars for each country, one for perceptions of completely fair 
elections and a second for broadly fair elections.  The broadly fair category includes 
completely fair as well as partially fair elections.  Detailed explanations of how this is 
calculated are included within the descriptions under each figure.  These distinctions 
are only used for simplifying the display of data, while the aforementioned recoded 
common four-point variables are used when running regression models. 
4.1.1. Free and Fair Elections 
The most common question is about the freeness and fairness of elections, which 
contains answers that refers to particular electoral conditions.  The AfroBarometer, 
ArabBarometer, and AsianBarometer all use this same survey item, including the same 
possible answers.  This makes these three surveys more comparable with each other 
than with the AmericasBarometer and CSES, which use different answer response 
categories.  Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 outline perceptions of elections in 
selected African, Arab, and Asian countries.  Countries are ordered according to the 
highest category of completely free and fair elections. 
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Figure 4.1: Perceptions of Electoral Fairness in Africa.  Survey Question:  On the whole, 
how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held on 
[date]?  Possible answers: (0) Not free and fair; (1) Free and fair, with major problems; 
(2) Free and fair, but with minor problems; and (3) Completely free and fair.  Dark grey 
shows percentages of respondents who rate elections as (3) completely free and fair.  
Light grey shows percentages who rate elections broadly free and fair, which includes 
responses (1), (2) and (3).  Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q45) and Round 4 (q71). 
As shown in Figure 4.1, perceived electoral fairness varies considerably between 
AfroBarometer countries.  Kenya has the lowest rated electoral fairness, with only 7% 
viewing the elections as completely free and fair, while Madagascar has the highest at 
68%.  This vast difference in public opinion parallels findings from electoral observer 
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missions in each country.  The elections prior to the Kenyan survey were reportedly 
marred by widespread mistrust of results which, together with ethnic tensions, 
sparked political violence resulting in deaths and destruction of property 
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008: 28).  Conversely, the elections prior to the 
Madagascar survey were generally peaceful and largely conducted in a manner that 
enabled citizens to freely express their democratic choices (EISA, 2007).  The same 
parallels between subjective public attitudes and more objective observer reports 
existed for most countries where election observer reports are available.  Aggregated 
public attitudes towards elections thus parallel expert assessments reasonably well, a 
finding that has been empirically validated elsewhere (Norris et al., 2013: 133; Rosas, 
2010: 76). 
 
Figure 4.2: Perceptions of Electoral Fairness in the Arab World.  Survey Question: On 
the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, 
held on [date]?  Possible answers: (0) Not free and fair; (1) Free and fair, with major 
problems; (2) Free and fair, but with minor problems; and (3) Completely free and fair.  
Dark grey shows percentages of respondents who rate elections as (3) completely free 
and fair.  Light grey shows percentages who rate elections broadly free and fair, which 
includes responses (1), (2) and (3).  Source: ArabBarometer Wave 1 (q211). 
Public opinion parallels election observer reports in the Arab world as well.  The reason 
for the low levels of public confidence in Morocco, where Figure 4.2 shows that only 
18% of respondents say elections are completely free and fair, arises from “the lack of 
legitimacy in the entire electoral process, given the overarching powers of the 
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monarchy” (Sater, 2009: 382).  King Mohammed VI’s control over key government 
appointments and decisions render public elections somewhat futile, which curtails 
the perceived freeness and fairness of the electoral process.  Palestine, where 71% of 
respondents said elections were completely free and fair, is very different.  Election 
observer reports regarding the election reflect this mostly positive assessment.  
Despite some discrepancies, the Palestinian election was reported to be mostly 
peaceful, EMB staff acted impartially, the overall process compared well with 
international standards, and the outcome reflected the public will (NDI, 2006: 2-3). 
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Figure 4.3: Perceptions of Electoral Fairness in Asia.  Survey Question: On the whole, 
how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held on 
[date]?  Possible answers: (0) Not free and fair; (1) Free and fair, with major problems; 
(2) Free and fair, but with minor problems; and (3) Completely free and fair.  Dark grey 
shows percentages of respondents who rate elections as (3) completely free and fair.  
Light grey shows percentages who rate elections broadly free and fair, which includes 
responses (1), (2) and (3).  Source: AsianBarometer Wave 2 (qii43). 
Public attitudes in AsianBarometer countries, as illustrated in Figure 4.3, do not match 
expert opinions as closely for some countries, such as Vietnam.  The high public 
approval of elections in Vietnam is confounding because Freedom House has said the 
country “is one of the most tightly controlled societies in the world” and reported that 
the incumbent Communist party did not ensure the freeness or fairness of the 2002 
election cycle (FH, 2003).  The government controls all media, prevents the promotion 
of democracy, harasses and imprisons political dissidents, and employs an extensive 
system of neighbourhood informers to track citizen activities (FH, 2003).  The 69% of 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Vietnam
Indonesia
Malaysia
Thailand
Mongolia
Singapore
Japan
Taiwan
Hong Kong
South Korea
Philippines
Completely free and fair Broadly free and fair
 91 
survey respondents who said the most recent Vietnamese election was ‘completely 
free and fair’ may therefore have provided this answer out of fear, but this is 
speculation.  However Indonesia, with the second highest completely free and fair 
response rate of 56%, was reported to be the country’s most democratic elections up 
to that point, reflected the will of the people and generally conducted in a calm and 
orderly fashion (The Carter Center, 2005: 10, 13, 75).  It appears that Vietnam may be 
an exceptional case regarding the dissimilarity between public attitudes and expert 
assessments. 
Public opinion regarding elections in the Philippines, where approval ratings are the 
lowest amongst AsianBarometer countries, generally corresponds with election 
observer reports.  The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) reported 
numerous problems with the 2004 election.  Its observer mission noted critical 
deficiencies within The Philippine Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and considered 
the election predominantly flawed, with numerous problems covering most areas of 
electoral administration before, during and after election day (Erben, Thakur, Jenness, 
& Smith, 2004).  The public seems to have been aware of the flawed process, with only 
15% of respondents in the 2005 survey considering the most recent election 
completely free and fair.  The original survey question for the AfroBarometer, 
ArabBarometer, and AsianBarometer all used a four-point answer scale and therefore 
did not require recoding.  The next section discusses the seven-point electoral trust 
question, which does require recoding to a common four-point answer scale. 
4.1.2. Electoral Trust 
The AmericasBarometer asks respondents about their trust in elections, although the 
original Spanish can also be interpreted as asking about the confidence in elections.  
The question uses a seven-point scale, recoded to range from 0 for no trust at all to 3 
for a lot of trust.  The original seven-point scale was recoded to start at 0, with 
subsequently higher values combined in successive pairs to produce a four-point scale.   
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Figure 4.4: Perceptions of Elections in the Americas.  Survey Question: To what extent 
do you trust elections?  Possible answers range from (0) Not at all to (6) A lot.  Dark 
grey sections show percentages of respondents who rate elections using the highest 
two values (5, 6) to represent a lot of trust.  Light grey sections show percentages of 
respondents who selected the top four values (3, 4, 5, 6) to represent broad trust in 
elections.  Source: AmericasBarometer Merged Datasets (b47). 
Figure 4.4 shows considerable variation between countries in the AmericasBarometer 
using this common recoded scale.  The lowest rate of complete electoral approval is 
14.3% in Argentina, while the highest is 71.3% in Uruguay.  The reports of electoral 
observers and experts again parallel aggregated public attitudes across 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Uruguay
Belize
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Chile
Venezuela
Panama
Dominican Rep.
Mexico
Peru
Guyana
Colombia
Brazil
Bolivia
Guatemala
Nicaragua
Jamaica
Honduras
Ecuador
Paraguay
Argentina
A lot of trust Broad trust
 93 
AmericasBarometer countries.  During elections In Argentina, observers witnessed 
disorganized balloting and noted that it would have been easy for anyone to remove 
ballot papers of parties they disliked (COPA, 2007: 18).  Their observations seemed 
accurate, since the day after elections seven opposition parties collectively lodged a 
formal complaint with Argentina’s National Electoral Chamber condemning the 
“systematic and massive theft” of ballot papers across the country (COPA, 2007: 18).  
Uruguay has the highest rate of perceived public trust, which accords with 
assessments of scholars and experts who consider it the most democratic country in 
Latin America (Fitzgibbon, 1951: 518-521; K. Johnson, 1988: 198). 
4.1.3. Fair Electoral Process 
The CSES differs slightly from previously discussed surveys in that it specifically asks 
about the fairness of the electoral process, rather than elections.  The five values for 
the original CSES question were recoded to range from 0 for an unfair electoral process 
to 3 for a fair process.  The highest two original values were combined, with all other 
values recoded without being combined to produce the common four-point 
dependent variable.  Public opinion again parallels the assessments of experts, 
observers, and scholars across CSES countries.  Using the highest two values to 
represent elections conducted fairly, Ukraine scores lowest with 23.8% public approval 
as shown in Figure 4.5.  This is roughly in line with the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) report, which notes the election was “marred by 
incidents of violence, arrests and actions against candidates and abuse of public office” 
(OSCE, 1998: 3).  Denmark is on the opposite end of the spectrum, with an 89.7% 
electoral approval rating, which is unsurprising since Denmark has a worldwide 
reputation amongst experts and scholars for outstanding electoral fairness. 
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Figure 4.5: Perceptions of Elections in Europe.  Survey Question: Thinking of the last 
election in [country], where would you place it on this scale of one to five where ONE 
means that the last election was conducted fairly and FIVE means that the last election 
was conducted unfairly?  Dark grey shows percentages of respondents who rate 
elections using the highest two values (4, 5) to represent elections conducted fairly.  
Light grey sections show percentages of respondents who selected the top three 
values (3, 4, 5) to represent election broadly conducted fairly.  Source: Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems, Module 1 (A3002). 
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4.2. Individual Level Variables 
The following sections explain all Individual level variables using the same thematic 
groupings from Chapter 2.  The sections explain how the different original survey items 
were transformed and recoded into common variables.  This is necessary before 
making comparisons across the regional datasets.  All missing or invalid values, such as 
‘don’t know’ or ‘refused to answer’ were either recoded as missing data (.) or null 
values (0), depending on what was appropriate for each variable. 
4.2.1. Socio-Demographics 
Gender 
Gender is a very simple dichotomous variable in each survey dataset.  However, values 
for the original variables2 were not always the same and had to be recodes.  The 
common variable has values of 0 to represent female and 1 to represent male.  Male 
and female percentages are each close to 50% in every dataset except ArabBarometer, 
which is 53.4% male. 
Age 
Original age variables3 are mostly in years, but the new variable divides age into eight 
categories.  The first includes respondents under 25, with each successive category 
including the next ten years and the final age category combining all respondents over 
65.  The percentages of people in each age category are similar across the different 
datasets.  Grouping age in in this way produces groups with sufficient numbers of 
respondents in each category, which reduces regression errors and outlier biases.  
Recoding age into six categories also gives it a scale similar in magnitude to most other 
variables, making its regression coefficients easier to interpret and compare. 
                                                     
2
 Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 and Round 4 (q101); AmericasBarometer Merged (q1); 
ArabBarometer Round 1 (q702); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (se002); CSES Module 1 (A2002) 
3
 Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 and Round 4 (q1); AmericasBarometer Merged (q2); ArabBarometer 
Round 1 (q701); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (se003a); CSES Module 1 (A2001). 
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Income 
Original income variables differ between survey datasets, necessitating the creation of 
two new dichotomous variables for more meaningful comparisons.  The first is for low 
income while the second is for high income; however, the definition of low and high 
income differs depending on the dataset they come from.  AfroBarometer uses a five-
point scale to assess how often respondents or their family members went without 
income over the previous year.  AmericasBarometer asks respondents which of eleven 
ranges their total household income fits within, as well as a four-point scale to assess 
the sufficiency of total household income for meeting needs and saving.  
ArabBarometer asks respondents for their monthly family income and recodes this to 
form a ten-point scale of income deciles.  AsianBarometer uses a five-point scale for 
total household income quintiles, as well as a four-point scale assessing the sufficiency 
of income for coving needs.  Finally, the CSES uses a five-point scale for income 
quintiles.  The values representing the highest and lowest income levels of the original 
four-point and five-point variable are recoded into new dichotomous variables for high 
and low income.  For example, the highest value on a four-point income scale would 
be recoded 1 to represent high income, while the remaining three values would be 
recoded to 0 to represent the absence of a high income.  For ten-point decile scales, 
the top three values are recoded to 1 to represent a high income, while the lower 
seven values are coded to 0.  AmericasBarometer does not use deciles for its eleven-
point scale, so the top three and bottom three values are used to represent high and 
low income.  Figure 4.6 shows the results of recoding income variables, with 
percentages of low-income respondents on the left and high income on the right.  The 
middle section includes all other income level responses. 
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Figure 4.6: Income Levels across Surveys.  This shows percentages of respondents with 
low, middle, and high household income.  Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 and Round 
4 (q8e); AmericasBarometer Merged (q10, q10d); ArabBarometer Round 1 
(q716incomedeciles); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (se009, seii9a); CSES Module 1 (A2012). 
Education 
Different public surveys use different questions to determine the education levels of 
respondents.  For example, the AmericasBarometer asks about the last year of 
education respondents completed and places responses into nineteen possible 
categories, while the CSES asks for the highest completed education level using eight 
categories.  All datasets do however include categories that allow for the creation of 
two common dichotomous variables for education levels.  The first indicates whether 
respondents have some university education, or completed any university degree.  The 
second designates respondents with a primary school level of education or lower, 
which includes respondents with no formal schooling or who are illiterate.  This 
provides a measurement for university education versus low education that is 
comparable across all public surveys.  As shown in Figure 4.7, university education 
levels are similar across most datasets except AfroBarometer, where university 
education is considerably lower and the majority of respondents have primary school 
education or lower. 
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Figure 4.7: Education Levels across Surveys.  This shows percentages of respondents 
with different education levels.  Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q90) and Round 4 
(q89); AmericasBarometer Merged (ed); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q703); 
AsianBarometer Wave 2 (se005, se005a); CSES Module 1 (A2003). 
Two original variables in the AsianBarometer Wave 2 were combined to minimising 
missing data.  The first asked respondents for their highest level of education using ten 
categories.  Its bottom three categories represent primary education or lower, while 
the top three represent different levels of university education.  These values were 
recoded to form the two aforementioned common dichotomous variables.  These 
were subsequently supplemented using a second education variable, which asked 
respondents their number of years of formal education.  Seven years or less was 
adopted to represent a primary school education or less, while fourteen years or more 
was used to represent university education.  Supplementing the new education 
variable using this method only affected about 1.7% of cases, but increased the 
number of respondents that can be included in regression models. 
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4.2.2. Participation and Engagement 
Electoral Participation 
Survey questions with different wording and differing sets of possible answers are 
used to determine whether respondents voted in the most recent election.  Some 
questions specified the type of election, for example whether presidential or 
legislative, while others simply asked if respondents had voted in the last election.  If 
past elections were specified, they were confirmed to be the same elections identified 
in the dependent variable question about electoral fairness, as outlined in section 4.5.3 
below.  Appropriate secondary questions were sometimes used to supplement the 
data and reduce missing cases, but only replaced a small percentage of the missing 
data.  To contend with differences between the original electoral participation 
variables and enable meaningful comparisons across the datasets, responses were 
recoded into a new dichotomous variable coded yes (1) if respondents cast a ballot in 
the most recent election and no (0) to signify not having voted.  The rate of electoral 
participation ranges from 67.5% in the ArabBarometer to 86.0% in the CSES (Europe).   
Political Interest 
The original questions4 about interest in politics are very similar and all use four-point 
scales.  The following is a typical question: How interested would you say you are in 
politics?  A frequent alternate version of the question asks how much interest 
respondents have.  No political interest question was asked in the CSES survey.  The 
different questions were recoded to a four-point answer scale, with the highest value 
representing high interest.  The biggest difference between surveys is that 
AfroBarometer asks about interest in public affairs rather than in politics.  This may 
explain the slightly larger response rate for high interest in AfroBarometer countries, 
since public affairs conceivably encompass more issues than politics.  With the 
exception of AfroBarometer, interest in politics occurs at similar rates across surveys. 
                                                     
4
 Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q16) and Round 4 (q13); AmericasBarometer Merged (pol1); 
ArabBarometer Round 1 (q215); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q056). 
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Supports Winner 
Two questions measure the effect of supporting election winners.  First is party 
identification, which arises from questions about which party or candidate 
respondents feel closest to or identify with.  The second asks about which party or 
candidate respondents voted for in the most recent election.  Original survey 
questions use long lists of candidates and parties, but the new variables are 
dichotomous and coded 1 if respondents identify with or voted the winners and 0 
otherwise.  If no single party received an absolute majority and a coalition was 
necessary to form government, then all members of the coalition were coded as 
winners.  Winners of elections were determined by election outcomes as recorded by 
Election Guide (IFES, 2012) or official national EMB archives.   
 
Figure 4.8: Support for Election Winners across Surveys.   This shows percentages of 
respondents who identified with or voted for the winning candidate, party, or coalition 
in the most recent election.  Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q86, q99) and Round 4 
(q86, q97); AmericasBarometer Merged (vb11_06, vb11_08, vb11_10, vb3_06 vb3_08 
vb3_10); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q062, qii39a); CSES (A3005_3, A3011, A3009, 
A2029, A2030, A2031). 
As we might expect, percentages that voted for winners are usually higher than 
percentages for respondents that identify with winners, as illustrated by Figure 4.8.  
This is because respondents may feel closest to a smaller party, but these smaller 
parties may not run candidates in all electorates or respondents may vote strategically 
for another larger party.  The common variable used in regressions uses party 
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identification as the primary variable and supplements this with voting choice to 
minimise missing data.  The two variables are highly correlated and both 
independently show consistent strong positive relationships with perceived electoral 
fairness.  Supplementing party identification with voting choices therefore does not 
substantially change results, but minimising missing data allows more cases to be 
included in the analysis. 
Urban/Rural Status 
Urban versus rural status refers to where survey respondents live, but the criteria for 
making this distinction are unclear.  This variable is unavailable for the ArabBarometer.  
Interviewers entered data to determine urban/rural status in most surveys, which 
could imply some subjectivity in making urban versus rural distinctions.  The CSES uses 
a four-point scale, which was recoded so that anything larger than a ‘rural area or 
village’ is considered urban.  These issues of subjectivity and recoding could prove 
problematic for comparisons, especially between datasets, but the indicator can still 
be used as a general metric for relative urbanization of where surveys were conducted.  
Figure 4.9 shows the percentages of respondents living in the respective areas, 
illustrating that the AfroBarometer includes more respondents living in rural areas. 
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Figure 4.9: Urban/Rural Status of Respondents across Surveys.  Bars show percentages 
of respondents living in rural versus urban settings.  Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 
(q91, q3, q79) and Round 4 (q90, q3, q79); AmericasBarometer Merged (q3c, q3_08, 
q3_0406, leng1, etid); CSES (A2022); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (level3). 
Political Ideology 
A political spectrum question is only included in two of the public surveys.  The 
AmericasBarometer uses a ten-point scale, while the CSES uses an eleven-point scale.  
The AmericasBarometer asks about liberal versus conservative alignment in some 
countries, but this uses the same scale.  Both logically start with left for the lowest 
values and right for the highest values, but these scales were recoded into two 
common variables.  For both surveys, the lowest three and highest three values were 
grouped together to create dichotomous variables representing far-left and far-right 
viewpoints.  This allows for comparisons between opposing views without 
multicollinearity problems because the middle values are not included as their own 
variable.  This approach reveals that 24.1% of AmericasBarometer respondents self-
identify as being right wing, while 18.4% identify as left wing.  For CSES respondents in 
Europe, 17.0% identify as right wing and 13.6% as left wing. 
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4.2.3. Media Attention 
Television/Newspaper/Radio 
Three variables measure the frequency of attention to different sources of political 
news: television, newspapers, and radio.  Radio dominates as the main source of 
political news in Africa, while television is the most common source in other parts of 
the world.  However, questions regarding news sources was not consistent across all 
datasets, necessitating recoding to a common scale and using proxy variables to create 
approximately comparable variables.  The AsianBarometer and ArabBarometer both 
lack questions about particular media sources, but include questions about attention 
to political news in general and the most important news source.  Combining these 
two variables provides approximations for how frequently respondents pay attention 
to the news source they consider most important.  Comparisons between regions 
using these variables should be approached cautiously.  Three common news source 
variables were created, each using a common four-point scale where 0 represents 
‘never’ and 3 represents ‘daily’ attention to that source.  Figure 4.10, Figure 4.11 and 
Figure 4.12 show the frequency people get political news from television, newspapers, 
and radio. 
 
Figure 4.10: Television Attention Frequency across Surveys.  Bars show frequency that 
respondents get news about politics and government from television.  Sources: 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q15b) and Round 4 (q12b); AmericasBarometer Merged (a2); 
ArabBarometer Round 1 (q216, q217); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q057, qii51_1). 
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Figure 4.11: Newspaper Attention Frequency across Surveys.  Bars show frequency 
that respondents get news about politics and government from newspapers.  Sources: 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q15c) and Round 4 (q12c); AmericasBarometer Merged (a3); 
ArabBarometer Round 1 (q216, q217); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q057, qii51_2). 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Radio Attention Frequency across Surveys.  Bars show frequency that 
respondents get news about politics and government from radio.  Sources: 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q15a) and Round 4 (q12a); AmericasBarometer Merged (a1); 
ArabBarometer Round 1 (q216, q217); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q057, qii51a). 
Political Knowledge 
This variable is operationalized as the number of factual political knowledge questions 
the respondent answered correctly.  Comparisons between datasets are problematic 
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however, because each survey asks different questions.  For example, the 
AfroBarometer asks for the name of the respondent’s Member of Parliament and the 
national Minister of Finance, while the AmericasBarometer asks about the number of 
provinces in the country and length of the executive term of office.  The CSES survey 
asks very different questions in every country, but this has not prevented its political 
information variables from being used in comparative regression models.  Having 
different questions is not ideal because it makes comparisons less reliable, but the 
variable remains useful as an indicator of general knowledge.  Two political knowledge 
questions were used from each dataset, so the variables share a common three-point 
scale with 0 representing no correct answers and 2 representing both questions 
answered correctly. 
4.2.4. Economic Performance 
National Economy 
Perceptions of the national economy are assessed with three survey questions 
regarding past, present and future conditions.  These questions usually started with 
the current situation by asking respondents to describe the present economic situation 
in their country.  This was usually followed with a question comparing the current 
situation with the economic situation 12 months ago.  Respondents were lastly asked 
about their thoughts regarding the likely future situation.  The exact wording differs 
slightly for some years and between surveys, but differences are not substantial 
enough to alter interpretations or hinder meaningful comparisons.  Answers do 
however use different scales and had to be recoded to be comparable across datasets.  
Some used three-point answer scales, while others have five point scales.  The 
implemented solution was to create common dichotomous variables for each of the 
three questions.  For example, the highest value on three-point scales and the highest 
two values on five-point scales were recoded to indicate a good or improving 
economic situation.  The lowest value or two values were similarly recoded to 
represent a bad or deteriorating economic situation.  Using the six common recoded 
variables, Figure 4.13 shows percentages of respondents with different perspectives 
about the national economy.  The question regarding the future economic situation 
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was not asked in the CSES survey, and the question asking about the past was not 
asked in the ArabBarometer. 
 
Figure 4.13: Perceptions of National Economy across Surveys.  Bars represent the 
percentages of respondents with different perceptions about the past, present and 
future national economic situation.  Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 and Round 4 
(q4a, q6a, q7a); AmericasBarometer Merged (soct1, soct2, soct3); ArabBarometer 
Round 1 (q101, q102); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q001, q002, q003); CSES (A3022, 
A3023). 
Personal Finances 
In addition to questions about the national economic situation, surveys also ask about 
personal or family financial situations.  These questions parallel those for the national 
economy by also asking about the past, present and future.  The wording of the 
questions is again sufficiently similar to provide meaningful comparisons.  The three-
point and five-point answer scales were once more recoded to dichotomous variables 
to facilitate comparisons.  The CSES does not ask any of the personal finance 
questions, while the ArabBarometer does not ask about the past or future personal 
finances.  A noticeable trend in Figure 4.14 is that most respondents are optimistic 
about their future finances. 
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Figure 4.14: Perceptions of Personal Finances across Surveys.  Bars Represent the 
percentages of respondents with different perceptions about their past, present and 
future personal finances.  Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 and Round 4 (q4b, q6b, 
q7b); AmericasBarometer Merged (idio1, idio2, idio3); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q103); 
AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q004, q005, q006). 
Paid Employment 
Questions about jobs and employment vary considerably across the different public 
surveys, but one consistent element is whether respondents had paid employment.  
The newly created dichotomous variable simply measures whether or not respondents 
have a paid job of some kind.  It is usually derived from one primary survey question, 
but sometimes supplemented with related questions to minimise missing data.  For 
example, the main CSES question asks about respondents’ current employment status, 
with missing values supplemented using variables for respondents’ main occupation 
and employment type.  These supplementary variables include response options 
indicating a lack of occupation or employment and only supplement 1.3% of the 
primary variable’s answers.  Figure 4.15 compares the rates of paid employment across 
surveys using the new common dichotomous variable.  It clearly shows very low levels 
of paid employment amongst AfroBarometer respondents and conversely high 
employment in AsianBarometer countries. 
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Figure 4.15: Paid Employment Rates across Surveys.  Bars show percentages of 
respondents that have some form of paid employment.  Sources: AfroBarometer 
Round 3 and Round 4 (q94); AmericasBarometer Merged (ocup1a, ocup4, ocup4a); 
ArabBarometer Round 1 (q704, q705); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (se012a, seii12b); CSES 
Module 1 (A2007, A2008, A2009). 
4.2.5. Political Performance 
Government Corruption 
Survey questions about government corruption differ slightly, but remain sufficiently 
similar for broad comparisons.  They ask respondents how many officials or how 
widespread corruption and bribery is in the government, the public sector or amongst 
public officials.  To reduce missing values, multiple government corruption variables 
are combined for some datasets.  For example, the primary AfroBarometer variable 
measures perceived corruption amongst national government officials, with missing 
values supplemented first with corruption amongst members of the national 
parliament and then with national executive officials, local government officials, and 
finally local councillors.  The AsianBarometer combines a primary variable measuring 
corruption and bribery in the national government, with missing values supplemented 
using a parallel question about local government corruption.  For AfroBarometer, over 
90% of the values come from the primary variable measuring corruption amongst 
national public officials, with the other variables supplementing decreasing numbers of 
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missing values.  The figure is slightly lower for AsianBarometer, with about 85% of 
values coming from the first variable.  Combining multiple corruption variables should 
therefore not substantially alter estimate outcomes, but doing so allows corruption to 
be included in more regression models and compared with a wider set of observations. 
All original corruption variables5 across all datasets use four-point scales, adding to 
their comparability.  Values were recoded to range from 0, for very low corruption, to 
3, for very high corruption.  No corruption question was asked in the CSES.  Relatively 
few respondents in the AmericasBarometer report low levels of corruption, revealing a 
distribution skewed towards higher perceived levels of corruption.  The relevant 
AmericasBarometer survey question is not sufficiently different from other datasets to 
explain this difference, implying that perceived corruption in the Americas is much 
higher. 
Institutional Trust 
Institutional trust represents trust or confidence in the legislature, executive, judiciary, 
police, and political parties.  However, the CSES does not include institutional trust 
questions and is thus not included in Figure 4.16.  The wording of institutional trust 
questions differs between surveys, but not enough to change the meaning or preclude 
meaningful comparisons between surveys.  The most important difference is that the 
AmericasBarometer uses a seven-point scale while the other barometers use a four-
point scale.  The implemented solution was dichotomization, with 1 representing trust 
in an institution and 0 a lack of trust.  The 4 point scales were split down the middle, 
while the seven-point AmericasBarometer scale was recoded so the lowest four values 
represent a lack of trust and the highest three values indicating trust in an institution.  
This is why institutional trust appears consistently lower for the AmericasBarometer in 
Figure 4.16.  This conservative approach helps ensure respondents truly do trust the 
indicated institution and produced rates of trust more similar to the other regional 
surveys. 
                                                     
5
 Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q56a q56b q56c q56d q56e) and Round 4 (q50a q50b q50c q50d); 
AmericasBarometer Merged (exc7); ArabBarometer (q253); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q114, q114). 
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Figure 4.16: Institutional Trust across Surveys.  Bars represent the percentages of 
respondents in each dataset that trust the respective institution.  Sources: 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q55a, q55b, q55c, q55f, q55h, q55i) and Round 4 (q49a, q49b, 
q49c, q49e, q49f, q49g, q49h); AmericasBarometer Merged (b11, b13, b18, b21, b21a, 
b10a); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q2011, q2012, q2013, q2014, q2015); AsianBarometer 
Wave 2 (qii07, q010, q007, q009, q013, q017). 
Crime Victimisation 
Not all types of crimes are included within this variable and, wherever possible, crimes 
are limited to those with a physical nature.  This includes physical attacks, armed 
robberies, sexual assaults, and other forms of crime that include an element of 
physical violence.  There are differences between the survey questions, but all share 
this common underlying aspect of being physical crimes.  In most cases, the questions 
ask about respondents and members of their family.  Perceived safety is used as a 
proxy variable in ArabBarometer, with the value of feeling ‘very unsafe’ substituting 
for crime victimization.  The newly created crime victimization variable is a 
dichotomous variable with 1 indicating respondents or their family members have 
been victim of at least one physical crime in the last year or, in the case of the 
ArabBarometer, feel that where they live is very unsafe.  Figure 4.17 clearly illustrates 
that a higher proportion of respondents in the AfroBarometer countries have 
experiences physical crimes than in other regional surveys. 
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Figure 4.17: Physical Crime Victimisation Rates across Surveys.  Bars show percentages 
of respondents who have been, or who know a family member who has been, the 
victim of a crime involving some form of physical assault or threat, or feel very unsafe 
for the ArabBarometer.  Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 and Round 4 (q9c); 
AmericasBarometer Merged (vic2_0406, vic2_1012, vic20, vic20); ArabBarometer 
(q205); AsianBarometer Wave 2 (qii37, qii32). 
4.2.6. Group Memberships 
Cultural Groups 
Most datasets have questions asking respondents about their religion or religious 
affiliation, their home or native language, and race or ethnic group.  The original 
questions6 have long lists of possible answers, but the new common dichotomous 
variables simply represent whether respondents are members of the majority group 
within each category.  Since a majority means more than all other groups combined, or 
over 50%, multiple categories were sometimes combined to achieve a majority.  If this 
was necessary, the approach was to start with the largest group in a country and add 
the next largest group(s) until including 50% of respondents.  For accuracy and 
consistency, the relative sizes of groups were determined using the survey datasets 
rather than external sources.  This may not be as suitable as using other data sources, 
                                                     
6
 Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q91, q3, q79) and Round 4 (q90, q3, q79); AmericasBarometer 
Merged (q3c, q3_08, q3_0406, leng1, etid); CSES (A2017, A2021, A2018); AsianBarometer Wave 2 
(se006, se014); ArabBarometer (q711). 
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but it was the most consistent because data is not available for all countries.  Since 
there are three categories, each respondent could be a majority or minority member 
within each category.  Unfortunately, data is not available for all categories in all 
countries.  For example, many countries in the CSES do not include data on language 
and ethnicity.  The ArabBarometer is omitted because it only has data on religious 
affiliation, but the AsianBarometer is included despite lacking data on ethnicity.   
Non-Religious 
Being non-religious is measured a dichotomous variable indicating whether 
respondents are atheist, agnostic or have no religion.  The original questions asked 
respondents about their religion, religious denomination, or religiosity.  Long lists of 
possible answers were usually provided, but this study in only concerned with 
individuals who identify as having no religion.  As shown by Figure 4.18, non-
religiousness ranges from a low of 5.3% in the AfroBarometer to 27.3% in the 
European countries of the CSES. 
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Figure 4.18: Non-Religious Respondents accross Surveys. Vertical bars represent the 
percentage of respondents that answered atheist, agnostic, no religion, or not at all 
religious.  Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q91) and Round 4 (q90); 
AmericasBarometer Merged (q3); ArabBarometer Round 1 (q711); AsianBarometer 
Wave 2 (se006); CSES Module 1 (A2017). 
Non-Partisan 
Being non-partisan means that respondents do not feel close to nor identify with any 
political party.  The original questions provide long lists of political parties as potential 
answers, but also include options indicating a lack of political affiliation.  Slightly 
different questions are asked in each survey, but they are sufficiently similar for 
making comparisons.  The new common dichotomous variable ignores particular 
political parties and simply represents respondents that do not feel close to or identify 
with any political party. 
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Figure 4.19: Non-partisanship across Surveys.  This shows percentages of respondents 
that do not identify with or feel close to any political party.  Sources: AfroBarometer 
Round 3 (q85) and Round 4 (q85), AmericasBarometer Merged Years 2006-2010 
(vb10), AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q062)7, and CSES Module 1 (A3004). 
Additional related variables supplement the common non-partisan variable to reduce 
missing data.  For AmericasBarometer, the supplementary question asked which 
political party respondents identified with.8  All responses that identified a particular 
political party or ‘other’ political party were coded as partisan, while those that said 
they did not identify with any party were coded non-partisan.  This replaces only 1.7% 
of the missing pre-supplementation cases.  The CSES similarly supplements the non-
partisan variable with questions regarding the parties respondents feel closest to.  
Both variables supplement the new nonpartisan variable in the same way, with 
affiliation with any party recoded to 0 and 1 if a lack of affiliation is indicated.  This 
provides valid data for 1448 missing cases, or about 3.1% of the original pre-
supplementation cases.  Figure 4.19 shows the percentages of respondents who feel 
close to or identify with a political party.  The percentages refer to the newly created 
non-partisan variable with all supplementations included.  As the figure shows, a 
                                                     
7
 There is a discrepancy between the dataset and questionnaire for this variable in AsianBarometer 
Wave 2.  The dataset variable is q062, but the questionnaire lists it as question 54. 
8
 A separate variable is used for each year of the AmericasBarometer, so vb11 refers to vb11_06, 
vb11_08, vb11_10, and vb11_12.  Each variable has a different set of values and was recoded 
separately. 
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majority of respondents in AmericasBarometer and CSES do not identify with any 
political party, while the majorities are flipped for the AfroBarometer and 
AsianBarometer.  ArabBarometer is missing because it does not ask a partisanship 
question. 
Social Trust 
The social trust variable indicates whether respondents generally trust other people in 
society.  The most frequent question asks the following: Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted?  Wording does not differ much between surveys, 
however this question is not asked in the CSES.  The new common variable is 
dichotomous, with 1 representing trust in others and 0 for indicating the need to be 
careful when dealing with others.  Figure 4.20 shows levels of social trust range from 
about 27% to 37% across the datasets. 
 
Figure 4.20: Rates of Social Trust across Surveys.  Bars show percentages of 
respondents that generally trust others.  Sources: AfroBarometer Round 3 (q83) and 
Round 4 (q84c); AmericasBarometer Merged (it1, it1b); ArabBarometer (q204); 
AsianBarometer Wave 2 (q024). 
4.3. National Level Variables 
National level variables apply to entire countries rather than individual survey 
respondents.  The variables outlined in the following sections primarily come from the 
Quality of Government (QoG) Dataset (Teorell et al., 2011), unless otherwise noted, 
but citations are provided for the original data sources wherever possible.  The QoG 
dataset is a large collection of cross-national comparative data drawn from freely 
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available sources.  Additional national level variables outlining different EMB design 
features come from ACE & IDEA datasets, but these are discussed in Chapter 5.  The 
following sections outline the national level variables for the year each individual level 
survey was conducted.  They are grouped according to the same thematic groupings 
found in Chapter 3.  These include democratic performance, electoral context, 
parliamentary composition, political performance, economic conditions, and cultural 
fractionalization. 
4.3.1. Democratic Performance 
Democratic Experience 
Democratic experience measures the age of democracy in years since women’s 
suffrage was granted.  In some cases, this does not coincide with universal suffrage for 
all groups, which can come later.  Gaining full universal suffrage can be an incremental 
process and the choice of women’s suffrage as a cut-off point means that at least a 
majority of the population can vote in national elections.  As Figure 4.21 illustrates, a 
large number of countries granted voting rights to women in the two decades 
following the Second World War.  Democratic experience thus represents the 
cumulative experience with voting for both sexes.  This makes it fairer than measuring 
the democratic experience of men only.  This important because the main dependent 
variable of interest is perceived electoral fairness.  Measuring democratic experience 
in this way reveals the following averages (in years) for each survey: AfroBarometer 
(41.4), AmericasBarometer (60.1), ArabBarometer (48.6), AsianBarometer (57.2) and 
CSES Europe (70.6). 
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Figure 4.21: Women's Suffrage Year for 188 Countries.  Bars show the number of 
countries that achieved full women’s suffrage each year.  Dark grey bars show 
countries included in this research, while light grey bars show all others.  Source: 
Strong-Boag et al.(2013). 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
The level of democracy is measured using two separate indices from Freedom House’s 
Freedom in the World reports: the Political Rights Rating and the Civil Liberties Rating.  
The scores for both these indices have been reversed to facilitate a more intuitive 
understanding, ranging from 1 to represent the least rights and liberties to 7 for the 
most.  The political rights index covers electoral processes, political pluralism and 
participation, and the functioning of government (Puddington, 2012: 33-34).  It 
measures the extent to which people can freely vote, compete for public office, join or 
form political organisations, and elect accountable and effective representatives.  The 
political rights index takes into consideration wider issues such as corruption, 
government accountability, electoral frameworks, and the rights and opportunities of 
minority groups.  The civil liberties index measures freedoms of expression, belief, 
association and organization as well as the rule of law and personal autonomy from 
the state (Puddington, 2012: 33, 35).  It takes into consideration the freedom and 
independence of the media, religious institutions, academia, judiciary, 
nongovernmental organisations, and a wide range of factors relating to personal 
liberties from state interference.  Combining these two indices together produces a 
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democratic freedom rating for each country.  The freedom ratings have also been 
reversed so that Not Free is the lowest value and Free is the highest.  Figure 4.22 
summarizes the ratings of countries across the different datasets.  Europe (CSES) 
clearly has more free countries, while there are many more partly free countries in the 
other datasets. 
 
Figure 4.22: Freedom Status for 79 Countries.  Bars represent the percentages of 
respondents in each regional dataset living in each type of country, with the actual 
numbers of countries listed above the bars.  Sources: Freedom House Freedom in the 
World, Freedom Rating (multiple years); Quality of Government Standard Dataset 
(fh_pr, fh_cl). 
4.3.2. Electoral Context 
Proportional Representation 
Proportional representation focuses on the electoral system of the lower legislature 
and does not consider the electoral system of upper legislatures.  This makes 
comparisons more meaningful because not all countries have upper legislatures.  
Countries that elect representatives using majoritarian or plurality electoral systems 
are coded 0, while .5 indicates mixed systems and 1 indicates completely proportional 
representation systems.  Data comes from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck, 
Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh, 2001) variable on lower legislature electoral system, 
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but this has been supplemented with data from the Institutions and Elections Project 
(Regan & Clark, 2013) variable on electoral system type for legislative elections. 
Direct Public Funding 
Direct public funding refers to whether political parties are subsidised by direct public 
funding.  This dichotomous variable comes from the ACE Electoral Project (ACE, 2012), 
but is supplemented with International IDEA Political Finance Database (IDEA, 2012).  
Direct public funding refers to any type of monetary assistance paid to political parties, 
either on a regular basis or for election campaigns.  It does not include indirect public 
funding such as tax relief, free transportation or subsidised media access for political 
parties.  The variable does not take into consideration how funds amounts are 
calculated. 
Victory Margin 
The victory margin is operationalized as the difference in percentage points between 
the party or candidate with the largest share of the vote compared with the party or 
candidate with the second largest share of the vote.  Data comes from the PARLINE 
database on national parliaments (IPU, 2013), which was supplemented with 
information from official national EMB websites.  If presidential and legislative 
elections are held concurrently, the victory margin is the average of all concurrent 
national level elections.  Information about the popular vote percentages is missing in 
a few instances, so case victory margins are sometimes calculated using the proportion 
of parliamentary seats awarded to the different political parties.  Victory margins can 
differ considerably between countries. 
4.3.3. Parliamentary Composition 
Legislature Size 
This variable is limited to the lower legislature and does not account for the size of the 
upper legislature.  Data comes from the Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote (J. W. 
Johnson & Wallack, 2012) database, which is supplemented with data from the 
election archives of the PARLINE database (IPU, 2013).  Values correspond to the 
number of coded seats in the lower house, which may not correspond precisely with 
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actual number of sitting members of parliament.  Small discrepancies may exist due to 
unforeseen vacancies or the existence of appointed legislators for which there are no 
electoral rules. 
Population per MP 
The population per legislator is calculated by dividing the total population by the 
number of members of parliament in the lower house.  The resulting value is an 
average of the number of people that each legislator represents, in millions.  Farrell 
and McAllister (2006: 735) use population in thousands, but using millions keeps the 
magnitude of this variable closer to other variables in the current research. 
Women in Parliament 
All values represent the percentage of women in the lower parliament.  Not all 
countries have upper legislatures, so it is not included to make comparisons more 
meaningful.  Data for this variable comes from the PARLINE (IPU, 2013) election 
archives.  The percentage of women in the lower parliament ranges from 0% in Belize 
to 40% in Sweden and Argentina. 
4.3.4. Political Performance 
Public Sector Corruption 
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International is used to 
measure public sector corruption.  The index uses expert assessments and opinion 
surveys to estimate the perceived level of public sector corruption in a country.  The 
CPI does not specifically measure electoral fraud, but considers corruption broadly in 
government and the public sector generally.  The index is therefore a proxy for 
estimating EMB corruption, but is more accurately interpreted as a metric of the 
overall level of corruption in a country.  Values have been inverted so that higher 
values represent higher levels of corruption.  This keeps the variable consistent with 
other variables and facilitates interpretation of results. 
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Income Inequality 
Income inequality is measured using the Gini index from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank, 2013) as the primary source, with the Gini index from the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt, 2011) used to supplement this 
data.  The Gini index measures the extent to which income distribution in a country 
deviates from being equal.  Values range from 0 for perfect equality to 100 for perfect 
inequality. 
Media Freedom 
Media freedom is measured using the Freedom of the Press score (Freedom House, 
2013).  This index encompasses laws or regulations, political pressures or controls, 
economic influences and repressive actions as they relate to freedom of the press.  The 
index has been inverted so that a value of 100 indicates the complete press freedom 
while 0 indicates no freedom. 
4.3.5. Economic Conditions 
Human Development Index 
Levels of development are measured using the Human Development Index (HDI).  The 
index combines life expectancy at birth, GDP per capita, adult literacy rates, and gross 
enrolment ratio for all educational levels (UNDP, 2013: 144-147).  It uses these metrics 
as proxies for overall levels of development.  HDI values range from 0 for the least 
human development to 1 the highest level of development. 
GNI Per Capita 
Data for Gross National Income (GNI) per capita comes from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank, 2013).  GNI combines the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with 
any income from abroad such as dividends, interest earnings, and profits.  The World 
Bank uses the Atlas method to account for changes in prices and exchanges rates and 
different inflation rates.  Original GNI per capita values, which were in Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) current US dollars, have been divided by 1000 to make the values 
more comparable in magnitude to other variables.  Figure 4.23 uses values before 
changing their magnitude, illustrating the wide gaps in GNI per capita between the 
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countries included in this research.  Liberia scores lowest with a per capita GNI of only 
$190, while Switzerland has the highest at $40,920. 
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Figure 4.23: GNI per Capita in 76 Countries.  This shows Gross National Income per 
capita in Purchasing Power Parity US dollars.  Source: Quality of Government Standard 
Dataset (Teorell et al., 2011). 
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GDP Growth Per Capita 
This variable uses GDP growth per capita as an indicator of economic performance.  
This data comes from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013) and is 
valued in percentages.  The annual growth rate of GDP per capita is based on constant 
local currency.  GDP per capita values are calculated by dividing annual GDP divided by 
midyear population. 
4.3.6. Cultural Fractionalization 
Cultural fractionalisation is measured using three separate variables for religious, 
ethnic and linguistic fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003).  These variables reflect the 
probability that two randomly selected people do not share the same cultural 
characteristic, meaning the same religion, ethnicity, and language.  Values for each 
fractionalisation variable range from 0 to 1.  Higher values indicate a higher probability 
the individuals have different cultural characteristics.  In other words, the higher the 
value the more fractionalization there is in that dimension. 
4.4. Methodology: Individual and National Variables 
The methodology for individual and national level variables is aimed at determining 
how they are related to perceived electoral fairness and the strength of those 
relationships.  The variables that prove to be significant and strongly related to 
electoral fairness can then be included within the EMB design models to control for 
their effects.  Existing published research has not tested many of the included 
independent variables with electoral fairness as the dependent variable, nor has any 
published research examined perceived electoral fairness in as many countries.  The 
methodology and any results it produces are therefore valuable independently of 
determining which variable to include when analysing EMB design variables. 
Dataset limitations prevent some combinations of variables and necessitate the 
construction of multiple regression models.  In total, this thesis includes 34 individual 
level variables and 18 national level variables.  However, the regional datasets do not 
contain sufficient numbers of countries to include many variables.  Moreover, some 
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countries are missing variables, which is problematic because all observations are 
automatically omitted if data is missing for any variable in the model.  This is especially 
important for multilevel models because entire countries could be omitted if they are 
missing a variable.  The missing data and large number of variables meant it was 
necessary to construct multiple models that separately test different sets of 
relationships.  At the same time, it is desirable to create models that are 
understandable and unified around a common theme to facilitate interpretation.  The 
result of balancing these considerations and limitations was to construct six individual 
level models and six national level models.  These are the thematic groupings of 
variables used throughout the different chapters.   
Two types of regressions are used to analyse individual and national level variables: 
multivariate order probit models and multilevel mixed-effects models.  All multivariate 
and multilevel models use the same rescaled dependent variable for perceived 
electoral fairness.  The estadd beta command was run after all regressions to add 
standardized beta coefficients to saved estimates.  Although beta coefficients abstract 
the variable scales and are not in the original variable units, using them enables 
meaningful comparisons regarding the relative strength of different independent 
variables.  They are therefore more useful for answering the research question of 
which factors and indicators have the strongest effects on perceived electoral fairness.  
The following sections explain the main two regression types used in this thesis. 
Individual level variables are analysed at three levels.  The first is by separate 
countries, providing insight into how relationships differ between countries.  This 
affords a level of detail that cannot be obtained when running regressions on entire 
regional datasets.  The process of setting up these models also clarifies which variables 
are missing in which countries.  The second type of regression was whole-dataset 
regional regressions that included the countries within a particular survey.  For 
example, all countries in the AfroBarometer and AsianBarometer were run in 
regressions to compare results between Africa and Asia.  The third type of regression 
uses a global dataset of all regional datasets appended together.  This approach is 
somewhat methodologically problematic because the different regional datasets do 
not all use the same sampling methodologies and survey questions sometimes differ.  
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However, the global models complement the more methodologically reliable national 
and regional models.  Trends that emerge as consistent and significant at all three 
levels of analysis are likely to be stronger and more reliable.  The inclusion of a global 
model also provides a level of generalization not available from the regional datasets.  
National level variables are only analysed at two levels, national and global, because 
these variables do not vary within countries and therefore cannot be included within 
separate country regressions. 
4.4.1. Multivariate Regression Models 
Ordered probit regression is the most appropriate method at the individual level 
because the dependent variable is a four-point ordered variable ranging from a lack of 
electoral fairness to completely fair elections.  The oprobit Stata command was used 
to fit ordered probit models of ordinal dependent variables with the independent 
variables.  Standard errors were clustered by country using the vce(cluster clustvar) 
option, with a numerical country variable used to identify the clusters.  Estimating the 
variance-covariance matrix using country clusters helps to account for potentially 
correlated observations within countries.  Using this cluster option does not change 
the coefficient sizes or directions, but it usually widens the range of standard errors 
and therefore affects significance levels.  Clustering makes relationships less precise 
because the standard error range is usually wider, but it helps make overall findings 
more reliable.  It sets a higher threshold for achieving significant results and thus 
increases confidence in the findings. 
Experimenting with different combinations of variables with the triple aims of 
maximizing the number of included countries, testing all individual level variables and 
combining them is a coherent way led to six multivariate models.  These are based 
around the broad themes of socio-demographics, participation and engagement, 
media attention, economic performance, political performance and group 
memberships.  These models are designed to maximize overlapping missing variables 
and thereby minimize overall data omission.  Finally, a summative model combines the 
strongest and most consistent significant variables from these six preliminary models.  
An important requirement for inclusion within the summative model is that variables 
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cannot be missing from any country, since this would remove the country from 
multilevel models. 
4.4.2. Multilevel Regression Models 
Multilevel models are more accurate when data has a hierarchical structure, meaning 
lower levels nested within higher levels (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002).  For this 
research, individual level survey data is the lower level because it is nested within 
countries, which are the higher level.  People within the same country are often more 
similar to each other than they are to people in other countries.  Failing to account for 
this in regression models violates the assumption of independent standard errors, 
meaning resulting standard errors would be inaccurately smaller, which increases the 
risk of achieving false significant results.  Using multilevel models helps avoid this 
problem by accounting for the possibility of non-constant variance across different 
countries (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Steenbergen & Jones, 2002).  A multilevel 
approach does this by simultaneously estimating the model at all levels.  In other 
words, the effects of both the individual level and national level variables are 
estimated at the same time. 
The xtmixed Stata command is used to run multilevel mixed-effects linear regression 
models.  This is an appropriate method when data is nested within multiple levels and 
we want to allow for both random and fixed effects.  Fixed effects are derived from the 
national level variables, since they do not change for each country, but change 
between countries.  Random effects are at the individual level because these variables 
change both within and between countries.  All regressions are reported using 
standardized regression coefficients to facilitate meaningful comparisons between the 
separate regional datasets.  The estadd beta command is run after each multilevel 
regression to add the standardized beta coefficients to regression estimates, since they 
are not added by default. 
Proven individual level variables from the summative multivariate models are used as 
control variables in multilevel models.  The same set of proven variables is used to 
provide consistency when comparing the relative strength of national level variables.  
 128 
These variables are also suitable because they contain minimal missing data, which 
ensures no countries are omitted because of insufficient individual level data.  This is 
important because the limited number of countries in the datasets precludes 
combining too many national variables in one model.  Running multilevel regressions 
with too few countries, or too few higher-level clusters, either introduces 
multicollinearity or convergence errors when trying to calculate variance matrices. 
The 18 national level variables are tested using six separate multilevel models.  Three 
national level variables are grouped in each model, which are based around common 
themes: democratic performance, electoral context, parliamentary composition, 
political performance, economic conditions, and cultural fractionalization.  These 
multilevel models are only run using the three datasets with the most countries: 
AfroBarometer, AmericasBarometer and European countries of the CSES.  The same 
multilevel models are also run using the combined Global dataset, which includes the 
AsianBarometer, ArabBarometer, and non-European countries of the CSES.  The 
different dataset regressions are combined vertically in the same output tables to 
facilitate side-by-side comparisons between the different regional and global models. 
4.5. Datasets and Data Management 
The use of multiple datasets and data sources necessitates extensive data 
management, while the inclusion of a broad selection of countries required new 
identification variables.  The following sections describe where individual level national 
level data comes from, how case study countries were selected, the new variables for 
identifying data, rules for creating common variables and how different data sources 
were combined. 
4.5.1. Individual Level Public Surveys 
Public survey data comes from AmericasBarometer, AsianBarometer, AfroBarometer, 
ArabBarometer, and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES).  These surveys 
are the source of dependent variables and all independent individual level variables.  
These include items such as individual demographics, public opinions or attitudes, and 
political participation.  The following list outlines the included cross-national surveys 
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and relevant years in brackets.  The actual years used for each country depend on 
when national elections were help in that country.   
More information about the country and year selection procedure is available in 
section 4.5.3.  The survey barometers use a common core set of items with very similar 
or identical wording across both questions and possible responses.  The main 
difference is with the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems because it does not draw 
from the same models of survey questions.  It does however include many useful and 
similar variables. 
 AmericasBarometer Merged (2006–2010) 
 ArabBarometer Wave One (2006–2007) 
 AsianBarometer Wave Two (2005–2007) 
 AfroBarometer Round Three and Four (2004–2009) 
 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module 1 (1996–2001) 
The number of countries included in regressions differs depending on the availability 
of data for particular variables.  Not all survey questions were asked in every country 
and only countries with valid data can be included in regression models.  The most 
important limitation is whether survey respondents gave their opinion about electoral 
fairness.  In total, 80 countries contain valid data on perceptions of electoral fairness at 
the individual level, which represents the maximum number of countries that can be 
included within a global analysis.  The actual number of countries in any regression 
model will depend upon the availability of data for the included variables. 
4.5.2. National Level Institutional Datasets 
National indicators come from many separate sources.  The primary EMB design 
variables come from the Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Electoral 
Knowledge Network and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA) Political Finance Database.  These datasets were supplemented using data from 
official electoral management body websites, national constitutions, electoral 
legislation, and personal communication with EMB and government officials.  Other 
national level data comes from the Quality of Government (QoG) Standard Dataset, 
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which includes a wide range of variables drawn from other freely available data 
sources (Teorell et al., 2011).  These sources include the United Nations, World Bank, 
Freedom House, Transparency International, and many others.  Missing QoG variables 
were supplemented by gathering data from the organisation that originally created or 
gathered the data.  The following is a list of the main national level data sources used 
in this thesis and the years for data availability: 
 ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data (1987–2012) 
 International IDEA, Political Finance Database (1987–2012) 
 QoG, Standard Dataset (1946–2010) 
 Official EMB websites, national constitutions and electoral laws (1980-2013) 
Comparative Data from the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (ACE, 2012) and the 
International IDEA Political Finance Database (IDEA, 2012) is combined into one 
dataset.  This combined dataset is referred to as the ACE & IDEA data.  Important 
supplementary data includes when EMBs were first established and when the last 
major institutional change occurred.  This enables calculating how long EMBs have 
existed and how long they have been structured in their current form. 
4.5.3. Country Case Selection Methodology 
Only one survey was needed per country, but there are often multiple rounds, years or 
waves of public surveys to choose from for each country.  Which survey year was used 
depended on three considerations.  The first and necessary consideration was to select 
surveys based on the inclusion of a question about perceptions of electoral fairness.  
The second was to minimize the time between elections and survey dates.  Although 
Anderson and LoTempio (2002: 347) found political trust levels unaffected after three 
months, it is unclear what effect longer durations might have.  Minimising the time 
between elections and surveys helps reduce response inaccuracies due to memory 
errors, as recollections about electoral fairness are expected to be more accurate 
closer to the date of the election.  The third consideration was to ensure the same 
individual level items were present across the different survey years.  This was 
necessary for making comparisons between countries, as well as across the different 
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regional surveys.  In summary, surveys were selected that asked about electoral 
fairness, minimized the time elapsed since the election and included as many of the 
same relevant questions as possible. 
The following paragraphs outline the countries selected based on these 
considerations.  Tables list the most recent legislative and presidential election dates 
alongside the dates national surveys were completed.  Presidential election dates are 
missing for countries that did not have elected presidents for the selected year.  A brief 
discussion of three key survey questions pertaining to elections follows each table.  Of 
particular importance is the survey item pertaining to electoral fairness, since 
dependent variables arise from this question. 
Table 4.1: Elections and Survey Dates for AfroBarometer Rounds 3 and 4 
 
Legislative Presidential Survey 
Benin 31 March 2007 19 March 2006 July 2008 
Botswana 30 October 2004 8 November 2004 June 2005 
Burkina Faso 6 May 2007 13 November 2005 October 2008 
Cape Verde 22 January 2006 12 February 2006 May 2008 
Ghana 7 December 2004 7 December 2004 March 2005 
Kenya 27 December 2007 27 December 2007 December 2008 
Lesotho 17 February 2007 . October 2008 
Liberia 11 October 2005 8 November 2005 December 2008 
Madagascar 15 December 2002 3 December 2006 June 2008 
Malawi 20 May 2004 20 May 2004 June 2005 
Mali 22 July 2007 29 April 2007 December 2008 
Mozambique 2 December 2004 2 December 2004 December 2008 
Namibia 15 November 2004 15 November 2004 February 2006 
Nigeria 21 April 2007 21 April 2007 May 2008 
Senegal 3 June 2007 25 February 2007 May 2008 
South Africa 14 April 2004 . February 2006 
Tanzania 14 December 2005 14 December 2005 July 2008 
Uganda 23 February 2006 23 February 2006 July 2008 
Zambia 26 September 2006 30 October 2008 June 2009 
Zimbabwe 29 March 2008 27 June 2008 May 2009 
Table 4.1 lists the countries and elections selected from the AfroBarometer Round 3 
and 4 surveys.  Three questions refer to elections, with similar wording for both survey 
rounds.  The first asks whether respondents voted in “the most recent, [year] national 
elections”, the second inquires about “the freeness and fairness of the last national 
election, held in [year]”, and the third asks which candidate respondents would vote 
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for if “a presidential election were held tomorrow” (Carter, 2008: 13, 22, 49; 2010: 15, 
43, 52).  The third question asks about general or national elections and prime 
ministers in countries without presidents (Carter, 2008: 50-51; 2010: 53).  From the 
wording of the question about electoral fairness, national elections are taken to mean 
the most recent legislative elections, which made them the most important for 
deciding which survey years to select.  It also made sense to select survey years based 
on the national legislative elections to ensure a consistent practice between countries. 
Table 4.2: Elections and Survey Dates for AmericasBarometer Merged 2006-2010 
 
Legislative Presidential Survey 
Argentina 28 October 2007 28 October 2007 February 2008 
Belize 7 February 2008 . October 2008 
Bolivia 18 December 2005 18 December 2005 March 2008 
Brazil 1 October 2006 29 October 2006 May 2008 
Chile 11 December 2005 15 January 2006 February 2008 
Colombia 12 March 2006 28 May 2006 February 2008 
Costa Rica 5 February 2006 5 February 2006 July 2006 
Dominican Republic 16 May 2006 16 May 2008 March 2010 
Ecuador 26 April 2009 26 April 2009 March 2010 
El Salvador 18 January 2009 15 March 2009 March 2010 
Guatemala 9 September 2007 9 September 2007 March 2008 
Guyana 28 August 2006 . October 2006 
Honduras 29 November 2009 29 November 2009 March 2010 
Jamaica 3 September 2007 . March 2008 
Mexico 2 July 2006 2 July 2006 February 2008 
Nicaragua 5 November 2006 5 November 2006 February 2008 
Panama 3 May 2009 3 May 2009 February 2010 
Paraguay 20 April 2008 20 April 2008 February 2010 
Peru 9 April 2006 4 June 2006 July 2006 
Uruguay 29 November 2009 25 October 2009 March 2010 
Venezuela 4 December 2005 3 December 2006 September 2007 
The multiple years for each country in the merged AmericasBarometer dataset 
enabled selecting survey years to reduce time elapsed since elections.  Table 4.2 
displays election and survey dates for AmericasBarometer countries.  The same three 
previously outlined questions about elections have slightly different phrasing.  The first 
asks whether respondents voted “in the last presidential elections”, the second 
inquires which candidates respondents voted for “in the last presidential elections”, 
while a third asks about the extent to which respondents “trust elections” (LAPOP, 
2006: 15, 8; 2008: 13, 8; 2010: 13-14, 8).  The electoral trust question does not specify 
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a type of election, but the other two questions ask specifically about presidential 
elections.  Presidential elections were therefore prioritized when deciding which 
survey years to select, unless the country did not have a president in which case 
legislative elections were used.  In most cases, presidential elections are held either 
simultaneously or very close to legislative election dates. 
Table 4.3: Elections and Survey Dates for ArabBarometer Wave 1 
 Legislative Presidential Survey 
Algeria 30 May 2002 8 April 2004 2006 
Jordan 17 June 2003 . 2006 
Lebanon 20 June 2005 . 2006 
Morocco 27 September 2002 . 2006 
Palestine 25 January 2006 9 January 2005 2007 
Table 4.3 outlines the five countries in the first wave of the ArabBarometer.  Only two 
of the three relevant elections questions are asked in this survey.  The first asks if 
respondents participated “in the most recent elections”, while the second inquires 
about “the freeness and fairness of the last national election” (ADB, 2007: 5).  Both 
mentions of elections are interpreted to ask about national legislative elections, and 
only two of the countries had presidential systems.  However, selection of the best 
survey year is immaterial because there is only one wave of data currently available. 
Table 4.4: Elections and Survey Dates for AsianBarometer Wave 2 
 Legislative Presidential Survey 
Hong Kong 12 September 2004 . December 2007 
Indonesia 5 April 2004 20 September 2004 November 2006 
Japan 11 September 2005 . February 2007 
Malaysia 21 March 2004 . July 2007 
Mongolia 27 June 2004 22 May 2005 May 2006 
Philippines 10 May 2004 10 May 2004 January 2005 
Singapore 3 November 2001 19 March 2000 January 2005 
South Korea 15 April 2004 19 December 2002 January 2006 
Taiwan 1 December 2001 20 March 2004 March 2006 
Thailand 6 February 2005 . 2005 
Vietnam 19 May 2002 . June 2006 
All countries in Table 4.4 come from the second wave of AsianBarometer surveys.  
Three relevant questions ask about elections.  The first enquires if respondents voted 
“in the election [the most recent national election, parliamentary or presidential] held 
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in [year]”, the second asks which “parties (or candidates for president if it was 
presidential race)” respondents voted for, while the third asks respondents to “rate 
the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [year]” (ABS, 2007: 4-5).  
This question is interpreted to ask about the last national legislative elections.  There 
were too many differences between relevant questions in other waves of the survey, 
so only the second wave of the AsianBarometer is used. 
Table 4.5: Election and Survey Dates for CSES Module 1 (Europe Only) 
 Legislative Presidential Survey 
Belarus 15 October 2000 9 September 2001 September 2001** 
Czech Republic 1 June 1996 . June 1996 
Denmark 11 March 1998 . April 1998** 
Germany 27 September 1998 . October 1998 
Hungary 10 May 1998 . May 1998* 
Iceland 18 May 1999 29 June 1996 June 1999 
Lithuania 10 November 1996 4 January 1998 January 1998* 
Netherlands 6 May 1998 . August 1998 
Norway 14/15 September 1997 . November 1997 
Poland 21 September 1997 19 November 1995 October 1997 
Portugal 17 March 2002 14 January 2001 March 2002 
Romania 3 November 1996 17 November 1996 December 1996 
Russia 19 December 1999 26 March 2000 April 2000** 
Slovenia 10 December 1996 6 December 1992 November 1997 
Spain 12 March 2000 . March 2000 
Sweden 20 September 1998 . November 1998 
Switzerland 24 October 1999 . November 1999 
Ukraine 29 March 1998 . April 1998 
United Kingdom 1 May 1997 . July 1997 
Only the European countries of the CSES survey are displayed in Table 4.5, since these 
are of primary interest for making regional comparisons.  However, the other non-
European countries are included in global models if they have valid data.  The same 
three questions about elections are included within the CSES survey.  The first question 
about electoral participation asks if respondents voted in “the elections”, although the 
wording in some countries specifies “the general election” (Sapiro, Shively, & CSES, 
2003: see notes for A2028).  There are multiple versions of the second question asking 
about which candidate respondents voted for, which differ between countries 
depending on the national political circumstances and configurations (Sapiro et al., 
2003: see notes for A2029, A2030 and A2031).  The third electoral fairness question 
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asks how fairly “the last election in [country]” was conducted (Sapiro et al., 2003: see 
notes for A3002).  Unfortunately, the three relevant election questions do not 
provided sufficient information regarding election type.  For consistency between 
countries and other datasets, national legislative elections were used as the basis for 
reducing time before survey dates. 
4.5.4. Geographic and Date Identification 
It was necessary to create a common coding scheme for geographic and date variables 
before appending and merging the different datasets.  Geographical identifiers come 
from two sources: three-letter alphabetical codes from the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO, 2006), and three-digit numerical codes from United Nations 
Statistics Division (UNSD).  The ISO alphabetical codes, which only apply to countries, 
were combined with survey years to identify the country and year using one variable.  
This unique identifying variable was used when combining datasets.  UNSD numerical 
codes include three levels ranging from macro geographical (continental) regions, to 
geographical subregions and finally countries (UNSD, 2012).  The numerical codes were 
given labels based on the English short forms, following the practice of both the UNSD 
and ISO. 
Date variables were recoded to be consistent across all datasets and comprised of 
three variables: day, month, and year.  The year was essential for ensuring valid 
matches between national indicators and individual survey data.  Years were available 
for all datasets, but some corrections were necessary.  For example, the 
AmericasBarometer and CSES datasets had some problems with their years.  All fixes 
were conducted with reference to original data sources and survey field reports.  Days 
and months of surveys were used to ensure surveys were conducted after elections 
finished.  This date information was not available for all datasets, but was again fixed 
in most cases by referring to original sources.  Some data for days was still missing 
despite these efforts, in which case surveys were only used if elections occurred at 
least one month before the surveys were conducted.  This provided a sufficient margin 
of error to ensure respondents had the most recent election in mind when answering 
relevant survey questions. 
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4.5.5. Variable Recoding Rules 
In addition to recoding identifying variables, several steps of general data management 
were applied consistently to the selected variables across all datasets.  Different 
regional surveys use different variable names, while some surveys change their 
variable names before each round or wave.  Furthermore, the values and answer 
scales for similar questions often differed between datasets and surveys.  Considerable 
variable recoding and data management was therefore necessary before combining 
datasets and running comparative regressions.  This required applying a consistent set 
of rules for cleaning up the data, which are outlined in the following paragraphs. 
First, new variable names used common prefixes for similar types of variables.  For 
example, common identification variables outlined in section 4.5.4 above all start with 
id_ while variables relating to survey respondents’ political views or attitudes all start 
with a pv_ prefix.  All national level indicators start with a nat_ prefix.  These prefixes 
make it easier to write common regression and other Stata scripts, while also making it 
possible to keep variables in the same alphabetical order across all datasets. 
Second, a suffix for the number of possible responses was added to the end of 
common variable names to indicate this information.  For example, the common 
perceived electoral fairness variable with four response categories is called 
‘pv_elections4’.  Numbers are not added to the end of dichotomous variable names. 
Third, dichotomous variables were coded so that a value of 1 represents the 
measurement item is present, while 0 represents its absence.  In general, these 
variables are usually assigned a simple no or yes label, where 1 represents ‘yes’ and 0 
represents ‘no’.  For example, the variable for whether respondents are non-partisan is 
coded 1 if they do not identify with any political party and 0 otherwise. 
Fourth, all response values were recoded so that larger numbers meant more of the 
item being measured.  Moreover, variables that logically included the possibility of 
having a null value were recoded to start at zero.  For example, perceived government 
corruption on a four-point scale was recoded so that 0 means respondents think there 
are no corrupt officials, while 4 represents all officials are believed to be corrupt.  
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Consistently coding variables according to this rule makes it easier to interpret the 
positive or negative sign of regression coefficients. 
Fifth, all non-valid and unusable responses were recoded to periods (.) because 
different datasets used different values for missing data.  Stata uses a period to 
represent missing data and does not include these cases in regressions or other 
calculations.  Some datasets use the code 98 for unknown, -1 for missing data or 999 
for refused to answer.  These values would substantially affect almost all forms of 
output from simple descriptive statistics such as averages to the size of regression 
coefficients.  It was therefore very important to change all invalid responses to 
periods. 
Sixth, notes with the original wording of survey questions or any coding changes are 
attached to variables if applicable.  For example, the variable for non-partisanship in 
AmericasBarometer has two attached notes: (1) Do you currently identify with a 
political party?  (2) Recoded to yes if respondent does not identify with any political 
party.  These notes enable better interpretation of variables and their values without 
referring back to original codebooks or questionnaires. 
The following list summarises the data recoding rules, which were applied to all 
variables across both individual and national level datasets.  These data management 
steps are necessary before conducting comparative analyses between regional 
datasets and before combining the datasets. 
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 Rule 1: Variable name prefixes show similarities between types of variable 
 Rule 2: Variables name suffixes show number of possible answers 
 Rule 3: Code dichotomous variables so 1 represents presence of item and 0 
represents its absence 
 Rule 4: Recode so larger values represent more of item being measured 
 Rule 5: Recode non-valid and missing data to periods (.) 
 Rule 6: Add note containing original wording of survey question 
4.5.6. Appending and Merging Datasets 
The terminology used here follows from the way the Stata software package discusses 
terms.  Stata refers to it as appending when adding observations from another dataset 
to the dataset in memory.  This is appropriate when both datasets represent the same 
thing and have the same variables.  For example, AfroBarometer Round 3 was 
appended to AfroBarometer Round 4.  Both of these datasets represent individual 
surveys, and all questions and possible responses had previously been recoded for 
consistency.  Stata refers to merging when combining datasets representing different 
things.  A many-to-one method was appropriate for combining the datasets used in 
this research.  This approach is suitable when the many public surveys in each country 
have to be matched with one national level variable for each country.  For example, 
the many individual level respondents in the AfroBarometer countries had to be 
matched with single national level variables from the ACE & IDEA datasets that applied 
to each country.  Creating usable multilevel regional datasets entailed first appended 
similar public surveys, such as the two waves of the AfroBarometer, and then merging 
these with national level datasets.  Both append and merge processes used the same 
unique identifying variable that combines the three-letter country code and survey 
year. 
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Chapter 5. Exploring the Effects of Electoral Management Design 
This chapter outlines the data and methodologies used to test two models of electoral 
management body design.  The first is the conventional independent model, outlined 
in section 5.1, which has been broken down into the six criteria that have available 
data.  These include implementation, accountability, powers, composition, term of 
office and budget.  Some of these criteria are composed of multiple tasks while others 
comprise single tasks.  Section 5.2 explains the methodology for analysing the 
conventional independent model using multilevel mixed-effects regression models.  
The second model of electoral management is the categorised autonomy model, 
covered in section 5.3, which is structured around four types of autonomy.  The 
institutional, financial and personnel categories are outlined first, since a minimal level 
of autonomy across these three categories is required to fulfil the functional autonomy 
variable requirements.  There are also more functional variables than there are for 
other types of autonomy.  However, the four types of autonomy all include multiple 
variables that are aggregated into autonomy indices.  The methodology outlined in 
section 5.4 thus entails multiple models to first test each variable separately, and then 
as combined additive indices. 
5.1. Conventional Independent Model 
The original conventional independent model conflates its different criteria into a 
single dichotomous variable.  According to the ACE Project Comparative Data (2012), 
approximately 63% of all EMBs meet most of these criteria and are therefore 
categorised as independent.  However, this approach is rather simple and discards 
valuable information, preventing analysis of the different criteria.  An alternative 
approach is to test each criterion separately, which is the method used for this thesis.  
The criteria of an independent EMB with available data include that it is responsible for 
core aspects of election implementation, not accountable to the executive branch, 
able to develop the electoral regulatory framework, composed of members who are 
outside the executive who have security of tenure, and free from daily governmental 
financial control (Wall et al., 2006: 9, 12).  Missing data and multicollinearity errors 
prevent testing all seven criteria, but most can be separately analysed using available 
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variables.  For example, institutional separation from the executive government is not 
examined due to intra-regional multicollinearity.  Most countries in Latin America have 
institutionally separate EMBs, while most countries in Europe have EMBs that are part 
of a government department.  The result is insufficient variation within each regional 
dataset, which produces too much multicollinearity between countries to test for the 
effects of different institutional or structural arrangements.  This first of the seven 
criteria is therefore not included in the current research.  Larger and more diverse 
datasets are required before the merits of institutional separation can be empirically 
verified. 
Before continuing, it is important to distinguish between ‘criteria’ and ‘tasks’ as these 
terms are used to operationalize the conventional independent model.  Some criteria 
include multiple tasks.  For example, the implementation criterion includes multiple 
core tasks required for running elections.  These tasks are analysed separately as well 
as combined into an aggregated index variable.  The following sections outline the 
criteria data and variables, along with their respective tasks, if applicable. 
5.1.1. Implementation 
The first criterion with available data is that an independent EMB is responsible for the 
implementation of elections.  This refers to the responsibility for performing core tasks 
of electoral governance.  Implementation tasks in this research include determining 
voter eligibility, conducting polling, and counting and tabulating the votes (Wall et al., 
2006: 5).  Variables are not available for all tasks and proxy variables provide suitable 
substitutes for some.  For example, there is no data for the core implementation task 
of receiving and validating nominations for electoral political parties and candidates.  
Unfortunately, ACE Comparative Data does not include a variable that represents this 
task or anything similar, so it is not included in this research. 
Voter registration is used as a proxy variable for determining voter eligibility.  This is 
based on the assumption that being responsible for voter registration usually includes 
determining voter eligibility.  Data for this variable was obtained by asking country 
experts the following question: Which is the authority responsible for the registration 
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of voters for national elections?  Available options include Central Government 
Department, Regional Government Authority, Local Government Authority, EMB, and 
Other (ACE, 2012).  No countries included in this research have regional voter 
registration authorities.  As Figure 5.1 illustrates, the task of voter registration is the 
responsibility of EMBs in most countries. 
 
Figure 5.1: Voter Registration Authorities across 80 Countries.  Pie chart sections show 
percentages of each type of voter registration authority, with numbers of countries 
listed in the legend.  No study countries have regional voter registration authorities.  
Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Voter Registration 
(vr004). 
The third core implementation task is conducting polling, which includes running 
voting booths and polling stations.  This is represented by the variable for EMB 
responsibility for elections.  The following question is asked of country experts: Does 
the national electoral body have the responsibility for elections at: National Level, 
Regional Level, Local Level, Other Kinds of Elections and Not Applicable.  Figure 5.2 
shows that all EMBs are responsible for national level elections,9 meaning that this 
level cannot be included in test methodologies because of insufficient variation.  In 
                                                     
9
 The Electoral Affairs Commission of Hong Kong was listed by ACE data as only responsible for local 
elections because Hong Kong is a pseudo city-state and considered part of China.  However, it was 
modified to ‘national’ responsibility to reflect the reality of how this variable is used in other countries. 
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addition, since not all countries have regional levels of government, it would be 
inappropriate to make comparisons using this level of electoral responsibility.  
Therefore, only local level electoral responsibility is used as a proxy for conducting 
polling.   
 
Figure 5.2: Responsibility of National EMBs across 80 Countries.  The column chart 
shows the numbers and percentages of countries where national EMBs have 
responsibility for each type or level of election.  This item allows multiple selections so 
percentages total more than 100%.  Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 
Comparative Data on Electoral Management (em002). 
The fourth core task is sorting and counting votes, which is calculated indirectly using a 
combination of two variables: EMB responsibility level and initial vote counting 
location.  If vote counting occurs at local polling stations and the national EMB is 
responsible for running elections at the local level, vote counting is considered the 
responsibility of the EMB.  Figure 5.3 shows where votes are initially sorted and 
counted.  The question for country experts asks:  Following the close of voting, where 
are the votes first sorted and counted?  Available options include: The polling stations, 
The polling centre, Special counting centres, and Other.  Most countries count votes at 
the polling stations, which is at the local level. 
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Figure 5.3: Vote Counting and Sorting across 80 Countries.  Pie chart sections show 
percentages for each of these locations, while the legend includes the number of 
countries.  Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Vote 
Counting (vc004). 
The final core task with available data, consolidating election results, is calculated 
using a combination of variables for where they are consolidated and the levels of 
EMBs responsibility.  If votes are consolidated at a level the EMB has responsibility for, 
then the EMB is assumed to perform this task.  For example, Argentina consolidates 
results at the regional level and its EMB has responsibility for running elections at this 
level, so it meets these conditions.  Figure 5.4 only includes 74 countries because of 
missing data in some AsianBarometer and ArabBarometer countries.  The question for 
country experts asks: Following the sorting and counting, to where are the results first 
transmitted for consolidation?  Possible answers include National Level, Regional Level, 
District Level, Sub-district level, Polling centre and Other.  Most countries consolidate 
elections at the district, sub-district, or a lower level.  These are usually considered to 
be at the local level. 
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Figure 5.4: Vote Consolidation Levels across 74 Countries.  The column chart shows the 
numbers and percentages of countries where national EMBs consolidate polling 
results.  This item allows multiple selections so percentages total more than 100%.  
Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Vote Counting 
(vc006). 
5.1.2. Accountability 
This independent EMB model criterion specifies that formal EMB accountability be to 
the legislature, judiciary or head of state and not the executive branch (Wall et al., 
2006: 9).  ACE Comparative Data does not include all these categories unfortunately, as 
illustrated in Figure 5.5.  The prompt for country experts is as follows: The national 
electoral management body reports to: The President, The Prime Minister, The 
legislature, A national government department, Another organ within the national 
government, or Other.  Presidents, prime ministers, and government departments are 
normally considered part of the executive, meaning EMBs cannot report to these 
actors to meet the accountability criterion.  The formal accountability variable is 
measured using only accountability to the legislature, which is also the largest 
category. 
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Figure 5.5: EMB Formal Accountability across 72 Countries.:  The column chart shows 
numbers and percentages of countries where national EMBs report to each type of 
actor.  This item allows multiple selections, so percentages total more than 100%.  
Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Electoral 
Management (em003). 
5.1.3. Powers 
The criterion regarding powers is slightly ambiguous in the IDEA Handbook of electoral 
design.  It allows for the possibility of independent EMBs having powers to (1) develop 
the electoral regulatory framework, (2) make policy decisions independently, (3) hire 
and manage their own staff, or (4) manage their own procurement and accounting 
(Wall et al., 2006: 9,12).  The power to settle electoral disputes is also mentioned.  
Variables are not available to test all these powers, but proposing legislative reforms 
and settling electoral disputes are represented by suitable variables.  Figure 5.6 
displays which bodies can propose electoral reforms, while Figure 5.7 presents data on 
the first level of electoral dispute settlement.  The question for reforming electoral 
legislation asks: Which body(ies) propose(s) electoral reforms?  Possible response 
categories include Legislative Committee, Legislature, Specially Appointed Committee, 
Election Management Body, Government, and Other.  This item allows for multiple 
types of bodies to propose reforms, so percentages total more than 100%.  The 
question regarding dispute settlement asks the following: What is/are the agency(ies) 
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responsible for the first level of formal electoral disputes?  Possible answers include 
Judiciary, EMB, Specially Appointed/Elected Electoral Tribunal, Other.  The most 
common bodies to be delegated the responsibility for settling electoral disputes are 
EMBs and the judiciary. 
 
Figure 5.6: Bodies that Propose Electoral Reforms in 80 Countries.  The column chart 
shows the numbers and percentages of countries that formally allow each type of 
body to propose electoral reforms.  Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 
Comparative Data on Legal Framework (lf011). 
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Figure 5.7: Responsibility for First Level of Electoral Disputes across 80 Countries.  The 
stacked bar chart shows the numbers and percentages of countries that formally allow 
each type of body to propose electoral reforms.  This item allows for multiple types of 
bodies to propose reforms, so percentages total more than 100%.  Source: ACE 
Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Legal Framework (lf007). 
5.1.4. Composition 
This criterion states than members of an independent EMB should be outside the 
executive branch (Wall et al., 2006: 9), but no available variable measures this fifth 
criterion directly.  The responsibility for selecting EMB members acts as an alternative 
proxy variable.  Members selected by the head of state, legislature, or judiciary 
substitutes for having members being independent of the executive branch.  Using 
these three actors follows the precedent from the formal EMB accountability, which 
mentions reporting to them as a criterion for independence (Wall et al., 2006: 9).  On 
the other hand, member selection by the head of government or executive is likely to 
increase substantive executive control over EMB members, which the independent 
model is designed to avoid.  This proxy variable therefore achieves a similar goal of 
measuring whether or not EMB members are directly under the control of the 
executive.  The data for this variable comes from the following question asked of 
country experts: The EMB members/commissioners are selected by: Head of State, 
Head of Government, Executive, Opposition, Legislature, Judiciary, Political parties, Civil 
society, Other, or Not Applicable. 
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5.1.5. Term of Office 
The next criterion of an independent EMB is that the members have some security of 
tenure so they can resist political pressures from executive government authorities 
(Wall et al., 2006: 12, 99).  The IDEA handbook specifically mentions a fixed term as 
one way of providing this security of tenure, but also notes that it is not a necessary 
precondition.  Data comes from country experts prompted with the following: The 
term of the members of the national electoral management body is: For the election 
period only, For a specified number of years, For an unspecified period, Other, or Not 
applicable.  The available data, displayed in Figure 5.8, reveals that most countries 
have specified or fixed terms of office.   
 
Figure 5.8: EMB Member Term of Office across 80 Countries.  Pie chart sections show 
percentages for each of these member terms, while the legend includes the number of 
countries or territories that use each type member term.  Source: ACE Electoral 
Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Electoral Management (em006). 
5.1.6. Budget 
The final criterion is that independent EMBs have and manage their own budgets 
separately from any government ministry or department (Wall et al., 2006: 9, 12).  The 
data does not indicate whether EMBs have separate bank accounts, but two proxy 
variables are suitable for measuring budgetary independence.  The first variable comes 
from the following question: The budget of the national electoral management body is 
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determined by:  After recoding the original variable and gathering supplementary data, 
possible answers include: President, Prime Minister, Legislature, National government 
department, Donors, EMB, Judiciary, Other and Not applicable.  Figure 5.9 shows which 
bodies determine EMB budgets using the supplemented dataset.  The second budget 
task is that an independent EMB manages its own expenses, or control its own 
expenditures.  Country experts are asked the following: The expenditures of the 
national electoral management body are controlled by:  After recoding and 
supplementing the original data, possible answers include: President, Prime Minister, 
Legislature, National government department, Auditing Agency, Donors, EMB, 
Judiciary, Other and Not applicable.  Figure 5.10 shows which bodies are responsible 
for auditing or controlling EMB expenditures.  The legislature, EMB, and donors are 
possibly the most removed from executive control and these actors are therefore used 
to construct this second budget variable.  Both budget questions allow multiple actors 
to be involved, so percentages total more than 100%. 
 
Figure 5.9: EMB Budget Determination Actors across 79 Countries.  The bar chart 
shows numbers and percentages of countries where each actor is involved in 
determining the EMB budget.  Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative 
Data on Electoral Management (em004). 
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Figure 5.10: EMB Expenditure Control Actors across 78 Countries.  The bar chart shows 
numbers and percentages of countries where each actor is involved in controlling EMB 
expenditures.  Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on 
Electoral Management (em005). 
5.2. Methodology: Conventional Independent Model 
Analysing the conventional independent model involves six multilevel regression 
models.  The first three examine the separate tasks of the implementation, powers, 
and budget criteria.  This helps determine which tasks have the most explanatory 
power.  The fourth model includes aggregated criteria variables, while the fifth model 
includes fulfilled criteria variables.  Aggregated criteria variables count how many 
requirements are satisfied, whereas the fulfilled criteria variables indicate whether all 
requirements are satisfied.  The final sixth model includes a standardized, weighted, 
and additive index of conventional EMB independence, which combines all tasks and 
criteria.  The models are tested using regional datasets and a combined global dataset.  
The regional datasets include the AfroBarometer, AmericasBarometer, and CSES 
(Europe only).  The ArabBarometer and AsianBarometer have two few countries as 
separate datasets, but they are included within the combined global dataset.  The next 
section explains how tasks and criteria are measured, as well as their weighting scores 
for creating the conventional independence index. 
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5.2.1. Measuring Tasks and Criteria 
Table 5.1 outlines the fulfilment requirements for all tasks and criteria.  The table 
presents tasks and criteria in the first column using terminology from section 4.1 
rather than the original framework.  This keeps discussions closer to the available data 
and thus more accurate and meaningful.  The second column outlines the 
requirements for fulfilling each task and criteria.  Requirements are based on the 
original conventional independent model, but have been adapted based the 
availability of ACE & IDEA variables.  Variable names are in italics and the numerical 
values refer to the dichotomous value, where 0 means the item is absent, and 1 means 
it is present.  The logical operator ‘AND’ indicates a required variable combination, 
while a forward slash ‘/’ indicates that multiple variables or combinations can fulfil a 
requirement.  The third column of Table 5.1 provides the scores used when 
aggregating all tasks and criteria into the weighted conventional independence index.  
A standardized version of this index is used in the sixth regression model.  Each of 
these implementation tasks receives a score of 0.5, resulting in a maximum 
contribution of 2.0 for the implementation criteria.  The two powers tasks receive 1.0 
each, totalling 2.0 for the powers criteria.  The two budget tasks also receive 1.0 each, 
totalling 2.0 for the budget criteria as well.  Finally, the accountability, member 
selection, and member term criteria each contribute 1.5 to the index.  The 
conventional independence index therefore increases in value based on the number of 
fulfilled tasks and criteria, with a maximum value of 10.5 if all requirements are 
fulfilled. 
The implementation, powers, and budget criteria are composed of multiple tasks, 
while the other criteria are each represented by single dichotomous variables.  
Creating the aggregated criteria indices involves adding the scores from the third 
column within each criteria and then dividing this by the number of tasks.  For 
example, adding the two powers tasks (proposing electoral reforms and settling 
electoral disputes) results in a maximum potential score of 2 if an EMB is responsible 
for both of these tasks.  Dividing this by 0, 1, or 2 produces a variable with values of 0, 
.5, and 1.  All aggregated variables therefore range from 0 to 1. 
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Table 5.1: Fulfilment Requirements and Weightings for Tasks and Criteria 
Implementation    
Voter Registration EMB responsible for voter registration (vr004d = 1) 0.5 
Responsibility Level EMB responsible for local level (em002c = 1) 0.5 
Sorting and Counting 
Votes 
Votes counted at polling stations/polling centres AND 
EMB responsible for local level (vc004a/b = 1 AND 
em002c = 1) 
0.5 
Consolidating Results Results consolidated at national/regional/local level 
AND EMB responsible for national/regional/local 
level (vc006a/b/c = 1 AND em002a/b/c = 1) 
0.5 
   
Accountability    
EMB Accountability EMB reports to legislature AND not to 
president/PM/government (em003c = 1 AND 
em003a/b/d = 0) 
1.5 
   
Powers   
Electoral Reform 
Proposals 
EMB proposes electoral reforms AND government 
does not (lf011d = 1 AND lf011e = 0) 
1.0 
Electoral Disputes EMB adjudicates electoral disputes (lf007b = 1) 1.0 
   
Composition   
Member Selection Members selected by legislature/judiciary AND not 
the PM/President/Government/Cabinet (em015e/f = 
1 AND em015b/c/i/j = 0) 
1.5 
   
Term of Office   
EMB Member Terms Members have fixed terms (em006b = 1) 1.5 
   
Budget   
Budget 
Determination 
EMB budget determined by the legislature/EMB/ 
donors AND not the President/PM/Government 
(em004c/e/f = 1 AND em005a/b/d = 0) 
1.0 
Expenditure Control EMB expenditures audited by 
legislature/EMB/donors AND not the 
President/PM/Government (em005c/g/f = 1 AND 
em005a/b/d = 0) 
1.0 
5.3. Categorised Autonomy Model 
The categorised autonomy model is similar to the conventional independent model, 
but it takes a different approach to measuring autonomy and analyses more elements 
of EMB design.  The model distinguishes between four types of autonomy: 
institutional, financial, personnel and functional (van Aaken, 2009).  The original model 
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has been modified to accommodate available data and its assumptions expanded to 
increase specification.  The biggest increase in detail is to the main functional 
autonomy postulation, which stated that electoral fairness would be bolstered if an 
autonomous EMB performs more electoral tasks (van Aaken, 2009: 313).  This one 
statement has been disambiguated into multiple statements regarding each separate 
task.  Some proxy variables are used because available data does not perfectly match 
the original framework specifications.  Proxy variables are only used if they are suitable 
and closely follow the original framework.  The following sections outline the data for 
the four categories of autonomy and their constituent elements. 
5.3.1. Institutional Autonomy 
Institutional autonomy is the degree of separation an EMB has from the executive 
government.  The original assumptions for institutional autonomy have been adapted 
based on available data.  Accountability to non-executive actors is measured by 
whether EMBs report to the legislature.  A permanent institutional status is measured 
by the duration of EMB existence.  Having EMBs established in the constitution is 
measured by whether electoral law is established in the constitution.  The next 
sections discuss these aspects of institutional autonomy and the variables used for 
measuring them. 
Accountability 
Van Aaken (2009: 306) specifies that accountability to the judiciary, head of state or 
legislature to provide some separation from the executive.  Unfortunately, the 
available data does not measure accountability to the judiciary or head of state, but it 
does include several executive and government options.  The dichotomous variable for 
accountability measures whether EMBs report to the legislature and not the president, 
prime minister or a government department.  The conventional independence model 
and categorised autonomy models both measure accountability to the legislature. 
Longevity 
The global trend is increasingly to establish permanent EMBs rather than temporary 
bodies.  Consequently, almost all EMBs in the countries included within this study are 
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permanent.  This does not provide sufficient variation for comparison, as it introduces 
multicollinearity errors.  Testing for the effects of permanence requires larger 
databases that include at least a minimal number of temporary EMBs.  Longevity 
therefore serves as an alternative for permanence, but additionally tests for the effects 
of institutional culture.  The longer an EMB has existed the greater its chances of 
gaining technical experience and developing a separate institutional identity, including 
a culture that distinguishes it from other institutions.  The ACE & IDEA dataset 
unfortunately does not have a variable for when EMBs were first founded, so data had 
to be independently gathered.  The variable was constructed by subtracting the year 
established from the public survey year to determine how old EMBs were when 
respondents were asked about electoral fairness.  Figure 5.11 shows the years that 
EMBs in this study were first established.  It spans 1915 to 2005 and omits three 
countries before this period: Australia (1902), Norway (1814), and Switzerland (1848).  
The figure illustrates that many EMBs are relatively recent developments, often 
coinciding with the independence of nations after the Cold War. 
 
Figure 5.11: Year EMBs Established across 74 Countries.  Bars represent number of 
EMBs established in each year.  Sources: ACE & IDEA Data, EMB websites, electoral 
legislation, constitutions, and electoral observation reports. 
Constitutional Status 
The ACE & IDEA dataset does not include a variable measuring whether EMBs are 
established in the constitution, however it does measure whether electoral law is part 
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of the constitution.  The expert survey question asks: What is the status of the 
electoral law governing national elections?  Valid answers include Part of Constitution, 
Separate legislation, Decree, Regulations or administrative rules, Other, and Not 
applicable.  Figure 5.12 shows the results for these sources of electoral law, as coded 
in the ACE and IDEA dataset.  Constitutional electoral law is harder to change and thus 
insulates it from executive and legislative conflicts of interest, which is the same 
justification for establishing EMBs in constitutions.  Having electoral law as part the 
constitution thus acts as a proxy for EMBs being established in the constitution.  Future 
research projects with more time for gathering original data could test whether 
establishing an EMB within the constitution contributes to the integrity of electoral 
governance. 
 
Figure 5.12: Electoral Law Status across 80 Countries.  Stacked bars show the number 
of countries where electoral law has the respective status, while percentages 
represent the proportion of countries where each is present.  Percentages total more 
than 100% because electoral law can have multiple statuses within each country.  
Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Legislative 
Framework (lf001). 
5.3.2. Financial Autonomy 
Both budget determination and expenditure control are measured in the same way 
and using the same data as the conventional independent model.  The discussion in 
section 5.1.6 above will therefore only be summarised here.  As with the conventional 
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model, the categorised autonomy model assumes that financial autonomy will be 
upheld best if the legislature, EMB, or donors determine EMB budgets and control 
their expenditures.  See Figure 5.9 for which bodies determine EMB budgets and 
Figure 5.10 for which bodies control EMB expenses. 
5.3.3. Personnel Autonomy 
Personnel autonomy measures the extent to which the higher-level members of the 
EMBs are free from partisan and executive interference.  This depends upon which 
actors select EMB members, the criteria used to select them, and their security of 
tenure.  Personnel autonomy is increased when non-executive actors select EMB 
members for fixed tenure terms and selections are based, at least in part, on EMB 
member expertise. 
Member Selection 
The categorised autonomy model approach to measuring the selection of EMB 
members is similar to the composition criteria for the conventional independent 
model.  Both models consider the legislature and judiciary sufficiently insulated from 
the executive to grant EMB autonomy, but the conventional independent model also 
includes the head of state.  The categorised autonomy model omits this actor and 
member selection therefore only contributes to personnel autonomy when the 
legislature or judiciary select EMB members.  This variable has been previously covered 
on page 147 when discussing which actors are involved in selecting EMB members. 
Membership Criteria 
EMB members can be selected based on their expertise or partisanship.  Data for this 
variable comes from the following prompt for country experts: The EMB 
members/commissioners are selected on the basis of their: Partisanship, Expertise, 
Combination of partisanship and expertise.  Expertise is expected to yield impartial 
electoral governance, except in transitional democracies where political party 
involvement may enhance trust in electoral management.  Testing for this aspect of 
personnel autonomy therefore requires parallel conditional requirements: one for 
established democracies and another for transitional democracies.  Expertise is 
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expected to generate trust in established democracies, while a mix of expertise and 
partisanship is expected to be more desirable in newer democracies.  The democratic 
status of countries is determined using Freedom in the World scores, which distinguish 
between free, party free and not free countries.  A ‘free’ status is used to represent 
established democracies, while party or not free countries are considered transitional 
democracies.  Figure 5.13 shows the data for membership selection criteria before 
controlling for democracy status. 
 
Figure 5.13: Basis of EMB Memberships across 80 Countries.  Bars show the 
percentages and absolute number of countries with each membership basis.  Source: 
ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Electoral Management 
(em014). 
Security of Tenure 
Security of tenure can be measured using two approaches, both of which relate to the 
length of EMB member terms.  The first approach uses member terms coded as an 
unspecified period.  This assumes that a term with an unspecified period is an 
appointment for an indefinite period, which is one of the originally postulated ways of 
enhancing personnel autonomy.  The assumption seems relatively safe given that 
other available options include the election period only, a specified number of years, 
other and not applicable.  The second approach uses the notes for specified terms in 
the original dataset, with a new variable created to indicate the number of years for 
member terms, as shown in Figure 5.14.  Most election cycles are five years or less, so 
7.5% 
55.0% 
23.8% 
13.8% 
0
10
20
30
40
Partisanship (6) Expertise (44) Combination (19) Not Applicable (11)
 158 
fixed terms of six years or more are taken to represent a degree of insulation from 
political cycles. 
 
Figure 5.14: Years of Fixed Terms across 80 Countries.  Bars show the number of 
countries and percentage of countries that appoint EMB members for the indicated 
number of years.  Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on 
Electoral Management (em006). 
5.3.4. Functional Autonomy 
Functional autonomy measures the number of tasks performed by an EMB that also 
has a minimal degree of institutional, financial and personnel autonomy.  This 
additional requirement that tasks be performed by an autonomous EMB distinguishes 
functional autonomy from the other categories.  Minimal autonomy levels are 
determined by combining the institutional, personnel and financial index scores.  If the 
resulting standardized score is positive, then an EMB is deemed to have passed the 
minimal autonomy threshold and measured as performed by an autonomous EMB.  
Electoral management functions also only contribute to the functional autonomy index 
if they are performed by an EMB that achieves this autonomy threshold.  The positive 
score used as a threshold cut-off point is somewhat arbitrary, but it identifies EMBs 
that have above average institutional, personnel, and/or financial autonomy.  IN 
addition, experimenting with different threshold cut-off points did not substantially 
alter results.  The method for creating this threshold is further explained in section 
3.8% 1.3% 2.5% 
12.5% 12.5% 
16.3% 
18.8% 
2.5% 
1.3% 
28.8% 
0
5
10
15
20
25
 159 
5.4.2, but a brief introduction was necessary here because all functional autonomy 
variables include this threshold requirement.  The following sections outline the 
elements of functional autonomy. 
Boundary Delimitation 
Maintaining electorate boundaries requires at least two key tasks: drawing boundaries 
and approving boundary changes.  The ACE dataset includes variables for the bodies 
responsible for each of these tasks.  The first prompt for country experts says: The 
body responsible for drawing the boundaries is: Legislature (1st chamber), Legislature 
(2nd chamber), Executive, Boundary Commission, Electoral Management Body (EMB), 
A government department or agency, Other, or Not applicable.  The second boundary 
function is the approval of any changes, which is often performed by a different body 
or actor.  The raw data comes from the following question: The authority responsible 
for final approval of the constituency boundaries is: The legislature 
(national/subnational), The Boundaries Commission, The Electoral Management Body, 
A government department or agency, Other, or Not applicable.  The responsibility for 
approval is important because it can influence how boundaries are drawn.  EMBs are 
responsible for drawing electorate boundaries in about a third of countries.  The two 
tasks must meet the autonomy threshold before they can contribute to the functional 
autonomy index. 
Electoral Reform 
The task of proposing electoral legislation reforms is measured in the same way as the 
‘powers’ criteria for the conventional independent model, but with the additional EMB 
autonomy threshold.  For brevity, the discussion and figures will not be repeated here.  
Figure 5.6 on page 146 shows that 34.1% of EMBs perform this task, but this 
percentage is reduced once the autonomy threshold is applied.  Consequently, the 
conventional independent model and categorized autonomy model include a different 
set of EMBs despite using the same variable to indicate which body proposes 
legislation reforms. 
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Financial Oversight 
There are two financial oversight variables in the ACE dataset.  The first measures 
which body receives the financial reports of parties and candidates, while the second 
measures which body investigates these reports.  The first set of data comes from the 
following question: What institution(s) receives financial reports from political parties 
and/or candidates?  Answers include EMB, Ministry, Auditing agency, Special 
institution, Court, Not applicable, and Other.  The second financial oversight task 
follows logically from the first, and involves auditing the reports submitted by political 
parties and candidates.  This data comes from the following question: Is it specified 
that a particular institution(s) is responsible for examining financial reports and/or 
investigating violations?  Available responses include EMB, ministry, institution for this 
purpose, auditing agency, court, other and No if not applicable, meaning the reports 
are not audited by any actor.  The largest category for both financial oversight tasks 
indicate that EMBs commonly receive and investigate political finance reports, as 
shown in Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16.  The autonomy threshold is applied to both 
financial oversight functions, so the newly constructed variables will only measure 
autonomous EMBs that perform these two tasks. 
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Figure 5.15: Political Finance Reporting across 78 Countries.  Bars show numbers of 
countries or territories where each institution receives financial reports from political 
candidates or candidates, with percentages totalling more than 100% because multiple 
institutions receive the reports in some countries.  Source: International IDEA, Political 
Finance Database (pf040). 
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Figure 5.16: Political Finance Investigation across 78 Countries.  Bars show the 
numbers of countries where each institution is responsible for examining financial 
reports or investigating infractions.  Percentages total more than 100% because 
multiple institutions can be responsible for this task.  Source: International IDEA, 
Political Finance Database (pf041). 
Core Election Tasks 
The core election tasks parallel the ‘implementation’ tasks of the conventional 
independent model, so they will not be explained in depth here.  The core tasks 
include voter registration (Figure 5.1), conducting polling (Figure 5.2), sorting and 
counting ballots (Figure 5.3), and tabulating the results (Figure 5.4).  All tasks have 
been modified based on available data, as discussed in section 5.1.1.  As with all 
functional variables, the autonomy threshold requirement restricts measuring the 
tasks to cases where they are performed by an autonomous EMB.  The set of EMBs 
that perform these tasks thus differs from those measured using the conventional 
independent model. 
Voter Information 
The task of providing voter information about political parties and candidates is open 
to conflicts of interest and thus best performed by a neutral body such as an 
autonomous EMB.  As Figure 5.17 shows, national EMBs provide voter information in 
26.9% 
19.2% 
9.0% 
15.4% 
7.7% 
6.4% 
41.0% 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Not Applicable (21)
Other (15)
Court (7)
Auditing Agency (12)
Special Institution (6)
Ministry (5)
EMB (32)
 163 
most cases, while the regional and local EMBs perform this responsibility in some 
cases.  However, the voter education conditions are only fulfilled when an EMB has 
responsibility for elections at the same level as the EMB that conducts voter education 
campaigns.  This means that three variables are used to measure whether voter 
education is performed by an autonomous EMB: the body responsible for voter 
education, which level of elections EMBs are responsible for, and the autonomy 
threshold.  The expert survey question asks the following: Who conducts information 
campaigns for national elections (informing where, when and how to register and/or 
vote)?  Figure 5.17 shows the available answers and original raw data for this variable 
before applying the autonomy threshold. 
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Figure 5.17: Information Campaign Bodies across 80 Countries.  Bars show numbers of 
countries where the respective actor conducts election information campaigns, with 
percentages totalling more than 100% because multiple actors conduct information 
campaigns in some countries.  Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative 
Data on Voter Education (ve001). 
Media Monitoring 
Impartial monitoring of campaign advertising and election news coverage is important 
for ensuring a level pre-election playing field.  The original variable measuring which 
body performs this task comes from the following question: Which of the following 
bodies or agencies has a responsibility in the regulation of media coverage of elections?  
Possible answers are shown in Figure 5.18.  The newly constructed variable does not 
differentiate between the two EMB options, meaning that this task is considered 
performed by an EMB if either variation is true, so long as the autonomy threshold is 
also obtained.  This means a coding of 1 represents that an autonomous EMB performs 
the media monitoring function, regardless of whether it does so by convention or by 
law. 
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Figure 5.18: Media Regulation Bodies across 40 Countries.  Bars show numbers of 
countries where the respective body is responsible for regulation of media coverage.  
Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Comparative Data on Media and Elections 
(me025). 
Dispute Resolution 
Electoral dispute resolution is part of the conventional independent model, so the 
discussion explaining this variable will not be repeated here.  See section 5.1.3 above 
for the details.  The judiciary is most often responsible for electoral dispute resolution, 
but EMBs are the second most common body that performs this function.  This 
important task contributes to functional autonomy if EMBs settle disputes and they 
meet the autonomy requirement. 
5.4. Methodology: Categorised Autonomy Model 
The fourfold categorised autonomy framework is tested using multiple separate 
regression models to analyse each variable individually as well as the aggregated 
autonomy indices.  This provides both a detailed look at the individual effects of each 
variable as well as a broader look at the effects of different autonomy types.  The 
following subsections outline how variable conditions are fulfilled, the different 
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autonomy indices are created and the eleven regression models are constructed.  The 
first eight regression models include separated variables, while the last three include 
indices created from aggregating these separate variables.   
5.4.1. Variable Construction  
Each of the four autonomy categories includes newly constructed variables, which are 
measured using one or more original ACE & IDEA variables.  The requirements for 
creating new variables are outlined in Table 5.2.  The conditions follow the categorised 
autonomy model outlined in section 3.2, with modification to accommodate available 
data where necessary.  The first column lists elements of the four autonomy categories 
using terminology from the data sources to ensure accurate descriptions.  The second 
column contains descriptions of the logic used to fulfil variable requirements, with 
italicised variable names and value descriptions in brackets.  All variables are 
dichotomous and values of 1 represent the presence of an indicated design feature, 
while 0 represents its absence.  The logical operator ‘AND’ indicates necessary 
combinations, while the ‘OR’ indicates the possibility of alternative fulfilment 
conditions. 
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Table 5.2: Autonomy Variable Construction Requirements 
Institutional Autonomy  
Accountability EMB reports to legislature AND not to 
president/PM/government (em003c = 1 AND 
em003a/b/d = 0) 
Electoral Law in 
Constitution 
Electoral law is part of constitution (lf001a = 1) 
Longevity Decades since EMB established (nat_embexpC, recoded 
to range from 0 to 1) 
  
Financial Autonomy  
Budget Determination EMB budget determined by legislature/EMB AND not by 
president/PM/government (em004c/e = 1 AND 
em004a/b/d = 0) 
Expenditures Control EMB expenditures audited by Legislature/EMB AND not 
by president/PM/government (em005c/g = 1 AND 
em004a/b/d) 
  
Personnel Autonomy  
Membership Criteria EMB membership based on expertise in older 
democracies or a combination of partisanship and 
expertise in newer democracies (em014b/c = 1 AND 
nat_fstatus = free/partly free or not free) 
Legislature or Judiciary 
Appointment 
EMB members selected by legislature/judiciary AND not 
president/PM/government/Cabinet (em015e/f = 1 AND 
em015b/c/i/j = 0) 
Unspecified Member Terms EMB member terms unspecified (em006c = 1) 
6+ Year Member Terms EMB members terms are 6 years or more (em006g, 
recoded to 0 or 1) 
  
Functional Autonomy  
Boundary Demarcation Autonomous EMB draws boundaries AND not 
executive/government 
(aut_threshold = 1 AND bd005e = 1 AND bd005c/f = 0) 
Boundary Approval Autonomous EMB approves boundaries AND not 
government 
(aut_threshold = 1 AND bd005c = 1 AND bd002d = 0) 
Proposing Electoral Reforms Autonomous EMB proposes electoral reforms AND not 
government (aut_threshold = 1 AND lf011d = 1 AND 
lf011e = 0) 
Receiving Financial Reports Autonomous EMB receives financial reports AND not 
government ministry (aut_threshold = 1 AND pf040a = 1 
AND pf040b = 0) 
Examining Financial Reports Autonomous EMB examines financial reports AND not 
government ministry (aut_threshold = 1 AND pf041a = 1 
AND pf041b = 0) 
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Voter Registration Autonomous EMB responsible for voter registration 
(aut_threshold = 1 AND vr004d = 1) 
Responsibility for Local 
Level 
Autonomous EMB responsible for local level 
(aut_threshold = 1 AND em002c = 1) 
Sorting and Counting Votes Autonomous EMB responsible for local level AND votes 
sorted and counted at polling stations/polling centres 
(aut_threshold = 1 AND em002c = 1 AND vc004a/b = 1) 
Consolidating Results Autonomous EMB responsible for 
national/regional/local level AND votes consolidated at 
national/regional/district or sub-district level 
(aut_threshold = 1 AND em002a/b/c = 1 AND 
vc006a/b/c or d = 1) 
Voter Information 
Campaigns 
Autonomous national/regional/local EMB conducts 
voter information campaigns AND not 
national/regional/local government (aut_threshold = 1 
AND vc001a/b/c = 1 AND vc001d/e/f) 
Media Regulation Autonomous EMB regulates election media by 
law/custom AND not government (aut_threshold = 1 
AND me025a/b = 1 AND me025g = 0) 
Electoral Dispute Agency Autonomous EMB adjudicates electoral disputes 
(aut_threshold = 1 AND lf007b = 1) 
5.4.2. Creating Autonomy Indices 
Aggregated indices were created for each of the four autonomy indices as well as 
three thematic functional sub-indices.  A simple additive index was created for the first 
three autonomy types, starting at 0 with 1 added each time variable requirements 
were fulfilled.  The total scores were then divided by the number of variables within 
each category to arrive at autonomy indices ranging from 0 to 1, with 1 representing 
all variable conditions fulfilled.  The values of the institutional, financial, and personnel 
autonomy indices were combined and then standardised to calculate the autonomy 
threshold.  If the standardized total was greater than 0, the EMB was considered to 
have met the minimum threshold for autonomy.  The threshold variable is 
dichotomous, with 1 indicating an EMB satisfies the autonomy requirement.  This is 
the variable referred to repeatedly for the conditional requirements outlined in Table 
5.2.  The functional variables differ because they are only added to this index if this 
threshold requirement is fulfilled.   
Additive indices are created for the different autonomy categories, with sub-indices for 
functional autonomy because it includes more tasks.  Three thematic functional sub-
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indices were created because there are many tasks within this category.  The 
functional sub-indices cover three thematic areas of electoral governance: elections 
and electoral processes, candidates and political parties, and structures and 
governance.  The first sub-index includes voter registration, conducting polling, 
counting votes, and consolidating results.  The second comprises receiving and 
examining the financial reports of candidates and parties, providing voter information, 
and regulating media coverage of elections.  The third sub-index encompasses 
boundary demarcation and approval, proposing electoral reforms and the first level of 
electoral dispute resolution.  Each of these sub-indices contains four variables, so 
when the total scores are divided by four the values ultimately range from 0 to 1.  The 
final step was to create aggregated indices from the institutional, financial, personnel, 
and functional variables.  The number of variables used to create the totals 
subsequently divides these values.  This produces variables with values that range 
from 0 to 1.  The next section discusses the regression models used to analyse the 
separate variables and aggregated indices. 
5.4.3. Constructing Regression Models 
The categorised autonomy model is analysed using multilevel mixed-effects regression 
models.  These use the xtmixed command in Stata along with the option to cluster 
standard errors within country groups.  The clustered standard errors do not change 
regression coefficient values, but they do apply a more stringent significance 
requirement.  This helps avoid Type 1 false positive errors of assuming a significant 
relationship exists when it is actually not present.  It was necessary to use multiple 
regression models because regional datasets contain a limited number of countries, 
which results in problems of multicollinearity if there is insufficient variation between 
countries.  Some of this multicollinearity results from applying the autonomy 
threshold, which limits the number of EMBs that meet functional variable 
requirements.  However, the threshold requirement is theory-driven and therefore 
cannot be omitted.  Another problem arose from using the robust clustered standard 
errors option.  Wald’s Chi2 scores were not output if there was only one different 
country between two variables in a model.  The solution to these problems was to 
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construct multiple regression models with a limited number of variables in each.  The 
practical limits of the datasets resulted in a limit of about four variables per regional 
dataset, although the global model could of course accommodate more.  The lower 
number of variables was used to enable meaningful side-by-side comparisons between 
the regional and global models.  The first regression models test individual variables 
from each autonomy category.  Subsequent models include the three functional sub-
indices and the four autonomy indices. 
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Chapter 6. Results for Established Factors Reveal Trends 
This chapter presents the results for all individual level variables and all national level 
variables except those for electoral management design.  It focuses on highlighting 
trends and regional differences, discussing reasons for unexpected findings, to provide 
a broader understanding of what determines perceptions of electoral fairness.  There 
are two main sections, based on the distinction between the individual and national 
level, which follow the same subsections used in earlier chapters.  Section 6.1 thus 
presents and discusses the regression models for socio-demographics, participation 
and engagement, media attention, economic performance, political performance and 
group memberships.  These models are analysed using multivariate ordered probit 
regression models.  Separate country models are summarised here and presented in 
Appendix E.  Any mention of country coefficients, results, models, or regressions refers 
to the tables in this appendix.  Regional and global models are presented here side-by 
side for easy comparison.  In addition to the main thematic models, the last section 
presents a summative model that combines the most reliable, robust, and widely 
available individual level variables.  There are no separate country regressions for this 
summative model as it includes variables from the first six models.  Section 6.2 
examines national level variables using the same thematic groups used in earlier 
chapters: democratic performance, electoral context, parliamentary composition, 
political performance, economic performance, and cultural fractionalisation.  The 
models are analysed using multilevel mixed-effects regressions, which include a 
selection of the most reliable and robust individual level control variables.  These will 
not be discussed here because they maintain similar coefficient sizes and significance 
levels as they did in the previous individual level regressions.  However, unlike the 
individual level data there are no summative models because the regional datasets do 
not contain sufficient countries to include many national level variables in multilevel 
models. 
6.1. Individual Level Variables 
There are numerous trends regarding individual level factors with effects on perceived 
electoral fairness.  These include new findings, validation of more tentative 
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relationships and confirmation of previous research.  For the socio-demographic 
grouping, people who are older, male or have higher incomes tend to view elections 
positively, but tertiary education is less consistent.  There appears to be a relationship 
between higher education and the level of democracy, with educated people making 
assessments of electoral fairness that are more accurate.  Regarding participation and 
engagement, people who vote or support election winners make consistently more 
positive assessments of electoral fairness, while those interested in politics, living in 
rural areas or identifying as conservative only sometimes make more positive 
assessments.  For media attention, getting political news from newspapers is 
negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness and watching television has a 
positive association, but the results for listening to radio news are mixed and having 
greater political knowledge has a mild negative relationship with electoral fairness.  It 
is possible that newspaper attention and political knowledge are similar to higher 
education in that they act as proxies for how informed respondents are about the 
fairness of elections.  Regarding economic performance, perceiving the national 
economy and personal finances as improving are good predictors of perceived 
electoral fairness, but the national economy presents a stronger and more consistent 
relationship while having paid employment is not a significant factor.  For the political 
performance grouping, trusting institutions is consistently linked with increased 
perceptions of electoral fairness, while perceiving high levels of public sector 
corruption has a negative effect.  The strongest positive relationships are for political 
institutions such as the national legislature and executive.  Being the victim of a 
physical crime also shows a weak negative relationship with perceived electoral 
fairness.  Finally, being a member of the religious or ethnic majority does not show 
consistent results and being non-religious is insignificant, but being non-partisan is 
negatively associated with electoral fairness and generally trusting others is strongly 
related to improved perceptions.  Overall, the strongest findings are that those who 
vote, support election winners, think the national economy as improving, perceive low 
levels of corruption, generally trust others and trust political institutions are more 
likely to view elections as fair.  The following sections present the evidence for and 
subsequently discuss the results for each individual level variable within their thematic 
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groupings.  The regional models used in each thematic grouping differ based on the 
availability of data for each set of included variables. 
6.1.1. Socio-Demographics 
Previous studies found factors such as age, gender, income and education to be 
related to different aspects of political trust and support (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; 
Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Birch, 2008; Norris, 2002, 2004; Rosas, 2010).  Table 6.1 
shows the results for socio-demographic variables for the regional and global models, 
with separate country coefficients summarized in Table 6.2.  The results support 
previous findings that older males with higher incomes are more likely to trust 
elections (Birch, 2008; Farrell & McAllister, 2006; Rosas, 2010).  This is probably due to 
their increased likelihood of life satisfaction and benefiting from the status quo.   
Table 6.1: Multivariate Models of Electoral Fairness with Socio-Demographics 
  Africa  Americas  Arab  Asia  Europe  Global  
Female Gender 0.015 
 
-0.021 * 0.060 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.087 *** -0.016 * 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Age (Decades) 0.107 *** 0.063 * 0.055 * 0.008 
 
0.134 *** 0.071 **
* 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.010) 
 
High Income -0.003 
 
0.066 * -0.054 
 
0.079 * 0.038 * 0.038 ** 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.119) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.034) 
 
Low Income -0.004 
 
-0.011 
 
0.012 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.034 * -0.006 
 
 
(0.081) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.025) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.045 * 0.003 
 
-0.017 
 
-0.161 *** 0.071 ** -0.008  
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.199) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.037) 
 
N: Respondents 24992 
 
33053 
 
4150 
 
11711 
 
25022 
 
106412 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
5 
 
11 
 
19 
 
80 
 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
5 
 
5 
 
1 
 
5 
 
5 
 
5 
 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.003 
 
0.002 
 
0.003 
 
0.010 
 
0.008  0.001  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
    
Age has the strongest and most reliable relationship with electoral fairness, income 
shows a moderately weaker relationship, while female gender and tertiary education 
have the weakest relationships.  Most interesting however are the negative 
relationships for tertiary education.  This variable may function as a proxy for being 
better informed about the political situation, which could lead to negative views of 
electoral fairness in many of the hybrid regimes included within this study.  Separate 
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exploratory analysis supports this contention, indicating that higher education in 
authoritarian democracies is negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness, 
which the relationships switches to positive in liberal democracies.  The following 
sections discuss these socioeconomic and demographic factors in more depth. 
Gender 
Gender presents a somewhat weaker relationship with perceived electoral fairness, 
although the trend is negative as anticipated.  Only two regions and the Global model 
obtain significance, while 60.5% of separate country regressions are insignificant.  
However, the regional and global coefficients are negative, while 27.6% of the country 
coefficients are negative and only 11.8% are positive.  This provides some evidence of 
a weak negative trend, indicating that females tend to perceive elections less fairly, 
however this trend is strongest in the Americas and Europe models.  The Africa, Arab 
and Asia models do not obtain significance, with their significant separate country 
coefficients split between positive and negative.  This shows no clear trends in these 
regions.  If there are any trends, women in the included Americas and European 
countries tend to make more negative assessments of electoral fairness than women 
do across the included African, Asian and Arab countries.  This may have something to 
do with the feminist movement having made more progress in the Americas and 
Europe, whereas women in less developed regions may be less aware of the inequity 
of gender imbalances in politics.  Nevertheless, globally males more frequently make 
positive assessments of electoral fairness, which provides limited support for the 
original proposition that males would tend to view elections as fairer than females. 
The finding that being female is negatively associated with perceptions of electoral 
fairness parallels the weak negative relationship found for other types of political 
support (Birch, 2008; Farrell & McAllister, 2006; Rosas, 2010).  Women are often less 
satisfied with political systems, state legitimacy, democracy and political institutions 
(Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & Singer, 2008; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; 
Cho & Bratton, 2006; Moehler, 2009; Seligson, 2002; Singh et al., 2012).  We can now 
add electoral fairness to the list, since men have more trust in elections compared with 
women.  There are many possible reasons for the genders disparities, but the main 
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reason is probably that both political systems and institutions remain dominated by 
men.  This is especially true at the higher levels, and women are likely to perceive this 
underlying structural bias negatively, especially in the Americas and Europe.  
Candidates in elections and members of parliament are more frequently men, even in 
the oldest and most established democracies.  Women thus face a structural and 
systematic bias that is reflected in their negative assessments of electoral fairness. 
Age 
The coefficient for age is consistently positive across all regional models except Asia, 
which is not exceptional because all four of the significant separate Asian country 
coefficients are positive.  Table 6.2 shows that across all country regressions, including 
Asia, 56.6% have positively significant relationships for age while only 3.9% are 
negatively significant, with the remaining coefficients insignificant.  Together with the 
regional and global results, this provides considerable empirical that older individuals 
tend to have more positive attitudes towards electoral fairness than younger 
individuals do. 
While the current study found older respondents place more trust in elections, 
younger individuals often show more positive attitudes in other areas of political 
support (Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Anderson & Singer, 2008; Cho & Bratton, 2006; 
Moehler, 2009; Seligson, 2002).  The difference could arise from younger voters not 
having learned how to vote strategically, for example by choosing fringe candidates 
rather than viable candidates, and subsequently perceiving elections as unfair when 
their choices appear futile.  Conversely, older voters may vote more realistically and 
not be as disillusioned by election results (Tavits & Annus, 2006).  A second 
explanation for the difference between younger and older respondents is that 
democratic satisfaction tends to increase as countries learn from successive electoral 
experiences and develop their electoral institutions and technical expertise (Farrell & 
McAllister, 2006).  This means that recent elections are likely to have been conducted 
more fairly compared with earlier elections.  Older people are thus more likely to have 
experienced more unfair elections and electoral scandals, and thus tend to make 
favourable comparative assessments regarding recent elections, while younger 
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individuals have experienced fewer elections and may therefore be less forgiving of 
any problems, even if improvements have been made.  Electoral integrity tends to 
increase with time so older individuals are likely to be more aware of the 
improvements, which might be why they express more positive attitudes when asked 
about the fairness of recent elections. 
Table 6.2: Summary of Socio-Demographics for Separate Country Results 
  Significant (+)  Significant (-) Insignificant Missing Data 
Age (Decades) 56.6% 3.9% 39.5% 0.0% 
Female 11.8% 27.6% 60.5% 0.0% 
High Income 28.9% 7.9% 63.2% 0.0% 
Low Income 21.1% 19.7% 59.2% 0.0% 
Tertiary Income 17.1% 28.9% 53.9% 0.0% 
     
Income 
The predictions regarding income levels found substantial support.  People in the 
highest income brackets tended to perceive electoral fairness more positively, while 
those in the lowest income brackets tended to have negative perceptions.  For the 
high-income variable, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and Global coefficients are 
significant and positive.  The relationship with low income is not as reliable, with only 
the Europe model showing a significant negative coefficient.  It therefore seems that 
high income is a better predictor than low income.  The country level regressions 
summarised in Table 6.2 further support this proposition, with 28.9% of countries 
showing positive relationships for high income and only 7.9% showing negative.  The 
results clearly support previous findings that people with higher incomes tend to view 
elections as fairer (Birch, 2008; Farrell & McAllister, 2006) and parallel other forms of 
political trust and support.  Higher income individuals are generally more satisfied with 
democracy and vote more frequently (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 74; Birch, 2010; 
Gilley, 2006; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999), so it is unsurprising that they also have more 
positive attitudes towards electoral fairness.  People with higher incomes generally 
benefit from the status quo and are more likely to vote for one of the major political 
parties, which usually have better chances of winning.  In addition, politicians are more 
likely to cater to the interests of higher income individuals because they can both 
provide campaign donations and apply pressure against politicians.  Lower incomes 
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individuals are less likely to view the current situation favourably, engage politically or 
have as much money for donations and are thus in a weaker position to lobby 
politicians.  This sets up a structural situation where higher income individuals are 
more likely to be satisfied with elections and their outcomes, while lower income 
individuals do not experience the same level of satisfaction or trust in elections. 
Education 
Unlike the other socio-demographic variables, results for tertiary education go against 
the predicted positive relationship direction.  Two regional models and 28.9% of 
country coefficients show negative relationships, while only one regional model and 
17.1% of national models are positive.  Two regional models, the Global model, and 
53.9% of country models failed to achieve significance.  Tertiary education therefore 
does not present an exceptionally strong relationship, but the evidence points more 
towards a slightly negative relationship, meaning that globally people with university 
education are less likely to view elections as fair.  The Europe model is an exception, 
with a positive regional coefficient and more positive country coefficients than 
negative.  However, with the exception of Europe, the overall trend goes against the 
presumed positive relationship between tertiary education and perceptions of 
electoral fairness. 
The mixed results could be a result of education interacting with the electoral context 
or type of democracy.  Assuming a higher education generally makes one more 
knowledgeable about political circumstances and the wider world; we can expect 
educated opinions to track reality more frequently and to make comparisons with the 
electoral experiences of other countries.  It is therefore possible that the differences 
for tertiary education between regions are due to the quality of elections in those 
regions.  Previous findings also indicated a negative relationship in AfroBarometer 
countries (Moehler, 2009) and a positive relationship using mostly European countries 
(Birch, 2008; Farrell & McAllister, 2006).  University educated individuals in Africa, 
where electoral problems abound, are more likely to have negative views of electoral 
fairness.  However, educated individuals in Europe, where free and fair elections are 
common, are more likely to have positive attitudes towards electoral fairness.  This 
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could explain why tertiary education coefficient is negative across AfroBarometer 
countries and positive in CSES European countries.  This raises an interesting 
dissimilarity between education and income.  There are often high levels of correlation 
between these two factors for other types of political trust, but the results here 
suggest differences when it comes to perceptions of electoral fairness. 
6.1.2. Participation and Engagement 
Participation and engagement variables include electoral participation, supporting 
electoral winners, interest in politics, living in urban versus areas and liberal versus 
conservative political ideology.  Analysing the results included in Table 6.3 confirms 
that people who support election winners and voted in the most recent elections are 
more likely to view elections as fair.  Those who are interested in politics, live in rural 
areas and have conservative ideologies are slightly more likely to view elections as fair, 
but these factors were only significant in some regions.  The following sections outline 
the results and discuss these findings in more detail. 
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Table 6.3: Multivariate Models of Electoral Fairness with Participation and Engagement 
 
Africa  Americas  Asia  Europe  Global  
Electoral Participation 0.101 *** 0.049 ** 0.084 ** 0.105 *** 0.087 *** 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.077) 
 
-0.034 
 
Supports Winner 0.180 ** 0.146 *** 0.284 *** 0.158 *** 0.163 *** 
 (0.114) (0.078) (0.173) (0.061) -0.052 
Political Interest -0.004 
 
0.131 *** 0.018 
 
. 
 
. 
 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.052) 
 
. 
 
. 
 
Urban Status -0.033 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.201 *** -0.011 
 
-0.021  
 
(0.075) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.049) 
 
Left-Wing . 
 
0.015 
 
. 
 
-0.066 * . 
 
 
. 
 
(0.059) 
 
. 
 
(0.075) 
 
. 
 
Right-Wing . 
 
0.052 ** . 
 
0.004 
 
. 
 
 
. 
 
(0.037) 
 
. 
 
(0.044) 
 
. 
 
Model Parameters 
     
N: Respondents 24635 
 
26519 
 
10826 
 
30533 
 
100959 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
10 
 
26 
 
73 
 
Degrees of Freedom 4 
 
6 
 
4 
 
5 
 
3 
 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.012  0.013  0.048  0.011  0.006  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
      
Electoral Participation 
Electoral participation, or voting, is consistently associated with perceived electoral 
fairness.  It demonstrates significant positive relationships for all regional models and 
the Global model, as shown in Table 6.3.  Separate country regressions are similarly 
consistent, as shown in Table 6.4, with 64.5% positively significant and not a single 
significant negative relationship, but the remaining country models are either 
insignificant or missing data.  These very robust findings allow us to predict with 
confidence that voting, for any candidate or party, is associated with increased 
perceptions of electoral fairness.  The anticipated positive relationship therefore finds 
strong support, which is consistent with other findings (McAllister & White, 2011; 
Moehler, 2009).  However, this electoral participation relationship may be endogenous 
or the result of a post-voting rationalization bias.  In other words, the causal 
mechanism between voting and perceived electoral fairness may go both ways.  
People could be more likely to vote because they perceive elections to be fair, or they 
may rationalise a belief that elections are fair afterwards to justify their vote as 
meaningful.  Alternatively, voting as an act of civic engagement could increase 
interpersonal trust and thus confidence in election officials or elected representatives 
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(Brehm & Rahn, 1997: 1017; Lanning, 2008: 445).  The current study was designed to 
find correlations and not causal links, so the direction of relationships was not 
investigated. 
Another factor to consider is that electoral participation likely interacts with whether a 
person voted for the election winner or loser.  However, this possibility was partially 
controlled for by the inclusion of a variable measuring whether respondents supported 
election winners.  Those who voted for the winners are likely to have more positive 
attitudes than those who voted for the losers (Nadeau & Blais, 1993: 562).  This was 
partially verified because supporting the winner was measured using voting choices as 
well as party identification, and both of these demonstrated positive associations with 
electoral fairness in separate exploratory regressions. 
Table 6.4: Summary of Participation and Engagement for Separate Country Results  
  Significant (+)  Significant (-) Insignificant Missing Data 
Electoral Participation 64.5% 0.0% 34.2% 1.3% 
Supports Winner 61.8% 3.9% 26.3% 7.9% 
Political Interest 34.2% 11.8% 28.9% 25.0% 
Urban Status 9.2% 38.2% 43.4% 9.2% 
Left-Wing 5.3% 18.4% 28.9% 47.4% 
Right-Wing 21.1% 7.9% 23.7% 47.4% 
     
Supports Winner 
Supporting electoral winners is also strongly associated with increased perceptions of 
electoral fairness, with significantly positive relationships in every available regional 
model as well as the global model.  A strong positive relationships exists whether 
supporting winners is measured via party identification or voting choice, although 
these exploratory regressions are not shown here.  Separate country regressions, 
summarized in Table 6.4, also reveal that supporting election winners is associated 
with increased perceptions of electoral fairness, with 61.8% significantly positive 
relationships, only 3.9% significantly negative and the remainder either insignificant or 
missing data.  These results provide strong support for the prediction that people who 
support election winners tend to make positive assessments regarding electoral 
fairness.  It does not take an extensive understanding of cognitive biases to 
acknowledge that this relationship makes sense.  It is clearly understandable and 
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supported by extensive research (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 
2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Banducci & Karp, 2003; Birch, 2008; Chang & Chu, 
2006; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Craig et al., 2006; McAllister & White, 2011; Moehler, 
2009; Singh et al., 2012). 
The current study confirmed that we can measure winner support via voting choices or 
political affiliations and get similar results, as was suggested by previous research 
(Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Anderson & Singer, 2008).  In other words, the same 
tendency towards positive assessments of electoral fairness emerges whether people 
voted for winners or simply identified with a winning political party.  Moreover, this 
study confirmed that the positive relationship maintains whether people voted for a 
single party that forms a majority or any member of a winning coalition (Banducci & 
Karp, 2003).  The nature of the current data and research design does not enable 
measuring the relative size of the relationships for supporting majority versus coalition 
winners, but both clearly have positive relationship with perceived electoral fairness.  
We could postulate that people who vote for winning coalition members may have less 
positive attitudes than people who voted for a single party winning a majority.  This 
would be because they might not see their preferences materialize as readily as 
someone who voted for a majority winning party that does not need to compromise 
on policy or legislation. 
Political Interest 
Political interest shows a significant positive relationship only in the Americas model, 
but this variable was missing for the Europe model and was therefore not included in 
the Global model.  Separate country regressions are 34.2% positively significant and 
11.8% negatively significant, with the remaining relationships either insignificant or 
missing data.  There may be regional differences with this variable because all 
significant country coefficients are positive in the Americas, while the country 
coefficients for other regions show no clear trends.  The Americas model therefore 
supports the prediction that political interest is positively related to electoral fairness, 
but findings are less conclusive for other regional models.  The regional differences 
reflect other research that finds a mix of relationships, but a general positive tendency 
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(Anderson & Singer, 2008; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Birch, 2010; Dowley & Silver, 
2002; Moehler, 2009: 362).  Although available results support the original political 
interest assumption, it is surprising the relationship was so unreliable given the wide 
range of other positive correlations with similar aspects of political trust (Anderson & 
Singer, 2008; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Moehler, 2009).  One 
possible explanation is that winner status and electoral participation were included in 
the same model, which both demonstrated consistent and strong positive 
relationships.  These variables may have overshadowed the strength and significance 
of the political interest relationship. 
Urban/Rural Status 
Results for urban status are not as consistent or reliable as the other variables in this 
model, but significant coefficients tend to support the expected negative relationship.  
Living in an urban area is negatively significant in the Asia model and 38.2% of all 
country models, but positively significant in only 9.2% of country models.  All other 
regional and country models as well as the Global model are either insignificant or 
missing data.  There is therefore a slightly negative trend indicating people in urban 
areas are less likely to view elections as fair, which supports the original assumption, 
but the relationship appears strongest in AsianBarometer countries.  This negative 
relationship between urban status and electoral fairness confirms previous findings 
(Mishler & Rose, 1997, 2001; Rosas, 2010). 
There are at least two possible reasons for the higher levels of electoral trust in rural 
areas.  First, the negative association might be due to unequal vote weighting between 
rural and urban areas.  Lower population densities in rural areas reduce the ratio of 
voters to elected representatives.  This means the votes of people in rural areas 
sometimes receive heavier weighting than the votes of people in urban areas, so 
individual voters in urban areas can be under-represented compared with their rural 
counterparts.  A second reason rural voters may have positive attitudes is that these 
areas are often more homogeneous compared with more heterogeneous urban areas.  
This increases the likelihood of rural voters electing someone who represents them 
either descriptively or substantively. 
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Left/Right Wing 
Results for the two political ideology variables are not as consistent or reliable, but 
significant coefficients tend to support the expected relationship directions.  The 
variables obtain significance in only one regional model each, but are not significant in 
the Global model.  Political ideology was only available for the Americas and Europe, 
but expected relationships find some limited support.  Although only two models in 
Table 6.3 show significant results, separate country regressions confirm the direction 
of these relationships: 80% of the significant right wing coefficients are positively 
significant, while 77.8% of the significant left wing coefficients are negative.  This 
means that people who identify as right wing are more likely to view elections as fair, 
while left wing individuals are less likely to hold this view.  Although some political 
ideology variables obtained conventional levels of significance, their coefficients are 
very small.  This indicates an extremely weak relationship, and it is unlikely that it 
would be much stronger if data were available for the other regional barometers.  The 
divisions of left versus right arises from the capitalist industrial revolutions that other 
parts of the world have either not experienced or developed without because of 
alternative political and economic structures.  The distinction is thus less meaningful in 
some parts of the world, but in the Americas and Europe is appears to still make a 
significant but weak difference.  People who identify as more right wing or 
conservative tend to have slightly more positive attitudes towards electoral fairness, 
while left wing or liberal people tend to have slightly more negative attitudes.  This 
supports previous research that found the same relationship (Birch, 2008; Rosas, 
2010).  We could speculate that this is because right wing individuals tend to be older 
and wealthier, and therefore likely benefit from the usually conservative status quo 
than the more progressive political and economic situations left wing people might 
prefer. 
6.1.3. Media Attention 
Variables relating to media attention were missing for many countries and differed 
between regional datasets.  We must therefore interpret any results using these 
variables with caution.  The findings, presented in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6, suggest that 
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getting political news from the newspaper is negatively associated with perceived 
electoral fairness.  Results for television and radio attention are not as reliable, but 
there may be a slightly positive relationship between watching television and viewing 
elections as fair.  The CSES survey did not have any media attention questions, so a 
Europe model is not included.  Political knowledge is only significant in one regional 
model and presents mixed results at the country level.  The following paragraphs 
discuss these results in more detail. 
Table 6.5: Multivariate Models of Electoral Fairness with Media Attention 
  Africa  Americas  Arab  Asia  Global  
Newspaper Attention -0.124 *** -0.020 
 
0.006 
 
-0.112 * -0.044 * 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Television Attention 0.003 
 
0.013 
 
0.182 * -0.011 
 
0.061 * 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Radio Attention -0.017 
 
-0.002 
 
0.162 ** 0.008 
 
-0.069 * 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.032) 
 
Political Knowledge -0.092 * -0.004 
 
0.036 
 
. 
 
. 
 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.086) 
 
. 
 
. 
 
Model Parameters 
     
N: Respondents 25279 
 
20207 
 
4775 
 
9952 
 
62367 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
14 
 
5 
 
9 
 
50 
 
Degrees of Freedom 4 
 
4 
 
1 
 
3 
 
3 
 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.007  0.000  0.013  0.005  0.002  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
      
Television/Newspaper/Radio Attention 
Television attention has positive coefficients for the Asia and Global models in Table 
6.5, but is insignificant in the other regions.  Significant country level results are almost 
evenly split between negative and positive.  Results therefore provide inadequate 
support for the proposition that watching television is negatively associated with 
electoral fairness.  Newspaper reading is significantly negative in the Africa, Asia and 
Global models, but insignificant for the other regional models.  Separate country 
regressions summarised in Table 6.6 confirm this negative relationship, with 33.3% of 
the county coefficients significantly negative and only 8.8% positively significant.  This 
means that people who more frequently read newspapers are less likely to view 
elections as fair, although the trend is strongest in AfroBarometer and AsianBarometer 
countries.  Radio attention results are mixed, with a positive result in the Arab model, 
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a negative result in the Global model and insignificant results for the other regions.  
Separate country regressions show a slightly positive relationship for radio attention, 
with 19.3% positively significant versus only 8.8% negatively significant.  Table 6.6 
shows that insignificant results are the largest category for media attention 
coefficients in separate country models, which further reinforces the finding that these 
relationships are neither reliable nor strong. 
The relationships for newspaper and television attention are in the opposite direction 
than has been found in previous research, which suggests that watching television 
decreases political trust while reading newspapers increases it (Hart, 1994; 
Hetherington, 1998; Karp et al., 2003; McLeod & McDonald, 1985; Miller et al., 1979).  
However, the current study found positive relationships for television attention and 
negative relationships for newspapers.  Newspaper reading is a better proxy for 
attention to political news since newspapers are less likely to be read for 
entertainment compared to watching television.  Newspaper attention is thus more 
likely to be associated with being politically informed, implying that people who read 
newspapers more frequently are in a better position to judge electoral fairness.  The 
negative direction of the newspaper attention relationship could be due to the types 
of countries included in previous research, which were often liberal democracies.  
Conversely, the current study involves many authoritarian democracies.  Liberal 
democracies generally have fairer elections, while authoritarian democracies are 
associated with weaker electoral integrity.  People who read newspapers in liberal 
democracies are thus more likely to make positive assessments of electoral fairness, 
while those who read newspapers in authoritarian democracies are more likely to view 
electoral fairness negatively.  The inclusion of numerous authoritarian hybrid regimes 
in the current study could explain why relationships are in different directions. 
Another explanation for the regional differences in media attention is the correlations 
between media type and socioeconomic status.  Almost half the population in 
AfroBarometer countries get their political news from the radio, with television and 
newspaper attention rates far lower.  People with televisions in Africa are likely to be 
wealthier, and higher income is associated with positive assessments of electoral 
fairness.  In addition, literacy rates are relatively low in many African countries so the 
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small fraction of the population that reads newspapers are more likely to have higher 
education, which is negatively associated with perceptions of electoral fairness in 
Africa.  This could explain why newspaper attention has a negative coefficient in most 
AfroBarometer countries.  Media attention models do not control for socioeconomic 
factors because including more variables would reduce the number of cases in the 
models, which were already minimal due to missing data for media attention variables.  
This topic deserves further attention when later rounds of the regional surveys are 
released. 
Table 6.6: Summary of Media Attention for Separate Country Results 
  Significant (+)  Significant (-) Insignificant Missing Data 
Newspaper Attention 33.3% 8.8% 42.1% 15.8% 
Television Attention 14.0% 17.5% 52.6% 15.8% 
Radio Attention 19.3% 8.8% 56.1% 15.8% 
Political Knowledge 12.3% 10.5% 57.9% 19.3% 
     
Political Knowledge 
Political knowledge only obtains negative significance in the Africa model in Table 6.5, 
but three of the four significant separate AfroBarometer country results are positive.  
These results do not reveal a clear trend.  The other regional models are insignificant 
and other separate country regressions do not reveal any trends.  Europe is not 
included in Table 6.5 because of missing data for most other variables in the model, 
but other regressions (not shown here) revealed a positive relationship for European 
countries.  This is consistent with findings using all countries in the CSES dataset (Birch, 
2008), most of which are in Europe.  How political knowledge and perceived fairness 
interact will be affected by the actual fairness of political processes.  Positive 
relationships found in most European countries reflect the general conduct of 
elections in these politically developed countries.  In other regions, having increased 
political knowledge is likely to make citizens more sceptical about fairness.  As 
informed citizens are better able to assess the quality of elections, we should expect 
regional differences between the Africa and Europe models.  Elections in Africa are 
more likely to be unfair, while Europe is more likely to have fair elections.  People with 
higher levels of political knowledge simply reflect this more closely in their attitudes 
towards elections. 
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6.1.4. Economic Performance 
Economic performance variables include perceptions regarding past, present, and 
future conditions of both the national economy and personal finances, as well as 
whether respondents have paid employment.  Not all regional datasets in Table 6.7 
have every variable, which is why there are missing coefficients.   
Table 6.7: Multivariate Models of Electoral Fairness with Economic Performance 
  Africa  Americas  Arab  Asia  Europe  Global  
Paid Employment -0.052 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.061 
 
0.008 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.006 
 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.028) 
 
Past Economy Worse 0.026 
 
0.089 *** . 
 
0.110 * 0.124 *** 0.080 *** 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.038) 
 
. 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.035) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.080 ** 0.113 *** -0.017 
 
0.204 *** 0.328 *** 0.139 *** 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.078) 
 
(0.213) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.032) 
 
Future Economy Better 0.097 ** . 
 
0.090 ** . 
 
. 
 
. 
 
 
(0.062) 
 
. 
 
(0.06) 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
Past Finances Worse -0.033 
 
0.040 *** . 
 
0.124 *** . 
 
. 
 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.027) 
 
. 
 
(0.068) 
 
. 
 
. 
 
Present Finances Good -0.062 * 0.044 *** 0.073 * -0.038 
 
. 
 
. 
 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.083) 
 
(0.076) 
 
. 
 
. 
 
Future Finances Better 0.021 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
 
(0.058) 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
Model Parameters 
      
N: Respondents 20664 
 
30284 
 
4521 
 
11624 
 
27758 
 
102527 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
5 
 
11 
 
19 
 
75 
 
Degrees of Freedom 7 
 
5 
 
1 
 
5 
 
3 
 
3 
 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.006  0.009  0.005  0.033  0.035  0.005  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       
Subjective evaluations of national economic performance were consistently significant 
and strong across the different regions, suggesting that perceptions of the economy 
are strongly correlated with perceptions of electoral fairness.  Personal finances 
similarly showed positive relationships, but they were usually smaller and less 
consistent.  This confirms the expected findings for national economy and personal 
finance, suggesting that people tend to assess electoral fairness more positively if they 
think the past economic or financial situation was worse, the present is good and the 
future will be better.  The lack of significant coefficients for paid employment could be 
because it is subsumed within perceptions regarding personal finances or the national 
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economy.  The following sections discuss these economic performance variables in 
more depth. 
National Economy 
Coefficients for the relationships between national economy variables and perceived 
electoral fairness are overwhelmingly positive, as shown in Table 6.8.  Perceiving the 
past national economy as having been improved upon is positively associated with 
electoral fairness in every region except Africa, but the Arab model is missing this 
variable.  Evidence from all models except the Arab model indicates that people who 
think the present national economy is good tend to make positive assessments of 
electoral fairness.  Optimism regarding the future national economy is only available 
for Africa the Arab models, but shows a positively significant relationship for both 
these models.  We can therefore infer that perceiving the national economy as 
improving is strongly and significantly associated with positive assessments of electoral 
fairness.  This conclusion finds further supported in separate country regressions, 
which are summarised in Table 6.8.  Perceiving the past national economy as worse 
has positively significant coefficients in 43.4% of country results and only 2.6% are 
negatively significant.  Coefficients are even more decisive for viewing the present 
economy as good, with 65.8% positively significant and only 2.6% negatively 
significant.  Not as many coefficients obtained significance for optimism regarding the 
future national economy, but 32.9% are positively significant and there are no 
negatively significant coefficients.  Unmentioned percentages are either insignificant 
or missing data, as shown in Table 6.8.  The strength of relationships vary, but taken 
together the regional and country findings provide robust support for the expectation 
that people who believe the national economy is improving are more likely to view 
elections as fair.  The positive associations maintained whether considering the 
present situation or comparing it with past and future situations.  This confirms 
previous findings and parallels the positive relationships between national economic 
conditions and many other types of political support (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; 
Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Chang & Chu, 2006; Chappell, 1990; Cho & Bratton, 
2006; Hibbs et al., 1982; Lühiste, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Moehler, 2009; Wong et 
al., 2011).  The explanation for such a consistent relationship is that the optimism 
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regarding the economy spills over into other areas of political trust.  It is perhaps 
surprising to find that this includes elections, given the tenuous link between national 
economic performance and electoral fairness. 
Table 6.8: Summary of Economic Performance for Separate Country Results 
  Significant (+)  Significant (-) Insignificant Missing Data 
Paid Employment 9.2% 17.1% 73.7% 0.0% 
Past Economy Worse 43.4% 2.6% 47.4% 6.6% 
Present Economy Good 65.8% 2.6% 31.6% 0.0% 
Future Economy Better 32.9% 0.0% 23.7% 43.4% 
Past Finances Worse 13.2% 2.6% 52.6% 31.6% 
Present Finances Good 19.7% 3.9% 51.3% 25.0% 
Future Finances Better 7.9% 0.0% 42.1% 50.0% 
     
Personal Finances 
The same positive trends are evident with personal finances in Table 6.7, but with 
fewer significant coefficients and more missing data.  These questions are asked in 
fewer survey, but the variables cover perceptions of past, present and future personal 
finances.  Two of three regional coefficients and 13.2% of separate country coefficients 
are negatively significant, while the other regional coefficient is insignificant and only 
2.6% of separate country models show negative relationships.  Other models are either 
insignificant or missing data.  Perceiving a good present financial situation is positively 
significant in four of the five regional results, with the only negatively significant 
coefficient in the Africa model.  This coefficient is small and minimally significant, so it 
could have occurred by chance.  Having good present finances shows a positive trend 
with country coefficients, with 19.7% positively significant versus only 3.9% negatively 
significant.  Finally, being optimistic about future personal finances did not obtain 
significance in the Africa model, which was the only model that included this variable.  
Only 7.9% of the coefficients for better future finances are positively significant, but 
there are no negatively significant results.  Most surveys do not ask about expected 
future personal finances. 
The overall trend for personal finances is positive as anticipated, meaning that people 
who perceive their personal financial situations to be improving are more likely to view 
elections as fair.  However, the relationships are not as strong as for perceptions of the 
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national economy, which may be partly due to more missing data.  An explanation for 
the weaker relationships is that people do not see the government as responsible for 
their personal financial situation, but they do hold the government responsible for 
performance of the national economy.  People likely perceive elections to be run by 
the government, even in countries with a highly independent electoral management 
body (EMB), so the link between elections and national economic conditions is 
therefore stronger than the link with personal finances.  Nevertheless, personal 
finances coefficients are highly significant even if small, suggesting a weak but 
consistently positive relationship between improving personal finances and perceived 
electoral fairness. 
Paid Employment 
The variable for having paid employment does not achieve significance in any of the 
regional models, suggesting there may be no relationship between paid employment 
and electoral fairness.  This lack of significant results suggests that there is no link, 
positive or negative, between having paid employment and perceived electoral 
fairness.  Separate country coefficients however show a weak negative relationship, 
with 17.1% negatively significant versus only 9.2% positively significant, but it is 
difficult to argue the trend is relevant given the absence of any significant regional 
results.  The lack of significant regional models could suggest that perceptions of the 
national economy or personal finances have more explanatory power than paid 
employment.  People with paid employment are more likely to have better personal 
finances and view the national economy favourably than people who are unemployed.  
The means the positive effects of paid employment could be captured by variables for 
personal finances or the perceptions of the national economy. 
6.1.5. Political Performance 
Political performance variables have some of the strongest and most consistently 
significant relationships with perceived electoral fairness, as displayed Table 6.9 and 
Table 6.10.  Trust in institutions is positively associated with trust in elections, higher 
government corruption is associated with lower perceptions of electoral fairness, and 
being the victim of physical crime has a negative relationship with electoral fairness.  
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The relative size of significant coefficients suggest that perceived corruption and 
institutional trust, especially in the executive and legislature, explain more variation in 
electoral fairness than many other variables included in this study.  However, this 
could also be due to the strong correlations between different types of political trust 
and perceived electoral fairness.  Public sector corruption is strongly related to 
electoral fraud, while crime victimization likely affects trust and support in many areas 
and for many institutions.  Unfortunately, the political performance variables are not 
available for CSES data, which means we cannot make comparisons with a European 
model.  It also means these variables are unsuitable for inclusion in a summative 
model or multilevel models despite their explanatory strength. 
Table 6.9: Multivariate Models of Electoral Fairness with Political Performance 
  Africa  Americas  Arab  Asia  Global  
Govt. Corruption -0.141 *** -0.070 *** -0.258 *** -0.187 *** -0.053 * 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.022) 
 
Trust Executive 0.202 *** 0.247 *** 0.186 *** 0.258 *** 0.121 *** 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.022) 
 
Trust Judiciary -0.020 
 
0.134 *** 0.021 
 
0.022 
 
0.055 *** 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Trust Legislature 0.096 *** 0.213 *** 0.179 ** 0.096 *** 0.179 *** 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Trust Parties -0.009 
 
0.173 *** 0.128 *** 0.079 * 0.115 *** 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.037) 
 
Trust Police 0.085 * 0.129 *** -0.009 
 
0.066 *** 0.111 *** 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.038) 
 
Crime Victimisation -0.063 *** -0.020 * -0.039 * 0.007 
 
-0.056 *** 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.047) 
 
Model Parameters 
     
N: Respondents 20699 
 
23998 
 
4189 
 
10016 
 
58902 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
17 
 
5 
 
11 
 
53 
 
Degrees of Freedom 7 
 
7 
 
1 
 
7 
 
7 
 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.032  0.075  0.078  0.081  0.024  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
      
Institutional Trust 
Relationships between electoral fairness and trust in institutions are consistently 
positive for the executive, legislature, judiciary, political parties, and police.  Table 6.10 
shows that more than half of all country level relationships for each of these 
institutions are positively significant, while only tiny fractions are negatively significant.  
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The strongest relationships are for the executive and legislature, with 77.2% and 61.4% 
of coefficients positively significant and only 1.8% and 3.5% negatively significant, 
respectively.  Many coefficients are large as well as highly significant, indicating strong 
relationships between perceived electoral fairness and trust in the executive and 
legislature.  Together with the regional results, this provides exceptionally strong 
support for a positive association between perceived electoral fairness and trust in the 
executive and legislature.  Trust in the judiciary, political parties and police is positively 
related to perceived electoral fairness, but not as consistently or reliably.  Trust in the 
judiciary is only significant in the Americas and Global models, while political party 
trust is not significant in the Africa model and police trust in not significant in the Arab 
model.  Yet, all significant regional results for these three institutions show positive 
relationships with perceived electoral fairness and there are no significant negative 
coefficients.  Table 6.10 shows that separate country coefficients for judiciary, political 
party and police trust are mostly positively significant and only small fractions are 
significantly negative.  The overarching trends are clearly positive, which confirms the 
prediction that trust in institutions is associated with perceptions of greater electoral 
fairness. 
Trust in different national institutions is highly inter-correlated, meaning that people 
who trust one institution are more likely to trust others.  For instance, people who 
trust the legislature are more likely to trust the executive and judiciary or courts.  This 
is probably because good governance in one area of government influences the quality 
of governance in other areas.  For example, good executive actors are more likely to 
create good police forces, which are in turn more likely to catch corrupt actors in other 
institutions.  Similarly, a good judiciary is more likely to pass impartial sentences to 
members of other political institutions and thereby help thwart political malfeasance.  
Trust in institutions therefore frequently applies to entire national political systems, 
which results in high levels of positive correlation between institutions.  There is also a 
high degree of correlation between institutional trust and electoral fairness, but it is 
unclear which direction causal relationships may travel.  On one hand, we could 
assume that trusting the executive, legislature, political parties, and other institutions 
causes people to trust elections.  The reasoning would be that these institutions are 
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often involved in running elections and trusting them should lead to trusting the 
electoral process.  Trust in the executive and legislature show the strongest positive 
relationships with electoral fairness, probably because these two institutions are more 
linked with elections than are the others.  On the other hand, trusting in elections may 
increase public trust in elected officials and representatives because they are more 
likely to be perceived as democratically legitimate for having won in a fair election.  
There may also be some interaction with the variable for supporting election winners.  
People who identified with or voted for the incumbent executive and legislative actors 
are more likely to both trust them and have positive attitudes towards electoral 
fairness. 
Table 6.10: Summary of Political Performance for Separate Country Results 
  Significant (+)  Significant (-) Insignificant Missing Data 
Corruption Level 0.0% 75.4% 24.6% 0.0% 
Trust Executive 77.2% 1.8% 14.0% 7.0% 
Trust Judiciary 61.4% 3.5% 35.1% 0.0% 
Trust Legislature 59.6% 1.8% 38.6% 0.0% 
Trust Parties 56.1% 8.8% 35.1% 0.0% 
Trust Police 59.6% 0.0% 40.4% 0.0% 
Crime Victimisation 0.0% 21.1% 77.2% 1.8% 
     
Government Corruption 
Government corruption is negatively related to perceptions of electoral fairness in 
every available regional model.  The separate country regressions summarised in Table 
6.10 also support this relationship, with 75.4% significantly negative and no 
significantly positive results.  Both regional and country coefficients are strong and 
highly significant.  Support is therefore very robust for higher levels of perceived 
corruption being associated with reduced perceptions of electoral fairness.  Given the 
links between government corruption and political trust (Chang & Chu, 2006; Kotzian, 
2011; Lühiste, 2006; McAllister & White, 2011; Mishler & Rose, 2001), it is unsurprising 
to find a similar relationship for electoral trust.  People who perceive higher levels of 
overall government corruption are predictably less likely to perceive elections as 
conducted fairly.  This is probably because questions about corruption refer to 
government officials or the public sector, so survey respondents conceivably include 
EMBs within this category.  Corruption is also positively correlated between 
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institutions in each country, so countries with higher levels of corruption are likely to 
have more corruption across all institutions.  This means that countries with higher 
levels of government corruption are more likely to have corrupt EMBs and thus less 
electoral integrity. 
Crime Victimisation 
Being the victim of a physical crime is negatively correlated with perceptions of 
electoral fairness.  This relationship is negatively significant in the Africa, Americas, 
Arab, and Global models.  There are no positively significant separate country 
coefficients, but 21.1% are negatively significant.  There is therefore support at the 
country, regional and global levels that being a victim of physical crimes is negatively 
associated with perceived electoral fairness.  Although regional and country 
coefficients are consistently negative, they are quite small.  This confirms previous 
findings of weak negative relationships with other aspects of political support 
(Ceobanu et al., 2011; Pérez, 2003).  The variable was limited to only physical crimes 
such as sexual assaults, physical muggings, and armed robberies.  The percentage of 
survey respondents who have suffered this kind of crime is quite small, which is might 
be why the relationship with electoral fairness is weak yet significant.  People who are 
victims of crime probably have a sense that the government or society has failed to 
protect them.  This sense of disappointment could carry over into assessments of 
electoral fairness, and it probably also carries over into trust in other institutions and 
satisfaction with democracy.  The logical inference is that people who have been the 
victim of physical crimes are less likely to be trusting. 
6.1.6. Group Memberships 
Group membership variables include being part of an ethnic or religious majority, non-
religious, non-partisan and generally trusting other people.  Regional and global model 
results for these variables are included in Table 6.11, while separate country-level 
results are summarised in Table 6.12.  The findings for religious and ethnic majority 
group membership are mixed with not clear trends, but probably should not be 
considered definitive because variables were missing for many countries.  Linguistic 
group membership was not included due to extensive missing data.  Cultural group 
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membership variables therefore provide little evidence of any consistent relationships.  
Overall, the social trust relationship is the strongest variable in Table 6.11, suggesting 
either that people who generally trust others are willing to extend their trust to 
officials running elections or that fair elections increase social trust.  There is a weak 
negative relationship for non-partisanship, probably because these individuals are not 
satisfied with any of the political parties or perhaps the political system in general.  
However, non-partisanship variables are not available in every dataset or every 
country and are therefore not suitable for inclusion within summative or multilevel 
models.  Being a non-religious person is not significant in any regional model.  The 
following paragraphs discuss the group membership results in more detail. 
Table 6.11: Multivariate Models of Electoral Fairness with Group Memberships 
  Africa  Americas  Asia  Europe  Global  
Religious Majority -0.004 
 
0.051 * 0.055 
 
0.027 
 
-0.013 ** 
 
(0.076) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.000) 
 
Social Trust 0.154 *** 0.115 ** 0.127 * . 
 
. 
 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.076) 
 
(0.172) 
 
. 
 
. 
 
Non-Religious 0.020 
 
0.034 
 
-0.045 
 
0.026 
 
0.024 
 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.060) 
 
Non-Partisan -0.052 
 
-0.139 *** . 
 
-0.093 *** -0.087 *** 
 
(0.079) 
 
(0.065) 
 
. 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.044) 
 
Ethnic Majority 0.035 
 
-0.042 * . 
 
. 
 
. 
 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.038) 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. 
 
Model Parameters 
     
N: Respondents 24451 
 
31426 
 
11606 
 
34492 
 
97705 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
11 
 
23 
 
69 
 
Degrees of Freedom 5 
 
5 
 
3 
 
3 
 
6 
 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.007  0.009  0.007  0.003  0.002  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
      
Cultural Groups 
Regional results for religious majority membership are inconclusive, with a negative 
coefficient for the Global model, but a positive result for the Americas model.  
Separate country regressions suggest a slightly positive trend, with 12.7% positively 
significant and 4.2% negatively significant, but 73.2% of results are insignificant so it is 
probably more accurate to say there is no reliable relationship.  The mild positive 
country level trend could have occurred by chance.  The results for being in the ethnic 
majority are also inconclusive, but the variable is only available in the Americas and 
 196 
Africa models.  The Americas model has a small and minimally significant negative 
coefficient, while the relationship is insignificant in the Africa model.  Significant 
country regressions are almost evenly split between positive and negative, providing 
no evidence of a trend.  Overall, there is almost no support for the assumption that 
being in the religious or ethnic majority is associated with improved perceptions of 
electoral fairness.  The variable for being non-religious does not obtain significance in 
any regional model, but with 19.7% negatively significantly versus 9.9% positively 
significant there might be some support for a very weak negative association.  
However, with 62.0% of country coefficients and all regional models as well as the 
global model showing insignificant results, this relationship is not well supported. 
Previous research found a positive link between belonging to cultural majority groups 
and different aspects of political trust, including electoral fairness (Birch, 2008; Dowley 
& Silver, 2002; Kelleher & Wolak, 2007; Lühiste, 2006; Norris, 2004).  However, the 
current study provides only weak support for being in the religious majority and no 
support for being in the ethnic majority.  Moreover, this lack of support does not 
change even if we modify the conditions to test plurality rather than majority group 
membership (exploratory regressions not shown).  Upon reflection, there may be very 
good reasons for this.  Some majority groups do not actually control the national 
government because a minority group is in power, which is likely to produce negative 
attitudes towards the government amongst majority group members.  A group might 
also be a numerical majority across the national population, but be a minority in the 
legislature.  Alternatively, people in majority groups may feel like the system is 
pandering to minority group interests.  It is therefore more likely that links between 
cultural group membership and perceived electoral fairness is contingent upon the 
unique conditions within each country. 
Different reasons for the unexpected results were not tested or controlled for in this 
study, since the aim was to find general global trends.  However, the topic may be 
worth studying to improve understanding of the roots of cultural political tensions.  
Such an investigation would be greatly aided by more data regarding religious, ethnic, 
and linguistic group membership.  These variables had the greatest amount of missing 
data in this study, which resulted in many omitted countries.  When more data is 
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available, future studies could look at relationships between the proportion of 
different groups represented in the legislature and the public perceptions of members 
of those groups.  One would expect to find that people who are members of groups 
with greater descriptive representation in the legislature would have more positive 
political attitudes as well as higher levels of political support and trust. 
Table 6.12: Summary of Group Memberships for Separate Country Results 
  Significant (+)  Significant (-) Insignificant Missing Data 
Religious Majority 12.7% 4.2% 73.2% 9.9% 
Social Trust 57.7% 0.0% 15.5% 26.8% 
Non-Religious 9.9% 19.7% 62.0% 8.5% 
Non-Partisan 7.0% 66.2% 25.4% 1.4% 
Ethnic Majority 14.1% 16.9% 39.4% 29.6% 
     
Social Trust 
Clearer trends are evident for generalized social trust, which obtains a significant and 
positive result in every region the variable is available.  Separate country regressions 
are similarly conclusive, with 57.7% positively significant and no negatively significant 
results.  The results provide strong support for a positive relationship between 
generally trusting other people and perceiving elections to be fair.  These results 
support the mostly positive findings for social trust in previous research (Dowley & 
Silver, 2002; Kaase, 1999; Lühiste, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Zmerli & Newton, 
2008).  Someone who generally trusts other people is more likely to trust the officials 
in political institutions.  The logic is that people who say they trust other people are 
more likely to believe that the officials running elections are trustworthy, and by 
extension that the election itself is trustworthy.  A more optimistic outlook regarding 
fellow citizens could therefore translate into an increased trust in the conduct of 
elections.  Alternatively, the causal mechanism could work in the opposite direction.  
Rothstein and Stolle (2008: 451-457) found associations between generalized social 
trust and trust in government institutions, but argued that the casual link flowed from 
impartial institutions to increased generalized trust.  A similar causal mechanism may 
exist for electoral fairness, with free and fair electoral management causing increased 
social trust amongst citizens.  This hypothesis is plausible, but requires different 
research designs to test. 
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Non-Religious 
The lack of significant coefficients for non-religious respondents is probably due to 
mixed correlations with other factors.  Non-religious people often have higher 
socioeconomic statuses, which are usually positively associated with most aspects of 
political trust.  Conversely, non-religious people are a minority in most countries and 
being a minority group membership of is anticipated to have a negative effect on 
political attitudes.  The separate country regressions in Table 6.12 do show a more 
negative trend, but this is inadequate evidence without significant regional 
coefficients.  There may therefore not be any consistent global relationships between 
political trust and being non-religious, as suggested by the lack of any significant 
regional coefficients. 
Non-Partisan 
Non-partisanship is negatively associated with electoral fairness in three regional 
models.  The trend is supported by separate country results, with 66.2% of 
relationships negatively significant and only 7.0% positively significant.  Many of the 
country, regional and global level coefficients for non-partisanship are relatively strong 
and achieve high levels of statistical significance, meaning the predicted relationship 
finds consistent and reliable support.  The results therefore support the proposition 
that not identifying with any political party is negatively associated with perceived 
electoral fairness, which confirms Birch’s (2008) earlier finding.  One plausible reason 
for the negative views of non-partisan individuals is that they are not satisfied with any 
of the available electoral choices.  This rejection of existing candidates and parties is 
reflected in a general sense of dissatisfaction regarding elections.  Cho and Bratton 
(2006: 741) found non-partisans be more satisfied than people who supported 
electoral losers, but less satisfied that those who supported the winners.  The current 
study was not setup to test gradients of dissatisfaction between different groups, but it 
would not be surprising to find.  Moreover, the negative political attitudes of non-
partisan individuals probably carries over into other areas of political trust, such as 
satisfaction with democracy or the political system and perceptions of state legitimacy.  
People who are non-partisan are less likely to have their preferences represented and 
are therefore less satisfied with current political circumstances. 
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Table 6.13 includes a final summative model combining the variables that achieved 
consistent, strong, and significant relationships in as many countries as possible.  The 
primary goal is to justify which variables to include in multilevel models.  The 
ArabBarometer is not included because many important variables are missing and 
there are too few countries in this dataset to run multilevel models.  The 
AsianBarometer also has too few countries for multilevel models, but it is included 
here for comparative purposes and ensuring consistency across more regions. 
Table 6.13: Multivariate Models of Electoral Fairness with Proven Variables 
  Africa  Americas  Asia  Europe  Globa
l 
  
Age (Decades) 0.076 ** 0.040 
 
-0.004 
 
0.106 **
* 
0.049 ** 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.009
) 
 
Female 0.014 
 
-0.007 
 
0.007 
 
-0.048 ** -0.007 
 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.012
) 
 
High Income -0.011 
 
0.053 * 0.053 * 0.028 
 
0.020  
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.078) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.035
) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.036 ** -0.005 
 
-0.095 ** 0.039 * -0.009  
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.076) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.028
) 
 
Supports Winner 0.243 *** 0.116 *** 0.376 *** 0.124 **
* 
0.164 **
* 
 
(0.135) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.200) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.057
) 
 
Electoral Participation 0.094 *** 0.045 ** 0.091 ** 0.093 **
* 
0.075 **
* 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.031
) 
 
Urban Status -0.027 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.149 *** -0.047 
 
-0.037  
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.045
) 
 
Past Economy Worse 0.028 
 
0.095 *** 0.097 ** 0.124 **
* 
0.064 **
* 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.031
) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.055 * 0.113 *** 0.141 *** 0.339 **
* 
0.113 **
* 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.031
) 
 
Non-Partisan 0.114 ** -0.050 * 0.216 * 0.016 
 
0.043 * 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.178) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.043
) 
 
Model Parameters 
     
N: Respondents 23737 
 
31726 
 
10596 
 
20137 
 
92922 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
10 
 
18 
 
73 
 
Degrees of Freedom 10 
 
10 
 
6 
 
10 
 
10 
 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.017  0.016  0.076  0.050  0.010  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001 
  
      
Overall, most coefficients maintain the same direction and approximate size as in 
previous models.  However, some variables lose their consistent significance because 
of the inclusion of stronger explanatory variables.  Female gender for instance only 
achieves significance in the Europe model and living in an urban location is only 
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significant in the Asia model.  These variables will therefore not be included in 
multilevel models.  Perceiving the past national economy to be worse will not be 
included in future models because it is somewhat redundant given the more widely 
available variable for a good present economy.  Therefore, the final selection of 
variables to be included within multilevel models is as follows: Age (Decades), High 
Income, Tertiary Education, Supports Winner, Electoral Participation, and Present 
Economy Good.  These variables are the most commonly available across the different 
datasets, which prevents countries being dropped from multilevel models because of 
insufficient individual level data. 
The next section analyses results for national level variables, except those measuring 
electoral management body design, which are presented in Chapter 7.  National level 
variables differ because they come from institutional sources, such as Freedom House 
or Transparency International, rather than cross-national public surveys. 
6.2. National Level Variables 
Overall, the most reliable national level variables indicate that societal factors and the 
electoral system matter for perceived electoral fairness.  The strongest relationships 
are for civil liberties, freedom of the press, percentage of women in parliament and 
degree of religious fractionalisation.  These variables demonstrated strong and 
consistent correlations with electoral fairness across multiple regions as well as the 
global models.  There were also moderately strong and consistent relationships for 
proportional representation and lower levels of corruption.  Some national level 
determinants achieved significance in only one region, suggesting no global trends or 
the possibility of regional differences.  These include election victory margins, lower 
parliament size, income inequality, and linguistic fractionalization.  Other variables did 
not obtain significance in any of the models and therefore do not appear to determine 
perceived electoral fairness.  Insignificant factors include years since universal suffrage, 
political rights, direct public funding of political parties, total population per MP, ethnic 
fractionalization, human development index, GNI per capita, and GDP growth per 
capita.  The following sections provide results for variables within each thematic 
grouping. 
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6.2.1. Democratic Performance 
Of the variables included in Table 6.14, only the civil liberties index achieves 
significance.  Its coefficient is strongly and positively significant in two regional models 
as well as the Global model, with only the Americas model not achieving conventional 
significance.  This provides good support for the notion that people in countries with 
stronger civil liberties protections are more likely to view their elections as fair.  The 
political rights index does not obtain significance in any of the models, which suggests 
that the level of political rights in a country is not significantly related to perceived 
electoral fairness.  Democratic experience fails to achieve significance in any of the 
regional models or the Global model.  This means that the number of years since 
universal suffrage is unrelated to perceptions of electoral fairness.  Overall, civil 
liberties is clearly the strongest national level predictor of perceived electoral fairness 
in this model, while democratic experience and political rights may not be related to 
electoral fairness, or that their explanatory power is eclipsed by the other variables in 
the model, such as civil liberties.  The results disagree with previous research that 
included democratic age (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Farrell & McAllister, 2006), but 
parallels prior findings of a positive relationship between civil liberties and political 
legitimacy (Gilley, 2006: 57).  However, democratic experience was measured in years 
since universal suffrage, but a better measure to use in the future would be total 
cumulative years of democracy.  The aforementioned previous studies used a variable 
for accumulated democratic experience rather than years since universal suffrage.  
Political rights were probably overshadowed in importance either by the strongly 
positive civil rights variable or by individual level control variables.  The liberties and 
rights indices are strongly correlated, but since they were included in the same model 
and political rights failed to achieve significance it appears that civil liberties are the 
stronger determinant of perceived electoral fairness. 
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Table 6.14: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Democratic Performance  
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
    
Democratic Experience -0.022 
 
0.064 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.032 
 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.047) 
 
Political Rights -0.014 
 
0.052 
 
-0.088 
 
0.002 
 
 
(0.197) 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.3) 
 
(0.141) 
 
Civil Liberties 0.283 * -0.028 
 
0.452 * 0.165 * 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.129) 
 
(0.271) 
 
(0.137) 
 
Individual Level 
    
Age (Decades) 0.041 *** 0.016 
 
0.058 *** 0.036 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.023 *** 0.029 *** 0.034 ** 0.021 *** 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** -0.001 
 
0.019 * -0.011 
 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Supports Winner 0.143 *** 0.116 *** 0.090 *** 0.128 *** 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Electoral Participation 0.062 *** 0.042 *** 0.091 *** 0.065 *** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.016) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.103 *** 0.128 *** 0.107 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Model Parameters 
    
N: Respondents 24020 
 
32337 
 
23136 
 
97280 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
74 
 
Degrees of Freedom 9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 254.167  195.958  142.206  405.511  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Democratic Experience 
The year of achieving woman’s suffrage was the starting point for calculating the total 
number of years of democratic experience.  The justification for doing so was that 
universal voting rights mark the start of more equitable democracy, which is important 
because the dependent variable is perceived electoral fairness.  However, this variable 
produced no significant results.  An alternative method would be to calculate 
democratic experience based on the total number of years of democracy, regardless of 
whether women or minorities could vote, but would not include any time spend under 
authoritarian rule.  The longer a country has been a democracy, the more elections it 
will have held.  With each electoral cycle come opportunities for electoral fraud 
problems and subsequent corrections and solutions.  Moreover, expertise and 
logistical resources generally improve over time so there would be less problems 
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arising from administrative or technical limitations.  Selecting female suffrage as the 
starting point did not allow for all these factors, since many countries did not allow 
women to vote until relatively recently. 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
Political rights did not obtain significance in any of the models, which is surprising 
because Birch (2008) previously found a positive relationship between political rights 
and perceived electoral fairness.  Her study did not however include a civil liberties 
index.  With separate variables for both political rights and civil liberties included in the 
same models, political rights failed to achieve significance while civil liberties was 
significant in three of the models.  This suggests that civil liberties matter more for 
perceived electoral fairness than political rights, implying that freedoms of expression, 
belief, association and organization, as well as the rule of law and autonomy from state 
interference are strongly related to electoral fairness.  The lack of results for political 
rights is nevertheless surprising because they seem more topically related to elections.  
For example, political rights include procedural fairness under the law, rights political 
participation, as well as freedoms of association, assembly, and petition.  Nevertheless, 
the insignificance of political rights and significance of civil liberties maintained across 
many regressions models (not shown) with many different variables included.  It is 
therefore appears that civil liberties have a stronger and more consistent positive 
relationship with perceived electoral fairness than political rights. 
6.2.2. Electoral Context 
The wider electoral context can have important ramifications for perceived electoral 
fairness.  The variables included in these models included proportional representation, 
direct public funding of political parties, and the size of election victory margins.  Table 
6.15 shows that proportional representation finds the most support, with strong 
significant positive coefficients for the Africa and Global models but not the Americas 
and Europe models.  The most likely reason for the positive relationship is that 
proportional representation systems are more reflective of public preferences and 
produce more politically inclusive parliaments.  Direct public funding of political parties 
does not find support in any of the models, suggesting that this aspect of electoral 
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systems is not associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness.  This could 
be because public funding increases electoral competition and perceptions of fairness, 
but spending tax money to fund political parties is likely to have a negative effect on 
public attitudes. 
Table 6.15: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Electoral Context 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
    
Proportional Representation 0.214 * -0.018 
 
0.090 
 
0.129 ** 
 
(0.174) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.269) 
 
(0.100) 
 
Direct Public Funding -0.012 
 
0.054 
 
-0.004 
 
0.025 
 
 
(0.221) 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.201) 
 
(0.133) 
 
Victory Margin 0.023 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.207 * 0.005 
 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.010) 
 
Individual Level 
    
Age (Decades) 0.041 *** 0.016 
 
0.058 *** 0.037 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.023 *** 0.029 *** 0.034 * 0.022 *** 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** -0.001 
 
0.020 * -0.010 
 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Supports Winner 0.143 *** 0.116 *** 0.090 *** 0.125 *** 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Electoral Participation 0.063 *** 0.042 *** 0.090 *** 0.064 *** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.016) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.103 *** 0.128 *** 0.107 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Model Parameters 
    
N: Respondents 24020 
 
32337 
 
23136 
 
96244 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
73 
 
Degrees of Freedom 9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 226.078  197.574  334.123  467.837  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Victory margin is negatively significant only in Europe, not obtaining significance in any 
other model.  The proposition that larger victory margins are associated with increased 
perceptions of electoral fairness therefore does not find support.  Bigger victory 
margins could be negatively associated with electoral fairness because this may as a 
proxy for transitional democracies, where margins are often higher.  In summary, 
proportional representation appears to have a positive relationship with electoral 
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fairness, while direct public funding fails to achieve significance and victory margin was 
significant in only one regional model but displayed a negative coefficient. 
Proportional Representation 
Results for proportional representation support previous research indicating that 
people perceive elections as more fair if the electoral system uses an element of 
proportional representation (Birch, 2008; Farrell & McAllister, 2006).  The significant 
positive relationship was expected, but was not present in the Europe model.  The lack 
of significant findings for the Europe model is surprising because Birch (2008) 
previously found a positive relationship using the full set of CSES countries, a 
substantial majority of which are in Europe.  The current study used the same dataset 
but limited countries to only those in Europe.  The lack of a significant Europe model 
result therefore suggests that either proportional representation does not affect 
electoral fairness within Europe or that the relationship with electoral fairness may be 
quite weak. 
The current study simply created a dichotomous variable representing the presence or 
absence of any type or amount of proportional representation.  However, at least two 
additional factors related to proportional representation may have an effect.  First, 
different types of proportional representation may produce dissimilar outcomes.  
Gingerich (2009: 538-539) for example finds that closed-list proportional 
representation is associated with more corrupt political financing practices within the 
bureaucracy than preferential-list proportional representation systems.  Second, not 
all members of a legislature or both national legislatures may be subject to election by 
proportional representation.  Some countries have unelected members of parliament 
where another actor, such as a council of ministers or an unelected body, may appoint 
some members of parliament.  In addition, only one of the national parliaments may 
use proportional representation.  Given the usually increased levels of political support 
associated with proportional representation, we could test the assumption that 
perceived electoral fairness would increase as more seats of all parliaments are subject 
to election using proportional representation.  A new variable could be operationalized 
to represent the total percentage of all parliamentary seats elected using proportional 
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representation.  This would be superior to a dichotomized variable that simply 
represents the presence of some elements of proportional representation. 
Public Funding 
Direct public funding of political parties did not obtain significance in any of the models 
despite previous research indicating a positive relationship (Birch, 2008).  This may be 
due to countervailing trends, one with a positive effect on electoral fairness and the 
other negative.  From one side, public funding of political parties is supposed to level 
the playing field and make it easier for smaller parties to compete in elections.  This 
could increase perceptions of electoral fairness as smaller parties have a better chance 
of obtaining seats.  On the other side, public opinion is often against tax money going 
towards financing political parties.  This could have a negative effect on perceived 
electoral fairness.  The insignificant results for direct public funding could be a 
consequence of these two opposing trends cancelling each other.  Another reason for 
the lack of significant results for public funding is that countries have different national 
restrictions and requirements for public funding.  For example, the provision of public 
funding often does not preclude candidates and parties from seeking private funding 
and therefore may not stop the perceived corruption associated with private political 
finance practices (Casas-Zamora, 2005; Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002: 78).  More data about 
the provision of public funding, the provision of other private sources and regulations 
regarding political finances would allow more detailed analysis and might uncover 
significant relationships.  Data regarding bans on types of donations, maximum 
amount limits and other political finance conditions is already available, (IDEA, 2012), 
but requires supplementation with original data gathering efforts to minimises missing 
data.  A fruitful line of research could be to gather this data to dig deeper into the 
controversial world of political finance and its effects on perceived electoral fairness 
and political trust. 
Victory Margin 
Results for victory margin accord with previous research findings of a negative 
relationship (Hartlyn et al., 2008), but provides evidence against other research and 
the predicted positive relationship (Birch, 2008).  The original victory margin 
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assumption was that larger margins would increase the legitimacy of election winners 
because it indicates that more of the population supported the winners.  The negative 
result for victory margin in the Europe model did not support this, instead suggesting 
that perceived electoral fairness decreases as victory margins increase.  Russia, 
Belarus, and Ukraine have some of the highest victory margins amongst included 
European countries, but also have some of the lowest perceptions of electoral fairness 
and are often considered electoral authoritarian or hybrid regimes.  Large victories can 
indicate an unfair electoral context in hybrid regimes.  Incumbents may exclude 
competing candidates or parties, intimidate opposition voters, or commit outright 
fraud by stuffing ballot boxes in an attempt to gain legitimacy with the appearance of 
an overwhelming victory.  Large margins may reflect electoral fraud as corrupt officials 
overzealously attempt to legitimize their authoritarian political masters, swinging 
victory margins too far away from reality.  Many of the more established democracies 
in the Europe model tend to have elections perceived as mostly fair with slimmer 
victory margins.  Older democracies may also have smaller margins because the 
different political parties gradually moved towards an ideological centre to appeal to 
median voters over time (Downs, 1957; Shepsle & Bonchek, 1997).  These factors could 
help explain the strong negative correlation between larger victory margins and 
electoral fairness in the Europe model.  Alternatively, the negative result may be due 
to the effects of majoritarian political systems, which usually grant larger majorities to 
election winners than what is present in the population, leading to perceptions of 
unfairness. 
6.2.3. Parliamentary Composition 
Elections and parliaments are closely related, so it is reasonable to expect some 
significant correlations.  Parliamentary composition variables include the size of the 
lower legislature, ratios of population per Member of Parliament (MP) and percentage 
of women in parliament.  Results presented in Table 6.16 show that the percentage of 
women in parliament has the strongest positive relationship with electoral fairness.  
This variable obtains positive significance in three models, with strong relationships in 
the Africa and Europe models and a weaker association in the Global model.  Only the 
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Americas model does not achieve conventional levels of significance for the women in 
parliament variable.  However, these results do not indicate a causal direction.  It 
remains unclear whether fair electoral systems facilitate more women entering politics 
or whether having more women in parliament increases perceptions of fairness.  Next, 
lower legislature size only obtains significance in the Africa model, where its coefficient 
is strong but negative and only minimally significant.  This suggests that larger 
legislatures are not associated with fairer perceptions of elections.  However, with only 
one minimally significant region, this result could have occurred by chance. 
Table 6.16: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Parliamentary Composition 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
    
Lower Parliament Size -0.350 * -0.031 
 
0.194 
 
-0.004 
 
 
(0.36) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.148) 
 
(0.076) 
 
Population per MP 0.115 
 
0.002 
 
-0.141 
 
-0.028 
 
 
(0.251) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.233) 
 
(0.072) 
 
Women in Parliament 0.241 * -0.049 
 
0.285 ** 0.096 * 
 
(0.139) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.081) 
 
(0.045) 
 
Individual Level 
    
Age (Decades) 0.041 *** 0.016 
 
0.059 *** 0.036 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.023 *** 0.029 *** 0.034 * 0.021 *** 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** -0.001 
 
0.019 * -0.011 
 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Supports Winner 0.143 *** 0.116 *** 0.090 *** 0.128 *** 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Electoral Participation 0.063 *** 0.042 *** 0.090 *** 0.065 *** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.016) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.103 *** 0.128 *** 0.107 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Model Parameters 
    
N: Respondents 24020 
 
32337 
 
23136 
 
97280 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
74 
 
Degrees of Freedom 9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 207.62  165.913  102.992  427.211  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Finally, the ratio of MPs per population does not achieve significance in any of the 
regional models or the Global model.  It therefore appears unrelated to electoral 
fairness, perhaps because there are too many other parliamentary design factors that 
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affect representation and perceived electoral fairness.  Overall, having more women in 
parliament is the strongest determinant of increased perceptions of electoral fairness, 
while having larger parliaments and lower ratios of population to MP are not positively 
related to perceptions of electoral fairness. 
Legislature Size 
Larger legislatures were expected to be associated with positive attitudes towards 
elections because having more seats should translate into greater diversity in the 
legislature and an increased chance of representing citizens’ preferences.  However, 
the strong and negatively significant results suggest that having larger legislatures is 
not associated with increased electoral fairness, as was indicated by prior research 
(Farrell & McAllister, 2006).  This could be because large legislatures dilute specific 
issues within an ocean of other priorities, which leaves voters feeling like their local 
representatives are relatively powerless.  Alternatively, large legislatures may require 
compromise with other factions to pass legislation and thus individual citizen 
preferences are seldom fully realized.  Further research could test for correlations 
between legislature size and other factors, such as party discipline and majority versus 
minority governments, to account for these interactions. 
Population per MP 
Population per MP is obviously related to legislature size, but controls for population 
size as well.  This was intended to investigate if the number of citizens represented by 
each MP affects public perceptions of electoral fairness.  The logic was that smaller 
ratios might allow for better quality representation, which would be evident in 
attitudes towards elections.  Despite previous research finding a relationship between 
population per MP and electoral fairness (Farrell & McAllister, 2006), the lack of 
significant results in the current study suggests there is no substantial relationship 
between these variables.  The most likely reason is that many other factors affect 
perceptions of electoral fairness and the ratio of population to MP is not a sufficiently 
strong explanatory variable to obtain significance. 
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Women in Parliament 
The finding that higher percentages of women in parliament are associated with 
increased perceptions of electoral fairness confirms the original assumption and prior 
research (Karp & Banducci, 2008).  However, the current study did not investigate 
causal mechanisms or account for any gender quotas.  It is thus unclear whether more 
women in parliament causes increased perceptions of electoral fairness, or whether 
fairer electoral and political systems facilitate more women entering politics.  
Moreover, the current study did not account for the impact of different types of 
gender quotas, which can substantially increase the percentage of female 
representatives (Paxton, Hughes, & Painter, 2010: 31-33; Tripp & Kang, 2008; Yoon, 
2001: 182-183).  It would be interesting to research whether gender quotas had any 
effect on public perceptions of electoral fairness.  On one hand, they could be 
perceived as unfair because they might be criticized for removing an element of 
meritocracy.  On the other hand, they could be viewed as positive discrimination 
attempting to offset systematic gender inequality.  It currently remains unclear 
whether gender quotas affect electoral fairness, but it is reasonable to expect a 
positive relationship. 
6.2.4. Political Performance 
Perceptions of electoral fairness were expected to increase with lower public sector 
corruption, less income inequality and greater freedom of the press.  Table 6.17 shows 
the results.  The reversed Corruption Perceptions Index shows significant coefficients 
in the Africa and Americas models, but not in the Europe or Global models.  
Nevertheless, the two coefficients are strong and achieve moderately high levels of 
significance, which support the assumption that greater levels of corruption are 
negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness.  The income inequality Gini 
Index is negatively significant in the Africa model, positively significant in the Americas 
model, and not significant in the Europe and Global models.  These mixed results 
provide no clear evidence regarding the direction of any relationship between income 
inequality and electoral fairness.  Freedom of the press shows large positive and 
significant coefficients for the Africa, Europe and Global models, but not the Americas 
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model.  This evidence therefore supports the common assumption that press freedom 
is positively associated with perceived electoral fairness.  Overall, press freedom has 
the strongest consistently positive relationship, while greater levels of corruption are 
negatively related to electoral fairness and results of income inequality are 
inconclusive.  This suggests that the wider political and social context affects 
perceptions of elections. 
Table 6.17: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Political Performance 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
    
Public Sector Corruption -0.199 ** -0.124 ** -0.076 
 
-0.033 
 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.065) 
 
Income Inequality  -0.149 * 0.064 * -0.076 
 
0.075 
 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.079) 
 
(0.184) 
 
(0.046) 
 
Media Freedom 0.158 * -0.031 
 
0.265 * 0.127 * 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.091) 
 
Individual Level 
    
Age (Decades) 0.041 *** 0.016 
 
0.059 *** 0.036 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.023 *** 0.029 *** 0.034 * 0.021 *** 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** -0.001 
 
0.019 * -0.011 
 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Supports Winner 0.143 *** 0.116 *** 0.090 *** 0.128 *** 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Electoral Participation 0.062 *** 0.042 *** 0.091 *** 0.065 *** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.016) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.103 *** 0.128 *** 0.107 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Model Parameters 
    
N: Respondents 24020 
 
32337 
 
23136 
 
97280 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
74 
 
Degrees of Freedom 9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 452.701  190.575  226.689  406.393  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Public Sector Corruption 
The correlations between public sector corruption and electoral fraud are obvious, so 
it is no revelation that people in countries with higher corruption have lower 
perceptions of electoral fairness.  The results parallel similar findings for the effect of 
corruption on other types of political trust (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Gilley, 2006; 
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Kotzian, 2011; Seligson, 2002) and supports past research indicating the same 
relationship between corruption and electoral fairness (Birch, 2008; Hartlyn et al., 
2008).  The same negative relationship between corruption and public trust is 
anticipated with a wide range of political institutions and different types of support. 
Income Inequality 
Societies with higher levels of income inequality experience a range of social problems 
such as poorer health, shorter lifespans, lower trust and increased violence (Wilkinson, 
1996; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2006).  We can now add lower levels of electoral trust to 
the list.  Findings for the Africa model indicate that people in countries with larger 
differences between the rich and poor are less likely to say their elections are fair.  
However, the coefficient shows a weak positive relationship in the Americas model.  
The results are therefore inconclusive, but could provide limited support for the weak 
negative relationships found in previous research (Anderson & Singer, 2008; Kotzian, 
2011).  Income differences indicate how fairly the wealth of a country is distributed.  
Hierarchical societies with higher income inequalities are more likely to be politically 
polarised.  The usual trend in countries with high levels of income inequality is for a 
small minority of the population to be exceptionally rich and have disproportionate 
control over the national political structures.  It is understandable why a 
representative random sample of the population in such countries, most of who will 
not be members of the rich minority, might tend to have negative attitudes towards 
electoral fairness. 
Media Freedom 
The relationship between media freedom and perceived electoral fairness is not well 
researched using comparative cross-sectional studies.  Freedom of the press is usually 
assumed to be a crucial element for a free and fair democracy because it can hold 
politicians accountable and keep the public informed.  The current study provides 
empirical support for this long-held belief and the strong positive relationship is not 
surprising.  Countries that uphold principles of media freedom are more likely to see 
political corruption exposed and thus electoral fraud gradually reduced.  Catching and 
publicising others committing fraud serves as a warning sign to those thinking about 
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their own attempts.  Each reported case of electoral malfeasance teaches candidates, 
political parties, and governments that engaging in electoral malfeasance increases the 
risk losing public support.  It is therefore a reasonably safe assumption that a causal 
relationship exists and that increased press freedom gradually helps encourage fairer 
elections. 
6.2.5. Economic Performance 
Economic performance variables include the Human Development Index, GNI per 
capita, and GDP growth per capita.  However, none of these variables achieves 
significance in any regional model or the Global model in Table 6.18.  These results 
therefore provide no support for the proposition that the national economy affects 
perceived electoral fairness.  This is surprising given the extensive research indicating 
links between similar economic performance indicators and a range of political and 
institutional trust (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Chappell, 
1990; Cho & Bratton, 2006; Gilley, 2006; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Nannestad & 
Paldam, 1994; Wong et al., 2011) as well as electoral fairness (Birch, 2008; Hartlyn et 
al., 2008).  The lack of significant coefficients for economic performance variables has 
at least two possible explanations.  First, it may reflect that people are able to separate 
economic performance and electoral fairness.  There is a clearer link between 
economic performance and trust in government actors, since governments regulate 
business and industry or otherwise try to influence economic conditions through 
policies or programs.  However, the link between economic conditions and electoral 
fairness is more indirect, so the lack of significant results may simply reflect the reality 
that people do not make this connection.  A second explanation is that perceived 
economic conditions outweigh actual economic indicators in explanatory importance.  
The variable for subjective opinions regarding the present economic situation obtains 
high levels of significance in every regional model, while none of the national level 
economic indicators obtains significance.  It is therefore possible that subjective 
perceptions of the economy matter more than objective economic indicators, which 
makes sense because the dependent variable measures subjective perceptions of 
electoral fairness.  This explanation is more supported by the data, since subjective 
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evaluations of economic performance were significant and consistently strong across 
the different regions.  Perceived economic performance therefore seems to matter 
more for perceptions of electoral fairness than national economic performance 
indicators. 
Table 6.18: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Economic Performance 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
    
Human Development Index 0.017 
 
0.055 
 
0.304 
 
0.024 
 
 
(1.729) 
 
(1.336) 
 
(2.711) 
 
(0.415) 
 
GNI per Capita 0.111 
 
-0.014 
 
0.068 
 
0.059 
 
 
(1.649) 
 
(0.514) 
 
(0.149) 
 
(0.091) 
 
GDP Growth per Capita 0.038 
 
-0.020 
 
0.030 
 
-0.010 
 
 
(0.304) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.153) 
 
(0.113) 
 
Individual Level 
    
Age (Decades) 0.041 *** 0.016 
 
0.059 *** 0.036 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.023 *** 0.029 *** 0.034 * 0.021 *** 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** -0.001 
 
0.019 * -0.012 * 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Supports Winner 0.143 *** 0.116 *** 0.090 *** 0.128 *** 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Electoral Participation 0.063 *** 0.042 *** 0.090 *** 0.064 *** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.016) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.103 *** 0.128 *** 0.106 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Model Parameters 
    
N: Respondents 24020 
 
32337 
 
23136 
 
95729 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
73 
 
Degrees of Freedom 9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 205.935  184.825  243.326  406.527  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
6.2.6. Cultural Fractionalization 
Lower religious, ethnic, or linguistic fractionalization was presumed to be positively 
associated with perceived electoral fairness.  Table 6.19 provides strong support for 
the religious fractionalization assumption, with negatively significant relationships for 
the Africa, Americas, and Global models.  This relationship is strongest and achieves 
the highest level of significance in the Global model, which together with regional 
results suggests that greater national religious diversity decreases the likelihood of 
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perceived electoral fairness.  Ethnic fractionalization does not achieve significance in 
any model, indicating a lack of any relationship between the degree of ethnic diversity 
and perceived electoral fairness.  Linguistic fractionalization is negatively significant in 
the Global model, but not in any of the regional models.  The coefficient for the Global 
model is moderately strong and significant, which provides some support for the 
assumption that increasing linguistic diversity decreases the likelihood of perceived 
electoral fairness.  Overall, religious fractionalization shows the strongest negative 
association with electoral fairness, linguistic fractionalization shows a weak negative 
association, while ethnic fractionalization appears unrelated to perceptions of 
electoral fairness. 
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Table 6.19: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Cultural Fractionalization 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
    
Religious Fractionalization -0.130 * -0.068 * -0.056 
 
-0.124 *** 
 
(0.278) 
 
(0.207) 
 
(0.355) 
 
(0.143) 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.018 
 
0.024 
 
-0.153 
 
0.063 
 
 
(0.527) 
 
(0.288) 
 
(1.103) 
 
(0.175) 
 
Linguistic Fractionalization -0.079 
 
0.008 
 
-0.079 
 
-0.133 ** 
 
(0.299) 
 
(0.283) 
 
(0.839) 
 
(0.148) 
 
Individual Level 
    
Age (Decades) 0.041 *** 0.016 
 
0.058 *** 0.036 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.023 *** 0.029 *** 0.034 * 0.021 *** 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** -0.001 
 
0.019 * -0.011 
 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Supports Winner 0.143 *** 0.116 *** 0.090 *** 0.128 *** 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Electoral Participation 0.063 *** 0.042 *** 0.089 *** 0.065 *** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.016) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.103 *** 0.128 *** 0.107 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Model Parameters 
    
N: Respondents 24020 
 
32337 
 
23136 
 
97280 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
74 
 
Degrees of Freedom 9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 199.884  146.676  130.147  432.764  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
The finding of a negative relationship between religious fractionalisation and perceive 
electoral fairness is relatively new.  Other studies have found negative correlations 
between ethnic diversity and political trust (Rahn & Rudolph, 2005: 546-548), 
economic growth (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Posner, 2004), and the quality of 
government (Alesina et al., 2003).  However, the present study found no relationship 
between ethnic fractionalisation and perceived electoral fairness.  This could be due to 
religious fractionalisation having more explanatory power and overshadowing ethnic 
diversity.  This means that any relationship between ethnic fractionalisation and 
electoral fairness is relatively weak.  Keech (1972) found that linguistic diversity could 
increase the likelihood of political conflict.  The only significant result in the present 
study was a negative relationship with perceived electoral fairness in the Global 
model, which is not reliable without significant regional results. 
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Chapter 7. Unexpected Results for EMB Models 
This chapter provides results for the two models of electoral management body (EMB) 
design.  Overall, both models unexpectedly demonstrate strong and significant 
negative relationship with public perceptions of fair elections, with very few 
coefficients demonstrating the anticipated positive relationships.  The predominantly 
negative correlations uncovered in this study go against the extensive literature 
advocating an independent electoral management body model (Elklit & Reynolds, 
2001; Goodwin-Gill, 2006; Lehoucq, 2002; López-Pintor, 2000; Mozaffar, 2002; 
Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002; Pastor, 1999a, 1999b; Wall et al., 2006).  The negative 
results may reflect the fact that formally independent institutions are subject to 
informal manipulation.  Many newer democracies have recently established formal 
representative institutions and hold multiparty elections, but are effectively 
authoritarian regimes in many ways.  These are often called competitive authoritarian, 
electoral authoritarian or hybrid regimes and are identified by their mix of 
authoritarian and democratic elements (Bogaards, 2009; Case, 2011; Ekman, 2009; 
Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Koehler, 2008; Schedler, 2010; 
Wigell, 2008).  Institutional arrangements in these regimes may appear formally 
independent, but the reality of the political situation often differs substantively from 
what constitutions or legislation prescribes.  Authoritarian or semi-authoritarian hybrid 
regimes have many options for manipulating democracy and holding onto power 
despite formally independent EMBs (Schedler, 2002a: 41-46).  As the case of Mexico’s 
democratic transition illustrates, political circumstances often matter more than the 
formal institutional independence of EMBs (Todd A. Eisenstadt, 2004).  The Mexican 
Federal Electoral Institute only fully applied its formal independence after the ruling 
party accepted an electoral loss and the political conditions changed.  Many countries 
have formally independent EMBs that exist in current hybrid regimes or have a recent 
past of authoritarian rule.10  Belarus, Burkina Faso, Russia, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe 
are examples of hybrid regimes included in this study that have formally independent 
EMBs.  There are enough of these countries in each regional dataset to sway the 
                                                     
10
 Benin, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Tanzania, 
Ukraine and Zambia are all listed as having independent EMBs. 
 218 
results, which could explain the strong negative correlations between independent 
EMBs and perceptions of electoral fairness.  People in hybrid regimes probably take 
into consideration the wider authoritarian context rather than the formal institutional 
arrangements when answering survey questions about electoral fairness.  This will be 
especially true if the formal arrangements are routinely circumvented or ignored.  
Birch (2008: 313) suggested this negative relationship could be a result of independent 
EMBs being introduced in response to problematic electoral impartiality.  If this is true, 
then people in countries with newly independent EMBS may be remembering the 
earlier more corrupt elections when answering survey questions about electoral 
fairness.  This could explain the predominance of negative results for the two EMB 
models, However, constitutional arrangements and formal structures are capable of 
democratising the wider political context despite informal manipulations (Hale, 2011), 
so future research should start to show more positive relationships.  If it does not, then 
the alleged positive effects of independent electoral management will remain 
unsupported by empirical evidence. 
The structure of this chapter is divided between the two models of EMB design.  Two 
main sections provide the results for the separate parts of the two models as well as 
their composite indices.  Section 7.1 examines results for the conventional 
independent model, while section 7.2 analyses the findings for the categorised 
autonomy model.  For consistency, these are divided into the same subsections used in 
earlier chapters. 
7.1. Conventional Independent Model 
The conventional independent model has available data for six criteria: 
implementation, accountability, powers, composition, term of office and budget.  
Results for the implementation tasks show either negative or insignificant relationships 
with perceived electoral fairness.  The only significant results for accountability to the 
legislature or judiciary are negative.  Making EMBs responsible for settling electoral 
disputes or proposing electoral reforms produce mixed or insignificant results.  Having 
members selected by the judiciary or legislature reveals have a weak negative 
relationship with electoral fairness, while having fixed member terms is strongly and 
 219 
negatively associated with electoral fairness.  There are no significant results for EMB 
budgetary variables.  Analysing the separate criteria therefore produces substantively 
more negative than positive relationships.  This approach does not account for the 
possibility that the different criteria matter in a holistic way, perhaps by reinforcing 
each other.  However, the additive index of conventional independence is strongly 
negative in the Europe model, but insignificant in all other regions and the Global 
model.  Overall, there are few positively significant results and the evidence generally 
does not support claims that independent EMBs increase electoral fairness. 
The following sections outline results for the different criteria of the conventional 
independent model.  These include EMB responsibility for the implementation of core 
election tasks, formal accountability to the legislature or judiciary, powers to propose 
electoral legislation or settle electoral disputes, member composition measured with 
selection by the legislature or judiciary, fixed terms of office and budgets and 
expenditures overseen by non-executive actors. 
7.1.1. Implementation 
Implementation refers to core tasks related to running elections, of which there are 
four with available data: voter registration, running the local level of elections, sorting 
and counting votes, and consolidating results.  The overall assumption is that assigning 
more of these tasks to an EMB is associated with increased electoral fairness, but 
findings are not supportive of this postulation.  However, there should also be some 
positive relationships with perceived electoral fairness for separate tasks.  Table 7.1 
presents the results for having EMBs perform the four core implementation tasks.  The 
missing coefficients for the Africa and Americas models are omitted due to 
multicollinearity.  Voter registration was omitted in the Americas model because all 
national EMBs are responsible for voter registration.  Consolidating results was 
omitted from the African model because all but one national EMB is responsible for 
this task, which conflicts with the requirement for more variation when using robust 
standard errors clustered by country. 
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Table 7.1: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Implementation Tasks 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
    
Voter Registration -0.119 * . 
 
0.201 
 
0.045 
 
 
(0.147) 
 
. 
 
(0.269) 
 
(0.115) 
 
Local Elections 0.319 *** -0.039 * -0.219 *** 0.017 
 
 
(0.110) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.151) 
 
Sort and Count Votes -0.190 ** 0.031 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.049 
 
 
(0.156) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.120) 
 
Consolidate Votes . 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.135 * -0.029 
 
 
. 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.128) 
 
Individual Level 
    
Age (Decades) 0.041 *** 0.016 
 
0.058 *** 0.036 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.023 *** 0.029 *** 0.034 * 0.024 *** 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** -0.001 
 
0.020 * -0.008 
 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Supports Winner 0.143 *** 0.116 *** 0.090 *** 0.128 *** 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.032) 
 
Electoral Participation 0.063 *** 0.042 *** 0.089 *** 0.063 *** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.016) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.103 *** 0.129 *** 0.106 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Model Parameters 
    
N: Respondents 24020 
 
32337 
 
23136 
 
92533 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
69 
 
Degrees of Freedom 9 
 
9 
 
10 
 
10 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 860.722  211.044  949.954  376.055  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
We can see that most significant results in Table 7.1 are negative and thus do not 
support the assumptions of the conventional independent model.  Voter registration is 
negative in the Africa model, suggesting that making EMBs responsible for this task is 
actually associated with decreased perceptions of electoral fairness.  EMB 
responsibility for local level elections has a strong and significant positive relationship 
in the Africa model, but a negative relationship in the Americas and Europe models.  
The mixed results are therefore inconclusive.  Sorting and counting votes has a 
significant negative coefficient in the Africa model, again suggesting that assigning this 
task to an EMB decreases perceived electoral fairness.  Finally, the task of 
consolidating results shows a negative result in the Europe model.  Most significant 
coefficients are moderate to relatively large, suggesting strong relationships.  
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Therefore, the overall trend for core implementations tasks is that assigning them to 
EMBs produces more negative relationships than positive, which suggests that making 
EMBs responsible for these tasks does not necessarily lead to improved perceptions of 
electoral fairness.  However, there may be some hope for making EMBs responsible for 
local elections, since this was the only variable positively associated with electoral 
fairness, even if it was only in one region.  This could indicate that making a national 
body responsible for the local level of elections removes some conflicts of interest.  
Having local government officials run local elections is more likely to provide 
opportunities to act on incentives to maintain power. 
Given the essential nature of implementation tasks for democracy and the assumption 
that autonomy reduces conflicts of interest, it is somewhat alarming that so many 
relationships are negative rather than positive.  The negative coefficients occur across 
multiple regions, which reduce the likelihood that the relationships are due to chance.  
However, one of the problems with the implementation task results is that they are 
mostly based on proxy variables and do not directly test the intended design features.  
For example, the task of vote counting is measured by combining where votes are 
counted with the level of elections for which EMBs are responsible.  If EMBs are 
responsible for the local level and votes are counted at polling stations, then it was 
assumed the EMB was responsible for counting the votes.  This seems a reasonable 
assumption, but a variable that expressly identified which body was responsible for 
sorting and counting votes would have been superior.  Other implementation tasks are 
not very useful to measure because there is insufficient variation between countries.  
For example, all EMBs are responsible for voter registration in the Americas countries.  
This problem could be minimized by gathering original data regarding the procedures 
for voter registration.  Multicollinearity problems could also be mitigated by the 
release of future datasets that include more countries, with the hope that this 
increases cross-national variation. 
Additional aspects of election implementation need researching in more depth across 
wider sets of countries.  Restrictions on registering, updating of the voter registry, 
identification requirements and ballot chains of custody can be sources of electoral 
fraud or voter disenfranchisement (Albaugh, 2011; J. E. Alvarez, 1996; R. M. Alvarez & 
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Hall, 2008).  Registration requirements or voting restrictions based on age, gender, 
ethnicity, mental disability, criminal incarceration, previous conviction, military or 
judicial service, multiple citizenships, and other factors can disenfranchise potential 
voters.  Further requirements such as periods of residence, citizenship, or 
naturalization provide additional ways of limiting who can vote.  These factors can 
affect substantial portions of the population and could be perceived as unfair or 
abused for partisan advantage.  Prior research suggests that more permissive voter 
registration practices increases voter turnout without substantially changing the 
overall composition of electorates (Mitchell & Wlezien, 1995; Powell, 1986; 
Rosenstone & Wolfinger, 1978).  Relationships between registration restrictions and 
perceived electoral fairness remain inadequately investigated, but they are expected 
to reveal positive relationships.  ACE data has variables on voting restrictions and 
registration requirements, but many of the countries included in the present research 
have missing data.  If the relevant data were gathered, it would be possible to research 
the relationships between these requirements or restrictions and electoral fairness or 
other aspects of political support.  There are at least two expectations related to 
registration requirements or voting restrictions that could be tested, each of which 
required different variables.  First, that perceived electoral fairness would decrease as 
the number of restrictions increases.  This would entail the creation of an additive 
index variable that measured the total number of different types of voting restrictions 
in each country.  A second expectation is that perceived electoral fairness would 
decrease as the percentage of the population restricted from voting increases.  The 
variable required for testing this expectation is more complex to construct because it 
would require cross-referencing other data sources to calculate the percentage of a 
population affected by different voting restrictions.  They are nevertheless important 
avenues of research as they have real-world policy implications and could provide 
information on how to increase political support for democracy. 
7.1.2. Accountability 
The results for formal accountability to the legislature or judiciary are negatively 
associated with perceived electoral fairness.  It is therefore apparent that reporting to 
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either of these actors is not sufficient for enhancing perceived electoral fairness.  It is 
possible that reporting to particular sets of multiple actors produces the most positive 
results.  For example, reporting to the judiciary and legislature rather than to the 
judiciary or legislature might have a positive effect.  Moreover, where EMBs report to 
is a very shallow definition of accountability.  There are many additional factors of EMB 
accountability that are considered important (Wall et al., 2006: 223-227), but no 
variables available to measure them.  A more meaningful measure of accountability 
would measure the performance standards to which EMB members are accountable 
and the mechanisms by which other government branches or agencies hold them 
responsible.  The ACE & IDEA data unfortunately does not include these variables, and 
independently gathering and coding those variables is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
7.1.3. Powers 
Two tasks with valid data are included within the powers criteria: proposing electoral 
reforms and settling electoral disputes.  Table 7.2 shows that there is little support for 
the predicted positive relationships.  First, making EMBs responsible for the first level 
of electoral disputes has a strong negative relationship with perceived electoral 
fairness in the Europe model, but a weak positive association in the Americas model.  
The results are thus mixed and inconclusive.  Slightly more than half the EMBs in the 
Americas model are responsible for dispute resolution, and many of these are strong 
independent EMBs that follow an electoral branch model designed to perform the 
‘electoral function’.  Poland has the only EMB in the Europe model that settles 
electoral disputes, providing insufficient variation to make any reliable assertions.  The 
relationship regarding EMB responsibility for dispute settling powers is therefore 
unclear.  As with many of the other variables, more detailed datasets across a wider 
selection of countries is required before it is possible to make any confident assertions.  
Second, making EMBs responsible for proposing electoral reforms is not significant in 
any regional model.  The null results could arise because the power to propose 
electoral reforms can be performed by multiple actors in most countries.  This usually 
includes the legislature or a legislative committee, but it often also includes other 
actors that the theory does not mention.  Moreover, the variable measures who can 
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propose electoral reforms, but not who can actually enact electoral legislation.  EMBs 
have competence for this task in some countries, but the cross-national data needed 
to analyses its relationship with perceived electoral fairness is missing.  The relatively 
weak power of proposing reforms is unlikely to have much effect if the legislature 
routinely ignores the suggested changes.  This ‘power’ is therefore not very powerful 
and can often be ignored without consequence.  The powers variables present mixed 
and insignificant relationships with perceived electoral fairness. 
Table 7.2: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Powers Tasks 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
        
Electoral Reforms 0.023 
 
0.031 
 
0.059 
 
0.027 
 
 
(0.201) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.190) 
 
(0.115) 
 
Electoral Disputes -0.075 
 
0.098 * -0.221 * -0.029 
 
 
(0.206) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.202) 
 
(0.113) 
 
Individual Level 
        
Age (Decades) 0.041 *** 0.016 
 
0.058 *** 0.035 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.023 *** 0.029 *** 0.034 * 0.025 *** 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.012) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** -0.001 
 
0.019 * -0.006 
 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.018) 
 
Supports Winner 0.143 *** 0.116 *** 0.090 *** 0.128 *** 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.032) 
 
Electoral Participation 0.063 *** 0.042 *** 0.089 *** 0.064 *** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.016) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.103 *** 0.129 *** 0.106 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Model Parameters 
        
N: Respondents 24020 
 
32337 
 
23136 
 
92506 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
69 
 
Degrees of Freedom 8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 141.340  198.676  307.224  388.620  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
While making EMBs responsible for electoral reforms or electoral disputes does not 
appear to be associated with improved perceptions of electoral fairness, combining 
these variables into a simple additive index produces a strongly positive and highly 
significant association in the Americas model.  This result is presented in Table 7.4, 
together with other additive total indices for the other criteria.  The coefficient for the 
powers index maintains it strength and high significance even when controlling for all 
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these other tasks, but only in the Americas.  This is interesting because EMBs in the 
Americas are some of the most independent and powerful in the world.  They more 
frequently have exclusive power to alter electoral legislation, separate from the 
legislature.  However, this strong positive relationship only presents itself in the 
Americas model.  It could be that the power to change legislation is more important 
that simply proposing those changes, but more data is needed to have any confidence 
in this conjecture. 
7.1.4. Composition 
Composition refers to how EMB members are selected, and the theory says 
independence and electoral integrity is enhanced when the task is performed by the 
legislature or judiciary rather that the executive.  However, the only significant result is 
negative for the Americas model, as shown in Table 7.4.  It is not very strong and only 
minimally significant.  Other results for the composition criteria are insignificant, 
possibly because all other criteria are included in the model.  Other variations of 
composition or member selection requirements may yield results that are more 
promising.  For example, we could alter the variable conditions so that appointment 
procedures require at least two actors from different branches of government.  The 
current requirement is an either/or condition, whereas perhaps a more stringent 
combined requirement would help eliminate appointments entailing conflicts of 
interest.  Having only the legislature appoint EMB members gives rise to conflicts of 
interest because it places elected representatives in charge of appointing the people 
who will manage their election.  This could be especially problematic where a single 
party dominates the legislature and there are no restrictions against having partisan 
EMB members.  Under these conditions, there will be incentives to appoint EMB 
members sympathetic to the party controlling the legislature so that the favour can be 
returned during elections.  For future research, it might be insightful to gather 
additional data regarding the roles of different actors involved in making EMB member 
appointments.  There are at least three tasks associated with appointment: 
nominating, selecting, and approving member selections.  Having one actor perform all 
three tasks provides that actor with considerable influence over the composition of 
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EMBs.  An alternative method would be to have different actors perform the three 
tasks.  For example, the EMB could nominate a list of candidates, the judiciary could 
select the most suitable candidate, and the legislature could approve that selection.  
Such a setup provides additional check and balances that help mitigate abuses of 
power.  Unfortunately, current data does not code for the tasks performed by each 
actor involved in selecting EMB members. 
7.1.5. Term of Office 
The consistently negative relationships for fixed member terms suggest they may 
actually decrease perceived electoral fairness.  The main issue of concern is that having 
security of tenure is important for electoral integrity because it helps protect EMB 
members from pressure from politicians who depended on elections to achieve or 
maintain power.  Wall et al (2006: 9, 12) specifically mention fixed terms as one of the 
ways of ensuring security of tenure within the independent EMB model.  The results of 
this current study suggest that fixed terms are not a good design feature for increasing 
perceptions of electoral fairness.  An alternative possibility, one that current data does 
not adequately or clearly measure, is that life-long appointments may be superior at 
enhancing electoral fairness.  This would be similar to judicial appointments that make 
someone a high court judge until retirement age.  In addition to the other aspects of 
judicial independence, such as making the positions well paid and separating them 
from the more partisan branches of government, lifelong appointments help insulate 
judges from political pressure.  The same style of appointment may work to isolate 
EMB members from partisan politics and concomitant pressures to corrupt elections. 
7.1.6. Budget 
Neither of the two budgetary variables obtains significance.  The first was that having 
EMB budgets determined by the legislature or EMB would be associated with 
increased perceptions of electoral fairness.  The second was that having EMB 
expenditures controlled by the legislature or EMB would be positively related to 
electoral fairness.  There are no significant coefficients in either model however, which 
provides no support for these assumptions.  According to these results, perceived 
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electoral fairness is not related to the roles legislatures or EMBs play in determining 
budgets or controlling expenditures.  As with other variables, alternative tests could be 
conducted, but further data would need to be gathered.  For example, requiring that a 
combination of actors determine EMB budgets may have more positive effects than 
testing for one from a set of actors.  The budget determination requirements were 
fulfilled if the EMB or legislature and not the executive performed this task.  This 
followed from the prescribed theory, but perhaps a combination of both the 
legislature and an independent auditing agency is most associated with electoral 
fairness.  The same could be true for controlling or auditing EMB expenditures.  The 
original theory states that EMBs should have their own back accounts separate from 
any other government department or ministry.  This data also needs to be gathered 
before analysing whether it may have a positive effect on electoral integrity. 
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Table 7.3: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Budget Tasks 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
        
Budget Determination 0.120 
 
0.026 
 
-0.005 
 
0.017 
 
 
(0.228) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.088) 
 
Expenditure Control -0.097 
 
-0.039 
 
-0.060 
 
-0.063 
 
 
(0.181) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.214) 
 
(0.091) 
 
Individual Level 
        
Age (Decades) 0.041 *** 0.016 
 
0.058 *** 0.037 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.023 *** 0.029 *** 0.034 * 0.023 *** 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** -0.001 
 
0.019 * -0.009 
 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Supports Winner 0.143 *** 0.116 *** 0.090 *** 0.121 *** 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.029) 
 
Electoral Participation 0.063 *** 0.042 *** 0.089 *** 0.066 *** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.015) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.103 *** 0.128 *** 0.106 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Model Parameters 
        
N: Respondents 24020 
 
32337 
 
23136 
 
94866 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
72 
 
Degrees of Freedom 8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 219.868  163.392  180.667  380.837  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
The conventional independent model results presented thus far have included 
dichotomous national level variables that analyse separate criteria and their 
constituent tasks.  The tables presented alongside the following paragraphs contain 
additive indices that measure different ways of combining the tasks and criteria.  The 
models in Table 7.4 include aggregated totals for the three criteria composed of 
multiple tasks: implementation, powers, and budget.  Dichotomous variables are 
included to control for the other three criteria: accountability, composition, and term 
of office.  The ‘total’ variables have values that increase as more of their respective 
tasks are performed by the national EMB.  This follows from the assumption that 
having more task requirements fulfilled should increase perceptions of electoral 
fairness.  The coefficients for these totals variables indicate that only implementation 
and powers criteria are significant, while the budget criterion has no significant 
coefficients.  The implementation criterion is negative and significant for the Americas 
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model, but the relationship is relatively weak, and negative but insignificant in the 
other models.  This unexpected result means that assigning more implementation 
tasks to an EMB appears to have a mild negative relationship with perceived electoral 
fairness.  The total powers criterion is strongly positive and highly significant in the 
Americas model, which suggests that making EMBs responsible for proposing electoral 
reforms and/or settling electoral disputes is positively associated with perceived 
electoral fairness.  This accords with the original prediction, but the relationship is only 
significant in the Americas.  For the budget totals variable, the lack of significant 
coefficients is not surprising given the similar lack of significance for its separate tasks.  
The logical conclusion is that having finances determined and controlled by the 
legislature or EMB has no significant relationship with perceived electoral fairness. 
The other three criteria based on single tasks also provide no support for their 
respective assumptions.  Their relationships with perceived electoral fairness are 
usually similar to earlier regressions, despite controlling for other conventional 
independent model criteria.  The accountability variable is negative and significant in 
the Africa and Global models, with a stronger relationship in the former.  This suggests 
that having EMBs report to the legislature or judiciary, and not the executive, is 
negatively associated with perceived electoral fairness.  The terms of office variable 
presents the strongest evidence against its original assumption, with significant 
negative coefficients in the Africa, Europe and Global models.  The consistency of the 
relationships indicates that fixed member terms probably have a negative association 
with perceived electoral fairness.  Overall, the results in Table 7.4 provide more 
evidence against than in favour of the conventional independent model.  Assigning 
more implementation tasks to an EMB, making it accountable to the legislature or 
judiciary, having members appointed by the legislature or judiciary, and having fixed 
term tenures for EMB members are all negatively associated with electoral fairness in 
at least one regional model.  The only significant positive finding is for assigning 
electoral reform and/or dispute settling powers to EMBs in AmericasBarometer 
countries. 
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Table 7.4: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Total Criteria Variables 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
        
Implementation (Total) -0.129 
 
-0.065 * -0.088 
 
-0.016 
 
 
(0.957) 
 
(0.184) 
 
(0.243) 
 
(0.116) 
 
Accountability -0.191 * -0.009 
 
-0.091 
 
-0.096 * 
 
(0.184) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.092) 
 
Powers (Total) -0.022 
 
0.211 *** -0.071 
 
0.012 
 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.118) 
 
(0.211) 
 
(0.111) 
 
Composition 0.099 
 
-0.116 * 0.124 
 
0.067 
 
 
(0.217) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.272) 
 
(0.097) 
 
Term of Office -0.123 ** -0.014 
 
-0.202 * -0.096 * 
 
(0.167) 
 
(0.151) 
 
(0.174) 
 
(0.091) 
 
Budget (Total) 0.012 
 
-0.017 
 
-0.083 
 
-0.045 
 
 
(0.244) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.312) 
 
(0.13) 
 
Individual Level 
        
Age (Decades) 0.041 *** 0.016 
 
0.059 *** 0.036 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.023 *** 0.029 *** 0.034 * 0.027 *** 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.012) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** -0.001 
 
0.020 * -0.003 
 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.018) 
 
Supports Winner 0.143 *** 0.116 *** 0.090 *** 0.122 *** 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Electoral Participation 0.062 *** 0.042 *** 0.089 *** 0.067 *** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.016) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.103 *** 0.128 *** 0.104 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.02) 
 
Model Parameters 
        
N: Respondents 24020 
 
32337 
 
23136 
 
88974 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
66 
 
Degrees of Freedom 12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 199.501  457.621  164.759  397.059  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
Table 7.5 includes fulfilled rather that totalled variables.  These are all dichotomous 
rather than ordinal variables, representing whether all task requirements are met 
rather than how many task requirements are met.  Overall, the results are very similar, 
but there are a few minor differences.  The implementation criterion is still negative in 
only one model, but this has changed from the Americas to the Africa model and the 
coefficient is now larger.  This means having EMBs perform all implementation tasks is 
negatively associated with electoral fairness in the Africa model, whereas having EMBs 
perform more of the tasks has a negative relationship in the Americas model.  Either 
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way, both relationships are negative and provide no support for the implementation 
assumption.   
Table 7.5: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Fulfilled Criteria Variables 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
        
Implementation -0.237 * -0.052 
 
0.145 
 
0.011 
 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.283) 
 
(0.096) 
 
Accountability -0.219 * 0.003 
 
-0.237 
 
-0.088 * 
 
(0.195) 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.303) 
 
(0.092) 
 
Powers 0.030 
 
0.132 ** -0.086 * 0.026 
 
 
(0.153) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.097) 
 
Composition 0.079 
 
-0.047 
 
0.108 
 
0.060 
 
 
(0.201) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.244) 
 
(0.093) 
 
Terms of Office -0.133 ** 0.020 
 
-0.176 
 
-0.099 * 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.212) 
 
(0.091) 
 
Budget 0.042 
 
0.018 
 
-0.096 
 
-0.048 
 
 
(0.178) 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.178) 
 
(0.100) 
 
Individual Level 
        
Age (Decades) 0.041 *** 0.016 
 
0.058 *** 0.036 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.023 *** 0.029 *** 0.033 * 0.027 *** 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.012) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** -0.001 
 
0.020 * -0.003 
 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.018) 
 
Supports Winner 0.143 *** 0.116 *** 0.090 *** 0.122 *** 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Electoral Participation 0.062 *** 0.042 *** 0.089 *** 0.067 *** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.016) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.103 *** 0.128 *** 0.104 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Model Parameters 
        
N: Respondents 24020 
 
32337 
 
23136 
 
88974 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
66 
 
Degrees of Freedom 12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 215.285  395.243  341.661  378.739  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
Delegating more core tasks to EMBs therefore does not appear to increase perceptions 
of electoral fairness.  Formal accountability remains unchanged with significant 
negative coefficients in the Africa and Global models again.  The powers criterion is still 
positive in the Americas model, but showing a weaker relationship and now a weak 
negative coefficient in the Europe model.  This negative finding undermines support 
for the assumption that making EMBs responsible for reform proposals and dispute 
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resolution has a positive relationship with electoral fairness.  A positive relationship 
does however appear consistently for the Americas model.  The composition results 
have changed and no longer show any significant coefficients, providing no support for 
any positive effects associated with having the legislature or judiciary select EMB 
members.  Term of office remains negative in the Africa and Global models, but is no 
longer significant in the Europe model.  This provides consistent evidence against 
having fixed EMB member terms.  The budget criterion remains unchanged with no 
significant coefficients.  Once again, there is little evidence to support most of the 
assumptions derived from the conventional independent EMB model. 
It should come as no surprise that the conventional independent model appears 
negatively associated with public perceptions of electoral fairness.  All criteria and 
their tasks were combined to create the aggregated EMB independence index found in 
Table 7.6.  This index has higher values the more tasks and criteria requirements are 
fulfilled.  However, the only significant coefficient in Table 7.6 is for the Europe model 
and it is negative.  This implies that perceptions of electoral fairness decrease as more 
of the conventional independent EMB variable conditions are met.  This 
counterintuitive finding suggests that the conventional independent model may not be 
the best way to design electoral institutions. 
 233 
Table 7.6: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Conventional Independence 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
        
EMB Independence -0.127 
 
0.059 
 
-0.243 * -0.065 
 
 
(0.169) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.110) 
 
(0.052) 
 
Individual Level 
        
Age (Decades) 0.041 *** 0.016 
 
0.059 *** 0.036 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.024 *** 0.029 *** 0.034 * 0.027 *** 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.012) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** -0.001 
 
0.019 * -0.003 
 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.018) 
 
Supports Winner 0.143 *** 0.116 *** 0.090 *** 0.122 *** 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Electoral Participation 0.062 *** 0.042 *** 0.089 *** 0.067 *** 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.016) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.103 *** 0.128 *** 0.104 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Model Parameters 
        
N: Respondents 24020 
 
32337 
 
23136 
 
88974 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
66 
 
Degrees of Freedom 7 
 
7 
 
7 
 
7 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 140.284  143.698  98.659  346.342  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
7.2. Categorised Autonomy Model 
Like the conventional independent model, the categorised autonomy model advocates 
separation from the executive.  However, it is constructed around four categories of 
autonomy rather than seven criteria of independence.  Although both models use 
similar variables, measurement and testing methodologies differ.  For example, a 
major dissimilarity is that a minimal threshold of combined institutional, personnel and 
financial autonomy is required for fulfilling the functional autonomy variable 
conditions.  This arises from the assumption that the performance of electoral 
governance functions will increase perceptions of fairness if EMBs are separate from 
executive control (2009).  Despite this more stringent autonomy requirement, most 
assumptions for the categorised autonomy model receive little empirical support.  
Findings frequently show negative associations with perceived electoral fairness, but 
many simply fail to achieve significance.  The most likely reason for the negative results 
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is again the inclusion of many hybrid regimes with formally independent electoral 
management bodies that may be subject to informal manipulation. 
A preview of findings indicates the extent to which results do not achieve their 
expected positive relationships with perceived electoral fairness.  This brief 
introduction to the findings is presented in the same order as subsequent sections, 
starting with institutional autonomy.  Formal accountability to the legislature, and not 
to the executive, shows no significant results.  Having electoral law be part of the 
constitution produces one negative and an otherwise insignificant association with 
perceived electoral fairness.  One of the few positive results is that longer lasting EMBs 
are significantly associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness.  None of 
the personnel autonomy or financial autonomy variables achieves significance in any 
regional models or the Global model.  The remained of the findings refer to tasks in the 
functional autonomy category.  Most significant boundary demarcation and approval 
coefficients are negative, although there is one positive result in the Americas model 
for autonomous EMBs being responsible for boundary demarcation.  There may be a 
positive effect on electoral fairness when autonomous EMBs receive political party and 
candidate financial reports.  However, delegating most other functions to autonomous 
EMBs either has a negatively significant association with electoral fairness or shows no 
clear trend because the results are only significant in one region.  Overall, the 
categorised autonomy model does not appear to have many positive relationships 
with perceived electoral fairness.  The following four main sections outline and discuss 
the results for the four categories of autonomy in more detail. 
7.2.1. Institutional Autonomy 
Institutional variables test EMB accountability, the constitutional statues of electoral 
law, and EMB longevity for their association with electoral fairness.  EMBs that have 
existed for longer do seem to have a positive association with perceive electoral 
fairness.  Table 7.7 presents these results, which shows the EMB longevity variable is 
positively significant in the Europe model and Global model, which provides some 
support for the prediction that perceptions of elections would improve the longer an 
EMB has existed.  Other findings do not provide much support for the argument that 
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institutional separation from the executive government increases electoral fairness 
(van Aaken, 2009: 306).  Accountability does not achieve significance in any of the 
regional models, providing no support for the assumption that formally reporting to 
the legislature and not to the executive increases perceptions of electoral fairness.  
Constitutional status is negative in the Africa model at a minimal level of significance, 
but is not significant in any other model, suggesting a very weak or coincidental 
relationship.  The negative finding runs counter to the expected positive relationship 
however, which does not support the idea that having electoral law established in the 
constitution increases perceived electoral fairness.  Overall, the assumptions regarding 
formal accountability to the legislature and constitutional status of electoral law find 
no support, but longer durations of EMB existence are positively associated with 
perceived electoral fairness. 
Table 7.7: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Institutional Autonomy 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
        
Formal Accountability -0.145 
 
0.006 
 
-0.102 
 
-0.058 
 
 
(0.195) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.159) 
 
(0.087) 
 
Constitutional Status -0.134 * 0.033 
 
-0.027 
 
-0.037 
 
 
(0.171) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.177) 
 
(0.080) 
 
EMB Longevity -0.075 
 
0.059 
 
0.158 * 0.093 ** 
 
(1.586) 
 
(0.266) 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.137) 
 
Individual Level 
        
Age (Decades) 0.057 *** 0.024 * 0.068 *** 0.049 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.022 ** 0.030 *** 0.036 ** 0.027 *** 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.012) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** 0.003 
 
0.025 * 0.000 
 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Supports Winner 0.150 *** 0.121 *** 0.102 *** 0.129 *** 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.104 *** 0.133 *** 0.105 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.021) 
 
Model Parameters 
        
N: Respondents 24142 
 
32437 
 
23669 
 
90103 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
67 
 
Degrees of Freedom 8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 170.961  139.177  340.133  298.128  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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The formal accountability variable did not obtain significance despite being 
constructed very similarly to the formal accountability criteria of the conventional 
independence model, which was negative and significant.  The most reasonable 
explanation is that the other variables included in the model have more explanatory 
power.  It is possible that accountability to the legislature is not a good way of ensuring 
electoral integrity.  Elected officials populate legislatures, so there are potential 
conflicts of interest when they oversee their own election.  A legislature dominated by 
one political party may use this position to manipulate the EMB configurations or 
activities to ensure electoral advantages for themselves.  An alternative accountability 
model might include a requirement for reporting to multiple actors, at least one of 
which is hopefully not subject to similar conflicts of interest. 
Although the constitutional status of electoral law only produced a single negative 
result, it was a proxy variable for the constitutional status of EMBs themselves.  The 
original expectations were that establishing EMBs as separate institutions within the 
constitution, and granting them a legal personality, would increase electoral fairness.  
These conditions would make EMBs harder to modify by partisan actors within the 
legislature, executive, or elsewhere.  Data was not available to test either the 
constitutional status of EMBs or whether they have their own legal personalities.  Due 
to data limitations, the current study could only analyse whether electoral legislation 
within the constitution was associated with electoral fairness.  This factor is important 
because it also hinders the ability of partisan interests to change the constitutionally 
established electoral legislation.  However, this variable could be improved by 
indicating the amount of electoral law contained within the constitution.  This could be 
measured by word count or number of constitutional articles and could be 
represented as a percentage of the total amount of electoral law.  The expectation is 
that having a higher proportion of electoral legislation in the constitution would be 
associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness. 
The positive results for the longevity variable suggest that experience may be an 
important factor for enhancing electoral integrity.  This variable was a proxy for 
permanent EMBs, which are supposed to be superior to temporary EMBs because they 
facilitate ongoing training, career advancement and separate institutional cultures.  
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Nevertheless, the fact that longer lasting EMBs are associated with increased 
perceptions of electoral fairness provides support for related findings using democratic 
experience.  As Farrell and McAllister (2006) have pointed out, democratic satisfaction 
increases with accumulated democratic experience.  The finding in this study suggests 
that perceived electoral fairness increases with EMB experience. 
7.2.2. Financial Autonomy 
Financial autonomy variables do not achieve significance in any of the regional models.  
The expectation was that perceived electoral fairness would improve if the legislature 
or EMB, without executive involvement, determined EMB budgets or audited EMB 
expenditures.  However, the results in Table 7.8 provide no support for the expected 
relationships.  The lack of results for expenditure control suggests that having the EMB 
or legislature audit EMB expenses or spending does not correlate positively or 
negatively with perceived electoral fairness, but other untested features of financial 
autonomy may still be important. 
Table 7.8: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Financial Autonomy 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
        
Budget 0.103 
 
0.030 
 
0.015 
 
0.024 
 
 
(0.238) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.127) 
 
(0.086) 
 
Expenditures -0.094 
 
-0.043 
 
-0.020 
 
-0.055 
 
 
(0.185) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.185) 
 
(0.087) 
 
Individual Level 
        
Age (Decades) 0.057 *** 0.024 * 0.068 *** 0.050 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.022 ** 0.030 *** 0.036 ** 0.024 *** 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** 0.003 
 
0.025 * -0.006 
 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Supports Winner 0.150 *** 0.121 *** 0.102 *** 0.128 *** 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.029) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.103 *** 0.134 *** 0.108 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Model Parameters 
        
N: Respondents 24142 
 
32437 
 
23669 
 
95711 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
72 
 
Degrees of Freedom 7 
 
7 
 
7 
 
7 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 198.838  163.589  136.136  323.164  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Van Aaken (2009: 308) specified that electoral fairness would be enhanced if EMBs had 
their own bank accounts and could manages their daily expenses free from executive 
government control.  This could be important for ensuring electoral integrity, since it 
restricts executive control over EMB operations, but no data is available to test the 
assumption.  Yet even if EMBs have their own bank accounts, the possibility of 
corruption and reduced electoral integrity remains.  With access to and control over 
their own finances, EMB members could fraudulently divert funds into their own 
pockets without adequate oversight.  Clearly, some form of financial oversight is 
needed.  It was not mentioned by Wall (2006) or Van Aaken (2009), but it is possible 
that delegating responsibility for expenditure control to an independent auditing 
agency might be the best option.  Such agencies are more likely to have specialized 
technical expertise in forensic accounting and financial investigation, which are helpful 
when auditing to counter financial fraud and corruption.  In addition, audits performed 
by a professional and independent agency are less likely to serve executive or partisan 
interests. 
7.2.3. Personnel Autonomy 
No models achieve significance for any of the personnel autonomy variables in Table 
7.9.  The membership criteria assumption was that perceptions of elections would 
improve if EMB members were selected based on expertise in established 
democracies, or a combination of expertise and partisanship in transitional 
democracies.  The member appointment assumption was that perceived electoral 
fairness would increase if either the judiciary or legislature appointed EMB members.  
The unspecified membership tenure assumption was that elections would tend to be 
fairer if EMB member tenures were for an unspecified period.  The other expectation 
regarding membership tenure was that fixed terms of longer than six years would 
improve perceptions of electoral fairness.  However, the results indicated that none of 
these personnel autonomy conditions has any positive or negative relationship with 
perceived electoral fairness. 
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Table 7.9: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Personnel Autonomy 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
        
Membership Criteria 0.031 
 
0.018 
 
-0.034 
 
0.027 
 
 
(0.202) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.181) 
 
(0.083) 
 
Legislature or Judiciary 
Appointment  
0.012 
 
0.037 
 
0.026 
 
0.039 
 
 
(0.237) 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.178) 
 
(0.085) 
 
Unspecified Tenure 0.012 
 
-0.018 
 
0.096 
 
0.039 
 
 
(0.229) 
 
(0.154) 
 
(0.197) 
 
(0.105) 
 
6+ Year Tenure -0.087 
 
0.007 
 
-0.095 
 
-0.063 
 
 
(0.203) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.349) 
 
(0.096) 
 
Individual Level 
        
Age (Decades) 0.057 *** 0.025 * 0.068 *** 0.049 **
* 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.022 ** 0.030 *** 0.036 ** 0.022 **
* 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** 0.003 
 
0.025 * -0.007 
 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Supports Winner 0.150 *** 0.121 *** 0.102 *** 0.135 **
* 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.104 *** 0.134 *** 0.109 **
* 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Model Parameters 
        
N: Respondents 24142 
 
32437 
 
23669 
 
98125 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
74 
 
Degrees of Freedom 9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 132.687  141.456  124.309  340.576  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
Although personnel autonomy is undoubtedly important, the variables analysed in this 
study provided no evidence of significant relationships with perceived electoral 
fairness.  This is unexpected considering the theoretical argument in favour of 
personnel autonomy and prior research indicating positive relationships for similar 
variables (Bland et al., 2012; Hartlyn et al., 2008; Rosas, 2010; van Aaken, 2009).  It 
could be that the membership criteria, appointment procedures, and tenure types for 
EMB members are too far removed from public knowledge to affect perceptions of 
electoral fairness.  There may also be very weak relationships that do not manifest in 
the presented models, or perhaps the variables are inadequate for measuring the 
intended design factors.  Future research using different variables may yet uncover 
useful results.  For example, one of the exploratory models not shown in this study 
revealed a positive effect with perceived electoral fairness if both the legislature and 
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judiciary appointed EMB members.  This small difference from legislature or judiciary 
made a large difference, and these kinds of details need investigating.  However, the 
theoretical models analysed in this research project do not drive these exploratory 
relationships. 
7.2.4. Functional Autonomy 
Functional autonomy variables differ from previous categories because they include 
the autonomy threshold requirement based on the combined scores of institutional, 
financial and personnel autonomy.  This autonomy threshold is included within every 
functional variable and means that the analysis only measures whether an 
autonomous EMB performs each task or function.  Rather than refer to this 
requirement for every functional assumption or variable, the term ‘autonomous EMB’ 
indicates an EMB that has achieved this threshold.  Most functional autonomy 
variables also include the requirement that executive government actors not be 
involved in performing each task.  These include presidents, prime ministers, cabinets 
and government ministries or departments.  Overall, the results provide very little 
support for the included aspects of Van Aaken’s (2009) framework. 
There are too many functional variables to include within one model, so testing them 
all requires four separate sets of regressions.  The first set, shown in Table 7.10, covers 
boundary demarcation and approval as well as proposing electoral reforms.  The 
strong and highly significant negative results for boundary demarcation are most 
evident in the Africa and Europe models, while weaker but still negative in the Global 
model.  The positive finding in the Americas model could also be due to the very strong 
autonomous EMBs in Latin America, which are often established as fourth branches of 
government.  However, the predominantly negative results globally provide little 
generalized support for the assumption that making autonomous EMBs responsible for 
drawing electoral district boundaries is associated with fairer elections.  The similar 
assumption regarding boundary approval has strong and highly significant negative 
coefficients in the Africa and Europe models, but fails to achieve significance in the 
Americas and Global models.  These findings provide no support for the predicted 
positive relationship with perceived electoral fairness for boundary approval by 
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autonomous EMBs.  Finally, the variable for proposing electoral reforms is strongly 
positive and highly significant in the Africa model.  All other coefficients are positive, 
but do not obtain conventional levels of significance.  The Africa model provides some 
support for a positive relationship between autonomous EMBs proposing electoral 
reforms and increased perceptions of electoral fairness.  However, the results may 
indicate a regional rather than global trend, since this variable does not achieve 
significance in the other models.  The Europe model is missing a coefficient because 
none of the included European EMBs meets the variable requirements.  Many 
European EMBs still follow a governmental model of electoral management. 
Table 7.10: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Functional Autonomy, Set 1 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
        
Boundary Demarcation -0.249 *** 0.108 * -0.053 * -0.083 * 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.078) 
 
(0.115) 
 
Boundary Approval -0.143 *** -0.107 
 
-0.247 *** -0.096 
 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.168) 
 
Electoral Reforms 0.225 *** 0.099 
 
. 
 
0.077 
 
 
(0.149) 
 
(0.203) 
 
. 
 
(0.183) 
 
Individual Level 
        
Age (Decades) 0.057 *** 0.024 * 0.068 *** 0.047 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.022 ** 0.030 *** 0.036 ** 0.026 *** 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.012) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** 0.003 
 
0.025 * -0.002 
 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.019) 
 
Supports Winner 0.151 *** 0.121 *** 0.102 *** 0.137 *** 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.033) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.103 *** 0.134 *** 0.107 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.021) 
 
Model Parameters 
        
N: Respondents 24142 
 
32437 
 
23669 
 
92190 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
68 
 
Degrees of Freedom 8 
 
8 
 
7 
 
8 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 410.072  179.325  8782.573  320.483  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
Delegating the responsibilities of boundary demarcation or the final approval of 
boundary changes to autonomous EMBs does not have the anticipated positive 
relationship with electoral fairness.  The negative relationships maintain under 
differing conditions of economic development and democratic experience, since the 
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included African countries are developing or underdeveloped transitional democracies, 
while most of the included European countries are developed liberal democracies.  
Although gerrymandering remains a problem and boundary demarcation and approval 
needs to be impartial (Carson & Crespin, 2004; Hirsch, 2003; McDonald, 2004), the 
evidence suggests that assigning this task to autonomous EMBs may not be the best 
approach. 
When partisan interests control electoral redistricting they consistently create maps 
that favour their interests (Hirsch, 2003; McDonald, 2004).  Divided state governments 
and bipartisan commissions produce more equitable electoral maps (McDonald, 2004: 
388-390).  Since legislatures are often dominated by a single political party, a logical 
policy recommendation is to take redistricting away from these potentially self-
interested actors and delegate this function to impartial commissions or courts (Carson 
& Crespin, 2004).  An alternative possibility is that electoral fairness would be 
increased if specialized non-partisan boundary commissions were responsible for 
electoral demarcation.  The non-partisan requirement prevents incumbents and 
political parties from using the redistricting process to maintain power, while the 
specialization requirement helps reduce administrative or technical errors by putting 
knowledgeable professionals in charge of the process.  Many of the same concerns 
regarding the structural arrangements of EMBs also apply to boundary commissions, 
such as how budgets are determined and how members are appointed.  As with 
autonomous EMBs, the objective of an autonomous boundary commission is to reduce 
conflicts of interest in electoral district demarcation by insulating commissioners from 
the self-interests of executive and legislative actors. 
The IDEA and ACE datasets already include some additional boundary demarcation 
variables such as redraw triggers and criteria used to redraw boundaries.  Other 
variables, such as which actors appoint commission members the criteria for their 
appointment, are not available and are likely to be important.  Alternatively, not 
regularly redrawing electoral districts could also have a positive effect on electoral 
integrity, since it would remove opportunities for gerrymandering.  Defining electoral 
boundaries within constitutions or aligning them with administrative districts reduces 
the likelihood that electoral constituencies are created to create safe seats for a 
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particular political party or candidate.  Since population demographics change, 
occasional redistricting will probably be necessary periodically, but we currently have 
little empirical evidence suggesting the optimal design features of boundary 
commissions. 
Another area that requires additional data for comparative investigation is the area 
electoral legislation reform.  Given the effect and scope of electoral legislation, this is 
perhaps one of the most important areas to investigate.  At present, there is only one 
variable in the ACE and IDEA data to indicate which body can propose changes to the 
regulatory framework.  Electoral reform differs between countries and often involves 
multiple actors, but there are no variables to indicate the roles of these different 
actors.  Most importantly, it would be helpful to know which actor has the final say on 
turning proposals into legislation.  The actor responsible for final approval has a great 
deal more power than any actor that only has powers of proposal.  We could assume 
that it would usually be the legislature, but some EMBs are established as fourth 
branches of government and have complete jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to 
elections, including electoral legislation.  Without a variable that specifically identifies 
the actor responsible for final approval, this design factor is difficult to analyse. 
Results for the second set of functional variables are displayed in Table 7.11.  Variables 
cover autonomous EMB oversight of political party and candidate finances, as well as 
responsibility for voter registration.  The financial oversight assumption was that 
electoral fairness would tend to increase if autonomous EMBs were responsible for 
receiving financial reports from political parties and candidates.  This has highly 
significant and strong positive coefficients in the Africa and Americas models, but a 
strong and significant negative relationship in the Europe model.  The two positive 
results provide support for the assumption, but the strong negative result in the 
Europe model undermines this finding.  The most likely reason for a negative 
coefficient in the Europe model is that many of the established liberal democracies in 
this reason follow the governmental model of electoral management.  These 
democracies usually hold free and fair elections, whereas many of the newer 
transitional democracies in the Europe model are transitional democracies with less 
electoral integrity.  The financial control variable is similar, but measures the effects 
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for having autonomous EMBs audit the submitted financial reports of parties and 
candidates.  The significant but weak negative coefficient in the Americas model and 
lack of significant coefficients in the other models do not provide any support for the 
expected positive relationship. 
Table 7.11: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Functional Autonomy, Set 2 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
        
Financial Oversight 0.291 *** 0.162 *** -0.323 *** -0.011 
 
 
(0.191) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.085) 
 
(0.239) 
 
Financial Control -0.093 * -0.044 
 
0.136 
 
-0.007 
 
 
(0.196) 
 
(0.121) 
 
(0.348) 
 
(0.212) 
 
Voter Registration -0.284 *** -0.037 
 
0.061 
 
0.021 
 
 
(0.140) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.158) 
 
Individual Level 
        
Age (Decades) 0.057 *** 0.025 * 0.068 *** 0.050 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.022 ** 0.030 *** 0.036 ** 0.023 *** 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** 0.003 
 
0.025 * -0.007 
 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Supports Winner 0.150 *** 0.121 *** 0.102 *** 0.133 *** 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.031) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.104 *** 0.134 *** 0.108 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Model Parameters 
        
N: Respondents 24142 
 
32437 
 
23669 
 
96762 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
72 
 
Degrees of Freedom 8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 334.932  339.118  1429.117  422.771  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
Overall, there is some evidence for a positive relationship between electoral fairness 
and making autonomous EMBs responsible for receiving political party and candidate 
financial reports.  However, making autonomous EMBs responsible for examining 
those reports and for maintaining the voter registry do not appear to increase 
perceived electoral fairness.  The negative result for financial control in the Africa 
model does not tell us much, because only autonomous EMBs in Cape Verde and 
Liberia examine financial reports.  This provides insufficient variation to make any 
conclusive statements regarding the effect of examining financial reports.  Finally, the 
voter registration variable has a strong and highly significant negative coefficient in the 
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Africa model, but fails to achieve significance in any other models.  This provides 
limited evidence against the expectation that making an autonomous EMB responsible 
for voter registration would be positively associated with perceived electoral fairness.   
While the Africa and Americas models show strong and highly significant positive 
coefficients for having autonomous EMBs receive financial reports, both regions 
showed negative significant coefficients before applying the autonomy threshold.  This 
provides support for the idea that autonomy matters when EMBs are responsible for 
financial oversight.  EMBs controlled by the incumbent government are unlikely to be 
as impartial when scrutinizing political finances.  For example, government controlled 
EMBs are more likely to scrutinize the finances of opposition parties and candidates for 
errors, while any problems with the reports of candidates or parties aligned with the 
incumbent government are less likely to be investigated.  The Europe model 
conversely has a strong and highly significant negative coefficient for reporting political 
finances to an autonomous EMB.  This result likely arises because most established 
European democracies follow a governmental model of electoral management, while 
newer democracies such as Belarus and Ukraine have autonomous EMBs.  The strong 
negative results probably reflect the fact that older democracies in Europe generally 
run fairer elections, despite being less likely to have autonomous EMBs. 
The ability to analyse the effects of different political finance regulations has been 
facilitated by increasing amount of data on the subject (Scarrow, 2007b), but the 
institutional contexts remain relatively unexplored.  It is likely that there are 
interaction effects between political finance laws and the autonomy of institutions 
tasked with enforcing those laws.  For example, disclosure of political finances and 
limits on some types of donations have positive effects on perceptions of efficacy and 
the emergence of electoral challengers (Hamm & Hogan, 2008; Primo & Milyo, 2006: 
33-35), but the nature of the body overseeing disclosures and enforcing contribution 
limits is also important.  A body controlled by partisan actors is unlikely to perform 
these functions as impartially as a bipartisan or autonomous institution.  Additionally, 
a weak impartial institution that only receives financial reports is unlikely to be as 
effective at ensuring fair political finances as actors with the power to sanction 
infringements. 
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Table 7.12: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Functional Autonomy, Set 3 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
        
Local Elections 0.211 *** 0.037 
 
-0.052 
 
-0.037 
 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.175) 
 
(0.278) 
 
Sort and Count Votes -0.349 *** . 
 
. 
 
-0.045 
 
 
(0.134) 
 
. 
 
. 
 
(0.293) 
 
Consolidate Results . 
 
0.042 
 
-0.035 
 
0.055 * 
 
. 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.060) 
 
Individual Level 
        
Age (Decades) 0.057 *** 0.025 * 0.068 *** 0.049 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.022 ** 0.030 *** 0.036 ** 0.025 *** 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** 0.003 
 
0.025 * -0.004 
 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Supports Winner 0.150 *** 0.121 *** 0.102 *** 0.136 *** 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.032) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.104 *** 0.134 *** 0.108 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.021) 
 
Model Parameters 
        
N: Respondents 24142 
 
32437 
 
23669 
 
93335 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
69 
 
Degrees of Freedom 7 
 
7 
 
7 
 
8 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 190.77  206.6  335.808  346.616  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
The third set of functional autonomy results are displayed in Table 7.12.  These cover 
autonomous EMB responsibility for local level elections, sorting and counting votes, 
and consolidating the results.  Missing coefficients are omitted due to perfect 
multicollinearity between variables in some regional models.  Responsibility for local 
elections has a positive coefficient in the Africa model, but is insignificant in all other 
models.  However, the strong and highly significant Africa result provides some 
evidence of a positive association between electoral fairness and making autonomous 
EMBs responsible for the local level of elections.  The variable for sorting and counting 
votes is strongly negative and highly significant in the Africa model, but omitted in the 
other regions and insignificant in the Global model.  The result however suggests that 
making autonomous EMBs responsible for sorting and counting votes does not 
increase electoral fairness, at least across the included African countries.  The variable 
for consolidating election results is significant and positive in the Global model, but it is 
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small and minimally significant.  The finding may have occurred by chance or may 
indicate limited support for making autonomous EMBs responsible for consolidating 
election results. 
While the current study looked whether EMBs were responsible for voter registration, 
many additional related factors are important.  Voting restrictions, registration 
requirements and enrolment practices can be abused to influence election results.  
Albaugh (2011: 399-402) for example points out that restricting voter registration to 
citizens likely to vote for the opposition have been commonplace in Cameroon.  
Another core task related to voter registration is voter identification.  Poorly defined 
voter identification laws in the United States have resulted in racial profiling and 
discriminatory practices that could affect election results and reduce public trust in 
electoral administration (Atkeson, Bryant, Hall, Saunders, & Alvarez, 2010: 70-72).  
Universally applying clear and specific voter enrolment and identification rules would 
reduce perceptions of bias and increase perceptions of electoral fairness.  The data to 
test this assumption either has many missing variables or is not readily available for 
large cross-national comparisons, but would be valuable for future research. 
Due to a lack of cross-national data, the current research did not account for other 
electoral conditions such as requirements regarding party and candidate registration 
or disqualification.  Prior research suggests that more permissive ballot access 
requirements raise the number of independent and smaller party candidates, thereby 
increasing electoral competitiveness (Drometer & Rincke, 2009).  When electoral laws 
restrict entry through more stringent petition or nomination requirements, the 
inevitable result is fewer candidates.  Incumbent governments may use legislation to 
ban, disqualify or otherwise exclude opposition parties and candidates based on 
nationality, ethnicity, religious or other requirements (Bogaards, Basedau, & 
Hartmann, 2010; Schedler, 2002a: 42-43).  Granting incumbent governments control 
over candidate or party registration produces conflicts of interest, since there will be 
an incentive to use the process to exclude electoral competitors.  This is a particularly 
insidious tactic because it hides behind a guise of legality.  An assumption that 
deserves testing is that delegating the function of party and candidate registration to 
an autonomous EMB increases electoral integrity. 
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Table 7.13: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Functional Autonomy, Set 4 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
        
Voter Information -0.088 
 
0.042 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.016 
 
 
(0.271) 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.195) 
 
(0.135) 
 
Media Regulation -0.162 * 0.000 
 
-0.096 
 
-0.076 * 
 
(0.207) 
 
(0.118) 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.113) 
 
Dispute Resolution 0.091 
 
0.037 
 
-0.116 
 
0.020 
 
 
(0.171) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.222) 
 
(0.136) 
 
Individual Level 
        
Age (Decades) 0.057 *** 0.025 * 0.068 *** 0.047 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.022 ** 0.030 *** 0.036 ** 0.025 *** 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** 0.003 
 
0.025 * -0.005 
 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Supports Winner 0.151 *** 0.121 *** 0.102 *** 0.141 *** 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.033) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.104 *** 0.134 *** 0.108 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.021) 
 
Model Parameters 
        
N: Respondents 24142 
 
32437 
 
23669 
 
91403 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
67 
 
Degrees of Freedom 8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 273.663  220.458  112.431  401.455  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
Results for the fourth set of functional variables are provided in Table 7.13.  The 
variables for conducting voter information campaigns and settling the first level of 
electoral disputes do not obtain significance in any of the models, indicating that 
delegating these functions to autonomous EMBs does not increase perceptions of 
electoral fairness.  The variable for media regulation is negatively significant in the 
Africa and Global models, but not significant in the Americas and Europe models.  
These findings fail to support the assumption that making autonomous EMBs 
responsible for regulating mass media coverage of elections has a positive association 
with perceived electoral fairness.  Overall, the results suggest that making autonomous 
EMBs responsible for conducting voter information campaigns and settling electoral 
disputes are not related to perceived electoral fairness, while making them responsible 
for media regulation might be associated with decreased perceptions of electoral 
fairness. 
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Political parties and candidates can engage in disinformation campaigns, but there is 
no evidence of a systematic relationship when autonomous EMBs perform this 
function.  However, the variable only analysed whether autonomous EMBs conducted 
voter information campaigns without government actors performing the same 
function.  Most countries allow multiple actors to provide voter information, so who 
performs this function may be less important than the regulations regarding the 
provision of voter information.  For example, restrictions against providing false and 
misleading information or punishments for violating voter education regulations, if 
enforces impartially, are likely to be more important than regulating which actors can 
provide voter information.  It is similarly important to understand where actors 
engaged in public information campaigns get their funding and whether they have 
ideological or partisan affiliations.  However, the current research project is focused on 
electoral management rather than primarily on political finance. 
Closely connected to providing voter information is the function of monitoring and 
regulating political news coverage.  Most people learn a great deal about candidates 
and political parties from the mass media, whether that is television, newspapers and 
magazines, radio or the internet.  The current study only investigated the effects of 
having autonomous EMBs perform a media oversight role, and found a negative 
association with perceived electoral fairness in the Africa and Global models.  As with 
boundary demarcation and financial auditing, specialized agencies may be the best 
actors for performing this function.  In the case of media monitoring, the most 
appropriate actor is likely to be an independent statutory media regulation body.  
While EMBs specialize at running and managing elections, media regulatory bodies are 
specialists at overseeing and monitoring the media.  Their job is to ensure media 
channels follow the laws regarding advertising and content requirements, which is not 
substantially different from ensuring media coverage of elections follows prescribed 
regulations and requirements.  Media regulation agencies are also likely to be better 
equipped, in terms of access to technology and expertise, to undertake the complex 
tasks involved in monitoring and regulating multiple media channels.  They may 
therefore be much more effective than EMBs at performing this function. 
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Making autonomous EMBs responsible for settling the first level of electoral disputes 
may not be the best approach.  Given the nature of the task, courts or the judiciary 
may be better suited to perform this function.  Independent judicial actors have the 
experience, knowledge, and resources to settle electoral disputes.  Most electoral 
disputes are similar to other types of legal disputes because they usually involve one 
actor accusing another of breaking a law or violating a regulation pertaining to 
elections.  Judicial actors are experienced with settling this form of dispute and have 
the specialized expertise necessary for performing adjudicative functions.  National 
EMBs in Latin America are often tribunals that resemble judiciary bodies, which may 
help explain why there is a positive relationship for having them settle electoral 
disputes in the Americas model.  The arrangement of EMBs as autonomous quasi-
judiciary actors probably makes them more competent at impartially settling electoral 
disputes than EMBs in other parts of the world. 
The following paragraphs analyse results for aggregated autonomy indices rather than 
separate variables.  These indices are composed of the previously outlines variables.  
Table 7.14 provides the results for three indices created from functional variables, 
while Table 7.15 provides indices for the four autonomy categories. 
Functional autonomy variables were combined into three thematic sub-indices for the 
election process, candidates and parties, and structures and governance.  First, the 
election process sub-index aggregates variables for autonomous EMBs being 
responsible for voter registration, the local level of electoral governance, counting and 
sorting votes, and consolidating the results.  It is strongly negative for the Africa model 
in Table 7.14, but moderately positive in the Europe model, while the other models are 
insignificant.  These mixed results provide no consistent support for the proposition 
that delegating core election processes to autonomous EMBs is associated with 
increased electoral fairness.  Second, the candidates and parties sub-index aggregates 
variables for receiving and examining political financial reports, conducting voter 
information campaigns and regulating media coverage of elections.  Here the results 
are again mixed, with a significant positive coefficient for the Africa model, a 
significant negative coefficient for the Europe model and no significant results in the 
other models.  Consequently, there is inadequate support for the idea that delegating 
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autonomous EMBs more functions related to political parties and candidates will 
increase perceptions of electoral fairness.  Third, the sub-index for structures and 
governance aggregates variables pertaining to boundary demarcation and approval, 
electoral reform proposals, and electoral dispute resolution.  The variable is strong and 
negatively significant in the Europe and Global models, but not significant in the other 
two models.  This provides some evidence that assigning electoral governance and 
structure functions to autonomous EMBs may be associated with decreased 
perceptions of electoral fairness.  Overall, the sub-indices indicate mostly negative or 
insignificant relationships, suggesting that assigning most functions to autonomous 
EMBs is either negatively associated with, or unrelated to, perceived electoral fairness. 
Table 7.14: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Functional Sub-Indices 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
        
Election Process -0.378 * 0.030 
 
0.127 * 0.067 
 
 
(0.426) 
 
(0.209) 
 
(0.152) 
 
(0.138) 
 
Candidates and Parties 0.325 ** 0.040 
 
-0.120 * 0.008 
 
 
(0.383) 
 
(0.184) 
 
(0.167) 
 
(0.186) 
 
Structures and Governance -0.077 
 
0.012 
 
-0.229 ** -0.133 * 
 
(0.450) 
 
(0.304) 
 
(0.318) 
 
(0.203) 
 
Individual Level 
        
Age (Decades) 0.057 *** 0.025 * 0.068 *** 0.049 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.022 ** 0.030 *** 0.036 ** 0.027 *** 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.013) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** 0.003 
 
0.025 * -0.002 
 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Supports Winner 0.150 *** 0.121 *** 0.102 *** 0.135 *** 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.034) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.104 *** 0.134 *** 0.107 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.022) 
 
Model Parameters 
        
N: Respondents 24142 
 
32437 
 
23669 
 
89304 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
65 
 
Degrees of Freedom 8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 341.253  146.282  285.516  375.438  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
Combining all the variables within each autonomy category produces an aggregated 
index for each of the institutional, financial, personnel and functional autonomy 
categories. The institutional index is negatively significant in the Africa model, but not 
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significant for any other model in Table 7.15.  This does not support the expected 
positive relationship with electoral fairness.   
Table 7.15: Multilevel Models of Electoral Fairness with Autonomy Indices 
  Africa  Americas  Europe  Global  
National Level 
        
Institutional Index -0.206 * -0.025 
 
0.016 
 
-0.031 
 
 
(0.382) 
 
(0.252) 
 
(0.356) 
 
(0.190) 
 
Financial Index 0.227 * -0.143 * 0.240 ** 0.028 
 
 
(0.309) 
 
(0.151) 
 
(0.247) 
 
(0.160) 
 
Personnel Index 0.176 
 
-0.033 
 
0.037 
 
0.031 
 
 
(0.525) 
 
(0.137) 
 
(0.561) 
 
(0.215) 
 
Functional Index -0.251 * 0.192 *** -0.303 ** -0.075 
 
 
(0.304) 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.418) 
 
(0.207) 
 
Individual Level 
        
Age (Decades) 0.057 *** 0.024 * 0.068 *** 0.050 *** 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
High Income 0.022 ** 0.030 *** 0.036 ** 0.029 *** 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.012) 
 
Tertiary Education -0.030 *** 0.003 
 
0.025 * 0.000 
 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Supports Winner 0.150 *** 0.121 *** 0.102 *** 0.130 *** 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.032) 
 
Present Economy Good 0.075 *** 0.103 *** 0.134 *** 0.107 *** 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.022) 
 
Model Parameters 
        
N: Respondents 24142 
 
32437 
 
23669 
 
87926 
 
N: Countries 20 
 
21 
 
19 
 
64 
 
Degrees of Freedom 9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
9 
 
Chi-Squared (Fixed Effects) 292.035  226.794  152.562  346.041  
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
The financial index has strong significant positive coefficients in the Africa and Europe 
models, which supports the expectation that financial autonomy is positively 
associated with electoral fairness.  However, a weaker negative coefficient in the 
Americas model and the lack of a significant coefficient for the Global model 
somewhat undermines the strength of this relationship.  There does however seem to 
be some regional support for the assumption that financial autonomy is positively 
associated with perceived electoral fairness.  The personnel autonomy index is not 
significant in any regional model, suggesting that this category of autonomy is not 
associated with perceptions of electoral fairness.  Finally, the functional autonomy 
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index is strongly and significantly negative in the Africa and Europe models.  This 
counters the anticipated positive relationship and suggests that delegating more tasks 
and functions to autonomous EMBs reduces perceived electoral fairness.  However, 
the functional index coefficient is positive in the Americas model, which provides 
regional support for the expected relationship.  Nevertheless, with two negative, one 
positive, and one insignificant coefficient, the findings are more strongly against a 
generalized assumption of a positive relationship between functional autonomy and 
perceived electoral fairness.  The overall results in Table 7.15 again suggest that 
autonomous EMBs may have a negative rather than positive association with 
perceived electoral fairness. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
The overarching research question of this thesis was to explain why perceptions of 
electoral fairness differ between individuals and countries.  The approach analysed a 
wide selection of factors across a diverse selection of countries to uncover 
generalizable patters and uncover regional differences.  The structure of chapters and 
their sections followed a division between individual and national level variables on 
one hand, and electoral management body (EMB) design variables on the other.  
Chapters 2, 4, and 6 covered the literature, data, and results for the individual and 
national level variables, while chapters 3, 5, and 7 did the same for EMB design 
variables.  The thematic groupings outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 were used 
throughout the thesis and formed the basis for constructing regression models.  Most 
individual and national level variables produced the predicted relationships with 
perceived electoral fairness, but the two EMB models produced mostly insignificant or 
unexpectedly negative relationships.  The following paragraphs briefly summarize the 
content of each main chapter before subsequent sections discuss key findings, 
acknowledge the limitations of this project, and outline future research opportunities. 
Chapter 2 presented theoretical underpinning and previous findings regarding 
conventional explanations of perceived electoral fairness, additionally introducing new 
explanations from related areas of political support.  Independent variables were 
included based on three broad justifications.  Firstly, some had not been analysed for 
their effects on perceived electoral fairness, but findings from other areas of political 
support suggested that relationships were likely.  Examples of these variables include 
crime victimization and cultural group memberships.  Secondly, many variables were 
included in this research because they had only been analysed with electoral fairness 
across a limited set of countries or demonstrated mixed results.  These variables were 
included because they showed promise, but previous results were not very robust.  
Thirdly, some variables were included to account for their strong and consistent 
associations with perceived electoral fairness.  They were included as control variables 
because previous research has demonstrated their strong effects with electoral 
fairness. 
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Chapter 3 outlined two models of electoral management body (EMB) design and their 
component parts.  First was the conventional independent model, which was 
disaggregated into six criteria with available data.  These included the implementation 
of core electoral tasks, accountability to non-executive actors, powers to settle 
electoral disputes and propose electoral reforms, members selected by non-executive 
actors, fixed terms of office for members, and budgetary oversight by non-executive 
actors.  Secondly was the categorized autonomy model, which separates EMB 
independence into four categories: institutional, financial, personnel, and functional 
autonomy.  Each of these categories included multiple elements, some of which are 
similar to the conventional independent model.  However, the categorized autonomy 
model included more aspects of electoral management and a different analytical 
approach.  For example, achieving functional autonomy required meeting a minimal 
threshold, which was based on a combination of the other three autonomy categories. 
Chapter 4 covered data and methods used throughout the thesis, but focused mostly 
on describing the common individual and national level variables.  Included sections 
covered the dependent variable of perceived electoral fairness, data sources, country 
case selection, and data management procedures.  The dependent variable used an 
ordered four-point scale with higher values representing greater perceived electoral 
fairness.  This chapter clarified the difference between individual level variables, which 
come from cross-national public surveys, and national level variables, which come 
from institutional datasets applying to entire countries.  The chapter explained how 
individual level variables would be analysed using order probit regression models, 
while national level variables would be analysed using multilevel mixed-effects 
regressions models.  It also discussed how national level variables would be analysed 
using regional and global models, while individual level models would be additionally 
analysed using separate country models.  This approach allowed for greater insight 
regarding national, regional, and global trends. 
Chapter 5 also covered data and methods, but for the two electoral management 
models.  It outlined the available data for measuring the component parts of these 
models and the proxy variables that could be used if data was missing.  The chapter 
outlined the logic and requirements for creating new variables, which followed the 
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theoretical models as closely as possible.  The chapter also described how the different 
independence and autonomy indices were created and measured.  The chapter 
explained that multilevel mixed-effects models were appropriate because dependent 
EMB design variables were at the national level and the dependent perceived electoral 
fairness variable was at the individual level.  All electoral management variables were 
analysed using the same set of robust individual level control variables. 
Chapter 6 was the first of two results chapters, and included findings for all individual 
level variables and national level variables that did not measure electoral management 
design.  In general, most individual level relationships were consistently in the 
expected directions, but many national level variables failed to achieve significance.  
Results are summarised here according to decreasing strength and robustness.  The 
strongest individual level findings were that people who voted, supported election 
winners, believed the national economy was improving, perceived low levels of 
corruption, trusted others and institutions were more likely to perceive elections as 
fair.  The strongest national level results indicated that civil liberties, women in 
parliament, freedom of the press and less religious fractionalization were positively 
associated with perceived electoral fairness.  Moderately strong individual level 
findings suggest that older individuals, males, higher income individuals, and those 
who view their personal finances as improving tended to make positive assessments of 
perceived electoral fairness, while being or knowing victims of physical crime was 
associated with moderately strong negative assessments.  Moderately strong and 
positive national level relationships were found for proportional representation, lower 
public sector corruption and less income inequality.  Weak positive individual level 
correlations indicated that people interested in politics, with partisan affiliations, living 
in rural areas or identifying as conservative tended to view elections as fairer.  Findings 
for tertiary education, political knowledge, and newspaper attention tended to 
produce positive relationships in liberal democracies and negative relationships in 
authoritarian democracies.  These are interesting albeit unsurprising findings because 
they suggest that more educated, knowledgeable, and informed respondents tend to 
make accurate assessments of electoral fairness.  The results for other individual level 
variables are mixed, inconclusive, or insignificant.  For example, having paid 
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employment, radio attention, being in the religious or ethnic majority and being non-
religious failed to attain consistent relationships.  Many national level variables also 
failed to achieve significant or consistent relationships with perceived electoral 
fairness.  For example, the variables for political rights, democratic experience, direct 
public funding of political parties, election victory margins, lower parliament size, 
population per MP, linguistic fractionalization and ethnic fractionalization did not 
reveal any trends.  None of the national level economic performance variables 
achieved significance in any model, which included GNI per capita, GDP growth per 
capita, and the Human Development Index. 
Chapter 7 presented results for the second main topic of this thesis, EMB design, which 
included analyses for the conventional independent model and the categorised 
autonomy model.  The overall assumption of the conventional independent model was 
that separating electoral management from the executive would reduce chances for 
government interference and thereby enhance perceptions of electoral fairness.  The 
categorised autonomy model was based on a similar assumption, but more explicitly 
specified that functional autonomy depended upon EMB institutional, personnel and 
financial autonomy.  However, most findings for these two models either provided no 
support for their respective assumptions or produced mixed and inconclusive results.  
In other words, there is very little empirical evidence that independent EMBs are 
associated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness.  Results for the 
conventional independent model suggested that delegating election implementation 
tasks to EMBs had either negatively significant or insignificant relationships with 
perceived electoral fairness.  Findings were similarly mixed or inconclusive regarding 
EMBs being responsible for settling electoral disputes and proposing electoral reforms.  
Variables for EMB budgetary independence did not obtain significance in any of the 
models.  Fixed EMB member terms had strong negative correlations with perceived 
electoral fairness, while EMB member selection by the judiciary or legislature 
suggested a weak negative correlation.  The additive conventional independence index 
was strongly negative in the Europe model, but insignificant in all other models.  Taken 
together, these results generally fail to support the assumption that independent 
EMBs increase electoral fairness.  Next, results for the categorised autonomy model 
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also produced mixed, insignificant, or negative relationships with perceived electoral 
fairness.  EMB accountability to the legislature showed no significant results and none 
of the personnel or financial variables achieved significance in any model.  The variable 
for making electoral law part of the constitution and most EMB boundary demarcation 
and boundary approval variables showed negatively significant relationships with 
perceived electoral fairness.  The results were not consistent however, since there was 
a significant positive relationship for boundary demarcation in the Americas model.  
There was some evidence of a positive relationship between electoral fairness and 
autonomous EMBs receiving political party and candidate financial reports.  However, 
this was undermined by a negative coefficient for the Europe model and a significantly 
negative coefficient for examining financial reports in the Africa model.  Results for the 
additive autonomy category indices were also mixed.  The institutional autonomy 
index was negative in the Africa model.  The financial autonomy index was positive in 
the Africa and Europe models, but negative in the Americas.  The functional autonomy 
index was negative in the Africa and Europe models, but positive in the Americas 
model.  The personnel autonomy index did not obtain significance in any model and all 
other unmentioned models were insignificant.  Overall, the categorised autonomy 
model produced a greater number of negative rather than positive relationships.  
However, there were some positive associations with perceived electoral fairness.  
EMBs that have existed for longer, have financial oversight of political parties or 
candidates, propose electoral reforms, and have financial autonomy from the 
executive all demonstrated significantly positive relationships with perceived electoral 
fairness. 
Having briefly summarised each chapter, the next sections highlight some key findings.  
The first section emphasizes new findings for perceived electoral fairness, the second 
explains findings that have been strengthened by this research, the third indicates 
results that conflict with prior findings, while the fourth discusses possible reasons for 
some of the unexpected findings.  The final sections then acknowledge several 
limitations of this study and possible future research directions. 
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8.1. New Findings for Electoral Fairness 
The results of this project, combined with its broad scope, increase our understanding 
of perceived electoral fairness.  Many of the findings are new for perceived electoral 
fairness and future research on this topic would benefit from considering them.  
Looking first at individual level variables, institutional trust had a globally positive 
association with perceived electoral fairness, although relationships with the 
legislature and executive are strongest.  It is however likely that the causal direction of 
this relationship goes both ways, meaning that institutional trust and perceived 
electoral fairness are interrelated, as well as being highly correlated with other types 
of political support.  Likewise, people who generally trust others tend to view elections 
as fairer, which is new a finding that parallels other areas of political support (Dowley 
& Silver, 2002; Kaase, 1999; Lühiste, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Zmerli & Newton, 
2008).  Correspondingly, having social trust broken due to physical crime victimization 
is associated with decreased perceptions of electoral fairness, which is also true for 
related kinds of political support (Ceobanu et al., 2011: 66-69; Pérez, 2003: 642-644).  
Another new finding with perceived electoral fairness is that subjective attitudes 
towards the national economy matter more than objective indicators of the national 
economy.  This differs from findings for other areas of political support, which have 
consistently found strong relationships for national economic indicators (Anderson & 
Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Chang & Chu, 2006; Chappell, 1990; Cho 
& Bratton, 2006; Hibbs et al., 1982; Lühiste, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Moehler, 
2009; Wong et al., 2011).  Subjective attitudes regarding personal finances appear to 
matter more than objective economic indicators, which may parallel other areas of 
political support (Anderson & Guillory, 1997: 75; Cho & Bratton, 2006: 745; Lühiste, 
2006: 487-488).  Several national level variables also presented new findings with 
perceived electoral fairness.  For example, having more women in parliament is 
associated with positive assessments of electoral fairness, coinciding with findings on 
related topics (Karp & Banducci, 2008: 112; Lawless, 2004).  Greater media freedom is 
strongly correlated with increased perceptions of electoral fairness, which accords 
with most theories of democracy.  Finally, there is a strong negative relationship 
between religious fractionalization and perceived electoral fairness, suggesting it is 
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more important than ethnic or linguistic fractionalization.  The new individual and 
national level findings are unsurprising when considered together, although having the 
empirical support is valuable.  People are more likely to view elections favourably if 
they trust government institutions and their fellow citizens, have not been the victim 
of physical crimes, and think the national economy is improving. 
8.2. Strengthening Prior Findings 
Some variables produced mixed results in previous studies or were analysed across a 
limited set of countries.  The scope of this current research project enabled variables 
to be analysed across five datasets and up to eighty countries.  This means we can be 
more confident about many previously uncertain findings.  For example, previous 
studies have produced mixed results for age with electoral fairness and other types of 
political support (Cho & Bratton, 2006: 745; Kotzian, 2011: 34; Moehler, 2009: 362; 
Rosas, 2010: 85), but the current research revealed it was one of the strongest and 
most robust predictors of perceived electoral fairness.  Likewise, people who think 
government corruption is high are globally less likely to perceive elections as fair, 
which strengthens the relationship found by a more limited electoral fairness study 
(McAllister & White, 2011: 676).  Another example is having no political affiliation or 
being non-partisan, which has a significant negative association with perceived 
electoral fairness, expanding upon similar findings (Birch, 2008: 312).  However, not all 
findings support previous research. 
8.3. Contradictions and Regional Differences 
The bulk of existing electoral fairness research concentrates on Europe or liberal 
democracies, often using datasets such as the CSES that are dominated by these 
countries.  As a result, previous findings sometimes do not accord with the findings of 
this broader research project.  It includes a greater number of authoritarian 
democracies across Africa, Asia, and the Americas than liberal democracies in Europe 
or elsewhere.  The most frequent regional differences found in this research were 
between Europe, with its mostly established or liberal democracies, and Africa, with its 
mostly transitional or authoritarian democracies.  Variables that showed particularly 
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notable differences include those that act as proxies for being informed, such as higher 
education, political knowledge, and newspaper attention.  People who read political 
news more frequently, have higher levels of political knowledge, and are university 
educated share the common trait of being better able to discern when authoritarian 
regimes use their power to manipulate elections.  Liberal democracies are notable for 
usually having fairer elections, which parallels the generally more positive associations 
for informed respondents in these countries. 
Overall, this research includes more authoritarian than liberal democracies, which 
could be why newspaper attention, political knowledge, and higher education 
produced more negative results than positive.  This evidence is inconsistent with some 
previous findings or reveals important regional differences.  For example, prior 
research suggests that reading newspapers increases political trust (Hart, 1994; 
Hetherington, 1998; Karp et al., 2003; McLeod & McDonald, 1985; Miller et al., 1979), 
but this study finds newspaper attention has a negative association with perceived 
electoral fairness.  Similarly, political knowledge demonstrated a weak negative 
association, where previous research indicated positive associations (Birch, 2008: 315; 
2010: 1610; Carpini & Keeter, 1996: 221-227).  Other findings reveal dissimilarities 
from prior studies.  For example, the current study finds some evidence of a negative 
relationship between lower legislature sizes and perceived electoral fairness, but 
previous research conversely indicated a positive association (Farrell & McAllister, 
2006: 739-740).  Prior research also indicated a positive relationship for the Freedom 
House political rights index (Birch, 2008: 313-314), but the current research instead 
reveals that the civil liberties index is a far stronger predictor of perceived electoral 
fairness. Finally, current findings suggest that objective national level economic 
performance may not affect perceptions of electoral fairness despite having strong and 
significant effects on other types of political support (Birch, 2008: 313-314; Gilley, 
2006: 57; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000).  These contradictory findings suggest the 
need for further research into these relationships to confirm their relationships with 
perceived electoral fairness and other public attitudes. 
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8.4. Negative Results for EMBs 
The predominance of negative coefficients for the EMB models may also be due to the 
presence of so many authoritarian democracies in this research.  Overall, results for 
the two EMB models went against expected positive relationships and provided no 
support for the respective EMB design assumptions.  The implications are somewhat 
alarming given the extensive literature advocating independent or autonomous EMBs 
(Goodwin-Gill, 2006; Lehoucq, 2002; López-Pintor, 2000; Mozaffar, 2002; Mozaffar & 
Schedler, 2002; Pastor, 1999a, 1999b; Wall et al., 2006).  Election observers and non-
governmental organizations often encouraged new democracies to establish 
independent EMBs as a way to reduce electoral malfeasance, but authoritarian rulers 
often circumvent these formal arrangements.  The overwhelmingly negative results 
suggest that survey respondents may have been recalling earlier elections that were 
more problematic, or the realities of electoral management may not parallel the 
formal legislative directives.  Many of the democracies included in this study had 
democratically representative institutions and held multiparty elections, but were 
effectively authoritarian regimes.  For example, Belarus, Burkina Faso, Russia, 
Venezuela and Zimbabwe are included in this study and often labelled competitive 
authoritarian, electoral authoritarian or hybrid regimes (Bogaards, 2009; Case, 2011; 
Ekman, 2009; Gilbert & Mohseni, 2011; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Koehler, 2008; 
Schedler, 2010; Wigell, 2008).  The institutional arrangements of EMBs in authoritarian 
democracies may appear independent on paper, but their members often face 
substantively different political realities.  The leaders or ruling parties in authoritarian 
democracies often manipulate elections to maintain power despite having formally 
independent EMBs (Schedler, 2002a: 41-46).  These informal realities of democratic 
manipulation are more likely to influence public opinion than formal institutional 
arrangements.  Alternatively, the negative relationships for EMB independence could 
result for independent EMBs being established in response to problematic electoral 
management.  Increasingly positive assessments may lag behind institutional changes, 
in which case future research may yet find empirical support for independent EMBs. 
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8.5. Project Limitations 
Not many comparative research projects have looked at causes of electoral fairness or 
used perceptions of electoral fairness as the dependent variable.  This meant that the 
variables tested in this project were often derived from research in related areas, such 
as institutional trust, democratic satisfaction, and political legitimacy.  These different 
types of political trust are strongly inter-correlated and have produced consistent 
relationships with a range of individual and national level variables (Anderson & 
Guillory, 1997; Anderson & LoTiempo, 2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003).  Since 
electoral fairness was strongly correlated with these other types of political trust, it 
was reasonable to expect similar relationships for electoral fairness.  This reliance on 
previous findings in related areas may not have been the best way of forming research 
questions, but it was somewhat necessary given the relative lack of cross-regional 
findings regarding determinants of electoral fairness. 
An important problem was that there were too few countries in the regional datasets 
to include many national level variables.  This also meant that there was often 
insufficient variation between countries for some national level variables, which gave 
rise to multicollinearity problems and caused them to be omitted from the regressions.  
Some aspects of EMB design, such as responsibility for voter registration, were thus 
not included in every regional model.  This is a weakness in the current study because 
some relationships could not be compared between all regions to uncover global 
trends or regional differences. 
Another recurring problem with this research was that many variables were 
unavailable or had large amounts of missing data.  Proxy variables were used if 
possible, but these were not as suitable as having variables that more accurately 
measured the particular EMB design feature of interest.  This was a particularly 
important problem with implementation tasks of the conventional independent 
model, such as responsibility for counting and tabulating the votes.  Multiple variables 
had to be combined, relying on multiple assumptions.  Functional autonomy 
assumptions relied on similarly imprecise proxy variables in some areas as well.  The 
use of these proxy variables meant that some aspects of electoral management body 
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design were not measured or tested accurately.  Consequently, the resulting findings 
may not be very reliable because they do not measure what they are supposed to 
analyse.  A related problem was that some aspects of EMB design simply did not have 
available data.  This was a shortcoming of the ACE & IDEA dataset, but it would have 
required many months of additional research to find the necessary information and 
there was not enough time to gather these details.  Future research projects could 
gather the required data to test a wider range of EMB design features more accurately. 
8.6. Further Research 
Scholars in developed countries, where most research of this kind occurs, have taken 
electoral fairness for granted.  Electoral management bodies are a relatively new 
phenomena and have received even less attention.  However, successive waves of 
democratisation across the developing world have helped motivate research on the 
determinants of democratic consolidation, and electoral fairness has consequently 
received increased attention.  This is fortunate, because even the oldest democracies 
remain vulnerable to electoral fraud and could benefit from continued institutional 
innovation to ensure the integrity of their elections.  The recent ‘robocall’ scandal for 
the 2011 Canadian national elections is a pertinent reminder of this fact.  Moreover, 
existing studies usually examine only one or two datasets or regions at a time, while 
the current broader research project uncovered numerous regional differences, 
ironically by looking for global trends.  This approach, while more laborious to setup, 
has the potential to yield far more useful and generalizable results. 
Research using only one regional dataset risks making generalisations to the rest of the 
world, which can be problematic if the findings have policy implications.  The risk is 
especially dangerous with datasets such as the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
(CSES), which has been used by many studies related to elections and electoral 
fairness.  The CSES dataset includes thirty countries from five regions of the world, 
which sounds like a good global comparison at first.  However, nineteen (63%) of its 
countries are in Europe, which means results using this dataset will be substantially 
influenced by European trends.  Furthermore, many other countries in this dataset are 
liberal democracies outside Europe.  This is important because policies and 
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institutional arrangements that might work well in liberal democracies may not work 
as well authoritarian democracies. 
Some additional aspects of this study could be improved upon in future research, 
especially regarding the variables used.  For example, variables such as democratic 
experience and proportional representation were not optimal.  Democratic experience 
was based on years since women’s suffrage, but a better measure would have been 
years of uninterrupted democracy.  This would more fully capture the cumulative 
effects of democratic consolidation, since many liberal democracies did not allow 
women to vote until surprisingly recently.  Proportional representation was 
represented by a dichotomous variable that only measured whether any 
proportionality was present in the electoral system.  This is a suboptimal coding 
scheme because it does not account for different types of proportional representation 
or what percentages of parliamentary seats are subject to proportional representation.  
For example, countries may have two national legislatures, but only one may use 
proportional representation or some seats may be appointed and unelected.  Based on 
the positive relationship found for proportional representation in this study, we could 
anticipate political support to increase as more seats of all parliaments are subject to 
election via proportional representation.  It would also not be surprising to find 
negative relationships for appointed parliamentary seats. 
Many of the variables available from ACE & IDEA did not capture important aspects of 
electoral management design.  For example, the greatest oversight concerning the 
design of EMBs does not recognise these bodies can be separate branches of 
government, equivalent in status to the legislature, judiciary, or executive.  The branch 
model has increased in popularity and been implemented in dozens of countries 
globally, especially in Latin America.  However, it has been mostly overlooked and 
cannot be evaluated using the existing data.  This oversight is probably because the 
tripartite separation of powers into legislature, judiciary, and executive is so well 
established that few people are aware of alternative configurations.  Data on financial 
autonomy was similarly limited.  For instance, there was no variable to measure 
whether EMBs had separate bank accounts.  Moreover, some EMB budgets are 
constitutionally determined as percentages of the national budget, for which there 
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was no variable.  This could prove to be a superior budgetary model because it makes 
EMB finances especially well protected from political manipulation.  Additional factors 
may affect perceptions of electoral fairness, but there was no available comparative 
data.  A particularly fascinating example, although probably not a good explanatory 
variable, is the prohibition of alcohol sales before elections in some countries.  For 
example, Uruguay prohibits the sale of alcohol at 7:30pm night before elections until 
the next day at 8:30pm after voting has ended, to ensure voters have clear minds 
when voting (Young, 2013).  Uruguay holds some of the most consistently free and fair 
elections in Latin America.  Similar laws preventing the sale of alcoholic beverages exist 
in Guatemala and El Salvador, which are not known for their fair elections.  This 
particular variable is not expected to have an effect of perceptions of electoral fairness 
and was mentioned because it was interesting, but it does illustrate that many factors 
of electoral management and electoral system design remain to be investigated. 
There are many research opportunities related to perceived electoral fairness.  For 
example, the dependent variable could be changed from public opinions to expert 
assessments.  This would enable large comparative cross-national studies by coding 
the assessments of electoral observer reports, which are now available for hundreds of 
elections in every region of the world.  Furthermore, examples of presidents corrupting 
elections abound (Albaugh, 2011; Koehler, 2008), but legislatures dominated by one 
party also often seek to unfairly maintain their dominance (McDonald, 2004). The 
purpose of autonomous EMBs is usually to separate electoral management from the 
executive branch, but electoral integrity can also suffer if one political party dominates 
the legislature.  The focus in this thesis has been on testing for separation form the 
executive, but perhaps separation from the legislature is just as important.  Further 
studies could test this assumption, perhaps in conjunction with evaluations of the 
branch model of electoral management. 
The most surprising outcome of this research project was the numerous negative 
relationships for two EMB design models.  These findings suggest that people in 
countries with independent or autonomous EMBs are more likely to have negative 
attitudes towards electoral fairness, which is the opposite of what theory suggests.  
The most likely reason for these negative relationships is the numerous authoritarian 
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regimes included in the different regional datasets.  However, one promising result of 
this research suggests that the longer an EMB has existed, the greater the perceptions 
of electoral fairness.  This suggests that as EMBs gain experience with running 
elections, they get better at resisting government interferences and the electoral 
process gains integrity.  However, there is probably a lag period between EMBs 
organizing objectively fairer elections and public perceptions of elections reflecting 
those improvements.  People probably remember electoral fraud scandals longer than 
the relatively mundane event of a well-managed election.  There is consequently hope 
for the independent or autonomous model of electoral management.  Future studies 
may therefore reveal positive associations between EMB independence and perceived 
electoral fairness. 
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics 
The following tables provide descriptive statistics for the variables used in different 
regional models.  The first column lists variables as they appear in Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7 regressions, with the common dataset variables names in brackets.  
Remaining columns provide the number of observations, mean and standard deviation 
values as well as the minimum and maximum values for each variable. 
Table 8.1: AfroBarometer Descriptive Statistics 
Individual Level Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age (s_agecat8) 25155 3.0546 1.4622 1 8 
Corruption Level (pv_corruption4) 22715 2.3856 0.8243 1 4 
Crime Victim (s_victim) 25357 0.1381 0.3450 0 1 
Electoral Fairness (pv_elections4) 25415 1.9652 1.1170 0 3 
Electoral Participation (pp_voted) 25283 0.7573 0.4287 0 1 
Ethnic Majority (s_majethnic) 24963 0.5541 0.4971 0 1 
Female (s_gender) 25415 0.4900 0.4999 0 1 
Future Economy Better (pv_econ3g) 21800 0.6068 0.4885 0 1 
Future Finances Good (pv_fina3g) 21926 0.6274 0.4835 0 1 
High Income (s_incomehigh) 25294 0.2201 0.4143 0 1 
Low Income (s_incomelow) 25294 0.1634 0.3697 0 1 
Newspaper Attention (pp_newspaper4) 25305 0.7718 1.0454 0 3 
Non-Partisan (pv_nonpartisan) 25411 0.3790 0.4852 0 1 
Non-Religious (s_nonreligious) 25413 0.0530 0.2240 0 1 
Paid Employment (s_employed) 25349 0.3362 0.4724 0 1 
Past Economy Worse (pv_econ1b) 24925 0.3655 0.4816 0 1 
Past Finances Worse (pv_fina1b) 25217 0.3595 0.4799 0 1 
Political Interest (pp_interest4) 25222 1.8780 1.0786 0 3 
Political Knowledge (pp_knowledge3) 25409 0.6524 0.7175 0 2 
Present Economy Good (pv_econ2g) 24992 0.2917 0.4546 0 1 
Present Finances Good (pv_fina2g) 25314 0.2826 0.4503 0 1 
Radio Attention (pp_radio4) 25400 2.2502 1.0291 0 3 
Religious Majority (s_majreligious) 25280 0.5780 0.4939 0 1 
Social Trust (s_soctrust) 25023 0.3454 0.4755 0 1 
Supports Winner (pv_winner) 24948 0.3851 0.4866 0 1 
Television Attention (pp_television4) 25351 1.2481 1.2893 0 3 
Tertiary Education (s_educationuni) 25372 0.0469 0.2115 0 1 
Trust Executive (pv_trustexec) 24653 0.6363 0.4811 0 1 
Trust Judiciary (pv_trustjudi) 24248 0.6083 0.4882 0 1 
Trust Legislature (pv_trustlegis) 23939 0.5826 0.4931 0 1 
Trust Parties (pv_trustparties) 24370 0.3386 0.4732 0 1 
Trust Police (pv_trustpolice) 24791 0.5318 0.4990 0 1 
Urban Status (s_urban) 25415 0.3760 0.4844 0 1 
      
National Level Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Civil Liberties (nat_liberties) 25415 4.903 1.064 2 7 
Corruption Perceptions Index (nat_cpi) 25415 6.690 0.939 4.1 7.9 
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Democratic Experience (nat_demoexp) 25415 39.813 14.833 12 63 
Direct Public Funding (nat_funding) 25415 0.736 0.441 0 1 
Ethnic Fractionalization (nat_ethnic) 25415 0.709 0.180 0.255 0.930 
GDP Growth per capita (nat_growthpc) 25415 3.402 1.842 -1.034 5.794 
GNI per capita (nat_gnipc) 25415 1.476 1.713 0.19 5.48 
Human Development Index (nat_hdi) 25415 0.451 0.091 0.304 0.601 
Income Inequality (nat_gini) 25415 47.668 9.199 35.931 67.4 
Linguistic Fractionalization (nat_linguistic) 25415 0.689 0.270 0 0.923 
Lower Parliament Size (nat_parlsize) 25415 207.014 114.409 40 400 
Political Rights (nat_rights) 25415 4.738 1.423 2 7 
Population per MP (nat_ppmp) 25415 0.115 0.100 0.007 0.412 
Press Freedom (nat_press) 25415 53.913 14.858 16 74 
Proportional Representation (nat_pr) 25415 0.590 0.912 0 2 
Religious Fractionalization (nat_religious) 25415 0.618 0.209 0.077 0.860 
Victory Margin (nat_vicmargin) 25415 37.611 23.163 1.96 76.2 
Women in Parliament (nat_wip) 25415 18.583 9.367 7 34.8 
 
Table 8.2: AmericasBarometer Descriptive Statistics 
Individual Level Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age (s_agecat8) 33668 3.2855 1.6055 1 8 
Corruption Level (pv_corruption4) 31943 3.2433 0.8323 1 4 
Crime Victim (s_victim) 33156 0.0614 0.2401 0 1 
Electoral Fairness (pv_elections4) 33707 1.7270 0.9831 0 3 
Electoral Participation (pp_voted) 33588 0.7698 0.4209 0 1 
Ethnic Majority (s_majethnic) 32961 0.6763 0.4679 0 1 
Female (s_gender) 33707 0.5054 0.5000 0 1 
Future Economy Better (pv_econ3g) 10110 0.3930 0.4884 0 1 
Future Finances Good (pv_fina3g) 10175 0.5069 0.5000 0 1 
High Income (s_incomehigh) 33313 0.0947 0.2929 0 1 
Left-Wing (pv_left) 27002 0.1838 0.3873 0 1 
Low Income (s_incomelow) 33313 0.2501 0.4331 0 1 
Newspaper Attention (pp_newspaper4) 21747 1.3143 1.0763 0 3 
Non-Partisan (pv_nonpartisan) 33650 0.6783 0.4671 0 1 
Non-Religious (s_nonreligious) 33694 0.1174 0.3219 0 1 
Paid Employment (s_employed) 31479 0.5554 0.4969 0 1 
Past Economy Worse (pv_econ1b) 32937 0.1931 0.3947 0 1 
Past Finances Worse (pv_fina1b) 33281 0.2148 0.4107 0 1 
Political Interest (pp_interest4) 33496 1.0682 0.9648 0 3 
Political Knowledge (pp_knowledge3) 31609 0.3509 0.5568 0 2 
Present Economy Good (pv_econ2g) 33399 0.1667 0.3727 0 1 
Present Finances Good (pv_fina2g) 33540 0.2353 0.4242 0 1 
Radio Attention (pp_radio4) 21792 1.7852 1.1455 0 3 
Religious Majority (s_majreligious) 32555 0.6936 0.4610 0 1 
Right-Wing (pv_right) 27002 0.2401 0.4272 0 1 
Social Trust (s_soctrust) 33321 0.3741 0.4839 0 1 
Supports Winner (pv_winner) 33356 0.1731 0.3783 0 1 
Television Attention (pp_television4) 21787 2.4170 0.9151 0 3 
Tertiary Education (s_educationuni) 33463 0.1954 0.3965 0 1 
Trust Executive (pv_trustexec) 27352 1.1707 1.3047 0 4 
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Trust Judiciary (pv_trustjudi) 32925 0.3643 0.4813 0 1 
Trust Legislature (pv_trustlegis) 32404 0.3817 0.4858 0 1 
Trust Parties (pv_trustparties) 33114 0.2413 0.4279 0 1 
Trust Police (pv_trustpolice) 33416 0.3774 0.4847 0 1 
Urban Status (s_urban) 33707 0.6550 0.4754 0 1 
      
National Level Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Civil Liberties (nat_liberties) 33707 5.3021 0.9083 4 7 
Corruption Perceptions Index (nat_cpi) 33707 6.6502 1.2202 3.1 8 
Democratic Experience (nat_demoexp) 33707 59.2228 10.8054 43 93 
Direct Public Funding (nat_funding) 33707 0.9173 0.2755 0 1 
Ethnic Fractionalization (nat_ethnic) 33707 0.4681 0.1913 0.1689 0.7396 
GDP Growth per capita (nat_growthpc) 33707 3.8216 3.2495 -2.12 12.2497 
GNI per capita (nat_gnipc) 33707 4.7797 2.7911 1.33 10.29 
Human Development Index (nat_hdi) 33707 0.6958 0.0608 0.568 0.796 
Income Inequality (nat_gini) 33707 50.2476 4.2647 39.9089 57.23 
Linguistic Fractionalization (nat_linguistic) 33707 0.1754 0.1758 0 0.6303 
Lower Parliament Size (nat_parlsize) 33707 150.6099 120.2863 32 513 
Political Rights (nat_rights) 33707 5.6503 0.9639 4 7 
Population per MP (nat_ppmp) 33707 0.1123 0.0878 0.0096 0.3781 
Press Freedom (nat_press) 33707 56.4456 14.6815 26 85 
Proportional Representation (nat_pr) 33707 1.1851 0.9596 0 2 
Religious Fractionalization (nat_religious) 33707 0.3212 0.1736 0.1350 0.7876 
Victory Margin (nat_vicmargin) 33707 15.8853 10.4912 0.63 40.31 
Women in Parliament (nat_wip) 33707 19.5136 9.7976 0 40 
 
Table 8.3: ArabBarometer Descriptive Statistics 
Individual Level Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age (s_agecat8) 5032 3.0491 1.4034 1 8 
Corruption Level (pv_corruption4) 4815 2.6739 0.8397 1 4 
Crime Victim (s_victim) 5009 0.0389 0.1934 0 1 
Electoral Fairness (pv_elections4) 5047 1.7751 1.1826 0 3 
Electoral Participation (pp_voted) 4791 0.6746 0.4686 0 1 
Female (s_gender) 5044 0.4657 0.4989 0 1 
Future Economy Better (pv_econ3g) 4638 0.5006 0.5001 0 1 
High Income (s_incomehigh) 4167 0.1884 0.3911 0 1 
Low Income (s_incomelow) 4167 0.2004 0.4003 0 1 
Newspaper Attention (pp_newspaper4) 4881 0.1965 0.6403 0 3 
Non-Religious (s_nonreligious) 5047 0.1224 0.3278 0 1 
Paid Employment (s_employed) 5028 0.4688 0.4991 0 1 
Political Interest (pp_interest4) 4966 1.3607 1.0420 0 3 
Political Knowledge (pp_knowledge3) 4953 1.0596 0.8844 0 2 
Present Economy Good (pv_econ2g) 4974 0.3104 0.4627 0 1 
Present Finances Good (pv_fina2g) 4949 0.5553 0.4970 0 1 
Radio Attention (pp_radio4) 4883 0.1317 0.5503 0 3 
Religious Majority (s_majreligious) 3106 0.6587 0.4742 0 1 
Social Trust (s_soctrust) 4924 0.2656 0.4417 0 1 
Television Attention (pp_television4) 4863 1.4092 1.1500 0 3 
Tertiary Education (s_educationuni) 5036 0.2357 0.4245 0 1 
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Trust Executive (pv_trustexec) 4898 0.5182 0.4997 0 1 
Trust Judiciary (pv_trustjudi) 4815 0.5030 0.5000 0 1 
Trust Legislature (pv_trustlegis) 4848 0.4620 0.4986 0 1 
Trust Parties (pv_trustparties) 4702 0.2988 0.4578 0 1 
Trust Police (pv_trustpolice) 4901 0.6072 0.4884 0 1 
      
National Level Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Civil Liberties (nat_liberties) 3823 3.7434 0.4368 3 4 
Corruption Perceptions Index (nat_cpi) 5047 6.6450 0.9111 4.7 7.4 
Democratic Experience (nat_demoexp) 5047 49.6739 11.6472 32 64 
Direct Public Funding (nat_funding) 5047 0.5554 0.4970 0 1 
Ethnic Fractionalization (nat_ethnic) 3823 0.3774 0.1728 0.1314 0.5926 
GDP Growth per capita (nat_growthpc) 5047 5.4601 2.5278 0.4620 7.5332 
GNI per capita (nat_gnipc) 5047 3.1135 1.6671 1.5493 6.24 
Human Development Index (nat_hdi) 5047 0.6343 0.0677 0.559 0.721 
Income Inequality (nat_gini) 5047 39.6201 3.3160 35.5045 45.3752 
Linguistic Fractionalization (nat_linguistic) 3823 0.2747 0.1861 0.0396 0.4683 
Lower Parliament Size (nat_parlsize) 5047 213.9285 115.1975 110 389 
Political Rights (nat_rights) 3823 2.7434 0.4368 2 3 
Population per MP (nat_ppmp) 5047 0.0574 0.0274 0.0306 0.0961 
Press Freedom (nat_press) 3823 40.0942 2.9861 38 45 
Proportional Representation (nat_pr) 5047 1.0101 0.8704 0 2 
Religious Fractionalization (nat_religious) 3823 0.2286 0.3387 0.0035 0.7886 
Victory Margin (nat_vicmargin) 5047 29.2603 33.1828 0.61 78.6 
Women in Parliament (nat_wip) 5047 8.2730 3.3375 4.7 12.9 
 
Table 8.4: AsianBarometer Descriptive Statistics 
Individual Level Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age (s_agecat8) 11901 3.7404 1.5336 1 8 
Corruption Level (pv_corruption4) 11149 2.4562 0.8416 1 4 
Crime Victim (s_victim) 11887 0.0436 0.2042 0 1 
Electoral Fairness (pv_elections4) 11915 1.9758 0.9267 0 3 
Electoral Participation (pp_voted) 11881 0.8215 0.3830 0 1 
Female (s_gender) 11912 0.4934 0.5000 0 1 
Future Economy Better (pv_econ3g) 10831 0.5072 0.5000 0 1 
Future Finances Good (pv_fina3g) 10914 0.5462 0.4979 0 1 
High Income (s_incomehigh) 11721 0.1618 0.3683 0 1 
Low Income (s_incomelow) 11721 0.2503 0.4332 0 1 
Newspaper Attention (pp_newspaper4) 10531 0.3358 0.8733 0 3 
Non-Partisan (pv_nonpartisan) 10933 0.3927 0.4884 0 1 
Non-Religious (s_nonreligious) 11913 0.1995 0.3997 0 1 
Paid Employment (s_employed) 11870 0.6500 0.4770 0 1 
Past Economy Worse (pv_econ1b) 11800 0.4516 0.4977 0 1 
Past Finances Worse (pv_fina1b) 11860 0.3953 0.4889 0 1 
Political Interest (pp_interest4) 11814 1.4829 0.8857 0 3 
Present Economy Good (pv_econ2g) 11822 0.3114 0.4631 0 1 
Present Finances Good (pv_fina2g) 11877 0.2988 0.4578 0 1 
Radio Attention (pp_radio4) 10528 0.1295 0.5555 0 3 
Religious Majority (s_majreligious) 11882 0.7179 0.4500 0 1 
 286 
Social Trust (s_soctrust) 11638 0.2670 0.4424 0 1 
Supports Winner (pv_winner) 10933 0.3727 0.4836 0 1 
Television Attention (pp_television4) 10521 1.6662 1.2349 0 3 
Tertiary Education (s_educationuni) 11915 0.2229 0.4162 0 1 
Trust Executive (pv_trustexec) 11588 0.6065 0.4885 0 1 
Trust Judiciary (pv_trustjudi) 11342 0.5826 0.4931 0 1 
Trust Legislature (pv_trustlegis) 11452 0.5327 0.4989 0 1 
Trust Parties (pv_trustparties) 11288 0.4291 0.4950 0 1 
Trust Police (pv_trustpolice) 11706 0.6297 0.4829 0 1 
Urban Status (s_urban) 11911 0.6307 0.4826 0 1 
      
National Level Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Civil Liberties (nat_liberties) 11915 5.1719 1.1224 3 7 
Corruption Perceptions Index (nat_cpi) 11915 5.3864 2.2112 0.6 7.6 
Democratic Experience (nat_demoexp) 11915 60.1544 13.0142 10 82 
Direct Public Funding (nat_funding) 10832 0.6746 0.4686 0 1 
Ethnic Fractionalization (nat_ethnic) 11915 0.3636 0.2402 0.001998 0.735134 
GDP Growth per capita (nat_growthpc) 11915 4.9513 1.8874 2.180389 8.34 
GNI per capita (nat_gnipc) 11915 11.8897 12.9934 0.7 37.65 
Human Development Index (nat_hdi) 11915 0.7294 0.1357 0.568 0.938 
Income Inequality (nat_gini) 11915 38.4177 5.5631 30.71483 53.3 
Linguistic Fractionalization (nat_linguistic) 11915 0.4579 0.2667 0.0021132 0.8359525 
Lower Parliament Size (nat_parlsize) 11915 316.5416 175.0443 30 550 
Political Rights (nat_rights) 11915 4.9876 1.7227 1 7 
Population per MP (nat_ppmp) 11915 0.1901 0.1258 0.0361352 0.4151795 
Press Freedom (nat_press) 11915 54.7383 18.1535 23 80 
Proportional Representation (nat_pr) 11915 0.2903 0.6815 0 2 
Religious Fractionalization (nat_religious) 11915 0.4261 0.2301 0.0798612 0.6844943 
Victory Margin (nat_vicmargin) 11915 27.9574 24.0970 0.22 79.52 
Women in Parliament (nat_wip) 11915 14.3184 5.8444 6.6 27.3 
 
Table 8.5: CSES (Europe) Descriptive Statistics  
Individual Level Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Electoral Fairness (pv_elections4) 29117 2.0919 1.0793 0 3 
Age (s_agecat8) 29069 4.0158 1.7053 1 8 
Female (s_gender) 29116 0.5212 0.4996 0 1 
High Income (s_incomehigh) 25115 0.1869 0.3898 0 1 
Low Income (s_incomelow) 25115 0.1981 0.3986 0 1 
Tertiary Education (s_educationuni) 29008 0.1606 0.3672 0 1 
Supports Winner (pv_winner) 27852 0.2969 0.4569 0 1 
Electoral Participation (pp_voted) 28063 0.8457 0.3613 0 1 
Urban Status (s_urban) 26228 0.7027 0.4571 0 1 
Left-Wing (pv_left) 24667 0.1318 0.3382 0 1 
Right-Wing (pv_right) 24667 0.1803 0.3844 0 1 
Political Knowledge (pp_knowledge3) 19994 1.3851 0.7202 0 2 
Past Economy Worse (pv_econ1b) 27997 0.3099 0.4624 0 1 
Present Economy Good (pv_econ2g) 28671 0.3758 0.4843 0 1 
Paid Employment (s_employed) 29071 0.4355 0.4958 0 1 
Religious Majority (s_majreligious) 20932 0.8003 0.3998 0 1 
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Ethnic Majority (s_majethnic) 13361 0.8716 0.3346 0 1 
Non-Religious (s_nonreligious) 24464 0.2726 0.4453 0 1 
Non-Partisan (pv_nonpartisan) 29117 0.5609 0.4963 0 1 
      
National Level Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Democratic Experience (nat_demoexp) 29117 70.2715 17.6103 28 84 
Corruption Perceptions Index (nat_cpi) 29117 3.1020 2.3430 0 7.9 
Ethnic Fractionalization (nat_ethnic) 29117 0.2024 0.1429 0.0468 0.5314 
Income Inequality (nat_gini) 29117 28.6804 5.4082 22.16239 43.4 
GNI per capita (nat_gnipc) 29117 18.6362 13.4427 0.85 40.92 
GDP Growth per capita (nat_growthpc) 29117 3.8157 2.4863 -1.0193 10.0045 
Human Development Index (nat_hdi) 29117 0.8046 0.0667 0.667 0.895 
Civil Liberties (nat_liberties) 29117 6.0188 1.2287 2 7 
Direct Public Funding (nat_funding) 29117 0.9024 0.2968 0 1 
Linguistic Fractionalization (nat_linguistic) 29117 0.2165 0.1744 0.0198 0.5441 
Lower Parliament Size (nat_parlsize) 29117 313.1779 196.0438 63 669 
Political Rights (nat_rights) 29117 6.5388 1.2366 2 7 
Population per MP (nat_ppmp) 29117 0.0736 0.0695 0.0044 0.3255 
Press Freedom (nat_press) 29117 77.3868 17.4062 18 95 
Proportional Representation (nat_pr) 29117 1.5934 0.7497 0 2 
Religious Fractionalization (nat_religious) 29117 0.4362 0.2073 0.1438 0.7222 
Victory Margin (nat_vicmargin) 29117 10.8024 10.8154 0.1 61.4 
Women in Parliament (nat_wip) 29117 21.6591 11.2760 7.3 40.4 
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Appendix B. Original Variables and Questions 
Electoral Fairness 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q45) and Round 4 (q71); ArabBarometer (q211); 
AsianBarometer (qii43): 
On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last 
national election, held in [year]?  Was it: completely free and fair; free and 
fair, but with minor problems; free and fair, with major problems; not free 
and fair? 
AmericasBarometer Merged (b47): 
To what extent do you trust elections?  (Seven-point scale ranging from 
‘Not at all’ to ‘A lot’) 
CSES (A3002): 
In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly.  In 
other countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly.  
Thinking of the last election in [country], where would you place it on this 
scale of one to five where ONE means that the last election was conducted 
fairly and FIVE means that the last election was conducted unfairly? 
Tertiary Education 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q90) and Round 4 (q89): 
What is the highest level of education you have completed?  No formal 
schooling; Informal schooling (including Koranic schooling); Some primary 
schooling; Primary school completed; Some secondary school/ High school; 
Secondary school completed/High school; Post-secondary qualifications, 
other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a 
technical/polytechnic/college; Some university; University completed, Post-
graduate 
AmericasBarometer Merged (ed): 
 289 
How many years of schooling have you completed?  _____ Year 
___________________ (primary, secondary, university, post-secondary not 
university) = ________ total number of years (Uses table to derive code) 
ArabBarometer (q703): 
Level of education: Illiterate; Elementary; Primary; Secondary; College 
Diploma – two years; BA; MA or higher 
AsianBarometer (se005a): 
How many years of formal education you have received?  _____ 
AsianBarometer (se005): 
What is your highest level of education?  No formal education; Incomplete 
primary/elementary; Complete primary/elementary; Incomplete 
secondary/high school: technical/vocational type; Complete 
secondary/high school: technical/vocational type; Incomplete 
secondary/high school; Complete secondary/high school; Some university 
education; University education completed; Post-graduate degree 
High/Low Income 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q8e) and Round 4 (q8e): 
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family 
gone without: A cash income?  Never; Just once or twice; Several times; 
Many times; Always 
AmericasBarometer Merged (q10): 
Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of 
this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all 
the working adults and children?  Which is the total monthly income in your 
household?  (list of 10 deciles based on currency and distribution in country) 
AmericasBarometer Merged (q10d): 
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The salary that you receive and total family income: Is good enough for 
you, you can save from it; Is just enough for you, so that you do not have 
major problems; Is not enough for you, you are stretched; Is not enough for 
you, you are having a hard time 
ArabBarometer (q716incomedeciles): 
Monthly income of family in [local currency]___________ (recoded to 
family monthly income by approximated deciles) 
AsianBarometer (se009): 
Here is a scale of household [annual/monthly] incomes.  We would like to 
know in what group your household on average is, counting all wages, 
salaries, pensions, dividends and other incomes that come in before taxes 
and other deduction.  Just give the letter of the group your household falls 
into.  (scale of quintiles differs for each country) 
AsianBarometer (se009a): 
Does the total income of your household allow you to satisfactorily cover 
your needs?  I will read out few statements about your income. Please tell 
me, which of the following statement is closest to your situation?  Our 
income covers the needs well, we can save; Our income covers the needs all 
right, without much difficulty; Our income does not cover the needs, there 
are difficulties; Our income does not cover the needs, there are great 
difficulties 
 
Religious and Religious Majority 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q91) and Round 4 (q90), AmericasBarometer Merged (q3_08, 
q3_0406, q3c); AsianBarometer (se006): 
What is your religion (, if any)?  (List of religions to select from) 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q28a) and Round 4 (q22a): 
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Let’s turn to your role in the community. Now I am going to read out a list 
of groups that people join or attend.  For each one, could you tell me 
whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, 
or not a member: A religious group (e.g. church, mosque)? 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q92): 
Excluding weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious 
services?  Never; About once a year or less; About once every several 
months; About once a month; About once a week; More than once a week 
AfroBarometer Round 4 (q91); AmericasBarometer Merged (q5b); ArabBarometer 
(q2564): 
How important is religion in your life?  Not at all important; Not very 
important; Somewhat important; Very important 
AmericasBarometer Merged (q5a): 
How often do you attend religious services?  More than once per week; 
Once per week; Once a month; Once or twice a year; Never or almost never 
AmericasBarometer Merged (cp6): 
I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you 
attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or 
twice a year, or never: Meetings of any religious organization?  Do you 
attend them… once a week; once or twice a month; once or twice a year; 
never 
ArabBarometer (q714a): 
In general, would you describe yourself as: Religious; In between; Not 
religious; Other 
ArabBarometer (q711): 
Religion: Muslim; Christian; Other 
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AsianBarometer (se007): 
About how often do you practice religious services or rituals these days?  
Several times a day; Once a day; Several times a week; Once a week; Once 
a month; Only during festivals (or several times a year); Less often; 
Practically never 
AsianBarometer (seii7a): 
Would you describe yourself as very religious, moderately religious, lightly 
religious, not religious at all?  Very religious; Moderately religious; Lightly 
religious; Not religious at all 
Linguistic Majority 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q3) and Round 4 (q3): 
Which Ghanaian/Kenyan/etc.: language is your home language? (List of 
languages to select from) 
AmericasBarometer Merged (leng1): 
What is your mother tongue, that is, the language you spoke first at home 
when you were a child?  (List of languages to select from) 
AsianBarometer (se014): 
What language do you speak the most in the home?  Only local language; 
Mostly local language; A mixture of local and official language; Mostly 
official language; Only official language 
Ethnic Majority 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q79) and Round 4 (q79): 
What is your tribe?  You know, your ethnic or cultural group.  (List of tribes 
and groups to select from) 
AmericasBarometer Merged (etid): 
Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or of 
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another race?  White; Mestizo; Indigenous; Black; Mulatto; Other 
Political Interest 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q16) and Round 4(q13); ArabBarometer (q215); 
AsianBarometer (q056): 
How interested would you say you are in public affairs/politics?  Not at all 
interested; Not very interested; Somewhat interested; Very interested 
AmericasBarometer Merged (pol1): 
How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?  A lot; 
Some; Little; None 
Political Knowledge 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q43a2) and Round 4(q41a2): 
Can you tell me the name of: Your Member of Parliament/National 
Assembly Representative?  Know but can’t remember; Incorrect guess; 
Correct name; Don’t Know 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q43b2): 
Can you tell me the name of: Your Local Government Councillor?  Know but 
can’t remember; Incorrect guess; Correct name; Don’t Know 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q43c2): 
Can you tell me the name of: The Deputy President/Vice President?  Know 
but can’t remember; Incorrect guess; Correct name; Don’t Know 
AfroBarometer Round 4 (q41b2): 
Can you tell me the name of: Your country’s Minister of Finance and 
Economic Planning?  Know but can’t remember; Incorrect guess; Correct 
name; Don’t Know 
AmericasBarometer Merged (gi3): 
How many provinces/departments/states does the country have?  Correct; 
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Incorrect 
AmericasBarometer Merged (gi4): 
How long is the presidential/prime ministerial term of office in country?  
Correct; Incorrect 
ArabBarometer (q2571, q2572): 
Can you remember the name of: Foreign Minister; Speaker/Leader of 
Parliament.  Correct answer; Incorrect answer 
Non-Partisanship and Supports Winner (through identification) 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q85) and Round 4(q85): 
Do you feel close to any particular political party?  No (not close to any 
party); Yes (feels close to a party) 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q86) and Round 4(q86): 
Which party is that?  (List of political parties to select from) 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q87): 
Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?  Not 
very close; Somewhat close; Very close; Not Applicable 
AmericasBarometer Merged (vb10): 
Do you currently identify with a political party?  Yes; No 
AmericasBarometer Merged (vb11_06, vb11_08, vb11_10, vb11_12): 
Which political party do you identify with?  (List of political parties to 
choose from) 
AmericasBarometer Merged (vb12): 
Would you say that your identification with that party the party mentioned 
in VB11: is very weak, weak, not weak or strong, strong, very strong?  Very 
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weak; Weak; Not weak, or strong; Strong; Very strong 
AsianBarometer (q062): 
Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel 
closest to?  (List of political parties to choose from) 
AsianBarometer (q063): 
How close do you feel to (answer in q062)?  Very close; Somewhat close; 
Just a little close 
Left/Right Wing 
 
AmericasBarometer Merged (l1, l1b): 
On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left/liberal to 
right/conservative. One means left/liberal and 10 means 
right/conservative.  Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk 
of those on the left/liberals and those on the right/conservatives.  In other 
words, some people sympathize more with the left/liberals and others with 
the right/conservatives.  According to the meaning that the terms 
"left/liberal" and "right/conservative" have for you, and thinking of your 
own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?  (Scale 
from 1 to 10) 
Electoral Participation 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q30) and Round 4(q23d): 
With regard to the most recent, year: national elections, which statement is 
true for you?  You voted in the elections; You decided not to vote; You could 
not find the polling station; You were prevented from voting; You did not 
have time to vote; Did not vote for some other reason; You were not 
registered or were too young to vote; You could not find your name in the 
voter’s register; Don’t Know/Can't remember 
AmericasBarometer Merged (vb2): 
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Did you vote in the last presidential elections of (year of last presidential 
elections)?  Voted; Did not vote 
AmericasBarometer Merged (vb1): 
Are you registered to vote?  /  Do you have an Identity Card?  Yes; No 
AmericasBarometer Merged (vb6): 
Did you vote for a deputy in the last elections?  Yes; No 
ArabBarometer (q207): 
Did you participate in the most recent elections on [date]?  Yes; No 
AsianBarometer (q027): 
In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were 
not able to vote because they were away from home, they were sick or they 
just didn’t have time. How about you?  Did you vote in the election [the 
most recent national election, parliamentary or presidential] held in [year]? 
AsianBarometer (q028): 
Which parties (or candidates for president if it was presidential race) did 
you vote for?  (List of political parties to choose from) 
Supports (Voted for) Winner 
  
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q99) and Round 4(q97): 
If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate 
would you vote for?  (List of political parties to select from) 
AmericasBarometer Merged (vb3_06, vb3_08, vb3_10, vb3_12): 
Who did you vote for in the last presidential elections of (year)?  (List of 
candidates or political parties) 
AsianBarometer (q028): 
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Which parties (or candidates for president if it was presidential race) did 
you vote for?  (List of political parties to choose from) 
AsianBarometer (qii39a): 
Based on the answer to q028, please construct a new variable indicating if 
the respondent voted for the winning camp or loosing camp.  1: Voted for 
the winning camp; 2: voted for the loosing camp 
Corruption Level 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q56a, q56b, q56c, q56d, q56e) and Round 4(q50a, q50b, 
q50c, q50d): 
How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, 
or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The President/Prime 
Minister and Officials in his Office; Members of Parliament/National 
Assembly Representatives; local government councillors/Elected Assembly 
men/women; National government officials; Local government officials?  
None; Some of them; Most of them; All of them 
AmericasBarometer Merged (exc7): 
Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, 
corruption among public officials is: Very common; Common; Uncommon; 
Very uncommon 
ArabBarometer (q253): 
Here are some statements that describe how widespread corruption and 
bribe taking are in all sectors in [respondent’s country]. Which of the 
following statements reflects your own opinion the best?  Hardly anyone is 
involved in corruption and bribery; Not a lot of officials are corrupt; Most 
officials are corrupt; Almost everyone is corrupt 
AsianBarometer (q114, q115): 
How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your 
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local/municipal government; the national government?  Would you say: 
Hardly anyone is involved; Not a lot of officials are corrupt; Most officials 
are corrupt; Almost everyone is corrupt 
Crime Victimization 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q9c) and Round 4(q9c): 
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: 
Been physically attacked?  Never; Just once or twice; Several times; Many 
times; Always 
AmericasBarometer Merged (vic2_0406, vic2_1012): 
Thinking of that the last crime of which you were a victim, from the list I am 
going to read to you, what kind of crime was it?  Unarmed robbery, no 
assault or physical threats; Unarmed robbery with assault or physical 
threats; Armed robbery; Assault but not robbery; Rape or sexual assault; 
Kidnapping; Vandalism; Burglary of your home; Extortion; Other; N/A (was 
not a victim) 
AmericasBarometer Merged (vic1ext): 
Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in 
the past 12 months?  That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, 
assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of 
crime in the past 12 months?  Yes; No 
AmericasBarometer Merged (vic20): 
You were a victim of an armed robbery of property not including your car in 
the past 12 months?  How many times?  (Number provided by respondent) 
ArabBarometer (q205); AsianBarometer (qii32): 
Generally speaking, how safe is living in this (city/town/village)?  Very safe; 
Safe; Unsafe; Very unsafe 
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AsianBarometer (qii37): 
In the past 12 months, have you or any member of your family been a 
victim of physical violence?  Yes; No 
Social Trust 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q83), AmericasBarometer Merged (it1b); ArabBarometer 
(q204); AsianBarometer (q024): 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you must be very careful in dealing with people?  You must be very careful; 
Most people can be trusted 
AfroBarometer Round 4(q84c): 
How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other 
Ghanaians/Kenyans/etc.?  Not at all; Just a little; I trust them somewhat; I 
trust them a lot. 
AmericasBarometer Merged (it1): 
Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people 
in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very 
trustworthy or untrustworthy?  Very trustworthy; Somewhat trustworthy; 
Not very trustworthy; Untrustworthy 
Paid Employment 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q94) and Round 4 (q94): 
Do you have a job that pays a cash income? Is it full-time or part-time?  And 
are you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)?  No 
(not looking); No (looking); Yes, part time (not looking); Yes, part time 
(looking); Yes, full time (not looking); Yes, full time (looking) 
AmericasBarometer Merged (ocup4): 
Are you currently working?  Yes; No 
AmericasBarometer Merged (ocup1a): 
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In this job are you: A salaried employee of the government or an 
independent state-owned enterprise; A salaried employee in the private 
sector; Owner or partner in a business; Self-employed; Unpaid worker 
AmericasBarometer Merged (ocup4a): 
How do you mainly spend your time?  Are you currently: Working; Not 
working, but have a job; Actively looking for a job; A student; Taking care of 
the home; Retired, a pensioner or permanently disable to work; Not 
working and not looking for a job 
ArabBarometer (q704): 
Employment status: Employed; Not employed 
AsianBarometer (se012a): 
Main occupation: Hired Workers (Excluding unpaid family workers); 
Employers and Self-Employed; Purely Property Owner; Unpaid family 
workers; Presently unemployed but LOOKING for Work; Presently 
unemployed and NOT LOOKING for Work; Never worked before; No answer; 
Decline to answer; Others 
AsianBarometer (se012b): 
Respondent is also the Chief Wage Earner?  Yes; No 
Television/Newspaper/Radio Attention 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q15a, q15b, q15c ) and Round 4(q12a, q12b, q12c): 
How often do you get news from the following sources: Radio/Television/ 
Newspapers?  Never; Less than once a month; A few times a month; A few 
times a week; Every day 
AmericasBarometer Merged (a1, a2, a3): 
How frequently do you listen to/watch/read the news on the radio/TV/ in 
newspapers?  Every day/almost every day; Once or twice a week; Rarely; 
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Never 
ArabBarometer (q216): 
How often do you follow news about politics and government in [country]? 
Very often; Often; Sometimes/ rarely; Never 
ArabBarometer (q216): 
What are your first and second most important sources of information 
about local politics and government in [country]?  Television; Radio; Local 
newspaper; Weekly magazines and papers; Internet; SMS Messages; Other 
AsianBarometer (q057): 
How often do you follow news about politics and government?  Practically 
never; Not even once a week; Once or twice a week; Several times a week; 
Everyday 
AsianBarometer (qii51_1, qii51_2, qii51_3): 
Main source of information: Television/Newspaper/Radio 
AsianBarometer (q057): 
From qii51 Which is most important?  Television; Newspaper; Radio (lists 
additional sources) 
Past National Economy 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q6a) and Round 4(q6a): 
Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months 
ago: Economic conditions in this country?  Much worse; Worse; Same; 
Better; Much better 
AmericasBarometer Merged (soct2): 
Do you think that the country’s current economic situation is better than, 
the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?  Better; Same; Worse 
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AsianBarometer (q002): 
How would you describe the change in the economic condition of our 
country over the last few years?  Is it: Much better; A little better; About the 
same; A little worse; Much worse 
Present National Economy 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q4a) and Round 4(q4a): 
In general, how would you describe: The present economic condition of this 
country?  Very bad; Fairly bad; Neither good nor bad; Fairly good; Very 
good 
AmericasBarometer Merged (soct1): 
How would you describe the country’s economic situation?  Would you say 
that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?  Very 
good; Good; Neither good nor bad (fair); Bad; Very bad 
ArabBarometer (q101): 
How would you rate the current overall economic condition of 
[respondent’s country] today?  Very good; Good; Bad; Very bad 
AsianBarometer (q001): 
How would you rate the overall economic condition of your country today?  
Very bad; Bad; So so (not good nor bad); Good; Very good 
Future National Economy 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q7a) and Round 4(q7a): 
Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Economic 
conditions in this country in twelve months time?  Much worse; Worse; 
Same; Better; Much better 
AmericasBarometer Merged (soct3): 
Do you think that in 12 months the economic situation of the country will 
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be better, the same or worse than it is now?  Better; Same; Worse 
ArabBarometer (q102): 
What do you think will be the state of [country’s] economic condition a few 
years (3-5 years) from now? Much better; A little better; About the same; A 
little worse; Much worse 
AsianBarometer (q003): 
What do you think will be the state of our country’s economic condition a 
few years from now?  Will it be: Much better; A little better; About the 
same; A little worse; Much worse 
Past Personal Finances 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q6b) and Round 4(q6b): 
Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months 
ago: Your living conditions?  Much worse; Worse; Same; Better; Much 
better 
AmericasBarometer Merged (idio2): 
Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or 
worse than it was 12 months ago?  Better; Same; Worse 
AsianBarometer (q005): 
How would you compare the current economic condition of your family 
with what it was a few years ago?  A little worse now; About the same; A 
little better now; Much better now 
Present Personal Finances 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q4b) and Round 4(q4b): 
In general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions?  
Very bad; Fairly bad; Neither good nor bad; Fairly good; Very good 
AmericasBarometer Merged (idio1): 
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How would you describe your overall economic situation?  Would you say 
that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?  Very 
good; Good; Neither good nor bad (fair); Bad; Very bad 
ArabBarometer (q103): 
How would you rate the economic situation of your family today?  Very 
Good; Good; Bad; Very Bad 
AsianBarometer (q004): 
As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today?  
Very bad; Bad; So so (not good nor bad); Good; Very good 
Future Personal Finances 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q7b) and Round 4(q7b): 
Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Your 
living conditions in twelve months time?  Much worse; Worse; Same; 
Better; Much better 
AmericasBarometer Merged (idio3): 
Do you think that in 12 months your economic situation will be better than, 
the same as, or worse than it is now?  Better; Same; Worse 
AsianBarometer (q006): 
What do you think the economic situation of your family will be a few years 
from now?  Much worse; A little worse; About the same; A little better; 
Much better 
Trust Executive/Legislature/Judiciary/Political Parties/Police 
 
AfroBarometer Round 3 (q55a, q55b, q55i, q55e, q55f; q55h) and Round 4(q49a, q49b, 
q49h, v q49e, q49f, q49g): 
How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough 
about them to say: The President/Prime Minister; The Parliament/National 
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Assembly; Courts of Law; The Ruling Party; Opposition Political Parties; The 
Police?  Not at all; Just a little; Somewhat; A lot; Don’t Know/Haven’t Heard 
Enough 
AmericasBarometer Merged (b21a; b13, b10a, b21, b18): 
To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister; national 
parliament; justice system; national police?  (Seven-point scale ranging 
from ‘Not at all’ to ‘A lot’) 
ArabBarometer (q2011, q2012, q2013, q2014, q2015); AsianBarometer (qii07, q010, 
q007, q009, q013): 
I’m going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me 
how much trust you have in them. Is it a great deal of trust, quite a lot of 
trust, not very much trust, or none at all? 
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Appendix C. Variable Coding Values 
Individual Level Variables Values 
Age (s_agecat8) 
1=11-20; 2=21-30; 3=31-40; 4=41-50; 5=51-60; 6=61-70; 
7=71-80; 8=81+ 
Corruption Level (pv_corruption4) 
0=Almost none, 1=Some officials, 2=Most officials, 
3=Almost all officials 
Crime Victim (s_victim) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Electoral Fairness (pv_elections4) Ranges from 0=Not at all fair to 3=Completely Fair 
Electoral Participation (pp_voted) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Ethnic Majority (s_majethnic) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Female (s_gender) 0=Female; 1=Male 
Future Economy Better (pv_econ3g) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Future Finances Good (pv_fina3g) 0=No; 1=Yes 
High Income (s_incomehigh) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Left-Wing (pv_left) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Low Income (s_incomelow) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Newspaper Attention (pp_newspaper4) 0=Never, 1=Monthly, 2=Weekly, 3=Daily 
Non-Partisan (pv_nonpartisan) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Non-Religious (s_nonreligious) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Paid Employment (s_employed) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Past Economy Worse (pv_econ1b) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Past Finances Worse (pv_fina1b) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Political Interest (pp_interest4) 0=None; 1=A Little; 2=Fairly; 3=Very 
Political Knowledge (pp_knowledge3) 0=Zero Correct; 1=One Correct; 2=Two Correct 
Present Economy Good (pv_econ2g) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Present Finances Good (pv_fina2g) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Radio Attention (pp_radio4) 0=Never, 1=Monthly, 2=Weekly, 3=Daily 
Religious Majority (s_majreligious) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Right-Wing (pv_right) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Social Trust (s_soctrust) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Supports Winner (pv_winner) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Television Attention (pp_television4) 0=Never, 1=Monthly, 2=Weekly, 3=Daily 
Tertiary Education (s_educationuni) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Trust Executive (pv_trustexec) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Trust Judiciary (pv_trustjudi) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Trust Legislature (pv_trustlegis) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Trust Parties (pv_trustparties) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Trust Police (pv_trustpolice) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Urban Status (s_urban) 0=No; 1=Yes 
  
National Level Variables Values 
Civil Liberties (nat_libertiesZ) Standardized values of inverted Civil Liberties Index 
Corruption Perceptions Index (nat_cpiZ) 
Standardized values of inverted Corruptions Perceptions 
Index 
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Democratic Experience (nat_demoexpZ) Standardized values for years since universal suffrage 
Direct Public Funding (nat_funding) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Ethnic Fractionalization (nat_ethnic) Ethnic Fractionalization scores 
GDP Growth per capita (nat_growthpcZ) Standardized values of annual GDP growth rate 
GNI per capita (nat_gnipcZ) Standardized values of GNI per capita (thousands) 
Human Development Index (nat_hdi) Human Development Index scores 
Income Inequality (nat_giniZ) 
Standardized values of Gini income inequality 
coefficients 
Linguistic Fractionalization (nat_linguistic) Linguistic Fractionalization scores 
Lower Parliament Size (nat_parlsizeZ) 
Standardized values for number of seats in lower 
parliament 
Political Rights (nat_rightsZ) Standardized values of inverted Political Rights Index 
Population per MP (nat_ppmpZ) 
Standardized values for population (millions) divided by 
seats in lower parliament 
Press Freedom (nat_pressZ) 
Standardized values of inverted Freedom of the Press 
scores 
Proportional Representation (nat_pr) 0=No; 1=Yes 
Religious Fractionalization (nat_religious) Religious Fractionalization scores 
Victory Margin (nat_vicmarginZ) Standardized values of victory margin percentages 
Women in Parliament (nat_wipZ) 
Standardized values of percentage of women in (both) 
parliament(s) 
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Appendix D. Electoral Management Bodies 
Algeria Ministry of Interior 
Argentina National Electoral Chamber 
Belarus Central Commission on Elections 
Belize Elections and Boundaries Commission 
Benin Permanent Administrative Secretariat, National Autonomous 
Electoral Commission 
Bolivia National Electoral Court 
Botswana Independent Electoral Commission 
Brazil Superior Electoral Court 
Burkina Faso Independent National Electoral Commission 
Canada Chief Electoral Officer 
Cape Verde Ministry of Internal Administration, Directorate-General for 
Electoral Process Support; National Elections Commission 
Chile Electoral Service 
Colombia National Electoral Council 
Costa Rica Supreme Electoral Tribunal 
Czech Republic State Electoral Commission 
Denmark Ministry of Interior - Election Unit 
Dominican Republic National Board of Elections 
Ecuador Supreme Electoral Tribunal 
El Salvador Supreme Electoral Tribunal 
Germany Ministry of Interior 
Ghana Electoral Commission of Ghana 
Guatemala Supreme Electoral Tribunal 
Guyana Guyana Elections Commission 
Honduras Supreme Electoral Tribunal 
Hong Kong Electoral Affairs Commission 
Hungary Ministry of Interior, National Election Office; National Electoral 
Committee 
Iceland Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs; National Electoral 
Board 
Indonesia General Election Commission 
Israel Central Elections Committee 
Jamaica Electoral Commission of Jamaica 
Japan Central Election Management Council; Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications - Election Division 
Jordan Independent Election Commission 
Kenya Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission 
Lebanon Ministry of Interior 
Lesotho Independent Electoral Commission 
Liberia National Elections Commission 
Lithuania Central Elections Committee 
Madagascar Ministry of Interior and of Administrative Reform; National 
Advisory Electoral Commission 
Malawi Malawi Electoral Commission 
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Malaysia Electoral Commission 
Mali Ministry of Territorial Administration; Independent National 
Electoral Commission; Constitutional Court 
Mexico Federal Electoral Institute 
Mongolia The General Election Commission of Mongolia 
Morocco Ministry of Interior 
Mozambique Technical Secretariat for Election Administration (STAE), National 
Election Commission 
Namibia Electoral Commission 
Netherlands Electoral Council; Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 
New Zealand The Electoral Enrolment Centre 
Nicaragua Supreme Electoral Council 
Nigeria Independent National Electoral Commission 
Norway Ministry for Local Government and Regional Development 
Palestine Central Elections Commission 
Panama Electoral Tribunal 
Paraguay Superior Tribunal of Electoral Justice 
Peru National Jury of Elections 
Philippines Commission on Elections 
Poland National Electoral Commission 
Portugal Ministry of Internal Administration, Directorate General for 
Internal Administration; National Electoral Commission 
Romania Permanent Electoral Authority Central Election Bureau 
Russia Central Election Commission 
Senegal Directorate General of Elections (DGE), Ministry of the Interior; 
Autonomous National Electoral Commission 
Singapore Elections Department, Prime Minister's Office 
Slovenia Central Election Commission 
South Africa Independent Electoral Commission 
South Korea National Election Commission 
Spain Central Electoral Board 
Sweden The Swedish Election Authority 
Switzerland Swiss Federal Chancellery - Section of Political Rights 
Taiwan Central Election Commission 
Tanzania National Election Commission 
Thailand Election Commission of Thailand 
Uganda The Electoral Commission 
Ukraine Central Election Commission 
United Kingdom Electoral Commission 
United States Federal Election Commission 
Uruguay Electoral Court 
Venezuela National Electoral Council 
Vietnam Election Council; The Standing Committee of the National 
Assembly 
Zambia Electoral Commission 
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 
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Appendix E. Individual Level Regressions by Country 
Table 8.6: Multivariate Models of Socio-Demographics in Africa 
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Age (Decades) 0.02 0.08 0.21 0.03 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.06 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.24 0.15 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
  
* *** 
 
** *** *** 
 
*** *** * 
  
*** 
 
** *** * *** *** 
Female 0.05 0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.09 0.17 0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
     
* 
     
* 
    
* *** *** 
  High Income 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.14 -0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.15) (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.14) (0.05) (0.13) (0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) 
    
*** 
       
*** * 
       Low Income 0.04 -0.09 -0.11 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.12 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.04 -0.14 0.10 
 
(0.10) (0.19) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.17) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.19) (0.08) (0.11) 
  
* * 
    
** * 
   
* 
   
*** 
 
** ** 
Tertiary Education -0.10 0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.14 -0.03 -0.10 -0.11 0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.19 -0.02 
 
(0.16) (0.13) (0.16) (0.22) (0.19) (0.23) (0.12) (0.17) (0.57) (0.19) (0.23) (0.16) (0.07) (0.16) (0.10) (0.22) (0.12) (0.36) (0.19) (0.22) 
 
* 
 
* 
    
** 
 
** * 
  
* 
  
** 
 
*** 
 Model Parameters 
                    N: Respondents 1111 1034 1151 1086 1071 1090 1138 1092 1074 1139 886 1110 2148 1023 2200 1131 2256 1156 979 1117 
Deg. of Freedom 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.7: Multivariate Models of Socio-Demographics in Americas 
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Age (Decades) 0.09 -0.05 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.02 0.11 0.06 -0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.13 0.00 -0.05 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.41 0.06 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
** * 
 
*** *** 
 
*** * * 
    
*** 
 
* 
  
** *** * 
Female -0.01 -0.11 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.05 -0.05 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.03 
 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
  
*** * * 
    
*** 
 
* 
    
* 
     High Income 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.09 0.05 -0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.03 
 
(0.09) (0.13) (0.28) (0.10) (0.11) (0.19) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.18) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.18) (0.16) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) 
 
* * 
  
* ** ** 
    
* 
 
** * * 
 
* * * 
 Low Income 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.05 -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 
 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) 
           
** 
      
* ** 
 
* 
Tertiary Education 0.03 -0.05 0.08 0.05 0.12 -0.06 0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.11 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.06 0.10 -0.06 
 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) 
  
* ** * *** * ** 
  
** 
    
** 
   
* * * 
Model Parameters 
                     N: Respondents 1358 2828 1397 1264 1462 1454 1482 1458 2877 1542 1374 1390 1557 1313 1523 1454 1511 1413 1475 1464 1457 
Deg. of Freedom 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.8: Multivariate Models of Socio-Demographics in Arab World 
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Age (Decades) -0.04 0.19 0.02 -0.07 -0.02 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
  
*** 
   Female 0.22 -0.09 0.04 -0.15 0.15 
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) 
 
*** * 
 
** *** 
High Income 0.00 -0.12 -0.04 0.04 -0.08 
 
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) 
  
* 
  
* 
Low Income -0.12 -0.08 0.15 0.05 -0.03 
 
(0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) 
 
* 
 
** 
  Tertiary Education 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 
 
(0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) 
      Model Parameters 
     N: Respondents 618 1088 858 652 934 
Deg. of Freedom 5 5 5 5 5 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.9: Multivariate Models of Socio-Demographics in Asia 
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Age (Decades) 0.04 0.01 0.22 -0.08 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.12 -0.04 0.03 
 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
   
*** 
 
*** 
  
* * 
  Female -0.06 -0.15 0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.03 0.00 
 
(0.06) (0.13) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
 
** * 
  
* *** 
  
** 
  High Income -0.03 -0.09 -0.11 0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.04 
 
(0.10) (0.19) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.19) (0.09) (-0.30) (0.12) (0.08) (0.13) 
   
** 
  
** 
     Low Income -0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.08 -0.13 -0.10 0.13 
 
(0.07) (0.18) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.14) (0.07) 
   
* 
  
* 
 
* * * *** 
Tertiary Education -0.07 -0.01 -0.15 0.02 0.01 -0.16 -0.05 -0.07 0.00 -0.17 -0.10 
 
(0.07) (0.17) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) 
 
* 
 
*** 
  
*** 
 
* 
 
** ** 
Model Parameters 
           N: Respondents 1383 339 1538 847 1008 1073 1130 1133 903 1082 1275 
Deg. of Freedom 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.10: Multivariate Models of Socio-Demographics in Europe 
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Age (Decades) 0.28 0.09 0.35 0.30 0.12 0.16 0.06 0.10 0.33 0.08 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.22 0.07 0.34 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
*** * *** *** ** *** * * *** * * 
  
* 
  
*** * *** 
Female 0.04 -0.01 -0.12 -0.09 0.07 -0.13 0.00 -0.25 -0.16 -0.10 -0.19 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.10 -0.08 -0.17 0.02 -0.17 
 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) 
    
* * ** 
 
*** ** ** *** 
   
* 
 
*** 
 
*** 
High Income -0.05 0.03 0.14 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.01 0.06 0.13 0.01 0.10 
 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.26) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) 
   
* * 
 
* ** ** 
 
* 
   
*** 
  
** 
 
** 
Low Income 0.10 -0.02 -0.24 -0.16 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.11 -0.16 -0.07 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.11 -0.03 -0.14 -0.09 0.08 -0.11 
 
(0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.16) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) 
 
** 
 
** ** 
   
* ** * 
   
*** 
 
* * * *** 
Tertiary Education -0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.14 0.02 0.08 
 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.16) (0.12) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.07) 
 
* 
  
* ** 
  
** 
 
*** 
  
* ** 
 
** ** 
 
* 
Model Parameters 
                   N: Respondents 800 1112 1728 1717 1319 1201 907 1619 1927 1476 748 1046 1306 1142 820 1004 1735 897 2518 
Deg. of Freedom 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.11: Multivariate Models of Participation and Engagement in Africa 
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Supports Winner 0.16 0.16 -0.09 0.35 -0.07 0.24 0.30 0.28 -0.20 0.07 0.30 0.21 0.12 0.40 0.31 0.15 0.41 0.44 0.16 0.35 
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.13) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
 
*** *** 
 
*** 
 
*** *** *** *** * *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Electoral Participation 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.03 0.10 0.18 0.05 -0.03 0.10 0.03 
 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) 
  
* 
  
* ** * *** * *** *** *** *** 
 
*** *** * 
 
* 
 Political Interest -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.12 0.07 -0.10 0.17 -0.09 0.01 -0.16 0.13 -0.02 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
            
** * ** *** ** 
 
** ** 
 Urban 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.06 -0.08 0.00 -0.07 0.01 -0.04 -0.20 -0.15 0.14 0.03 -0.07 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.17 -0.17 -0.26 
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
  
* 
  
* 
 
* 
  
*** ** ** 
 
* 
 
* * *** *** *** 
Model Parameters 
                    N: Respondents 1105 987 1147 1104 1066 1051 1131 1045 1099 1116 896 1101 2152 1026 2112 1037 2223 1145 1006 1086 
Degrees of Freedom 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 8.12: Multivariate Models of Participation and Engagement in Americas 
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Supports Winner 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.19 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.06 0.01 -0.08 0.20 0.15 
 
(0.14) (0.06) (0.09) (0.13) (0.1) (0.1) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) 
 
*** *** ** * 
  
*** *** *** 
  
*** *** ** *** *** 
  
* *** *** 
Electoral Participation -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.00 -0.02 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.01 -0.04 0.08 0.03 -0.04 0.10 0.01 
 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (0.07) 
     
* ** *** 
  
* 
 
* * * 
  
* 
  
** 
 Political Interest 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.11 0.13 0.26 0.13 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.19 0.04 0.14 0.08 0.38 0.21 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
*** *** *** 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
   
* *** 
 
*** * *** *** 
Religious Attendance 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.13 -0.02 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
    
* * 
  
* 
   
* 
    
** ** 
 
** 
 Urban -0.04 -0.10 -0.15 -0.05 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.15 -0.12 -0.21 -0.08 0.15 -0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.03 -0.07 -0.04 
 
(0.10) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.14) 
  
*** *** 
      
*** *** *** * *** * 
    
* 
 Left-Wing -0.07 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.09 -0.05 -0.10 0.03 -0.11 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 0.05 -0.05 0.08 0.01 0.03 -0.09 -0.10 0.20 
 
(0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
 
* 
    
** 
 
** 
 
** 
 
* 
  
* * 
  
** * *** 
Right-Wing -0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.25 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.14 0.10 0.06 -0.08 -0.08 
 
(0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) 
  
* 
  
* 
 
*** * 
 
* *** * *** 
 
*** 
 
*** ** * * ** 
Model Parameters 
                     N: Respondents 1199 2221 1089 791 1175 1220 1132 1167 1969 1442 1063 982 1359 1173 1292 1056 1163 1059 1351 1328 1271 
Degrees of Freedom 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 8.13: Multivariate Models of Participation and Engagement in Arab World 
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Electoral Participation 0.38 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.32 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
 
*** *** *** *** *** 
Political Interest -0.02 0.21 -0.17 0.06 0.07 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
  
*** *** * * 
Model Parameters 
     N: Respondents 883 1209 841 992 807.00 
Degrees of Freedom 2 2 2 2 2.00 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 319 
Table 8.14: Multivariate Models of Participation and Engagement in Asia 
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Supports Winner 0.44 0.06 0.04 0.23 0.04 0.33 0.40 0.06 . 0.48 0.01 
 
(0.07) (0.16) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) . (0.11) (0.08) 
 
*** 
  
*** 
 
*** *** * 
 
*** 
 Electoral Participation 0.00 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.19 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.24 0.06 
 
(0.08) (0.18) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.10) 
   
*** * *** * ** 
  
*** * 
Political Interest -0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.07 0.02 -0.07 0.10 -0.11 -0.12 0.10 
 
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
 
** 
  
* * 
 
* ** * * ** 
Urban -0.07 . -0.24 0.01 -0.05 -0.11 -0.10 -0.16 . -0.19 -0.06 
 
(0.08) . (0.06) (0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) . (0.09) (0.08) 
 
** 
 
*** 
  
** ** *** 
 
** * 
Model Parameters 
           N: Respondents 1393 349 1509 877 1017 1069 1139 1121 906 1037 1315 
Degrees of Freedom 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.08 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.01 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 8.15: Multivariate Models of Participation and Engagement in Europe 
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Supports Winner 0.11 0.49 0.11 0.15 -0.14 0.03 0.12 0.29 0.08 -0.02 0.21 0.04 0.26 0.10 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.05 
 
(0.22) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.1) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.11) (0.05) 
 
* *** 
 
** ** 
 
** *** 
  
*** 
 
*** ** *** 
  
** 
 Electoral Participation 0.10 0.26 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.11 0.00 . 0.18 0.05 0.12 0.31 0.07 0.13 
 
(0.21) (0.11) (0.20) (0.12) (0.09) (0.16) (0.22) (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.11) (0.18) . (0.09) (0.12) (0.16) (0.07) (0.14) (0.08) 
 
* *** ** *** *** 
  
** ** *** * 
  
*** 
 
* *** * *** 
Urban -0.08 0.13 -0.15 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.21 0.02 -0.13 0.10 -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.06 -0.14 . 
 
(0.14) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.1) (0.1) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) . 
  
** * 
   
*** 
 
* ** 
  
** *** 
   
*** 
 Left-Wing -0.01 -0.12 -0.13 -0.04 0.01 -0.16 -0.23 0.07 0.09 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.16 0.10 -0.09 0.13 -0.06 -0.04 0.02 
 
(0.23) (0.11) (0.13) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.17) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) 
  
** * 
  
*** *** 
     
*** * * * 
   Right-Wing -0.04 0.11 -0.09 -0.15 -0.13 0.11 0.33 0.02 -0.07 0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.11 -0.09 0.07 0.07 -0.01 -0.07 0.03 
 
(0.14) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.16) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.07) 
  
* 
 
** ** * *** 
     
** * 
   
* 
 Model Parameters 
                   N: Respondents 337 1167 1870 1774 1096 1323 641 1666 1945 1319 936 708 1019 1019 839 935 1731 562 2257 
Degrees of Freedom 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 8.16: Multivariate Models of Media Attention in Africa 
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Newspaper Attn. -0.17 0.05 -0.10 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.12 -0.19 -0.08 -0.04 -0.11 0.01 -0.14 -0.10 -0.04 -0.10 -0.06 -0.05 -0.21 -0.09 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
** 
 
* 
  
* ** *** * 
 
* 
 
*** ** 
 
** * 
 
*** * 
Television Attn. 0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.14 -0.11 0.08 -0.05 -0.10 0.09 -0.05 -0.13 -0.13 -0.11 -0.07 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
          
*** * 
  
* ** 
 
*** * * * 
Radio Attn. 0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.08 -0.08 0.00 0.13 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.13 0.05 0.00 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
    
* * 
 
*** 
     
* 
 
* 
  
* 
  Political Knowl. -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.09 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.04 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) 
  
* 
      
* 
     
* ** 
    Model Parameters 
                    N: Respondents 1127 1035 1157 1106 1078 1102 1146 1089 1120 1142 934 1116 2171 1043 2203 1136 2262 1174 1021 1117 
Deg. of Freedom 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.17: Multivariate Models of Media Attention in Americas 
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V
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Newspaper Attn. 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.12 . . . 0.03 -0.06 
 
-0.09 -0.06 0.01 . . 0.05 
 
-0.05 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) . . . (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) . . (0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
     
* * *** 
    
* 
 
** * 
     
* 
Television Attn. 0.05 0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.12 -0.01 . . . -0.07 -0.08 
 
0.01 0.03 0.01 . . 0.04 
 
-0.01 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) . . . (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) . . (0.03) 
 
(0.04) 
  
* 
   
*** 
    
* ** 
         Radio Attn. 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.05 . . . 0.06 -0.05 
 
0.04 -0.05 0.06 . . -0.05 
 
0.04 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) . . . (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) . . (0.03) 
 
(0.03) 
 
** 
   
* 
     
* * 
   
* 
     Political Knowl. -0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.10 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.09 -0.02 0.02 -0.12 0.05 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.16) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.04) 
        
* 
 
** 
  
* 
   
** 
  
** * 
Model Parameters 
                     N: Respondents 1348 2745 1293 1146 1383 1466 1472 1323 2677 1515 1263 1403 1529 1314 1438 1214 1503 1294 1423 1455 1299 
Deg. of Freedom 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 1 4 1 4 
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.18: Multivariate Models of Media Attention in Arab World 
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Newspaper Attn. 0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.08 0.04 
 
(0.05) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) 
    
* 
 Television Attn. 0.28 0.22 -0.03 0.12 0.01 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
*** *** 
 
** 
 Radio Attn. 0.20 0.23 -0.07 0.04 0.05 
 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) 
 
*** *** * 
  Political Knowl. -0.05 0.25 -0.13 0.00 -0.11 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
  
*** ** 
 
** 
Model Parameters 
     N: Respondents 811 1209 841 988 926 
Deg. of Freedom 4 4 4 4 4 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.19: Multivariate Models of Media Attention in Asia 
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Newspaper Attn. -0.02 . -0.16 -0.11 . 0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.05 -0.14 
 
(0.03) . (0.03) (0.04) . (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
   
*** * 
      
*** 
Television Attn. -0.02 . -0.19 0.06 . -0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.14 0.13 
 
(0.04) . (0.03) (0.06) . (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
   
*** 
      
* *** 
Radio Attn. -0.05 . 0.03 -0.06 . 0.03 0.07 -0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.02 
 
(0.03) . (0.03) (0.03) . (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
* 
     
* 
    Model Parameters 
           N: Respondents 1207 381 1539 868 1023 961 1097 1074 861 1045 1300 
Deg. of Freedom 3 0 3 3 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.20: Multivariate Models of Economic Performance in Africa 
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m
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w
e
 
U
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n
d
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n
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n
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B
u
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Fa
so
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m
b
ia
 
Paid Employment -0.12 0.04 0.04 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.09 -0.03 -0.22 0.00 0.20 -0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.06 -0.13 0.03 -0.22 -0.10 
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) 
 
* 
        
*** 
 
*** 
  
* * *** 
 
*** ** 
Past Econ. Worse 0.17 0.04 -0.07 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.11 -0.17 0.09 -0.20 0.06 0.00 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.06) (0.16) (0.07) (0.16) (0.07) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) 
 
* 
         
* 
 
* 
 
** ** ** ** 
  Past Fina. Worse 0.01 0.00 0.18 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.14 0.04 0.11 0.05 -0.07 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.06) (0.16) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) 
   
* 
         
* 
  
* 
    Pres. Econ. Good -0.13 0.15 0.03 0.04 -0.12 0.07 0.10 0.21 0.05 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.15 0.04 0.24 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.25 
 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.24) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) 
 
* ** 
  
* 
 
* ** 
 
* 
  
*** 
 
*** 
 
* 
 
* *** 
Pres. Fina. Good 0.09 -0.01 0.11 0.02 0.13 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.11 -0.01 0.19 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.09 -0.03 -0.07 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.06) (0.17) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.15) (0.11) (0.10) 
     
* 
    
* 
 
*** 
       
* 
Fut. Econ. Better -0.05 0.10 -0.02 -0.06 0.26 0.03 0.17 0.27 0.02 0.02 0.16 -0.05 0.10 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.07 
 
(0.11) (0.21) (0.14) (0.19) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.09) (0.08) (0.17) (0.08) (0.26) (0.08) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) 
     
*** 
 
** ** 
  
* 
 
** * *** 
 
*** * ** 
 Fut. Fina. Better 0.19 -0.05 0.01 0.18 -0.06 -0.09 -0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.09 -0.03 -0.02 
 
(0.11) (0.22) (0.14) (0.19) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.08) (0.25) (0.08) (0.13) (0.16) (0.11) 
 
* 
  
* 
 
* 
              Model Parameters 
                    N: Respondents 883 952 902 884 944 967 1034 679 810 928 662 1003 2054 779 1934 950 1873 866 732 828 
Deg. of Freedom 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.21: Multivariate Models of Economic Performance in Americas 
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N
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u
a
 
P
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P
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ay
 
P
e
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U
ru
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V
e
n
e
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e
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Paid Employment -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 
 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.13) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) 
             
* 
     
* * 
 Past Econ. Worse 0.13 0.18 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.23 
 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.14) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.17) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) 
 
*** *** * 
 
* ** 
  
** * * * 
  
* * 
  
* 
 
*** 
Past Fina. Worse -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 -0.08 0.07 0.12 -0.04 0.13 
 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) 
      
* 
   
* 
    
* * * * ** 
 
** 
Pres. Econ. Good 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.25 -0.02 0.01 0.14 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.24 0.15 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) (0.11) (0.06) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.15) (0.07) (0.08) (0.16) (0.07) (0.10) 
 
* * ** 
 
** * * ** * ** 
 
*** 
  
*** *** 
  
* *** *** 
Pres. Fina. Good 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.14 0.03 0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.17 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.07 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.10) 
 
*** 
     
*** 
 
** 
    
* * * *** *** 
  
* 
Fut. Econ. Better . . . . . . . 0.12 0.12 0.10 . . 0.04 . . . 0.10 0.12 . 0.13 . 
 
. . . . . . . (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) . . (0.07) . . . (0.07) (0.07) . (0.08) . 
        
*** *** * 
      
* *** 
 
** 
 Fut. Fina. Better . . . . . . . 0.09 0.08 0.02 . . -0.03 . 
  
0.05 -0.04 . 0.00 . 
 
. . . . . . . (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) . . (0.07) . 
  
(0.07) (0.07) . (0.08) . 
        
** ** 
            Model Parameters 
                     N: Respondents 1347 2763 1369 1215 1461 1419 812 1057 1995 1342 1326 1015 1206 1339 1485 1461 1204 1168 896 1155 890 
Deg. of Freedom 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 7 7 5 5 7 5 5 5 7 7 5 7 5 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.22: Multivariate Models of Economic Performance in Arab World 
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Paid Employment 0.03 0.14 -0.06 0.03 0.00 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
  
* 
   Pres. Econ. Good 0.17 -0.01 0.13 0.04 0.31 
 
(0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.21) (0.09) 
 
*** 
 
** 
 
*** 
Pres. Fina. Good 0.22 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.15 
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
 
*** 
  
** *** 
Fut. Econ. Better 0.29 0.30 0.04 0.08 0.16 
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
 
*** *** 
 
* *** 
Model Parameters 
     N: Respondents 828 1152 824 868 849 
Deg. of Freedom 4 4 4 4 4 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.23: Multivariate Models of Economic Performance in Asia 
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Paid Employment -0.01 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.15 0.08 0.00 
 
(0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
   
*** 
  
* 
  
* 
  Past Econ. Worse 0.05 0.15 0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.03 -0.05 0.10 
 
(0.08) (0.16) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.24) (0.09) 
 
* 
     
* 
   
* 
Past Fina. Worse 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.12 
 
(0.08) (0.16) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.09) 
           
* 
Pres. Econ. Good 0.25 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.21 0.27 0.05 
 
(0.08) (0.15) (0.08) (0.12) (0.27) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
 
*** 
 
** * 
 
*** *** *** ** *** 
 Pres. Fina. Good -0.05 -0.16 -0.05 0.10 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.06 
 
(0.07) (0.17) (0.07) (0.13) (0.16) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) 
 
* 
  
* 
       Fut. Econ. Better 0.04 0.16 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.07 0.16 
 
(0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.29) (0.09) 
  
* * * 
 
** 
    
*** 
Fut. Fina. Better -0.01 -0.14 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.06 0.11 
 
(0.07) (0.15) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.10) 
           
* 
Model Parameters 
           N: Respondents 1169 306 1310 811 976 921 1098 954 827 1020 812 
Deg. of Freedom 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
 
 329 
Table 8.24: Multivariate Models of Economic Performance in Europe 
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U
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Paid Employment 0.07 0.08 -0.08 0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.18 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.12 0.01 0.02 0.06 
 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) 
 
* * 
      
*** 
      
* 
  
* 
Past Econ. Worse 0.28 0.30 -0.02 0.14 0.32 0.14 0.18 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.16 -0.03 0.11 
 
(0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.18) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.17) (0.05) 
 
*** *** 
 
** *** *** *** 
 
* 
   
*** * *** 
 
*** 
 
** 
Pres. Econ. Good 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.15 0.20 0.03 0.27 0.17 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.24 0.07 0.24 
 
(0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12) (0.06) (0.15) (0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.21) (0.13) (0.24) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.47) (0.05) 
 
*** *** *** *** ** *** 
 
*** *** *** 
   
** * * *** * *** 
Model Parameters 
                   N: Respondents 746 1140 1833 1910 1392 1479 925 1728 2024 1516 1112 1068 1440 1740 1096 946 1929 909 2825 
Deg. of Freedom 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.25: Multivariate Models of Political Performance in Africa 
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Corruption Level -0.04 -0.03 -0.18 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.21 -0.23 -0.45 -0.20 -0.12 -0.09 -0.08 -0.14 -0.28 -0.13 -0.09 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
   
** * * * ** 
 
* *** *** *** *** ** ** * *** *** * * 
Trust Executive 0.15 0.25 0.07 0.29 0.26 0.17 0.16 0.40 0.11 0.08 0.27 -0.14 0.21 0.45 0.38 0.05 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.34 
 
(0.11) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.14) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) 
 
* *** 
 
*** *** ** *** *** ** * *** * *** *** *** 
 
*** *** *** *** 
Trust Judiciary 0.12 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.23 0.05 0.01 -0.13 0.16 0.00 -0.05 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.02 
 
(0.11) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.06) (0.13) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) 
 
* 
   
** 
  
** 
  
* ** 
  
* * 
 
* 
  Trust Legislature -0.02 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.05 
 
(0.11) (0.14) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.14) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.06) (0.13) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) 
       
* * 
   
* 
  
* *** *** 
   Trust Parties -0.16 0.11 0.27 -0.16 -0.07 0.02 0.10 -0.13 0.04 0.14 -0.05 -0.15 0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.05 
 
(0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.14) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) 
 
** 
 
*** *** 
  
* * 
 
** 
 
** * 
   
** 
   Trust Police 0.05 -0.08 0.17 0.21 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.24 0.25 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.07 
 
(0.11) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.06) (0.14) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) 
   
* *** 
    
* * *** *** ** 
 
* 
     Crime Victim -0.12 0.03 -0.10 -0.05 0.04 -0.06 -0.12 0.08 -0.08 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 -0.10 -0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.04 
 
(0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) (0.26) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.08) (0.06) (0.17) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.16) (0.13) (0.11) 
 
* 
 
* 
  
* *** 
 
* 
   
*** 
   
* 
   Model Parameters 
                    N: Respondents 925 580 941 891 987 940 1097 589 810 1008 714 1004 1976 693 1816 913 2027 1041 771 976 
Deg. of Freedom 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.06 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.26: Multivariate Models of Political Performance in Americas 
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Corruption Level -0.10 -0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.13 -0.08 0.02 -0.03 -0.10 0.00 -0.02 -0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.10 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.08 -0.10 
 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
** * 
  
*** * 
  
*** 
  
** 
  
*** * 
   
* *** 
Trust Executive 0.14 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.26 0.19 . 0.29 0.35 0.23 0.32 . 0.28 0.21 0.32 0.25 0.20 0.19 . 0.28 . 
 
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) . (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) . (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) . (0.08) . 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
*** *** *** *** 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
*** 
 Trust Judiciary 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.24 0.20 0.28 0.14 0.16 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.26 0.16 
 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** * * * *** *** *** *** *** * *** ** * *** *** 
Trust Legislature 0.28 0.25 0.13 0.20 0.21 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.26 0.15 0.29 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.26 0.55 
 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
 
*** *** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** *** *** 
Trust Parties 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.20 0.10 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.11 0.32 0.07 0.22 0.27 0.28 0.10 0.11 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.28 0.21 
 
(0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
 
*** *** *** *** * *** *** *** *** *** * *** *** *** ** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Trust Police 0.10 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.24 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.18 0.16 0.10 0.01 0.29 0.09 0.06 
 
(0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
 
** *** ** ** *** *** *** ** *** *** ** *** * 
 
*** *** * 
 
*** * * 
Crime Victim -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.04 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.31) (0.14) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.25) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (-0.30) (-0.20) (0.29) 
 
* 
          
* 
         Model Parameters 
                     N: Respondents 1220 2504 1168 988 1365 1311 1426 1276 2583 1396 1155 1229 1417 1148 1365 1339 1400 1191 1398 1172 1354 
Deg. of Freedom 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 6 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.14 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.27: Multivariate Models of Political Performance in Arab World 
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Corruption Level -0.14 -0.12 -0.18 -0.22 -0.22 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
 
** * *** *** *** 
Trust Executive 0.26 0.18 0.02 0.30 0.19 
 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) 
 
*** ** 
 
*** *** 
Trust Judiciary 0.11 -0.05 0.03 0.11 -0.09 
 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) 
 
* 
  
* 
 Trust Legislature 0.06 0.18 0.24 0.03 0.04 
 
(0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) 
  
** *** 
  Trust Parties 0.14 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.16 
 
(0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) 
 
** 
   
*** 
Trust Police 0.17 0.02 0.11 -0.01 0.06 
 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) 
 
*** 
 
* 
  Crime Victim -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 
 
(0.23) (0.17) (0.42) (0.27) (0.16) 
    
* 
 Model Parameters 
     N: Respondents 754 1015 656 937 827 
Deg. of Freedom 7 7 7 7 7 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.05 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.28: Multivariate Models of Political Performance in Asia 
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Corruption Level -0.21 -0.28 -0.23 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.11 -0.23 -0.21 -0.44 -0.25 
 
(0.05) (0.14) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) 
 
*** * *** ** *** *** ** *** *** *** *** 
Trust Executive 0.37 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.16 0.25 0.16 0.03 -0.11 0.17 
 
(0.08) (0.19) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.21) (0.39) (0.11) 
 
*** 
  
* 
 
** *** *** 
  
*** 
Trust Judiciary 0.06 0.03 0.15 -0.03 -0.08 0.16 0.04 -0.01 0.31 0.38 -0.07 
 
(0.08) (0.26) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.13) (0.10) 
 
* 
 
*** 
 
* ** 
  
*** *** 
 Trust Legislature -0.07 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.22 0.07 0.12 
 
(0.09) (0.19) (0.08) (0.14) (0.17) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.16) (0.26) (0.09) 
 
* 
  
* 
  
** * ** 
 
** 
Trust Parties 0.00 0.18 0.16 0.08 0.11 0.08 -0.06 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.13 
 
(0.10) (0.17) (0.08) (0.15) (0.15) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10) 
   
*** 
 
* * * 
   
* 
Trust Police 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.16 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.19 0.06 
 
(0.07) (-0.30) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.16) (0.15) (0.08) 
   
** ** * * 
   
** 
 Crime Victim -0.04 . -0.03 0.06 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 0.04 -0.07 0.03 0.02 
 
(0.19) . (-0.20) (0.81) (0.24) (0.22) (0.10) (0.16) (0.64) (0.14) (0.17) 
     
** 
 
* 
    Model Parameters 
           N: Respondents 1149 251 1298 735 926 888 1047 1016 779 923 1004 
Deg. of Freedom 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.08 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; (standard errors) 
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Table 8.29: Multivariate Models of Group Memberships in Africa 
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Social Trust 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.20 0.08 0.06 0.34 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.14 
 
(0.16) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) 
 
* * * 
 
*** * * *** ** *** * * 
 
* *** * *** 
 
** *** 
Non-Partisan 0.03 0.07 0.14 -0.06 0.02 -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 -0.11 -0.07 -0.22 -0.10 -0.19 -0.06 -0.22 -0.03 -0.07 -0.14 -0.03 -0.07 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) 
   
* 
  
*** ** 
 
*** * *** * *** * *** 
 
** ** 
 
* 
Non-Religious 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 -0.11 -0.06 -0.04 0.12 -0.02 -0.05 . 0.06 -0.08 0.07 
 
(0.09) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.36) (0.35) (0.28) (0.16) (0.24) (0.25) (0.17) (0.22) (0.74) (85.73) (0.08) (0.13) . (0.20) (0.40) (0.24) 
     
* * 
    
* 
    
* 
  
* * 
Ethnic Majority 0.07 0.09 -0.24 0.33 0.09 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.12 0.00 -0.01 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.13 -0.14 -0.13 0.10 0.08 -0.08 
 
(0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
  
* *** *** * 
   
*** 
  
** *** 
 
*** *** *** * * * 
Religious Majority -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.09 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.16 0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 0.06 0.05 -0.07 -0.05 0.04 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.00) 
    
* 
      
* 
  
* 
 
* * 
   Model Parameters 
                    N: Respondents 1119 783 1136 1102 1044 1095 1133 1008 1112 1137 779 1070 2164 1011 2125 1120 2254 1158 988 1113 
Degrees of Freedom 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 8.30: Multivariate Models of Group Memberships in Americas 
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Social Trust 0.12 0.03 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.19 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.05 
 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
 
*** 
 
*** ** * 
 
*** *** *** ** 
 
*** * ** *** 
 
*** * ** *** * 
Non-Partisan -0.13 -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.09 -0.19 -0.17 -0.11 -0.11 -0.09 -0.02 -0.21 0.01 -0.14 -0.19 0.00 -0.09 -0.03 -0.30 -0.27 
 
(0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
*** *** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
*** 
 
*** *** 
 
** 
 
*** *** 
Non-Religious 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -0.14 0.04 
 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.09) (0.13) (0.21) (0.14) (0.06) (0.06) 
      
* * 
    
** * 
     
* *** * 
Ethnic Majority -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.11 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.31 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 0.05 0.04 -0.04 
 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) 
  
* 
   
*** 
    
* *** 
 
* 
   
*** 
  
* 
Religious Majority 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.05 . 
 
(0.11) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) . 
       
* 
     
* 
 
* ** 
     Model Parameters 
                     N: Respondents 1364 2746 1410 1301 1449 1415 1451 1373 2752 1445 1370 1373 1514 1394 1435 1402 1475 1346 1406 1373 1398 
Degrees of Freedom 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 8.31: Multivariate Models of Group Memberships in Asia 
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Social Trust 0.01 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.16 0.20 0.38 0.26 
 
(0.06) (0.13) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.16) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
   
*** * *** 
  
*** *** *** *** 
Non-Partisan 0.09 -0.08 0.06 -0.18 -0.11 -0.11 -0.07 0.01 . -0.46 0.07 
 
(0.06) (0.13) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.07) . (0.11) (0.07) 
 
*** 
 
* *** ** ** * 
  
*** * 
Non-Religious -0.05 . -0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.12 -0.05 -0.19 0.06 -0.03 
 
(0.09) . (1.03) (0.19) (0.09) (0.17) (0.12) (0.23) (0.11) (0.09) (0.17) 
 
* 
     
* 
 
** 
  Religious Majority 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 -0.09 
 
-0.08 -0.10 0.16 
 
(0.07) (0.13) (0.10) (0.19) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11) . (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) 
       
* 
   
*** 
Model Parameters 
           N: Respondents 1339 345 1529 858 976 1049 1125 1093 918 1027 1306 
Degrees of Freedom 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.04 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 8.32: Multivariate Models of Group Memberships in Europe 
  B
e
la
ru
s 
C
ze
ch
 R
e
p
u
b
lic
 
D
e
n
m
ar
k 
G
e
rm
an
y 
H
u
n
ga
ry
 
Ic
e
la
n
d
 
Li
th
u
an
ia
 
N
e
th
e
rl
an
d
s 
N
o
rw
ay
 
P
o
la
n
d
 
P
o
rt
u
ga
l 
R
o
m
an
ia
 
R
u
ss
ia
 
Sl
o
ve
n
ia
 
Sp
ai
n
 
Sw
e
d
e
n
 
Sw
it
ze
rl
an
d
 
U
kr
ai
n
e
 
U
n
it
e
d
 K
in
gd
o
m
 
Non-Partisan 0.07 -0.06 -0.30 -0.28 -0.13 -0.08 -0.07 -0.18 -0.07 -0.15 -0.12 -0.03 0.04 -0.14 -0.04 -0.20 -0.25 -0.05 -0.14 
 
(0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) 
 
* 
 
*** *** *** * * *** 
 
*** ** 
  
*** 
 
*** *** * *** 
Non-Religious -0.03 -0.07 . -0.14 -0.04 . . 0.13 -0.12 0.03 0.00 . -0.01 0.17 0.06 0.08 -0.10 0.08 -0.09 
 
(0.17) (0.07) . (0.07) (0.07) . . (0.07) (0.06) (0.35) (0.60) . (0.15) (0.13) (0.26) (0.10) (0.19) (0.16) (0.05) 
    
* 
   
* * 
    
** 
    
** 
Ethnic Majority 0.04 0.06 . . . . 0.13 . . . . 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 . . 0.18 0.05 0.00 
 
(0.09) (0.16) . . . . (0.10) . . . . (0.16) (0.09) (0.11) . . (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) 
       
*** 
         
*** 
  Religious Majority 0.10 -0.02 . 0.03 0.03 . . -0.08 . 0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.15 . -0.09 0.09 0.00 
 
(0.13) (0.13) . (0.08) (0.09) . . (0.08) . (0.25) (0.26) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.24) . (0.17) (0.15) (0.05) 
 
* 
                  Model Parameters 
                   N: Respondents 832 1038 1988 1931 1427 1564 965 1790 2039 1607 1106 1114 1517 1779 1112 993 1987 842 2845 
Degrees of Freedom 4 4 1 3 3 1 2 3 2 3 3 3 4 4 3 2 4 4 4 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 
Cells: standardized beta coefficients; (standard errors); * p<0.1, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
         
 
